Foreign policy in global information space: Actualising soft power. by Chong Chia Siong, Alan
1Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: 
Actualising Soft Power
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
by Alan Chong Chia Siong
12 April 2002 
London School of Economics and Political Science
UMI Number: U166535
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U166535
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
If
7979
§9^7 i i f
ABSTRACT
2
The contemporary practice of the internal-external divide in foreign policy is being 
challenged by globalization’s non-territorial logic. This challenge is reformulated as 
information globalization: a border-crossing trend of social exposure to alternative ideas 
jointly precipitated by the global reach of information and communication technologies, 
global capitalism, and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity. The agents and processes 
associated with it confound any orderly delineation of ‘the foreign’. This can be understood 
as an ideational threat to the nation-state in terms of generating a public ‘global information 
space’ that reopens all borders to political struggle. For the nation-state to survive in this 
space, a reformulation of foreign policy as discourse is needed.
This thesis argues that the ideational, in the form of information, is endowed with 
power relations in spite of its abstraction, hence creating a tangible enough ‘target’ for 
‘offence/defence’ by foreign policy. In this regard, information is defined as the socially 
patterned relationship of events and symbols capable of politically inducing action, identity 
or community. Thus ‘soft power’, or the ability to produce outcomes through attraction 
instead of coercion, becomes a central focus of this examination of informational challenges 
to statist foreign policy. Two central research questions are posed. Firstly, how can foreign 
policy defend or project statist political communities using soft power within a global 
information space? Secondly, does soft power, when exercised in turn by non-state actors, 
affect foreign policy by undermining statist community within the same global information 
space? An answer to the first question is to actualise soft power through forms of Leadership, 
whether from ‘Inside-Out’ or ‘Outside-LT, which are derived from domestically proven 
communitarian discourses worthy of emulation abroad. Alternatively soft power can be
exercised by non-state actors to the detriment of state interests through processes I label the 
‘Intermestic Correlation of Forces’, ‘Socialisation’ and the ‘Demonstration of Ideas’. In this 
second hypothesis, foreign policy retains relevance by learning to accommodate itself to the 
demands of external parties with interests in the welfare of domestic political constituencies. 
Exercising soft power in this sense is a conflation of the international and the domestic 
(intermestic) spheres. The case studies of Singaporean and Chilean foreign policies 
respectively provide analytical illustrations of both hypotheses.
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INTRODUCTION: 
A NEW ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN POLICY — THE NATION­
STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INFORMATION
The Conceptual Confrontation Between Nation-State Foreign Policy and Globalization
To define any space as foreign is to demarcate the simultaneous categories of the 
inside and the outside. The state in world history evolved its existence through the consistent 
legitimisation of borders that facilitate the creation of identity, security and welfare for 
inhabitants within them. At the same time, this enclosure of a particular set of goods excludes 
the depredations and burdens of ‘excess’ amounts of people, territory and threats to security. 
This separation of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ has never been static as leaders and populations 
within pre-existing historical states have tried to shift their boundaries according to real and 
perceived ideas of optimum need satisfaction.
Globalization as a concept and late-modern phenomenon threatens the relative 
autonomy of states’ agency in controlling their boundaries. This thesis proposes to treat 
globalization
as a particular set of processes which are caused by autonomous, development- 
oriented and state-produced agents, such as non-state actors and regimes, as well as 
by state-instruments themselves, which result in spatial and temporal transformations 
of nation-state parameters of social power and action, in the course of which 
consciousness of the globe as a whole is intensifying.1
Globalization is thus the becoming of the global due to processes set in motion by the
development of the state towards the total envelopment of terrestrial space into a connected
whole where the identity, security and welfare needs of mankind tend towards a common
problematique inviting common solutions. There is a transformation of problem-solving
space here: ‘the common’ is regarded less viable as the nation-state; it is instead a common
15
space for outsiders, near and far, to legitimise their inputs on functional and ideological 
grounds. The re-territorialisation of the state towards the global began with European 
imperialism, and has been accelerated by developments in political, social, economic and 
scientific innovation.
It was only in the 1990s, particularly with the demise of the Cold War that the tension 
between the global and the jigsaw-like international diversity of nation-state units mounted 
cumulatively and visibly as issues of ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘new nationalisms’, 
‘secessionism’, ‘univernalisation of human rights’, ‘migrant and child labour exploitation’, 
‘illegal immigration’, ‘good governance’, ‘capital flows’ and ‘financial fraud’. These are 
signposts of the tensions wrought by globalization on existing centres of authority and power. 
Inevitably traditional etatiste foundations of foreign policy have become contested in the 
present and will be more so in the future so long as globalization proceeds unrelentingly. To 
survive, foreign policy needs to comprehend the challenge of globalization. At the core of 
globalization lies an ideational foundation, particularly amplified by late twentieth century 
information and communication technologies, in which the globe as a political and 
ideological space comes about when it is produced and reproduced, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, into social modes that privilege the intervention of outsiders in national spheres 
(Waters 1995, 8-10; Spybey 1996, 5-11). In this line of thinking, id^a^hange produces policy 
and activity change; hence existing communitarian modes find their rationale challenged.
It will be argued in this thesis that the ideational is endowed with power relations in 
spite of its abstraction, hence creating a tangible challenge to foreign policy. The
1 Synthesised from Waters (1995, 3), Clark (1997, 1), Robertson (1992, 8) and Held et al (1999, 16).
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conceptualisation of ‘soft power’ as the ability to produce outcomes through attraction 
instead of coercion (Nye Jr. 1990a, 31; 1990b, 166; 1999b, 24-25) is integral to the central 
research question: how can foreign policy defend or project statist political communities 
using soft power to articulate their particular existence in the information space opened up by 
globalization? And as a corollary: how can soft power exercised in turn by non-state actors 
affect foreign policy within the same global information space?
This thesis sets itself apart from most other works in the rapidly mushrooming nexus 
of globalization and International Relations (Luard 1990; Camilieri and Falk 1992; McGrew 
et al. 1992; Scholte 1993; Rosenau 1997a; Clark 1997; Clark 1999; Youngs 2000) by 
addressing the ideational challenge of globalization to the nation-state in terms of ‘global 
information space’. It argues for a reformulation of foreign policy strategy, in terms of two 
soft power foreign policy hypotheses. The working assumption is that operative abstractions 
such as the global are likely to place individuals and their constructed modes of organisation 
under logical strain when they do not conform to centuries-old modes of territorial practice. 
Yet it is equally probable that these same human subjects of strain will be compelled to re­
examine notions of community. Community, in this context, encompasses specifying 
identity, interests and normative existence. By acting to distort the foreign, globalization’s 
special effects may ironically provoke new ways of thinking through complex coalitions of 
identity and interests, or through ever-deepening forms of communitarian bonds against a 
recast image of the foreign. By deductive and interpretative methods, subsequent chapters 
will discuss how globalization-competent foreign policy processes may operate as 
‘leadership inside-out and outside-in’, and as the ‘intermestic politics of foreign policy’. 
Leadership inside-out and outside-in means the translation of domestically-derived practices
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into ideas for foreign policy usage. The intermestic politics of foreign policy refer to the 
making of foreign policy within a complex environment where political inputs can be made 
by other state and non-state actors due to permeable boundaries. These hypotheses take into 
account both the empowerment and weakening of political constituencies by information 
flow and will be illustrated by the cases of Singaporean foreign policy and the Asian Values 
Debate 1992-99, and Chilean foreign policy and the Pinochet Extradition Controversy 1998- 
2000.
Approach and Method: Inquiring the New International Environment for Soft Power 
Foreign Policy
The building blocks behind the foreign policy agency studied in this enterprise are 
‘people’ -  human subjects who possess will, imagination and biases. They seldom function 
as uni-dimensional elements with universally fixed properties. The ‘people’, as the ‘social’ in 
social science, possess a behavioural agency which they may impute to themselves, being 
totally unanticipated by the social scientist.2 This intrinsic affliction of social science is 
treated not by comparing its results against the falsifiability and universal law tests of the 
natural and physical sciences, but by the standard of elementary science. Social science 
stands upon its ability to identify its subject matter, to develop taxonomy out of phenomena, 
and to explain the occurrence of the latter (Lessnoff 1974, 32).
Consider the human elements behind the ingredients of the new international 
environment. The nation-state is built upon the ‘hearts and minds’ of the inhabitants who 
either decide their governance collectively, or in deference to authoritarian elites. Both
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decision-making forms define, on behalf of an imputed general will or other noble sanction, 
the direction and pace of manipulating or closing boundaries of interaction with the foreign. 
Globalization, as defined earlier, is a set of processes that are directly produced by human 
agents, or are indirect consequences of actions by the same. Globalization’s effects in turn 
impact upon practices of the human agents who caused them in the first place. Causality is 
naturally imprecise because the trajectories of nation-states and globalizing processes are 
collective resultants of mass human behaviour. The ‘hearts and minds’ factor in decision­
making is synonymous with the subjective production and interpretation of information for 
planning and acting.
In the light of these human factors, this thesis will employ qualitative analysis, an 
approach aimed at documenting ‘the richness and diversity of meanings people attribute to 
phenomena.’ (Holdaway 2000, 166) In sum, it is an exercise in deduction and interpretation 
to account for the agency of foreign policy vis-a-vis the structures of its environment. 
Deduction will be defined as firstly ‘the action or result of tracing out or setting forth in 
order; a detailed narration or account.’ Secondly, it is ‘the process of deducing or drawing a 
conclusion from a principle already known or assumed;...[and] inference by reasoning from 
generals to particulars.’ (OED 1989, 358) As a close methodological cousin, interpretation 
refers to the explanation of how social reality is constructed and perpetuated. Postmodern 
analysis a la Michel Foucault, Gianni Vattimo and Jean-Francois Lyotard, involving textual 
readings and deconstruction of discourse is included in interpretation (Gubrium and Holstein 
2000).
2 Robert Brown has, for instance, approached this problem by elaborating extensively on the need to compose 
social explanation according to ‘genetic’, ‘intention’, ‘disposition’, ‘reason’, ‘function’ and ‘empirical 
generalization’ categories of social action. (1963,40-44) See also Lessnoff (1974, 33-35), and Devine (1995).
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The task of the next three chapters is to analyse how globalization and its theorising, 
along with information flow, jointly impact upon the statist foundations of foreign policy. 
Chapter 1 will deduce globalization’s ideational threat to the state and indicate the 
inadequacies of mainstream scholarship on globalization in treating its consequences for 
foreign policy. Structuration theory will be introduced to illuminate the relevance of foreign 
policy. Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, as an underlying framework for the whole 
thesis, offers particular advantages in explaining globalization’s impact on statist foreign 
policy because it accounts for how ‘agents’ (i.e. states and other actors) can constitute reality 
while also being affected by the ‘structure’ (i.e. the promoters, processes and outcomes of 
globalization). With discussion of structure, it may seem that structural theories of 
international relations, namely neo-realism and neo-liberalism, may be more germane to this 
project than a foreign policy approach, but it will be suggested later that these miss the point 
in explaining agency. A more focussed deductive account of globalization will be given in 
terms of a three-sided process I call ‘information globalization’. This comprises the global 
reach of information and communication technologies, transnational capitalist surveillance, 
and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity. This is an ideational process with transformational 
impact upon political space, and how the latter organises power. Information enters the 
picture because ideas for organising and deconstructing social reality according to widening 
and permeable frontiers are affecting states’ abilities to justify and exercise power over 
citizens and foreigners. Information globalization’s precise impact upon foreign policy can 
only be evaluated through the former’s spatial transformation of the latter’s borders of 
accountability, that is, the complicating of the confines of foreign policy. Hence, the need for 
a layered analysis of the spatial effects of information globalization in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2 will define information and treat it as power in terms of the components of 
a flow. This is linked to how globalizing agents and processes can transmit, amplify, or 
mutate meanings of security, identity and welfare within every component of a flow: source, 
transmitter, channel, reception, destination and noise. Using a combination of deduction and 
postmodern interpretation, the power possibilities of information proliferate in all 
components. These enable the widest geographical inclusion of actomess in transnational 
politics based upon the generation, or representation, of information for implementing action.
Chapter 3 will then flesh out information globalization’s transformation of 
geographical space, in terms of ‘global information space’, which is to be extrapolated 
directly from the three components of the former. Global information space will be argued to 
be a Hobbesian informational state of nature manifesting the subjectivities of world public 
opinion. In response to the uncertainty of existence within global information space, the 
political and communitarian bases, and the necessity of soft power will be deduced. This is 
the first step in extending Nye’s formulation into specific foreign policy prescriptions.
Chapter 4 will carry deduction to the final stage by joining the discursive power 
implications of information, described in Chapter 2, to the normative international defence of 
identity and community, and to the characteristics of soft power posited in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 will present ‘soft power in foreign policy’ by hypothesising foreign policy as 
primarily strategy through adaptation of foreign policy models from a sub-field of 
International Relations called Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The adaptation of two FPA 
hypotheses will be based on the following criteria. Firstly, the model must be able to
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accommodate and adapt to the contemporary porosity of policy-making and diplomacy in the 
context of multiple sources of information and opinion. Secondly, the model must be able to 
explain the ‘publicness’ of foreign policy-making in terms of the participation of increased 
numbers of players within and outside governments, whether as policy initiators or feedback 
agents. Thirdly, the nature of global information space places the key onus of defending 
security, identity and community on the intellectual foundations of policy-makers.
The Leadership in Foreign Policy model, which stresses the individual and personal- 
idiosyncratic factor (Cemy 1979, 59) in foreign policy decisions, is a natural candidate. The 
policy-maker who ‘conducts’ relations abroad represents a multitude of citizens, or in 
authoritarian regimes, a select elite, and must be able to comprehend their interests 
thoroughly. In doing so, he/she must understand the precise interface between domestic 
stability, and social welfare, with the interests that matter outside his borders. With global 
information space permeating borders, he must be able to process and focus incoming or 
outgoing voices of dissent, indifference, or approval over political issues into a coherent 
diplomacy. Within these general tasks, he has room to exercise visionary leadership and 
accentuate the leadership component of leader-follower relationships. If foreign policy can be 
personalised, it is more likely to be coexistent with a unitary conception of statehood. The 
purposefulness of his existence and that of stateness will be bound up in how he represents 
and defends raison d’etat in terms of identity and community. Leadership strategies will also 
be elaborated as soft power extensions into the literatures of regime theory and ‘epistemic 
communities’. A regime is an implicit or explicit set of rules and norms that govern state 
behaviour internationally, while an epistemic community ‘is a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’ (Haas 1992, 3) In short, both 
the regime and epistemic community ply their respective utility according to the generic 
leadership model where there is issue or policy uncertainty, specialised interpretation of
circumstances is required, and where foreign policy may be engaged in attempts at
institutionalising agendas where prescient expert forecasting and foreknowledge are
imperative. The leadership in foreign policy hypotheses will be translated as
Leadership A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership
Inside-Out Inside-Out by projecting a communitarian base, by its credibility as a
(LIO): source of information, and by targeting an omnidirectional audience.
Leadership A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership
Outside-in Outside-in by exercising political entrepreneurship through international
(LOI): regimes, and by forming epistemic communities.
As it is apparent, the hypotheses to be derived expose foreign policy-making in a 
complex environment. The second set, which I will label the ‘Intermestic Politics of Foreign 
Policy’, assumes that foreign policy is never made in a straightforward manner. It is 
inherently political rather than completely rational. It is firstly characterised by making 
decisions based on pre-emption and bargaining between a large number of alternately 
competing and collaborating constituencies of interest within and across borders. Secondly, 
these entities, which include non-state actors, possess varying degrees of policy convictions, 
which may be ideological. And thirdly, disparities in knowledge of relevant issues exist. 
Even well known phenomenon such as ‘bureaucratic politics’ have mutated in conditions of 
globalization. Decision-making occurs across national boundaries, above and below official 
channels, hence the general enmeshing of the ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ spheres of policy 
into the ‘intermestic’. This is political in every aspect of the struggle to preserve one’s 
agenda intact, if not completely. Lobbying through positive and negative publicity, ‘leak’
campaigns, and national and international legal sanctions are common ways of ensuring 
information, and hence opinion favourable to one’s cause, will be reflected in policy. Chapter 
4 will hypothesise the intermestic foreign policy in terms of
(i) Intermestic 
Correlation of 
Forces (ICF):
The intermestic correlation of forces joining state and non-state 
parties can shape foreign policy change through direct 
mobilisation of ideas, sanctioning standards through global 
regimes, non-state self-constitution of expertise, and 
manufacturing subjective world public opinion.
(ii) Intermestic 
Socialisation (IS):
Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-state actors hold states 
to account through regimes they sign on to.
(iii) Multipolar 
Direct Emulation 
Through 
Demonstration 
(MDED):
Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration occurs 
when states and non-state actors emulate ideas that have been 
proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining particular 
objectives.
Evidently, the range of foreign policy tools involved in all of these hypotheses 
involves the presentation of information for a political purpose. Nye coined the phrase ‘soft 
power’, or the ability to ‘co-opt’ others through the attractiveness of one’s ideas. What is 
different about theorising soft power foreign policy is that it is being regarded here as a 
frontline instrument in a different kind of environment, global information space, where the 
coercive capability of ‘hard power’ instruments such as the military and economic take a 
backseat in influencing opinion. Nye himself notes that soft power becomes prominent only 
in a complex milieu where states are faced with managing economic interdependence, 
dispersal of technology, especially the impact of communications and military technology, 
transnational actors, and shifts in political issues between and among states (Nye 1990b, 160- 
165). Power indices and concentrations are widely diffused in this environment of 
globalization. Over the next few chapters, it will be seen that once power of discourse is 
appreciated, this soft power of ideas either supersedes completely, or at the least, precedes
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the utility of hard power. Conversely in cases where hard power application has been a fait 
accompli, soft power might yet be employed to counteract the former’s degree of impact. 
Nye’s formulation of soft power was elaborated largely for an American audience, and he 
has only made limited references to Japan, China and Singapore.3 In this connection, the case 
studies are partly chosen on the basis that they are geographically diverse, non-American 
illustrations of soft power foreign policy engagements. One is based in Asia, the other in 
Latin America. This will be valuable in extending the analytical validity of the soft power 
concept beyond its largely American genesis.
The selection of the two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 will then illustrate the two 
aforementioned sets of FPA hypotheses, modified with their soft power aspects, within the 
context of global information space. The same three criteria used to qualify the two sets of 
foreign policy hypotheses also qualify these two cases. The first is the Asian Values Debate 
(1992-99) featuring the critical role Singaporean foreign policy played in it. The second is 
the Pinochet Extradition Controversy (1998-2000), involving a trial of Chilean sovereignty 
under mixed state and non-state-actor pressures for a global standard of justice. Each of the 
two countries involved in their respective issues has been historically and progressively 
involved in the evolution of global information space from within their domestic politics. 
Both Singapore and Chile are also representative of weak states with unevenly distributed
3 Nye first raised the concept in a review of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era in Bound to Lead 
(1990a). His passing references to the political weakness of Japanese soft power and China’s susceptibility to 
US soft power are made in “Soft Power” (1990b, 169-170). On the occasion of a 1999 public lecture in 
Singapore, he noted briefly that Canada, the Vatican, the Netherlands, Sweden and Britain were candidates for 
exercising soft power. But he cautioned that proper mastery of soft power required proximity to American­
shaped global norms of liberalism, access to communication channels for framing issues, and credibility based 
on the conformity between national practice and ideas. The first two aspects automatically favoured the US but 
the third remained situation-dependent. (Nye 1999a) On Singapore, he said that its aspiration towards being a 
regional educational hub, and a technologically advanced and innovative society, was altogether improving its 
soft power. However, he cautioned that social control and information restrictions needed to be factored into the 
future strengthening o f soft power.(ST 1999a).
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power assets (Handel 1981, 30-54) linked to and operating within political, economic and 
cultural globalizing processes. Secondly, both countries suffer from the historical condition 
of border porosity. Foreign policy is conducted in an environment of multiple linkages 
between home and abroad in the forms of NGOs, MNCs, academics, political leaders, 
interventions of several foreign governments, as well as intense media scrutiny. All of these 
interactions occur within and reinforce a common global information space. This immensely 
complicates nation-state strategies for ‘winning’ on each issue, and widens the need for 
foreign ministries to employ soft power to earn opinion points.
Thirdly, in their respective foreign policy issues, both countries are faced with the 
clash of ideas across borders. Each of these states is involved in ‘soft’ matters that erode or 
defend identity and welfare. Singapore articulates ‘Asian Values’ as a broad intellectual 
bulwark against a largely American-inspired global strategy of liberal democratisation and 
human rights promotion. Chile’s sovereignty and its fragile democracy are subject to the 
trials of scrutiny arising from the arrest overseas of its controversial ex-dictator and symbol 
of the Right, Senator Pinochet, on charges of violation of the universal human rights of 
Chilean citizens. The charges were jointly filed by an alliance between Chilean and global 
human rights NGOs and a Spanish judge, and at the place of arrest, involved clashes between 
national sovereignty and international law focussed upon the extradition of a person charged 
with crimes against humanity. Ultimately, the nation-state boundary is where this author 
locates the primary foundation of his inquiry, and Fouc^uhi^n discourse analysis will be 
helpful in explaining soft power in articulation of a case for defending foreign policy amidst 
globalizing modernity.
26
CHAPTER 1 
THE THREE SIDES OF INFORMATION GLOBALIZATION
1.1 The Empirical and Epistemological Challenge of Globalization to the Nation-State 
and its Foreign Policy
The notion of ‘community’ is central to the creation of the nation-state and hence 
necessary to briefly revisit in this section in order to elucidate the erosion of foreign policy 
by globalization. Mainstream foreign policy theorists have always defended the importance 
of their focus on grounds that the nation-state’s sine qua non is to guard the common interests 
of those living within its boundaries (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1963a; Frankel 1967; Clarke 
and White 1989). In this regard, foreign policy is a ‘separate and special area of government 
linked to the security and the fundamental values of the state’ which ‘is intended to affect, 
and [ironically] is limited by, factors outside the national political system as well as within 
it.’ (Wallace 1971, 9-10,17)* Security is conventionally understood in material terms of the 
protection of territorial integrity, the right to limit foreign property or other influences 
deemed prejudicial to the overall safety and wealth of the nation-state. A less conventionally- 
labelled set of security concerns, but more popularly invoked in diverse communitarian terms 
by the nation-state, would be abstract bonds such as ‘nation’, ‘society’, ‘national 
sovereignty’, ‘the people’, ‘the culture’, ‘the identity’ or simply ‘way of life’ (Wittfogel 
1957; Strausz-Hupe 1956; P. Anderson 1974; Mann 1986; Weber 1978; A. Smith 1990;
?
Canovan 1996). This is the realm of the ostentatiously ‘domestic’ or ‘national’, and it accords 
‘value’ to nation-states for their human inhabitants. The nation-state as community reinforces 
through definitional circularity an indissoluble link between the membrane of domestic well 
being and the wall of ‘foreign/external security’.
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As a challenge to the nation-state, globalization is analysable in terms of physical 
impact and ideational change. The former involves physical change and boundary-diminution 
and is an empirical account of globalization. The latter refers to how globalization modifies 
philosophical, ideological and policy conceptions of patterns of state units existing on the 
world political and socio-economic map. As will shortly be argued, most globalization 
scholars envisage the marginalisation of the state. Correspondingly, the future of foreign 
policy is thematically irrelevant to them. One should instead ponder national policies 
transiting towards global public policies since globalization threatens to dissolve ‘the 
international’ into ‘the global’. Such views are unsatisfhctory_for presuming that global 
governance is attainable in a linear fashion while ignoring the capacity of states to react 
creatively to globalization without sacrificing raison d’etat.
As an empirical process of change towards porosity of boundaries or their total 
displacement, globalization is often explained in the literature through studies of multiple 
border-spanning technological improvements, interdependence, and the cultural spread of 
capitalism. Technology shrinks distances and borders, whether man-made or natural, and 
initiates a sense of proximity in interaction between individuals and groups of them, such 
groups as the nation-state. Furthermore, expanding forms of technological contact whether 
through trade, or war, compels civilisations and individuals to face up to broadening horizons 
of joint benefit, joint threats, or antagonistic encounters with encroaching foreigners. Most 
historical, transportation and communications derived accounts depict globalization in this
1 See the comparable definitions in Rosenau’s chapter titled “Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area” in his 
autobiographical anthology The Scientific Study o f Foreign Policy (Rosenau 1971, 401-440); and also Jones 
(1979, 74-75).
way (Luard 1990, 189; Robertson 1990,15-30; Camilieri and Falk 1992,1-11; McGrew et al. 
1992, 2-14, 23-26; Scholte 1993, 68-99; Hobsbawm 1995a, 1995b; Foreman-Peck 1998, xiii- 
xvi). In a related set of arguments, connectivity occurs through the consensual identification 
of transborder problems and solutions requiring common standards of conduct. This is 
transactionalism at its most elementary stage. The evidence adduced in support of this view 
ranges from the emergence of the International Telegraphic Union, the transition from formal 
and informal empires in the mid-twentieth century, to the voluntary and involuntary 
induction of independent nation-states into neo-liberal supranational financial and trade 
regimes. To this list, the whole series of environmental conferences, beginning in the 1980s 
where both non-state actors and states played conflicting and complementary roles, are 
included as transactionalism (Mattelart 1994, ch. 1; Carney 1996; Dunning 1997; Rosenau 
1997a; Arts 1998). In the eyes of their proponents, these four examples seem to capture the 
trends of rising collaboration across borders, as well as the concomitant integration of nation­
states into interdependence networks.
The coining of the terms ‘interdependence’, ‘dependence’ and ‘transnational’, while 
useful, lead many to marginalise foreign policy. Interdependence, as Barry Jones clarifies it, 
‘exists for a grouping of two or more actors when each is dependent upon at least one other 
member of [the] group for satisfactory outcomes on any issue(s) of concern/ (Jones 1995, 6) # 
This has developed from the embedded sub-notion of ‘dependence’, which is a condition in 
which an actor’s preferred outcome relies in varying degrees on a preceding or co­
determining outcome in another location or others’ actions. Symbiotic upon these two terms 
is a third in the compositional lexicon of globalization: the ‘transnational’, which means
2 Held et al (1999, 2-10) suggest the alternative triadic framework of ‘hyperglobalizers,’ ‘sceptics’ and
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‘crossing national boundaries’. It was both the multinational, and synonymously 
transnational, business corporation (i.e. MNC/TNC) and other non-state actors that 
popularised the term in the 1960s. These terms connote a blanket threat to the orthodox 
separation of both domestic and foreign policies conducted by states possessing impermeable 
borders and national resources, simply because problems and solutions can now become both 
structure (e.g. environmental pollution and market confidence/panic) and agency (e.g. MNC 
decisions, individual choices, and state-sponsored mercantilistic or competitive trade 
measures).
The political economy writers on globalization go further by positing that capitalism 
is no longer international, and not only cite evidence of transactional threats to the state, but 
also call for a paradigm shift in comprehending global political economy. Kenichi Ohmae is 
the most radical advocate of ‘the cartographic illusion’ and ‘the end of the nation state’ 
(Ohmae 1996; 1990; 1994). From a business studies perspective, the territorial nation-state is 
seen to have outlived its economic utility with the advent of a borderless economy run on the 
four ‘Is’ of investment, industry, IT and individual consumers. These operate globally and do 
business not with nation-state units but with entities of ‘the right size and scale to be the true, 
natural business units in today’s global economy.’(Ohmae 1996, 2-5)3 These may be sub- 
and supra-national in scope, or simply ‘region states’. Ohmae’s ‘region states’ are not strictly 
nation-states but production and market-efficient combinations of states and sub-national 
territories pandering to the needs of commerce. Examples of such combinations include the 
Hong Kong-Southern China nexus, Singapore-Johor-Batam ‘growth triangle’, the Osaka-
‘transformationalists ’.
3 The idea of naturally viable business units replacing nation-states is also embraced by another business school 
thinker Naisbitt (1994). Naisbitt does not resort to the label of ‘region states’ but instead employs the corporate
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Kansai region, the Rhine region around Baden-Wurtemberg, and California’s Silicon 
Valley/Bay area. Susan Strange and David Elkins take this argument to a more sophisticated 
level predicting, firstly, the unravelling of national jurisdictions in political economy, and 
secondly, the capitalist mobility dynamics of privileging investment-sawy MNCs, 
knowledge workers and individual financiers. The latter constitute a global capitalist market, 
developed on the back of the technological revolution in communications in the 1990s, along 
with the transnational division of labour in the post-Cold War era (Strange 1997, 365; 
Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 32-47; Strange 1996, 7-12, 82-87; Sassen 1991, 3-15; 
Elkins 1995, 79-87, 89-94). Additionally, through their study of MNC patterns, Richard 
Barnet and John Cavanagh have contributed the idea of ‘imperial corporations’ running a 
new world order, presumably of economy-centric politics (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994).
The World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank and IMF reports of astronomical 
rises of the ratio of external trade to GDP worldwide, and the year-on-year increase in the 
volume of private capital transactions accentuated by the 1997-99 financial crisis, lend 
statistical credence to these claims of a global political economy with diminished borders. 
The ratio of trade to GDP as a measure of economic ‘openness’ for developing countries 
almost doubled from 22.8% to 38% between 1985 and 1997, while the corresponding figures 
for developed countries were 16.6% to 24.1% respectively (World Trade Organization 1998, 
33). This compares favourably with the ratio of world trade to world GDP of 29% in 2000, a 
year for which the WTO noted the strongest overall production and trade growth since 1990 
in spite of cyclical economic crises (World Trade Organization 2001, 1). Meanwhile, the net 
private capital flows for 1984-89 were US$15.2 billion compared to net official (i.e. inter­
parlance o f ‘downsizing’ to describe the actual and potential dissolution of existing nation-states into small and
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government) flows of US$23.9 billion for the same period; by 1990-96, the pattern was 
reversed with net private flows increasing nearly ten-fold to US$148.1 billion while net 
official flows declined to US$15.3 billion (International Monetary Fund 1998, tab.2). These 
last set of statistics suggest that non-state actors, especially MNCs and individuals, were 
making a larger share of financial transactions. Overall, WTO calculations showed that the 
1990-97 ratio of increases in world merchandise exports to increases in world GDP grew 
from about 1.5 to 3.3. Between 1998 and 1999, taking the 1997-99 financial crisis into 
account, the ratio declined from 2 to 1.5, but the pattern of economic expansion and openness 
is expected to continue over the long term, notwithstanding the economic impact of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US (World Trade Organization 2000, 6, chart II. 1; 
2001,18).
The global political economy thesis is a theoretical displacement of the international, 
and like the previous empirical boundary-shrinkage arguments, suffers from its inattention to 
the detailed impact on foreign policy. The latter is conveniently swept under the umbrella 
prognosis of state decline in purely functionalist and instrumentalist terms. Cultural prefixes 
such as nationality and its association with ethnicity, identity and moral beliefs have so far 
been ignored. A third set of empirical globalization theorists, specifically exploring culture, 
field a range of views about whether culture can be maintained discretely in nation-state 
units, or it must be defined transnationally invoking the terminology of global integration and 
disintegration. For most analyses, a ‘third culture’ perspective may emerge beyond the 
homogeneity-heterogeneity dichotomy.4 In this vein, postmodernist critique can aid inquiry
micro-states in the name of economic efficiency and accountability.
4 The first-ever World Culture Report agrees with such an optimistic analysis. See “General Introduction” in 
UNESCO (1998b, 15-20).
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into the diversity of local and popular discourses arising from domestic state-society 
struggles and how they become projected onto a global plane. (Featherstone 1990, 1-3) 
Contestation becomes the trend in striving for and resisting globalized homogeneous culture, 
as contributions by Roland Robertson (1990), Alain Touraine (1990), Zygmunt Bauman 
(1990), Ulf Hannerz (1990) and Aijun Appadurai (1990) indicate. Appadurai’s reading of the 
complexity of interpreting a unified globality is worth noting in passing as he attributes 
contestation to ‘disjunctives between economy, culture and politics’ in five social ‘scapes’ -  
ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes. (Appadurai 1990, 296- 
301) Trends in economics, politics, ideas and identities exert pulls and counter-pulls of logic, 
straining the nation-state’s territorial legitimacy, producing progress, adaptation and critical 
reaction, and ultimately inducing fragmentation of the verities of national existence.
In a 1996 article, the critical theorist Robert Cox joined the global culture debate by 
introducing ‘civilisations’ as a counter-framework for discussing capitalism, political 
dominance, human rights, marginal communities, communication and knowledge in 
international politics (Cox 1996). Significantly, Cox defined civilisation as a ‘community of 
thought’ instead of territory (Cox 1996, 144). Ultimately, this leads to Huntington’s thesis of 
civilisations-in-rivalry as a defining characteristic of post-Cold War global politics. He 
argues that the politics of global culture are essentially struggles for individual and societal 
identity creation, and endeavours to assess how core civilisational states pursue geopolitical 
civilisational strategies (Huntington 1996, 21). In his grand explanation, there is little 
sustained theorising of specific foreign policy shifts. Nevertheless, this work contains the 
warning that in the ongoing global clash centred on several civilisational core states, values 
transmitted across borders may become social threats. Secessionist inducements to the
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restiveness of social and political milieus of nation-state societies and sub-groups can, for 
example, precipitate cultural ‘fault line wars’ fought out militarily (Huntington 1996, ch. 6- 
11). While this tussle of ideational flows over the culture-territory bind possesses potential 
consequences for foreign policy, this is generally not developed by culture globalization 
scholars to predict foreign policy changes. Instead, they tend to revert to the ‘decline of state’ 
debate, with its indirect implication for foreign policy.
The next group, the grand theorists of globalization, hail from sociological 
backgrounds. Due to their disciplinary training, they do not directly address foreign policy 
debates about state transformation. The majority of these theorists approach the discourses of 
globalization from the point of advanced modernity (Featherstone, Lash and Robertson 1995; 
Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). Among them, the work of Giddens is most representative 
and relevant to the present research. He locates globalization as a consequence of modernity. 
Modernity is assumed to be a radical break from previous practices (Giddens 1990, 2-6). It 
can be analysed in terms of pace, scope and institutional change. Giddens proposes that 
modernity is a set of dynamics operating in three dimensions: the separation of time and 
space, the disembedding of social systems, and the 'reflexive ordering and reordering of 
social relations in the light of continual inputs of knowledge affecting the actions of 
individuals and groups.’ (Giddens 1990,17)5 The notable common emphasis in all three is on 
the power of ideas in transforming modes of life. ‘Time-space distanciation’ literally tears 
space away from time through modem systems of standardised time measurement enabling 
‘relations between “absent” others locationally distant from any given situation of face-to- 
face interaction.’ (Giddens 1990, 18-19; 1991, 16; 1995, 26-48) This is abetted by the
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‘dislocation of space from place’ brought about by the processes of ‘charting’ the globe into 
‘universal maps, in which perspective played little part in the representation of geographical 
position and form.’ (Giddens 1990, 19) It follows that the disembedding of social systems is 
intertwined with time-space distanciation in its ‘“lifting out” of social relations from local 
contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space.’ 
(Giddens 1990, 21-22; 1991, 18)6 Institutionally, disembedding makes possible the 
‘rationalised organisation’ able to command and support activities locally and over great 
distances. ‘Symbolic tokens’, such as money and expert systems, are both modem 
manifestations of disembedding. The last dynamic, reflexivity of examination, effects 
constant modification and reform of social practices under the constitutive power of the 
scrutiny afforded by knowledge flows (Giddens 1990, 38-45; 1991, 20). Modernity is above 
all characterised by its inherently expansionary and flexible processes, defying attempts at 
stability. Globalization is the symptom of an expanding modernity.
Given modernity’s implicit privileging of the extension of human control over nature 
and destiny, these characteristics of globalization translate institutionally into the local 
deepening and horizontal stretching of capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and military 
power in the expansion of nation-state forms of governance. While Giddens does not oppose 
the thesis of the decline of the nation-state, he is ambivalent on the matter, and hence silent 
on the notion of ‘foreign policy’. Many others such as Robertson, Held et al and Jones are 
also ambivalent about the future of the nation-state, and hence of foreign policy, in their 
assessment of the diachronic nature of globalization, that is, globalizing agents and processes
5 This tri-faceted ‘dynamism of modernity’ has also been elaborated in Giddens’ earlier and recently updated 
works, A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism (1995), and Modernity and Self-Identity (1991).
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provoke national reactions resulting in synthetic consequences that do leave some structures 
of nation-states intact (Robertson 1992, ch. 4, conclusion; Held et al. 1999, 55-57, 444-452; 
Jones 2000). To some extent, Giddens, Robertson, Held et al and Jones conclude their 
theorising by leaving the door open for an extrapolation of postmodern consequences for 
nationhood and statehood. This has implications for foreign policy process and power, as this 
thesis will argue.
The other pole of the epistemological group is represented by those espousing 
discontinuist views towards the nation-state. Waters and Albrow predict that the present 
century will see the decline of nationality and stateness due to the long-term trends identified 
by the empiricists, which undermine national legitimacy in functional, materialist and 
identity matters. What is happening locally is the fragmentation of authority, identity and 
other social relationships with global agents and processes claiming individual and sub­
national attention, material and spiritual support. Culture may be commodified along with 
fragmentation, but like all social fields, it is open to reflexive remaking in virtual and 
selective forms (Waters 1995, 159-161; Albrow 1996,4,140-162).
The preceding tour of the empirical and epistemological challenges of globalization 
theorists against the viability of the nation-state still falls short of answering the question of 
what happens to foreign policy under globalization. The existing literature is heavily 
obsessed with macro analyses of nation-state viability, even where ambivalence towards the 
nation-state exists. It is all too simple for many writers to forecast the dissolution of the
6 In his neo-ideological work, The Third Way: The Renewal o f Social Democracy, Giddens summarises 
globalization-as-modemity primarily as being ‘about the transformation of time and space in our lives. Distant 
events, whether economic or not, affect us more directly and immediately than ever before.’ (1998, 31)
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‘international’ into the ‘global’. They subsume foreign policy under networks of 
‘multilayered governance’ in an incompletely globalized international order comprising 
mixed actomess of states, non-state actors and international organisations. The same 
obsession with macro-analyses of the nation-state’s fate within a nascent ‘global governance’ 
occurs with preliminary attempts to study globalization from an International Relations 
perspective (Luard 1990; Camilieri and Falk 1992; Scholte 1993; Rosenau 1990, 1997a; 
Clark 1999; Youngs 2000). To some extent, an IR approach to globalization is fatefully 
coloured by the multiplicity of international organisations and non-state actors as agents, or 
by the post-Cold War fluidity. The ‘complex interdependence’ of the 1970s did not witness a 
significant loss of boundary control, due to the Cold War. Today many forms of power, along 
with ideological differentiation, proliferate in a non-bipolar international order, allowing new 
sub- and transnational spaces for manoeuvre and political constituency within a global frame. 
In this regard, the culture, interdependence and transactional dimensions conveyed by the 
empirical globalization literature is useful in illuminating how and what foreign policy needs 
to adapt to. At the same time, the grand theorists’ notions of stretching, variety, and the 
intensification possibilities for social relations across time and space can usefully contribute 
to analyses of one’s community and its corresponding ‘foreign’ sphere. Borders can be 
treated as obsolescent if global governance means a domestically patterned world state, but 
not if a broad ‘global society’ of mixed state and non-state authorities still obtains, as is 
presently the case (Shaw 1994). In this regard, this thesis ought to render a satisfactory 
account of how the empirical transactional challenge to the nation-state occurs in terms of 
information flow shaping practices, and to relate this to a set of corresponding spatially based 
epistemological understandings of globalization. Media flows, capitalist information
7 This phrase is frequently used by Held et al (1999). Rosenau’s (1997a) ‘multicentric’ and ‘bifurcated’
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practices and post-Cold War fluidity are elements for a reformulation. The preceding survey 
strongly suggests a structure and agency problematique as to what globalization is about and 
how states, international organisations and non-state actors relate to it. To further understand 
how globalization affects foreign policy, it is now useful to introduce structuration theory as 
the underpinning of this thesis.
1.2 Structuration Theory and Globalization
The critical problem facing social scientific research is the explanation of causality: 
does the actor act autonomously, or does its environment shape its actions? Conversely, does 
the actor transform its environment in order to produce its actions? These three extreme 
positions indicate the ‘agency-structure problem’ that had long exercised social theory, but it 
was only in the late 1980s that IR theorising began to examine it seriously (Wendt 1987; 
1999, ch.4; Onuf 1989). Most of these scholars cite Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory as 
the main inspiration, hence the need to consider it here.
Giddens, in the book setting out his most detailed exposition of structuration, supplies
a stronger reason relating more directly to my claim that globalization is a trial of
representations: social science theories tend to be partly derived from pre-existing ideas held
by agents which they analyse, and after ‘theory’ is cast, the ideas gain currency and tend to
lose their original quality. Giddens suggests that
the notion of sovereignty and associated theories of the state were stunningly new 
when first formulated; today they have in some degree become a part of the very 
social reality which they helped to establish. (Giddens 1984, xxxiv)8
governance is similar.
8 Associated structurationists include Luckmann (1967) and Bernstein (1978).
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The enigma of locating causality lies somewhere between governing practices across time, 
and the agents of transmission or origination.
Structuration theory, according to Giddens posits that:
The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of 
phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality 
of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome 
of the practices they recursively organise. Structure is not ‘external’ to individuals: as 
memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more 
‘internal’ than exterior to their activities...Structure is not to be equated with 
constraint but is always both constraining and enabling...Structure has no existence 
independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day 
activity. Human agents always know what they are doing on the level of discursive 
consciousness under some description. However, what they do may be quite 
unfamiliar under other descriptions, and they may know little of the ramified 
consequences of the activities in which they engage. (Giddens 1984, 25-26)
Agents are assumed reasonably to be rational and conscious actors exercising power in
pursuit of parochial or collective ends while also reflexively monitoring their actions during
and after their commission. This reflexivity is produced by matching internal and prior
expectations with the results of actions, whether intended or unintended, so as to constrain, or
enable, amendments to ongoing or future actions (Giddens 1984, 7-10). Structure enters
causality when one asks how far the actors’ rational pursuit of interests, and the existence of
internal and prior expectations came about, although it may be possible that the relevant
actors wholly originated their causalities. This understanding of structure plays centrally in
Michel Foucault’s understanding of the power of discourse construction (Foucault 1997),
which will be used later to extend soft power explanations.
As an illustration, consider how the total originality of causation imputed to the agent 
is put in doubt when one tries to explain the foreign policies of nation-states that initiate 
regional and international regimes. The founding of the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, the Non­
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aligned Movement and the UN could be traced chronologically to a handful of core states. 
However, the lineage of ideas inspiring the norms and procedures of cooperation are more 
complicated: the balance of Westphalian influences and liberal internationalism will have to 
be weighed against geographical and idiosyncratic factors. Furthermore, the actual behaviour 
of member states with respect to any regime’s formalities depends on leaders’ and citizens’ 
interpretations of universal permissibility and expedience. Examples of structuration within 
interstate cooperation include the selectivity of commitment by UN members to humanitarian 
interventions, the speed of EU enlargement, and mixed signals about the applicability of free 
trade arrangements within Southeast Asia.
Structure accordingly refers to organised sets of rules and resources
allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it 
possible for discemibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time 
and space and which lend them ‘systemic’ form. (Giddens 1984,17)
Structure as sets of rules and resources need not be formalised in institutions. It could be like
international regimes where both informal and formal rules and norms can coexist. And
where agents act consciously or unconsciously upon these rules and resources, they
reproduce, or even transform the ‘system’ of relations among them. This is structuration in
operation, and it is only to this extent that this thesis shares a constructivist approach.9
Structuration theory offers a way of thinking about globalization as an environmental 
factor which has been driven along by state and non-state actors, and which subsequently 
impacts upon them by generating global spaces that challenge representations of community.
9 Wendt (1999, 23-29) for example offers two sets of constructivist possibilities -  material-ideational and 
individualism-holism -  all of which are extrapolated from agency and structure, which ontologically 
complicates practical foreign policy research, and hence is beyond this thesis’ scope.
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This thesis will attempt to theorise a revamped concept of agency for foreign policy and its 
non-state aspirants by first outlining the ideational threat of globalization at the end of the 
Cold War. Here, it is useful to bear in mind the agency-structure intermeshing of information 
capabilities, capitalist globalization, and post-Cold War ideological fluidity in the 
information globalization process.
1.3 Information Globalization as a Confluence of Technology, Economics and the Post- 
Cold War Disorder
Transnational information flow is both structure and agent of the rubric of 
transactionally evolved globalization, as well as a trend making its presence felt specifically 
in the 1990s. Information flow affects states through time-space distanciation and a 
compression of geography effected cumulatively in the form of technological progress, 
economic extension and changes in the political environment. No one set of factors acts 
autonomously. They overlap and pull each another towards a confluence of power of 
geopolitical change. In this sense, this thesis is premised upon a social understanding of 
technology. It is assumed that technology is the concrete application of abstract scientific 
solutions to socially-articulated problems and needs,10 and that an insatiable human ‘appetite 
for convenience, comfort and entertainment products and services, as well as for means to 
overcome natural barriers like geography and travel time, creates a constant pull on 
technology.’ (Mayo 1985, 7)11 This must however be qualified as a general truth simplifying 
the actual empirical complexities of change.
10 Adapted from Sussman (1997,18-19).
11 A perspective supported by McLuhan (1974), Ellul (1964), Mumford (1967), Benthall (1976), R. Williams 
(1990, 9-31) and Winston (1998,1-15).
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The occurrence of ‘information globalization’ is explainable as the resultant of the 1 
tugging and heaving of both the ‘pull’ of society and the ‘push’ of technological capability. 
These pull and push dynamics are evident in the following three trends which may be 
identified from the general interpretation of globalization in Section 1.1, and supplemented 
- by political trend analysis, to comprise information globalization: (1) media technology has 
cumulatively and significantly enhanced the reach of information flows over the past 
century-and-a-half according to social necessity; (2) the globalization of capitalism in tandem 
with the advances of media technology has driven the penetration of information flows 
worldwide and correspondingly increased the scrutiny and visibility of both existing and 
hitherto underexposed interlinkages of political, social and economic activity; and (3) the 
termination of the Cold War represents a culminating point in the development of the 
ideologically-diverse Westphalian international system.
1.3.1 Information and Communication Technologies as Global Connectors
10In a structural sense, information and communication technology is the quintessence 
of bridging time and space (Kellerman 1993; Mattelart 1994; Mowlana 1997, xi-xvii, 7-8). 
The following narrative traces the technological trajectory of communicating social patterns 
towards a global frame. Communication sociologist Harold Innis has identified a critical link 
between the history and shape of political empires and their prevailing modes of
12 ‘Information and communication technologies’ (henceforth, ICTs) encompasses the full range of transmission 
and reception forms ranging from writing on stone and papyrus to the Internet and communications satellites. 
ICT thus overlaps with some authors’ reference to ‘media technology’ which covers only conventional 
broadcast media such as radio, newspaper and television. The term ‘ICTs’ not only admits some scholars’ 
differentiation o f information technologies (IT) as computers and storage disks, but also acknowledges the 
intensified possibilities of computers merging with communication forms like the telephone, modem, radio, 
television, video and satellite. Consider for instance, the Internet-linked interactive television, and ‘text 
messaging’ on mobile phones.
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11communication. In his study of the premodem history of the West and Near East, Innis
showed that there were two types of media at work: those emphasising time (parchment,
clay, stone), and those emphasising space (papyrus and paper). The former were relevant to
the construction of architecture and sculptural manifestations of control, while the papyrus
and paper forms, being lighter and less durable, were suited to administration and trade.
Although it is difficult to pin down the exact effects of a medium on its host civilisation, that
is, separating precisely the push and pull factors, owing to the medium influencing scholarly
appraisal by itself, Innis posits the working hypothesis that the concept of empire waxes and
wanes according to the ‘efficiency of communication’ (Innis 1972, 7-9). What mattered to
political control at any centre was the ability to consolidate the symbolic expression of
individual human experience and hence, of allegiance, in its train. The media of time
extended men’s minds beyond the ‘range of remembered things’ and the media of space
increased the ‘range of known places’. Writing carried on both types of media ‘enhanced a
capacity for abstract thinking’ and the language of oral tradition became physically
interpreted into written word of authority (Innis 1972, 10). In this way, a recorded form of
‘extended social structure’ became a recognisable bond between ruler and ruled. The
implications were that
[t]he sword and pen worked together. Power was increased by concentration in a few 
hands, specialization of function was enforced, and scribes with leisure to keep and 
study records contributed to the advancement of knowledge and thought. The written 
record signed, sealed, and swiftly transmitted was essential to military power and the 
extension of government. Small communities were written into large states and states 
were consolidated into empire. (Innis 1972,10)
At a later stage in the recovery of Europe from the dark Middle Ages, the Gutenberg printing
press might well be appended to the sword-and-pen formula. In fact, Benedict Anderson has
13 Innis’ ideas are relevant to the ensuing exposition not just for his treatment of parchment, paper and stone as 
early mass media, but also for his ‘ecological holist’ approach to enriching the study o f international relations
documented evidence of the origins of many nationalisms in print media (B. Anderson 1991, 
ch. 2-5).
The groundbreaking reach of stone, paper and printing was emulated, intensified and 
diversified with the advent of electronic and electronically reliant media. Media theorists 
Ithiel de Sola Pool, John Thompson, and Lofti Maherzi in the UNESCO World 
Communication Report, along with a US Department of Commerce Report, have variously 
coined this the ‘global flow of mass media’ (Pool 1990, 34-39, 71-72),14 the ‘globalization of 
communication’ (Headrick 1991, 6-9; Thompson 1995, 149-159; Maherzi 1997, 12-13, 77)15 
and the ‘globalization of the mass media’ (US Department of Commerce 1993, 4). What is 
particularly striking about this stage of development is the striving for a means of 
accelerating information flow beyond the limitations of physical transportation. The key 
politico-economic and scientific challenge after the Renaissance was to surpass the runner, 
horse and sail in connectivity. Most media theorists have seen globalization as a trend 
towards flows defying boundaries and a technology-engendered consciousness of shared 
human existence on the globe (Pool 1990, 71; Mattelart 1994, vii-xi; Thompson 1995, 150; 
Maherzi 1997, 77), which overlaps with this thesis’ working definition of globalization. The 
properties of electricity are overwhelmingly responsible for driving the technological
by explaining historically, time and space biases in the evolution of empires and civilisations. (Deibert 1999)
14 Journalist Frances Caimcross (1997) has offered the alternative term the ‘communications revolution’ to 
describe the basic idea that location will no longer matter for business and society in an age of fibre-optic 
networks and digital compression in communications.
15 Other communication scholars have situated media technology within globalization by positing that media 
structures, processes and audiences are undergoing ‘transnational horizontal integration.’ (Srebemy- 
Mohammadi et al. 1997, xiii).
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capabilities powering the next three broad phases in which media ‘networked’ a global frame 
of social and political action into being.16
The first phase began with the invention of the electric cable telegraph and the 
concurrent development of submarine and overland cable networks. The social demand 
operated in the two forms of railway safety and the needs of an emerging economic practice 
of stock exchanges, both beginning in the early 1800s (Ellis 1954, 90, 147-149; J.M. Scott 
1972, 8-16; Headrick 1991, 11-12). Steam trains embodied speed but this also introduced the 
need for managing the operation of such vehicles on single-track systems, and in tandem 
with stopping safely and punctually at the stations they served. The numerous accidents 
involving trains inspired telegraph amateurs such as W.F. Cooke, Charles Wheatstone and 
Edward Davy to experiment with new methods of signalling along railway lines and between 
stations (Winston 1998, 23). From another direction, capitalism in the form of the stock 
exchange required timely information about commodities’ and manufactures’ demand and 
supply conditions abroad, and shipping movements at ports. In the 1830s, pigeons had been 
resorted to, to facilitate transactions and news traffic between Paris, Brussels and French 
provincial cities (Headrick 1991, 12). Not surprisingly, following the patented breakthroughs 
of electric telegraph lines by Cooke and Wheatstone in Britain and Samuel Morse in America 
in 1837, it was largely the business elites who bankrolled large scale ventures to deploy 
electric cable systems, followed belatedly by the British and American governments. The 
latter were keen to support strategic developments in commerce and communication (A.C. 
Clarke 1992, 35-96). Overland cable-laying spread easily having been presaged by the 
Cooke-Wheatstone railway trials and Morse’s famous 1844 Baltimore-Washington line, but
16 This organisation of the history of ICTs is broadly adapted from Thompson (1995, 152) and Pool (1990, 71-
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overseas networks took longer owing to the technical difficulties of coping with the electrical 
and physical properties of the sea and the initial sluggishness of government support (A.C. 
Clarke 1992, 91-94).
The prospects of circling the globe changed dramatically when military and political 
considerations entered the picture. The cumbersome use of fires and other line-of-sight 
signalling systems could now be superseded. By the 1850s, France seized upon the telegraph 
line as a tool for communicating with her administration and settlers in Algeria and 
consolidating her hold on North Africa. Conversely, cutting telegraph cables proved to be 
critical in defeating the enemy in the 1861-65 American Civil War. In the Crimean War of 
1854-56, the British and French decided that the initial 20-day message transmission period 
from metropole to frontline using a combination of telegraph and physical despatch was 
unacceptable. It was decided to effect near-continuous telegraphic transmission from the 
Austrian terminus of Bucharest right up to the Crimea including a section of cable under the 
Black Sea (Headrick 1991, 16-17). Cable communications now reduced message 
transmissions from months, weeks and days to hours and minutes.
To Innis’ formulation of communications expansion as ‘sword and pen’, one can add 
the electric telegraph network, and along with it, the explosion of demand and supply of 
news to be carried across vast distances. News is the grist to the mill of media technology 
and constitutes our second and concurrent phase of media globalization. ‘News’ by most 
accounts is a derivative of capitalist economics: it drew its own demand indirectly through 
financial and commercial speculative activities (J.M. Scott 1972, 30-63). It was reliant upon
100).
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the electric telegraph for speed, and in turn almost single-handedly financed the operation of 
the telegraph networks after the railway became eclipsed overnight by electric non-alphabetic 
signal systems (Winston 1998, 27-28). In the 1830s and 1840s three ‘international news 
agencies’17 were set up respectively in Paris, London and Berlin. Each initially attempted to 
cover the world independently for their nationally and regionally located financial clients but 
rivalry proved damaging and by 1870, an ‘inter-agency division-of-labour’ agreement was 
reached. Britain’s Reuters covered exclusively British-controlled territories and the ‘Far 
East’ whilst retaining special access to the US through partnership with Associated Press. 
The French Havas (subsequently Agence France-Presse) covered French colonies, Italy, and 
the Iberian Peninsula, while South America was ‘shared’ with Reuters. The German Wolff 
agency did Austria, Scandinavia and the Russian Empire. Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, smaller rivals emerged on the scene, and by the end of World War One, the 
Americans entered the market in strength with both Associated Press and United Press 
Association (subsequently United Press International).
The politics of oligopoly operated to manage competition and keep the profit pie 
stable throughout this time, and the respective market dominance of each agency was tied 
precariously to the tides and fortunes of the major imperial powers of the day (Boyd-Barrett 
1980, 117-120; Read 1992, 53-62, 168-176; Thompson 1995, 154-156). After 1945, the ‘Big 
Four’ — Reuters, Associated Press, United Press International and Agence France-Presse — 
dominated the non-communist world while TASS and Xinhua serviced the Soviet and
17 This term is strongly associated with Oliver Boyd-Barrett (1980) who assigns it to primarily four western- 
based news agencies that evolved from their national origins to ‘not only collect news from most countries and 
territories of the world, but also distribute news to most countries and territories.’ (p. 14). Subsequently Boyd- 
Barrett has argued that in discussing the global media organisation and the globalization o f news, ‘the 
connections between news agencies, national formation and globalization are more profound and have a more 
substantial history than has been recognized up to this point in time.’ (Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998,1)
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Chinese Communist political orbits. Newsgathering around the world was naturally 
expensive and logistically demanding in terms of staffing bureaus and experience, and 
furthermore it was interlinked with the economic centres of demand, which often coincided 
with the political centres (Boyd-Barrett 1980, 31-52; 1998, 19-34). With decolonisation and 
the expansion of the nation-state membership after 1945, the Third World and non-aligned 
intergovernmental lobbies painted the ‘Big Four’ into the generic target of western 
neocolonialism and accused them of perpetrating a ‘bad news syndrome’ about national 
conditions in the developing world, ‘cultural aggression’, and sustaining an inequitable world 
economic order (Righter 1978, 12-48; A. Smith 1980, 68-110; Pavlic and Hamelink 1985; 
Alleyne 1995).
While newsmaking, or newsgathering, was continuously augmenting increased social 
demand for technology and driving towards globalization of reporting, corresponding 
capability revolutions were occurring rapidly in the wake of the telegraph and cable. The 
escalating science of electromagnetics now swung wide open the technological possibilities 
for a whole host of associated applications. This third phase of ICT globalization is ushered 
in by the telephone, radio, television, microchip, computer and the space satellite, spread 
slightly over a century from the invention of the electric telegraph. Alexander Bell’s 1876 
telephone patent, for instance, occurred a decade after the first transatlantic telegraph cable 
had been successfully laid and the electric telegraph had taken firm root in business practices. 
Yet, for years afterward, it encountered social resistance from sections of elite opinion which 
feared moral degeneration with mass access to voice communication, and there were only a 
few things the telephone could better the telegraph at, apart from reproducing less-than high- 
fidelity sound in place of Morse code (Winston 1998, 59-60).
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Radio was exceptional by comparison at the beginning of the twentieth century. It 
‘sold’ itself as ‘wireless telegraphy’ initially and answered a twin naval need for long­
distance communications beyond line-of-sight in the era of the ironclad warship, along with 
general maritime safety (Herring and Gross 1936, 76-80; Baker 1970, 36-60; Headrick 1991, 
116-117). Not long after, telephone and microphone technologies were enterprisingly hitched 
to radio to give meaning to the term ‘broadcast’ by 1922. Furthermore, radio operated within 
invisible airwaves and breached the point-to-point limitations of cable for reach and area 
coverage. Creating its social utility via mass home entertainment, and battlefield applications, 
was not difficult.
Television, not unlike radio, also worked on wireless multi-point transmission and 
reception principles. Between its trial broadcasts in the mid-193Os and its large-scale 
consumer adoption in the early 1950s beginning in America and Europe, the prime obstacle 
was largely the quality of its picture content and lack of colour (Winston 1998, 119-125). 
The parallel research undertaken after 1945 into signal conductors that culminated 
chronologically in the transistor and integrated circuit, enhanced telephone, radio and 
television quality immeasurably in terms of speed, clarity and range of spin-off utilities. 
Portable recording formats such as cassette tapes, vinyl records and digital discs further 
served to supplement existing electromagnetic communication on all individual, social, 
military, political and commercial bases. By the mid 1960s, rocket science married to the 
prevailing state of electronic communications, had produced the commercially viable geo­
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stationary communication satellite which afforded limitless global roaming potential for 
electronic information flows for the first time in history.18
Paralleling all these developments is the revolution in automated computational and 
information storage and retrieval systems beginning in the interwar years. Initial prototype 
computers were large and catered to scientists performing research-based complex 
calculations, or more widely to military uses in encryption, decipherment and ordnance 
trajectory calculations. Computers also aided the Hydrogen Bomb project. With the arrival of 
the transistor chip and its progenies, the computer was finally downsized and made available 
for business users and the home (Winston 1998, 166-240). The electronic chip (microchip), 
starting with the ‘transistor’, was effectively to complement and integrate itself into all forms 
of ICTs by the 1980s. The logic of miniaturised computing, represented through storage, 
calculation and dissemination functions via cable, portents centralisation and decentralisation 
possibilities in stages or in simultaneity. Software enables ‘work’ at home, office and 
between distanced points of production and consultation (Robins and Webster 1988, 49-57; 
OECD 1996, 10-11). The idea of networking computers subsequently imitated the telegraph 
in many ways, and first underwent military communications experiments by the US Defense 
Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency from 1969 onwards before gaining 
sufficient technological momentum as a viable commercial spin-off. Networked computers 
as a civilian tool began with electronic bulletin boards in the universities in the 1970s. This 
experiment was then hitched to the mass utility of the personal computer, finally attracting
18 Incidentally, satellite technology visionary Arthur C. Clarke claims that the 1964 Tokyo Olympics was the 
first attempt at live global television transmission via space, occurring seven years after the USSR launched the 
world’s first experimental satellites -  the Sputnik series. (1992, 197-198) INTELSAT corporation however 
claims that its satellites formed the first complete global satellite communication system in 1969 and which 
allowed the worldwide television coverage of the Apollo moon landing that year (INTELSAT 1999). In October
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business attention in the early 1990s in the form of the Internet (Tapscott 1996, 17-23; 
Winston 1998, 323-336). The Internet, as its name suggests, is a network of networks (or 
‘webs’) of computers organised spatially. If this third phase can be considered to be sharply 
distinct from the first two ICT globalizations, it is that ICTs were forging geographical reach 
from an already advanced base in the form of the principles of electric encoding of 
information, and that its overall amplified volume and quality of transmission, channel and 
reception resulted as much from inter-technological hybridisation and fusion, as from 
technological displacement and self-improvement. Socially demanded connectivity now 
became faster, carried more volume, and delivered improved sight and sound clarity.
Statistically, global ICT audience reach over the past decade and a half in all three 
basic forms of modem mass media —  daily newspapers, radio receivers and television 
receivers —  has increased. Judged against steady declines of illiteracy rates across the globe 
(UNESCO 1999a, fig. 2), UNESCO statistics for daily newspaper circulation rates among 
developing countries nearly doubled from 37 per 1,000 inhabitants to 60 between 1980 and 
1996, while among the developed countries, there was a decrease from 363 to 226. The latter 
decrease must be viewed against the rise in penetration rates of electronic media. Using the 
same illiteracy decrease as a backdrop, radio receiver availability showed significant 
improvement for both developing and developed countries in the period 1980-96: among the 
former, 120 receivers per 1,000 inhabitants had more than doubled to 244; among the latter, 
880 receivers per 1,000 inhabitants had increased to 1,056. Most dramatic however, was the 
rise in television receiver accessibility over the same period: for developing countries, it was 
almost a fivefold increase from 27 per 1,000 inhabitants to 154; among the developed
1998, according to one industry survey, 48% of the “Space Market” was occupied by telecommunications
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countries, a relatively saturated ratio of 424 per 1,000 inhabitants increased to 545 (UNESCO 
1999a,TV-3, IV-4, IV-8 -  IV-10, tab. IV.S.l, IV.S.3). Assuming that television broadcast is 
the most preferred, easily-comprehended and sense-pervasive form of mass media in terms of 
its fusion of visual and audio symbols within transmission and reception capabilities, it is 
also significant that geographically, large parts of the Third World such as Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, South Africa and Malaysia, have seen television 
receivers increase by some 223% between 1980 and 1996, while Egypt, Oman, India, 
Mongolia and Thailand have registered impressive increases of between 816% to 2,145% 
over the same period. China, the most populous country, showed a staggering 4,889% 
expansion! Although this was from a low base, the pace of change is still striking. Among 
other countries with fairly large populations, Russia, Indonesia and Zambia caught up with 
145% to 184% increases.19 Meanwhile, large Latin American states such as Argentina, Chile 
and Brazil, along with Saudi Arabia, maintained a fairly high television density of 100-349 
receivers per thousand inhabitants. By 1996, the US had also set a new ceiling of 751-1,050 
receivers per thousand inhabitants.
These figures ought to be read in conjunction with the last major worldwide statistical 
survey of non-indigenous television programme content published in the mid-1980s. 
Assuming that the importation of television programmes constitutes a major index of global 
information flow, it is significant that such non-indigenous programmes constituted an 
average ‘one-third or more of total programming time’ in a survey of 69 countries, of which 
two-thirds were Second and Third World members. With the exception of America’s low of
utilities (Futron Corporation, 1998).
19 All percentages calculated from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1998. (UNESCO 1998a, Tables 9.2) The 
comparison year chosen is 1996 because it conforms to the latest and most consistent media statistics available
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2% of foreign content, the then-USSR and China’s 8%, and India’s 11%, all others generally 
ranged between 30-60% in terms of screening of imported programmes (Varis 1984, 146- 
147). All these percentages are likely to have increased throughout the 1990s given the 
worldwide trade expansion in intellectual property, entertainment and cultural products (US 
Department of Commerce 1993). As an interim indication, the UNESCO World Culture 
Report 1998 reported that in terms of percentage of imports in total films distributed, for both 
television and cinema, the national average was 79%, with the US importing more than in the 
1980s, at 22%, while at the extreme, Chile registered 100% imports (UNESCO 1998b, 168, 
graph 9).
To further buttress the statistical argument for a global audience reach using 
television as a representative mass media, the capabilities of Cable News Network (CNN) 
can be sampled as the advent of global media agents. Starting out with an aspiration towards 
24-hour cable-only news provision for a lucrative American audience, the company realised 
by the mid-1980s, that it was profitable to gamble on going global. Its corporate chief, Ted 
Turner, seized upon both the expansion of world trade linkages and its concomitant need for 
up-to-date information. Furthermore, inspired by the non-western world’s New World 
Information and Communication Order-New International Economic Order (NWICO-NIEO) 
arguments about biased and exclusionary practices by western media, his fledgling CNN 
adroitly exploited a commercial opportunity with its World Report newsgathering and 
broadcast format (Flournoy and Stewart 1997, 2-3, 16-20). CNN undertook to provide 
broadcasters resident anywhere in the world with an opportunity to present news of their 
societies from within their national contexts, or from their point of view. In return, CNN
for the two country studies at the time o f writing. This edition o f the Yearbook provides two detailed coloured
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would be committed to transmit these stories unedited and uncensored through its various 
channels or rebroadcast them on its other affiliated networks, while at the same time 
respecting the rights of the original local broadcaster to use or re-use their contributed CNN 
material, and actively encouraging them to do so. Subsequently, these contacts enabled the 
company to expand its pool of overseas ‘on-the-spot’ correspondents. CNN’s partnerships 
with assorted local media enabled it to obtain the news-breaking edge over rivals in major 
crises in Libya (US retaliatory air strikes), China (Tiananmen), the former Soviet Union, 
Iraq-Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm, the civil strife in Somalia and Bosnia and so on. 
Simultaneously, it allowed broadcast agencies from some 141 countries, such as those of 
Venezuela, Belize, Cuba, Czech Republic, Croatia, Turkey, Cameroon, South Africa, India 
and China opportunities for transmission on its news channels (Flournoy 1992, 7-15; 
Flournoy and Stewart 1997, 33-52; CNN World Report 1999). CNN’s relationship with 
authoritarian China deserves particular mention: the state-controlled China Central 
Television signed up to World Report when it learnt about CNN’s non-censorship policy, and 
according to a CNN editor, ‘takes two hours of World Report every week and turns it around 
and broadcasts it out on the local stations.’20 Increasingly, local stations in various Chinese 
regions are doing programme tie-ups with CNN to facilitate local English practice.
In 1999, CNN International claimed an audience of 138 million television households 
in more than 210 countries and territories through a network of 23 satellites providing 
regional coverage for all inhabited continents, while CNN World Report itself is estimated to 
reach an additional 260 million households via national broadcast affiliates (CNN 
International 1999; CNN World Report 1999). This, of course, does not even include the
maps for comparisons between 1980 and 1996.
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extent of visits to its Internet news-sites. The network also stakes its reputation on having 
pioneered the first global ‘interactive news show’ with live phone-in, fax and email questions 
entertained on air (CNN advertisement 1999). The multiplier factor in CNN’s viewership is 
probably more substantial than existing statistics suggest, considering its programming and 
marketing format, and that ‘households’ do not exclude neighbours, visitors and community- 
based viewing. CNN’s capabilities are a trailblazer for its competitors such as BBC-World, 
and potentially the Arab Al-Jazeera, and Asia’s Channel News Asia.
Aside from the CNN factor, statistical analyses of media reach have also yet to take
into formal account the information proliferation capacities of the Internet. As a network of
networks, according to the UNESCO World Communication Report, it
...has no owner...[and] is managed by a community of users and finances its 
operating costs via its members, who pay connection fees to hubs (or network nodes) 
entrusted with routing the data exchange, or to local providers who connect up to the 
hubs. (Maherzi 1997, 45-46)
The Internet represents ‘Hydra-headed’ communication prospects. Presently one might
project its ‘growth’ through numbers of users by geographical region in which North
America, Europe and the Asia/Pacific register a disproportionate numerical preponderance.21
Assuming that the majority in these areas accesses the Internet through telephone lines, these
statistics compare favourably with the equally high total number of telephone lines in the
three regions 22 The measures of personal computer ownership per thousand inhabitants in
20 CNN assignment editor Claudia Chang quoted in Flournoy and Stewart. (1997,52-53)
21 World total: 163.25million (m); Canada & USA: 90.63m; Europe: 38.55m; Asia/Pacific: 26.97m; South 
America: 5.26m; Africa: 1.14m; Middle East: 0.88m as o f April 1999. (Nua.com 1999) The measure of Internet 
host distribution by geographical area and type o f domain from Network Wizards (www.nw.com) cited by 
Maherzi (1997, 48) in his UNESCO-supported World Communication Report reflects a similar domination by 
Europe, North America and the Asia/Pacific.
22 The total number of lines for the Americas (252,032,700), Asia, including the Pacific rim, (254, 514, 600) 
and Europe (296, 528, 400) are significant in their apparent equality considering that more than two-thirds of 
world population live in these areas. Africa (16, 914, 600) and Oceania (11, 790, 500) rank low by contrast. 
(ITU 1999, A-7, tab.l)
1996 show that more can be done to bridge the digital infrastructure divide: the ‘industrial 
countries’ lead with 156.3; Eastern Europe and the CIS with 18.2; Latin America and the 
Caribbean with 17.5; Asia/Pacific with 5.3; the Middle East (Arab States) with 5.7; while 
Africa has no statistics available (UNESCO 1999b, 282, tab. A.I).23 Nevertheless, the 
percentage rise in the number of Internet host computers for 1993-98 in all inhabited regions 
hints at rapid progress towards an increasingly connected world inclusive of developing 
countries: Africa 74.7%, the Americas 78.5%, Asia 110.9%, Europe 80.1%, and Oceania 
61.5%. (ITU 1999, A -ll)
Technically, Internet audience reach is infinite through its embodiment of mass 
media-telecommunications convergence and its corresponding ability to interface with other 
forms of IT and traditional print formats such as books and newspapers. Ominously, one 
might conclude that ICTs which started off with mapping empires have culminated with the 
Internet connecting the globe into a cybernetic 24-hour information circuit.
1.3.2 Informational Practices Within Global Capitalism and the Spread of Market 
Liberalisation
Technology and economics are not exclusively intertwined in a bias towards the 
growth of the former in facilitating globalization. The contrasting fortunes of the telegraph 
and telephone in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attest to the practices within 
capitalism that supply the carrier with its load of information and invest it with importance. It 
is widely recognised that economics is purposive in nature and the capitalist type, more than 
its rivals, relies on actors’ awareness of ‘objective conditions’ and ‘states of belief which
23 The ‘Asia/Pacific’ figure is a mean calculated by the author from the UNESCO table indicated. At the time of 
writing, both the ITU and UNESCO admit that personal computer statistics remain incomplete.
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enable demand and supply, price setting and factor allocation decisions to progress towards
equilibrium (C.B. Richardson 1997, 5). Information greases the wheels of the free market on
both micro and macro-economic levels, and from a political economy perspective, forms the
knowledge complement to production. In the writings of Susan Strange, while the production
structure determines the ‘what, who and how’ of production decisions, knowledge confers
equivalent ‘power and authority’ upon
...those who are acknowledged by society to be possessed of the ‘right’, desirable 
knowledge and engaged in the acquisition of more of it, and on those entrusted with 
its storage, and on those controlling in any way the channels by which knowledge, or 
information, is communicated. (Strange 1994,121 )24
The financial analyst, the risk and IT consultants, the accountant, the sub-national, national
and intergovernmental economic monitors comprise the knowledge structure. Their output
and preoccupation is the creation, updating and interpretation of financial and economy-
related reports that assume an aura of quasi-authoritative ‘bills of health’ with respect to
firms, national economies and global markets. The authority of such bills of health beg the
question of whether ‘objective’ facts and ‘states of belief can be scientifically precise in
swaying markets towards equilibrium, and the answer lies in the subjective realm of the
power of convincing the theoretically rational actor in capitalism.
The role of surveillance in global political economy is a major aspect of control by 
information. The white-collared information workers mentioned above qualify as part of the 
practice along with ‘mobilisation of organisational resources’ in response to perceived 
market fluctuations and ‘reflexive governance’ in the form of national and global fiscal
24 In describing the ‘knowledge structure’, Strange made explicit reference to the work of the main proponent of 
‘post-industrial society’, Daniel Bell. Since the 1960s, the rising profile of white-collar managerial, financial, 
scientific and computer knowledge-based occupations in national economies has also been subsumed under 
other labels such as ‘knowledge industries’ and the more popular ‘information society.’ These are synonymous
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policies (Hewson 1994, 61-62, 77). Surveillance accurately describes the evolution and 
workings of the postwar Bretton Woods financial architecture, upon which the United 
Nations signatories in 1944 agreed a Keynesian consensus, by which disruptions in 
worldwide economic flows might be diagnosed and reconstruction facilitated (Scammell 
1957, 6-8). The IMF was to stabilise relative currency values and prevent competitive 
devaluations by making loans to countries which suffered short to medium-term balance of 
payments difficulties. The World Bank was to aid the cause of development and 
reconstruction by channelling a mix of private and public financial resources into official 
loans for countries with limited access to capital markets or low on credit-worthiness. Indeed, 
disbursing funds meant monitoring conditions in member-states in line with the neo-liberal 
free market philosophies at their core, and employing policy levers to avoid the interwar 
scenario of extreme economic nationalism. Such a mandate necessitated the formulation of 
information adequate for ensuring economic liberalism in national trade, monetary and fiscal 
policies as well (Mason and Asher 1973, 420-456; Goddard and Birch 1996, 222-223; Pauly 
1997, 98-130). In this sense, the IMF and World Bank’s reporting on countries under their 
tutelage, and their imposition of ‘conditionality’ goes beyond surveillance into political 
penetration into the modus operandi of national economic governance (Miller-Adams 1999, 
100-133).
For their first 45 years of existence, both the IMF and the World Bank oversaw a 
primarily international, interdependent, and largely western-dominated world economy 
affected by Cold War divisions. By 1989-91, the world economic map had been redrawn 
with the Soviet collapse, the emergence of newly industrialising countries, the continuing
with ‘knowledge structure.’ (Machlup 1962; Drucker 1969; Bell 1973; Thunell 1977; Reich 1992; Castells
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plight of the vast majority of the Third World, and the sudden incorporation in both total and 
partial degrees of East European and Chinese economies into capitalist economic 
arrangements in trade and finance. The IMF’s annual report for 1992 pronounced that the 
world had finally progressed towards a ‘global monetary system’ with the fall of the Iron 
Curtain (International Monetary Fund 1992, 1). The next year, the fortieth meeting of the 
Interim Committee of the Fund’s Board of Governors adopted a ‘Declaration on Cooperation 
for Sustained Global Expansion’ whose concluding paragraph called for ‘strengthening’ the 
Fund’s ‘effective surveillance’ over exchange rates and macro-economic policies of member 
states ‘with a view to identifying and addressing in a timely manner problems that may give 
rise to tensions in the world economy and undesirable volatility in exchange rates.’ 
(International Monetary Fund 1993, x) In April 1998, in the wake of the ‘Asian contagion’ 
and Russia’s rouble collapse, the IMF’s information prescription had become politically 
global to the point of lecturing Japan on its weaknesses in domestic economic stimulus, 
warning Argentina to cool economic growth in the run-up period to critical national 
elections, and signing a deal with Indonesia compelling liberalisation and bank closures in an 
essentially patrimonial economy. It was also making prognoses on labour markets, banking 
supervision and competition policy (Dale 1998; Kirk 1999).
Three developments in the 1980s had also prepared the ground for the intensification 
of market-based information flow that occurred after the events of 1989-91. The first was the 
decade-long Debt Crisis, which engendered more than usual IMF and World Bank scrutiny 
into the (mis)management of domestic political affairs of Latin America and Africa. The 
second was the demonstration effect of the newly industrialising countries. The third was the
1989,1996)
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example of Thatcherism and Reaganomics. The latter ‘economic ideologies'* acted as positive 
advertisements for capitalism and were scripted ostensibly into academic and official 
literature discussing alternative development models (J. Williamson 1990; Stallings 1992; 
Biersteker 1995).
Last but not least, the massive flows of trade and investment conducted by MNCs 
have generated the expansion of occupations related to the knowledge structure of global 
political economy and supported the growth of a worldwide information-intensive IT 
industry. Such MNC activities had two large implications for information flow. Firstly, 
beginning in the early 1980s, investments increasingly entailed political risk analysis in 
addition to the purely economic national credit assessments regularly performed by banks 
engaged in cross-border lending. Learning the lessons posed by Third World debt default in 
the early 1980s, and the serial political instabilities demonstrated by the Lebanese Civil War, 
coups and revolutions in Chile, Iran and Nicaragua in the 1970s, along with the unexpected 
nature of military invasions in Afghanistan (1979) and Kuwait (1990), lenders and investors 
have become conscious of assessing risk in non-economic dimensions such as civil order, 
stable authority, propensity to expropriate, legal transparency and war risk (Haendel 1979, 
91-124; C.R. Kennedy Jr. 1987, 1-22; Solberg 1992; Herberg 1992). Secondly, the embrace 
of IT by MNCs has increased their infrastructural demands on investment-recipient countries 
in the form of assessing the educational quality of workforces and the technological 
adaptability of host countries’ social and labour policies (Reidenberg 1997; Froomkin 1997; 
Gellman 1997). This requirement is often factored into country-risk analysis and is 
particularly onerous for developing countries that are compelled to account for deficiencies 
on the bargaining table with MNCs and other states within the framework of a global
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information economy. Such deficiencies might include domestic elite-driven protectionism, 
political resistance to embracing national information infrastructure initiatives, and policies 
favouring censorship at the expense of business needs (Lenk 1997; Talero 1997). This form 
of exposure may weaken the host countries’ positions by raising the political, social and 
economic costs of the latter’s efforts to ‘interface’ with a global capitalist information order. 
On the other hand, MNC expansion correspondingly drew the attention of non-state actors 
seeking borderless checks and balances to the excesses of MNC involvement in perpetuating 
corruption and other underdevelopment ills in the Third World. With the aid of the Internet 
and other global media, organisations such as Transparency International have set out to 
crusade against what they regard as the unethical and dehumanising practice of corruption in 
national and global contexts through exposes, and to raise awareness through campaigns and
95publications.
1.3.3 Post-Cold War Geopolitical Fluidity
To speak of globalization in the 1990s is to acknowledge the sea changes on the 
geopolitical map of the world in 1989-91. The Cold War had globalized the Soviet-American 
contest. The bipolar confrontation between the two blocs took the form of multidimensional 
grand strategies pursued by the superpowers with weapons of intercontinental range and 
mass destructive effects, accompanied with much public rhetoric. The multidimensional 
means employed had underscored the totality of the ‘war’ of ideas on which each side staked 
their prosperity and future (P.M. Taylor 1997, 27-52). For the whole world, the 1945-89 era 
was a unique window of history in which the ideological struggle became totalising in
25 Transparency International’s published monitoring report titled “Privatisation Process of Panama’s Telephone 
Company Intel SA” in 1996-97 is illustrative of its ethical purpose. (Transparency International 1999) See also 
the growing literature addressing NGO scrutiny within the knowledge structure of the global economy: 
Mathews (1997, 50-60); Kobrin (1998); Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson and Sasser (2001).
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consequence: scores of colonial territories joining the ranks of independent nation-states for 
the first time needed to make choices in their form of domestic governance, and these 100- 
plus states had to do so within the context of the developing electronic media, and an 
international political economy dominated by the US and her allies which excluded the 
communist world by default. The ‘war’ of communism versus liberal democratic capitalism 
respected no boundaries and the total stakes made superpower intervention commonplace 
(Halliday 1983, 32-33, 39-42; Gaddis 1997, 82-83). Third World non-alignment became, in 
practice, a figleaf for reproduced ideological rivalry outside Europe and North America.
Although this is not the place to posit a theory of the end of the Cold War, it is 
reasonable to observe that the USSR met its demise in large part due to the weight of its 
ideological contradictions exacerbated by the demonstration effects of the western model and 
the physical containment pressures exerted by NATO and other US allies (Risse-Kappen 
1994; Checkel 1997). One distinct post-Cold War effect was to eliminate the automaticity of 
superpower intervention worldwide in response to its rival’s moves (Clad 1995, 117-121). 
Another equally important result was the environment of ideological flux immediately 
attending a contested unipolar moment, or conversely, arising from the decompression of 
bipolarity (Gaddis 1991,1992; Jervis 1992; Kegley Jr. and Raymond 1994, 3-64; Huntington 
1996; Rosenau 1997b). As some writers have pointed out, the American model had also 
exhausted itself economically and socially in its appeal under the pressures of mounting 
budget deficits and neglect of non-military spheres of social welfare (P. Kennedy 1989, 665- 
692; Fulbright 1989; Marullo 1993; Bromley 1999). Instead, in place of the USSR and 
communism as a geopolitical blanket counterpoised against the coalitional straightjacket of a 
Free World or the western camp, post-Cold War decompression today brings a jostling of
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pan-Islamic civilisational values, Asian Values, an ‘African Renaissance’, Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, resurgent nationalisms, the ‘Third Way’, and the presumed victor of 
the cold war, liberal democratic capitalism. This is an assessment shared as much by political 
leaders as academics since the early 1990s. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela of South Africa, 
Fernando Cardoso of Brazil and Narasimha Rao of India have articulated their perception of 
new national directions in the form of acknowledging the ‘right to differ’, as well as its tragic 
correspondence with the ‘fight to differ’ so dangerously magnified in the Balkans.26 In 
surveying Africa, a Nigerian leader argued that much as Africa was liberated from rigidly 
following US and Soviet socio-economic models, it had now to synthesise or establish 
indigenous formulas for democratisation to progress realistically (Obasanjo 1997). In East 
Asia, the stalemate between the US and the EU on one side, and the Asia-Pacific rim states 
on the other, over a universal vision of human rights and security confidence-building is a 
recurring conflict of ideas and problem-identification.
These are only the more prominent contenders in a world ideological marketplace, for 
there are possibly variegated rainbow political colours shading themselves out from these. 
The non-existence of dominant ordering ideology emancipates competing territorial 
justifications of communitarian-statist organisation. In addition, non-state entities such as 
terrorists, cyber ‘hacktivists’, MNCs, NGOs, including Greenpeace-type outfits, anti­
capitalist anarchists, illegal immigrants and global criminal networks, pursue their disparate 
agendas utilising the networking avenues afforded by ICTs. Through mediated visibility, 
these agendas frequently impinge upon national agendas. This has in turn prompted some
26 These two phrases were coined by then-President Nelson Mandela (1997, 7) o f South Africa and his 
assessment is widely shared by the respective contributions of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, 
then-Prime Minister Narasimha Rao of India, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi of Iran, and then-Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia in the same volume by Lepor (1997).
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observers to theorise the arrival of soft power and ‘information warfare’ (Nye Jr. and Owens 
1996; Cohen 1996; Guehenno 1998/99; Freedman 1998/99; Henry and Peartree 1998).
The nature of post-Cold War effects is as much of a babble of informational diversity 
built around conflicting political, social and economic ideas of civilisations as it is of a neo­
realist perspective of declining powers contending with virile challengers. While military and 
economic power have not lost their utility, they play second fiddle to diplomacy and 
information management because, unlike the Cold War, there is neither ‘common enemy’ for 
automatic targeting, nor permanent alliances for fixed goals. Issues of crisis tend to be 
shifting and complex due to the way consequences hurt imputed ‘friends’ and ‘foes’, and also 
because of the way cross-border social, economic and political links manage to create large 
degrees of collateral damage. The recent 2001-2002 campaigns against terrorism are a case in 
point: the US-led coalition has had to wage a propaganda campaign marginalising Osama bin 
Laden’s Al-Qaeda network while wooing the peaceful majority among Arab populations as 
allies of a righteous war (De Young and Sipress 2001). Additionally, the Bush 
Administration’s public labelling of an ‘axis of evil’ as the doctrinal extension of the ‘war on 
terror’ has provoked visible dissent among allies and enemies alike (Knowlton 2002). Indeed, 
the outcome of the struggle to shape a new world order, hierarchical, interdependent, global 
democratic or otherwise, is likely to depend more upon whether the informational challenges 
can be met and adapted, or refuted, in the post-bipolar gaze of individuals, NGOs and 
national populations with vastly improved access to ICTs (Norris 1997; Strobel 1997,10).
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1.4 Information Globalization and Structural Contestations
Information globalization, as a border-crossing trend of social exposure to local and 
alternative ideas, thus becomes reality at the confluence of factors of ICTs, the spread of 
capitalist informational practices, and global ideological and power diffusion with the end of 
the Cold War. It manifests itself as a multidimensional information flow on a global scale 
ignorant of time and space boundaries, thereby precipitating a global political information 
space, or climate of scrutiny. Substantively, this is ‘structurational change’ taking place in 
terms of Giddens’ conception of the tri-faceted ‘dynamism of modernity’ surveyed in Section
1.1 (Giddens 1990, 16). Firstly, it represents a radical break from premodem practices of 
connecting time and space in social arrangements due to a lack of universal uniformity in 
time measurement. Information globalization accelerates the process begun by print 
capitalism (B. Anderson 1991, 43-45). It separates time and space by making possible 
relations ‘between “absent” others, locationally distant from any given situation of [physical] 
face-to-face interaction’ (Giddens 1990 18-19; 1995, 26-48; 1991, 16) through the mediation 
of ICTs and a global economy. Secondly, global information flow facilitates ‘disembedding’ 
processes within modernity. This means that social relations in local contexts can be 
extracted out, re-examined, or socialised across time and space (Giddens 1990, 21-22; 1991, 
18). Information flow equips the two disembedding mechanisms of symbolic tokens (e.g. 
money) and expert systems (i.e. systems of technical, governing accomplishments or 
professions) identified by Giddens to effect change in economics and politics. CNN’s live 
broadcasts of political events, together with surveillance and market penetration 
characteristics of global capitalism, bear out the disembedding nature of late twentieth 
century economics and politics. Thirdly, information globalization encourages constantly 
reflexive re-examination of existing social modes for both individuals and societies
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regardless of location and stage of development. This is because information availability 
widens the latitude for choice of modes of living through awareness of alternatives. In other 
words, ‘thought and action are constantly refracted back upon one another...in the light of 
incoming knowledge.’ (Giddens 1990, 38; 1991, 20) Alternatively, reflexivity in thought 
could also mean justifying pragmatic and syncretic ideologies and coalitions on grounds of 
rational success, reinforcing reactionary notions of ‘otherness’, or rejecting ‘foreignness’ 
altogether. Post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity mirrors this as political and economic actors 
pursue variations that may stray significantly from previously hegemonic Cold War 
ideologies and associations against a ‘common enemy’.
Incoming information thus becomes ‘political’ when its representational qualities 
provoke reflexivity of self-examination among direct and indirect decision-making 
audiences. Clearly, a discussion of the ‘power’ of information flow carried by information 
globalization needs accounting when information providers and channel controllers can 
potentially manufacture ‘opinion’ presaging action or approval at various levels and locations 
of social organisation. In Chapter 3, the availability of informational power as a climate of 
scrutiny across frontiers will be elaborated as a threat to national community, in tandem with 
a layered analysis of the spatial implications of the three facets of the information 
globalization process.
Not surprisingly there exists at the transition into the twenty-first century manifold 
sites where nation-states interrogate and challenge every possible advance of globo-logic 
over definitions of community. These contests are structural in the dual sense that they not 
only involve particular territories, but instead, they are about setting, or defying, standards of
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acceptable and unacceptable conduct, both domestic and international. At this point, it may 
be objected that if globalization compresses political space, and a clash of interests arises 
from the proximity of actors sharing that space, structural theories such as neo-realism or 
neo-liberalism may be more appropriate in resolving national-global contests through 
‘system management’ such as shifts in balance of power, problem-solving bandwagoning, or 
regime-building. As Kenneth Waltz put it, systems as patterned interactions rely on the 
regularity of actors’ behaviour and their capabilities. This regularity of behaviour and 
capabilities is what Giddens has termed rules and resources binding social systems in time 
and space. Waltz, speaking primarily for the neo-realists, assigns to international structure a 
static quality in which they are ordered according to state units differentiated by function and 
capabilities (Waltz 1979, ch.5-6). The balance of power operates according to the leadership 
of one or more hegemonic states outranking the rest in an order of capabilities, especially 
military and economic. Other neo-realists, such as Stephen Krasner and Joseph Grieco, who 
have introduced explanations of international cooperation through regime creation, argue 
similarly that the fusion of power and self-seeking goals is the foundation behind hegemon- 
led cooperation (Krasner 1982; Grieco 1993).
Neo-liberals such as Ernst Haas, Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod, and the earlier 
writings of Nye, differentiate themselves by arguing that states selfishly pursue their national 
interest up to a point, beyond which considerations such as the long-term pay-off structure 
and the calculations of loss and benefit arising from the number of state and non-state actors 
on any issue induce jointly-maximising collaboration (E. Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye Jr. 
1989, ch. 1, 2, 8; Axelrod and Keohane 1993, 87-98). These literatures of the ‘neo-neo’ 
debate have the advantage of steering clear of the anti-international institution orientations of
the realists and the anti-state obsession of liberal, revolutionist or idealist international 
relations theorists. They also have the ready argument that globalization is no more than a 
phenomenon produced by an identifiable hegemonic centre, or centres. To that extent, they 
are right in pinpointing the fact that an unstable American leadership exists within a fluid 
post-Cold War international disorder connected by capitalism and ICT networks. The latter 
two features of information globalization, as clarified earlier, may well prolong the pattern of 
western geopolitical dominance for some time. But this control cannot be secure and static, 
because information globalization’s three facets also produce immense possibilities for 
contestation. These possibilities can be collectively summarised as the lack of an immutable 
and automatic single ideological narrative under the worldwide gaze of ICT-connected 
individuals and nation-states: whose actual pay-offs, and whose joint benefits inhere in 
existing structures are unclear, although these are conveniently attributable to the American 
superpower.
Due to the informational practices of capitalism, the extensions of ICTs in creating 
multiple networks of transmission and reception, and the end of the strategic verities of 
bipolarity, the focus for nation-states in responding to globalization depends on how fungible 
power has become in defending the security of identity. The latter is a soft issue playing in 
the arena of meaning creation, and in conditions of information globalization, it will precede 
any decision to apply economic and military power. Chapter 2 will treat this foundation of 
soft power as power within information flow. And while both neo-realists and neo-liberals 
have a point in privileging structure, they do not clearly address how the agents might revise 
or constitute those structures’ operations through their own efforts at generating the
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foundations of meaning for those structures,27 whether they be the UN Security Council 
resolutions, the international law of human rights, good economic policy under IMF 
guidelines, or the defence of cultures. In fact, where appropriate, as in the development of 
hypotheses of soft power agency in Chapter 4, the positive elements of neo-realist and neo­
liberal thought such as regime and epistemic community theory, will be built upon to develop 
an account of agency by states and non-state actors alike in using information as instruments.
Hence soft power foreign policy, following structuration theory, answers the 
following questions: whose ideas, design, and ultimately whose order globalizes? And what 
impact would this have on ‘our community’? There is often a soft threat from ideas projected 
through traffic such as news, issue and international legal agendas. For foreign policy to be 
reoriented to tackle this threat, the latter must be analysed in terms of the power of 
information and subsequently, its spatial consequences.
27 Baldwin (1993, 20-22) makes the lack of explanation o f the fungibility of power a criticism of the ‘neo-neo’ 
debate. Both sides do not explain how hegemonic coercion can translate into power for achieving other 
objectives that defy self-evident cost-benefit analysis, e.g. identity.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE POWER OF INFORMATION
2.1 Introduction: Information and Global Politics
The present research is confronted with a myriad of definitions of information derived 
from the wider business IT, science and mathematical literatures. According to the 
‘information systems’ perspective there are three requirements for defining information. 
Firstly, information is contingent upon a recipient’s understanding of it and consequent 
action. Secondly, acting upon information means interpreting and analysing it. Thirdly, it 
follows that information is an improvement upon ‘data’, which is a raw condition of 
representational symbols without meaning, that is, non-organised objects (Liebenau and 
Backhouse 1990, 2-3; Boisot 1995,161-164). This account is consistent with a 1962 study by 
Fritz Machlup who defined knowledge as a ‘state of knowing’, as a.basis for detailing the 
measurement of knowledge in education, research, media and IT. He noted that semantically, 
both ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ are anchored in the common concept of meaning, and so 
on a general level, the two are indistinguishable. The only difference lay only in their verbal 
roots: to ‘inform’ is to convey what is known; and to ‘know’, the outcome of being informed. 
Machlup observed that this was a minor and possibly negligible difference (Machlup 1962, 8, 
14-15) with which this thesis can agree. Hereafter, ‘information’ as a sphere of meaning can 
be regarded as synonymous with ‘knowledge’.1
Analysing the list above of definitional requirements further suggests that information 
is socially generated, ordered and possesses value. In this respect, the mathematical school of 
information and communication represented chiefly by Shannon, Weaver, Wiener, Brillouin
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and Rapoport attach a consensually utilitarian meaning to information that resonates with the
above-mentioned criteria. Weaver for instance explained information as
.. .a measure of your freedom of choice when you select a message.. .[assuming that,] 
you are confronted with a very elementary situation where you have to choose one of 
two alternative messages...(Weaver 1966,17; Shannon and Weaver 1949)
Similarly motivated, Rapoport articulates information as making possible
...a precise language for talking about the structure of assemblies and the 
fundamental processes involving the emergence of order from chaos and chaos from 
order... [;] information is the carrier of order. (Rapoport 1966, 54)
Fundamentally, information theory in science aims at maximizing value to observers and
users. Most mathematical derivations of information flow express themselves in terms of
changing probabilities (Goldman 1953, 2; Brillouin 1956, x; Theil 1967, xxl) and alleviating
‘difference[s] between two states of uncertainty.’ (Krippendorff 1986,13)
Approaching information studies from a third direction, the generic ‘sociology of 
knowledge’, a broad school of thinking on the socially utilitarian nature of information is 
further reinforced. Increasingly, there is growing recognition that social structure and 
knowledge do not exist in a relationship of one-way domination, that is, structure does not 
simply shape knowledge. Rather, the two are co-constitutive, or influence one another in 
complex ways (Law 1986, 3-4). Bruno Latour has taken such a line of argument in proposing 
a ‘performative definition’ of society whereby actors within it, ‘whatever their size, define in 
practice what society is, what it is made up of, what is the whole and what are the parts...’ 
(Latour 1986, 273; Rouse 1987, 248-265) Society is informed into being by a pattern of 
representational practices, both willed and unwilled alike. John Searle argues similarly that 
social reality is the consequence of collective intentionality and ‘the biological capacity to
1 This is not a controversial treatment as an early work proposing the incorporation of a ‘political economy of 
information’ into International Relations attests. (O’Brien and Helleiner 1980)
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make something symbolize -  or mean, or express -  something beyond itself.’ (Searle 1995, 
227-228) These understandings strengthen the structuration approach adopted from Giddens 
for this thesis.
Having established the utilitarian attributes of information, the literature on the 
political economy of information suggests another set of distinctions: information may be 
either a resource or a commodity. Dan Schiller argues that information as resource ‘is 
something of actual or potential use’ while an ‘information commodity’ is, like all 
commodities, derived from the vocabulary of capitalism, something ‘produced increasingly 
by wage labour within and for a market.’ (D. Schiller 1988, 33) In the present argument, 
information is necessarily expansive in meaning encompassing both resource and commodity 
characteristics as information is being considered politically in the realm of international 
relations. Politics often involves decision-making and social change on an organised basis, 
and thus its action-generators would be constituted by ideas of any form so long as they fulfil 
the criteria of being social movers. Economic information such as reports of excessive debt
and blatant systemic corruption, or cultural information such as separatist or revanchist 
propaganda from abroad, are as likely as political ideologies to cause social and political 
displacement once they are translated into social meaning. Hence this thesis can finally adopt 
the working definition of information as a socially patterned relationship of events and 
symbols capable of inducing action, identity or community. To reiterate a formulation 
declared earlier in this section, ‘information’ is assumed to be interchangeable with, and to 
encompass, both ‘ideas’ and ‘knowledge’.
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The subject of politics is in this regard closely intertwined with the definition of
information as a connector of meaning and action. Countless primary tracts and secondary
literature in political science have been authored around the question of ‘what is politics as
an activity?’. Through these works, it has become possible to articulate an understanding of
politics as an exercise of decision-making for the purpose of social organisation or other
jointly-constituted ends, against a background of competing wants, limited resources, and a
search for affirmative identity.2 This squares comfortably with Bernard Crick’s defence of
politics in a distributive sense
...as the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are 
conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the 
welfare and the survival of the whole community. (Crick 1964, 21)3
To make appropriate decisions according to criteria as diverse as the quantitatively fair,
qualitatively just, order, prestige and cultural standards, or even to serve parochial interests,
political actors need to be equipped with capacities for symbolic and conceptual
interpretations of needs, resources and options for solution. It relates to Man’s
interpretational skills in pursuit of survival (Edelman 1964, 114-115; Mueller 1973, 13-17).
Politics is inherently a search for, and sustenance of, patterns of order, and where informed
and enlightened compromises do not work, force may be employed but this usually requires
justification (Crick 1964, 30-31) to both fellow power exercisers, target populations,
majorities and minorities alike. In short, information must be digested in the course of the
operation of politics as it empowers action, resistance or acquiescence. Karl Deutsch makes a
pertinent point in drawing parallels between information and the operation of a trigger:
Power, we might say, produces changes; information triggers them off in a suitable 
receiver. In the example [of the gun] ..., the most important thing was not the amount
2 This is synthesised from Schmitt (1996, 26-27), Raphael (1970, 31-32), Blondel (1976, 40-44), Lipson (1981, 
12-20) and Levy (1987, 32-33).
3 This definition has the advantage of implicitly incorporating the ancient Greek notion of ‘politics as the good 
life’ as well as more realist understandings of politics as conflict and bargained resolution.
73
of pressure on the trigger, once it had reached the required threshold, but rather the 
fact that it was delivered at the trigger, that is, at one particular point of the gun. 
Similarly, the information required for turning the gun to a particular target need not 
be carried by any amount of energy proportionate to the energy delivered to the target 
by the gun. The important thing about information is...the pattern carried by the 
signal, and its relationship to the set of patterns stored in the receiver. (Deutsch 1966, 
146)
In politics, as in information theory, action is carried out via communication of ideas from 
source, transmission, channel and reception, and above all, the source loads information with 
meaning in order to empower it as a trigger. In this vivid sense, politics can be discussed as 
‘political communication’, and a system in terms of its language, transmission, and its 
medium (Meadow 1980; Nimmo and Sanders 1981).
Within a closed political arena, such as the nation-state, legislative assembly or 
corridors of a bureaucracy, political communication and information flow can be 
conveniently isolated for the study of decision-making processes, but when applied to the 
level of the international and globalization, complexity inflates research possibilities and 
defies neat analysis. In a tightly-ordered domestic context, government propaganda services, 
newspaper and broadcast media can be ‘located’ in terms of impact derived through 
quantitative measures of audience feedback. By contrast, global media agents such as CNN, 
BBC World Service and the Internet generate potentially multidirectional impacts across 
time zones and cultures. Under conditioning by global information forces, domestic politics, 
and the international politics of states, have very broad and multiplied ‘fronts’ opened up for 
dealing. The ontologies of action and reaction in foreign policies become varied and 
complicated by individual actions (terrorists), ideologies (religious/cultural fundamentalisms 
and human rights), non-state actors (e.g. Greenpeace and MNCs), and international 
organisations (e.g. UN, WTO, IMF) in addition to conventional state-initiated causes. The
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controversy over prioritising agency and structure haunts both policy and academic analyst. 
Central to all this is the very basic task of interpreting the ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ for 
foreign policy.
In this Chapter, the innate power relations of ‘information’ will be examined, through 
which, it will become apparent that information offers wide possibilities for constructing 
political realities for the state official and non-state actor alike. First, the concept of 
information flow and its components will be introduced as a vehicle for examining the 
operation of power. The idea of flow is deducible from the cross-boundary logic of 
information globalization. Next to flow will be a short discussion of theories of power, which 
will clarify their analytical links to Foucaultian discursive power, and ultimately, soft power. 
The rest of this Chapter will examine components of information flow in detail, and these 
will be drawn together in the conclusion to present a coherent affirmation of Foucaultian 
discursive power at the heart of soft power.
2.2 Information Flow
As a preliminary step towards elaborating information as power, the elements of 
information flow need to be introduced, following Warren Weaver’s proposition (Figure 1), 
which is widely adopted by both mathematical theorists of information and communication 
scholars (Weaver 1966, 17).
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Figure 1: A System o f  Information Flow
The source and the creation of the message at the point of origin on the extreme left 
constitute information creation. It is then transferred via a ‘medium’, which may jointly and 
indistinguishably comprise transmitter, channel and receiver. These components of the 
medium are self-explanatory as technology. However, the medium as a collective concept 
opens up an intellectual and political controversy. Media philosopher McLuhan offers a 
helpful definition: the medium is more than a technological arm of efficacy; it is 
simultaneously a message by itself, and both a potential and actual shaper of representation, 
aesthetic, memory and other content carried upon it (McLuhan 1974, 51-66, 70-71). This 
understanding is evident when one considers how drama in the form of a coup d'etat, a racial 
riot, or a torture allegation against a government, is portrayed differently in varying degrees 
across printed news and books, television, radio, film, tapes, discs and Internet sites. Each 
medium tends to affect the receptivity and taste of singular and varying combinations of 
senses. A particular medium, say television or Internet, may in one instance, require a 
specific encoding of information in the form of moving pictures and clipped shots with 
minimal text, and in another, require a multimedia capture of so-called ‘defining essences’ of 
a viewpoint or an event. Built into media is the concept of noise, which implies corruption of 
the clarity of the information transmitted. Noise can range from malfunction of equipment, to 
the naturally-occurring ‘static’ riding on electromagnetic wavelengths, to the incompetence 
of crafting and interpretation of the original message by the political leader, civic participant 
or spokesman. Noise can be both accidental and deliberate.
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Lastly, at the receiving end is the recipient, who is as vulnerable or intelligent as the 
source and message creation process. He also possesses the capacity and discretion to decode 
the information conducted through the media. Here is where a ‘good’ spin on an event may 
be perceived as ‘bad’ deception and unadulterated superficiality. The recipient can then be 
self-motivated to provide feedback via the same route from which he received the original 
information. Alternatively, he might wish to become a transmission source himself and the 
flow occurs in a reciprocal direction from that shown in Figure 1. In any case, the caprice of 
representation can occur anywhere down the length of the flow as noise.
By the latter half of the twentieth century, technology had attained for mankind 
unprecedented capabilities for accuracy in transmission, channelling and reception, but at the 
same time, electronic inventions such as the microchip, television and Internet had also 
amplified and multiplied the terminals for information creation. The structure for reporting 
and making news has become wider and more accessible to other actors in addition to states 
and corporations. Unsurprisingly, ICTs beginning from the printing press have enabled man 
to be modem in the sense of vastly extending his ability to be inspired, to record, and 
maximise ideas for controlling his environment for existence. The modem is definable as a 
knowledge-based liberation from the traditional worldview where life and change is 
inherently circumscribed by uncritical faiths, inherited social experience and fatalistic 
reconciliation to strictly local circumstances of subjection (Black 1967, 11-13, 54-55; 
Rostow 1971, 26-30, 56-62).4 In the perspective of the modernisation theorists, ICTs are both 
modem and modernising in being able ‘to help survey a new environment, raise people’s
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aspirations, guide and control a dynamic process, teach new skills, and socialize citizens to a
new and different society that is still only in the process of becoming.’ (Schramm 1967, 6-7)5
The project of modernity stands for awareness of new possibilities, unities of achievement
and of unparalleled identity association. Yet at the same time, ‘modem’ media with their
‘real time’ and geography-surmounting span enable postmodern theorists to announce the
demise of grand narratives in the construction of society and hence of all political life. The
postmodernist Gianni Vattimo has observed that
The mass media, which in theory offer information in ‘real time’ about everything 
happening in the world, could in effect be seen as a kind of concrete realization of 
Hegel’s Absolute Spirit: the perfect self-consciousness of the whole of humanity, the 
coincidence between what happens, history and human knowledge...In actual fact 
[however], the increase in possible information on the myriad forms of reality makes 
it increasingly difficult to conceive of a single reality. It may be that in the world of 
the mass media a ‘prophecy’ of Nietzsche’s is fulfilled: in the end the true world 
becomes a fable. (Vattimo 1992, 6-7)
Vattimo’s observation is the result of what his contemporary Michel Foucault calls the
operation of discourse power throughout modernity, constituted by the production of
scientific and social scientific modes of managing society for the benefit of mankind. As his
genealogical studies of prisons, clinics and asylums reveal, these supposedly progressive
changes have reproduced power in the form of authorities of knowledge, or information.
These in turn possess the utility of subjecting people to scrutiny, and the legitimacy to
punish, and to correct scientifically defined ‘errant ways.’ (Foucault 1980; 1997) As will be
explained in the following sections, Foucaultian ideas are probably an advance upon
conventional understandings of relational and hidden power.
4 This is consistent with Giddens’ more recent use of the term ‘reflexivity in thought’ to distinguish modem 
from pre-modem societies in regard to the impact and role of knowledge. See Giddens (1990, 38-39).
5 Giddens also devotes some attention to the globalization of the media as part and parcel of his modernity 
thesis: “The point here is not that people are contingently aware of many events, from all over the world, of 
which previously they would have remained ignorant. It is that the global extension of the institutions of 
modernity would be impossible were it not for the pooling of knowledge which is represented by the ‘news’.”
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2.3 The Power Content of Information Flow within Information Globalization
As Section 2.1 has explained, information is intrinsically a political power resource as 
it carries meaning. Political theorists from Plato to Foucault have both implicitly and 
explicitly recognised that political debate, with the employment of rhetoric, empirical 
examples, communitarian assumptions, natural law claims and counter-claims, tends to 
produce outcomes not unlike battles for control and dominance fought by physical arms. 
Power, in its most general working definition, is (a) relational and purposeful in nature 
involving at least two parties; and (b) operates when A is forced to do X by B, a course of 
action which A would not voluntarily do.6 In addition, as theorising by Steven Lukes has 
shown, the definition of power remains elusive but may be qualified by the degrees of its 
visibility. Overt conflict can reveal to the naked eye how and where an opponent is floored. 
Yet on a second level, power may have operated through the premeditated exclusion of 
certain weapons, resources and issues that one’s opponent may potentially avail himself of in 
decision-making. This is achieved subtly through a ‘mobilization of bias’, which Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz describe in terms of tangible forms of ‘predominant values, 
beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures (“rules of the game”) that operate systematically 
and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others.’ 
Bachrach and Baratz labelled this ‘face’ of power ‘nondecision-making’ (1970, 18, 43, 3-51). 
On a third dimension, power can also be said to act when potential resources and issues are 
excluded or precluded from politics by a combination of nondecision-making and ‘the 
operation of social forces and institutional practices.’ (Lukes 1974, 24, 11-23) Power
(1990, 77-78) In one of his 1999 BBC Reith Lectures, Giddens claims that advances in communications 
technology are the defining force of globalization as a revolution, even against the state. See Giddens (1999).
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assumes a skin of subtlety in Lukes’ ‘three-dimensional view’ in the form of contenders’ 
long-term socialised values, prejudices and patterns of a macro-structural nature beyond both 
the control of immediate power contestants and the decision-making framework. This third 
dimension may skew, eliminate, or render fictitious opponents’ autonomy and sense of 
agency altogether. Understanding the complexity of the power of information flow must 
therefore be sensitive to these possibilities and hence the need for a component-by- 
component explanation (Figure 1) if the structural emplacements of power are to be 
illuminated.
In adopting Lukes’ three-dimensional power model, the present analysis also aims to 
surmount the quantitative methodological trap identified by many mass media researchers as 
a handicap in the development of their discipline. Writing nearly 15 years after the advent of 
audience surveys gained popularity under the stimulation of newspaper and radio, Joseph 
Klapper noted that despite amassing ‘cascading data’ with the aim of establishing whether 
media directly produces delinquency, debases public tastes and becomes politically 
persuasive,
.. .we have not only failed to provide definitive answers, but we have done something 
worse: we have provided evidence in partial support of every hue of every view. We 
have on the one hand demonstrated that people’s existing tastes govern the way they 
use media, and on the other hand reported instances in which changed media usage 
was associated with apparently altered tastes.7
This ‘pessimism’ was widely acknowledged in intra-disciplinary surveys of ‘diffusion
models’ of information flow (Savage 1981), political advertising campaigns (Kaid 1981),
general political communication (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, 11), socialization (T. Bums
6 Adapted from Merriam (1950, 15-46) and Dahl (1994, 288, 290). It is notable that Dahl conscientiously 
resisted fixing any permanent concept of power; only generalisations would be possible in a constant search for 
accurate operational definitions, (p.308)
7 An observation made in the late 1950s by Joseph Klapper (1966, 535-536).
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1977; Morley 1990) and class consequences (Westergaard 1977) of media transmission. 
Klapper’s proposed new agenda called for ‘situational’, ‘phenomenistic’ or ‘functional’ 
approaches moving ‘away from the tendency to regard mass communication as a necessary 
and sufficient cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as influences working 
amid other influences, in a total situation.’ (Klapper 1966, 537) This more inclusive, 
sociological agenda tended to focus mass media forms as contributory agents and critical bit 
part actors, short of being the only source of change in a social situation (McQuail 1994, 2- 
4). By the mid-1970s, Colin Seymour-Ure had clarified the idea of media effect as one used 
in ‘a broad sense’: the media could be a necessary and sufficient cause of events only in the 
‘strongest sense’ where media needs no assistance in causality; but more frequently, media 
operates ‘in a weaker sense’ as ‘the catalyst or occasion of an event which might have 
happened anyway but not otherwise at that time or in that form.’ (Seymour-Ure 1974, 21)
At the same time, others have suggested the politics and mass media be studied in a 
holistic systems perspective encompassing institutions, audience orientations to politics and 
‘communication relevant aspects of political culture’. Further research fragmentation 
occurred across mass media studies where others have proposed a culturalist model of 
communication emphasising group and culture-bound contexts, and yet others have plumbed 
for radical humanistic and interpretative sociological directions in explaining media power 
(Rosengren 1994; Craig 1994; Krippendorff 1994). Critical theory and postmodernism a la 
Vattimo and Foucault have today found new relevance to media analysis, and they may 
eventually clarify and further illuminate Lukes’ hidden power dimensions in components of 
information flow across all social boundaries (Curran 1990, 139-142; Moores 1993; Mattelart 
1994; Ang 1996).
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2.3.1 Power Within Information Source
As has been elaborated elsewhere, politics occurs within an environment in which 
Man finds and expresses his existence with symbols in language, art and other forms of 
visual and oral interpretation. The creation of information as patterns of symbolic meaning is 
unambiguously direct relational power in the sense that human beings conduct their activities 
according to reports, mediating and acting as stimuli, without which actions will not be 
purposefully performed. The development of information throughout history has invariably 
been need-driven: for instance, the ‘political’ for government, citizen and party functions; 
‘commercial’ for economic activities; and ‘entertainment’, a loose category catering to 
individual physiological and psychological needs, and including lifestyle, health and culture.
Delivering fresh and regular information seems straightforward enough when it is 
construed in terms of the physical means of getting numbers of spokespersons, journalists, 
stringers and sub-editors to collect, sort and compile, along with the acquisition of reliable 
electronic lines, cameras and satellites. However, an equally illuminating question to pose is: 
how is news sourced, created or ‘pieced together’? This is where two and three-dimensional 
models of power operate. Firstly, one might consider the widest possible range of 
information creators in the realm of politics, which in practice encompasses the category of 
foreign affairs as well: the government bureaucracy, corporate organisations, sub-national 
groups and individuals -  private and official -  are all players in utility-driven information- 
generation. Then, one needs to ponder what determines the ‘what, which and how’ of their 
ideas. Governmental and intergovernmental bureaucracies such as the national ministries, the 
IMF, NATO and the UN are likely to generate reports on ‘security’ and ‘administration’
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according to the biases and acculturated values, ideologies and rules derived from 
circumstance and personnel choice in their respective social, geographical and occupational 
contexts (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1963b, 106-128; Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3-30; 
Pfetsch 1998). Sub-national and non-state actors will equally have disparate agendas, just as 
the chief executive officer of an MNC, a prisoner-of-conscience, the soldier on the ground, 
the ‘nouveau riche’ professional and the blue-collar worker will view welfare and 
governance differently at home and abroad. All politically-active entities will yeam for rights 
and benefits, but their prioritising, substance and phraseology will be unlikely to be uniform, 
hence the potential for conflicts between ‘objectives’ and ‘truths’. In political decision­
making, it is thus highly conceivable that when one ‘truth’ gains ascendancy through 
individual charisma or incremental compromise, rivals will lose by default (Gregory 1993, 
225-226), unless that ascendancy is fully countered, or at the very least, contested 
prominently and persistently. In short, when political actors are information sources, 
information becomes necessarily partisan and mediates politics.
The general field of reporting information under the heading ‘news’ exhibits the
power of caprice in information in even sharper relief. Consider for instance the following
comment by a journalist on the news product, which reveals far more than it states:
[News] is put together by large and shifting groups of people, often in a hurry, out of 
an assemblage of circumstances that is never the same twice. Newspapers and news 
programmes could almost be called random reactions to random events.
The terms ‘put together’ and an ‘assemblage of circumstances’ suggest the operation of a
multiplicity of pre-existing mindsets attempting to depict reality based on past intelligence,
and together with the notion of ‘random reactions’, imply a role for value-filters in news
8 Journalist John Whalo quoted in Golding and Elliot (1979, 6).
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selection. Additionally, the participation of people as individuals demands explanation in 
forming events.
Structure and agency have inextricably evolved with the historically need-driven 
demand for news: what, which and how does information as newssheets, papers and bulletins 
get produced? The history of news production, often indistinguishable from journalism and 
broadcasting, produces strong evidence of the socially conditioned specificity of news 
creation. This ranges from human messengers pandering to ancient Greco-Roman imperial 
authorities, to news services for monarchs, generals, reformers, revolutionaries and 
mercantile interests in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, through to the ‘public sphere -  
public opinion’ needs of twentieth century mass government. As Jurgen Habermas’ 
genealogical inquiry into the transformation of the public sphere articulated it, newsmaking, 
content and deployment assumed particular forms at each step of its co-evolution with 
economy and polity (Habermas 1991, ch. II and III; Olson 1966). Today the ‘modem’ news 
agency is organisationally structured around four general processes of planning, gathering, 
selection and production (Golding and Elliot 1979, 92-113; Tunstall 1971, 34-39; Boyd- 
Barrett 1980, 73-111, 152-154). Planning decides long-term events for coverage and 
determines resource allocation for reporting short and medium term events. Gathering comes 
from the reporter on the ground. Selection is material sorting, condensation and general 
editing for broadcast and print. Finally, production is the art and science of presenting news 
in format for its showing to the audience.
The ‘power’ of making the news happen boils down to the human factor in value- 
filtering all these structure and agency features. Peter Golding and Philip Elliot argue that
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news values are a corpus of ‘occupational lore’ implicitly and explicitly guiding ‘newsroom 
practice’. These qualifications determine how gathered information from the reporter on the 
ground makes the ‘public’ news: drama or story quality, entertainment, importance (e.g. 
historical, political, economic etc.), source credibility, size, proximity, negativity, political 
obstacles on the ground, immediacy, elites, personalities and in the medium of television, 
visual appeal as well (Golding and Elliot 1979, 114-123; Boyd-Barrett 1980, 74-79).9 There 
is no authoritative definition of what these mean in practice except for precedents offered by 
pioneering media models such as the BBC public broadcasting system, the laissez faire 
‘liberal-democratic’ system, the Soviet socialist model, the authoritarian-developmental 
model, or the practices pursued by the global news agencies.10 It has been a well-researched 
fact that the latter actively shape their affiliates’ and subordinate partners’ reporting and 
discriminatory selection practices in the various countries they serve. Meanwhile, at the 
‘centres’ where the newsfeeds are finally prepared for commercial despatch to regional and 
national news agencies, editorial control is exercised for value fit. One researcher, drawing 
upon empirical surveys of practising journalists in OECD countries, reinforced the prevailing 
sociological perception that journalistic ‘objectivity’ is a chameleon value, and what matters 
in judging journalism is the journalist’s degree of ‘active’ interest in information- 
construction (Paterson 1998). Michael Schudson, drawing upon a biographical comparison of 
two reputable early twentieth century western journalists, describes reporting as ‘an invention 
of the nineteenth century, a result of and a contributor to a democratic market society and an 
urban commercial consciousness.’ (Schudson 1988, 228) Both his journalistic subjects
9 The human tendentiousness in newsmaking perhaps reaches its extreme in war reporting as Phillip Knightley’s 
study points out: The First Casualty. From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, 
Propagandist and Myth Maker (1989).
10 Most countries tend to self-define their own models according to ‘national characteristics’, politics, ideology, 
demography, history etc. For reference see: Katz and Wedell (1977), Browne (1989), McDonnell (1991) and 
Fox (1997).
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admitted being intellectuals, Wall Street sympathisers or news trend-buckers in reporting
contra-realities and peculiarities. Schudson’s final definition of a reporter as ‘someone
faithful to sources, attuned to the conventional wisdom, serving the political culture of media
institutions, and committed to a narrow range of public, literary expression’ (1988, 239)11 is
echoed indubitably in CNN’s Christiane Amanpour’s comment to the International Herald
Tribune at the height of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo:
I have chosen to apply, to the best of my ability, contextual objectivity to all my 
reporting, especially during war and especially when confronted with the most serious 
crimes against humanity. I insist on putting my reports in context, and I am often 
strongly impassioned. I will not apply moral equivalents where none exist.. .Anyone 
indicted for the most grave of crimes against humanity is not a chat show guest. 
(Amanpour 1999)
In the light of the susceptible nature of news, the NWICO agenda’s overall charge of 
ideological bias against the prevailing global information flow remains valid in principle but 
lacks a plausible proposal for redress of political power in its call for institutional change and 
reallocation of resources. In a broader sense, assuming that propaganda ‘consists of the 
planned use of any form of public or mass-produced communication designed to affect the 
minds and emotions of a given group for a specific public purpose, whether military, 
economic or political’,12 newsmaking in its structural, agency and human characteristics may 
produce subtle propaganda power of unlimited potential. Lastly, within the context of 
globalization, the subjectivity of reporting also opens up questions of how far news as
11 Jeremy Tunstall writes that all news correspondents ‘operate within what they regard as some set of news 
values’ and ‘[uncertainty is inherent in both the news values and the degree of discretion in relation to news 
values’ even in specific work situations. (1971, 263) Similarly Boyd-Barrett’s study of international news 
agencies cautions that apart from the influence of the western market ‘feel’ of the ‘Big Four’ on news selection 
and editing, there was a ‘problem’ of both relying on non-English educated local journalists’ incompatible 
linguistic standards of reporting and the impossibility of eliminating formal and informal pressures imposed by 
his ‘home’ government and other local interests. (1980, 93) A new thread of news studies has thus emerged 
along these lines under the theme ‘sociology of news’. (Berkowitz 1997)
12 Paul M.A. Linebarger’s definition from a US military manual, Psychological Warfare (1948) adopted in 
Whitaker Jr. (1960, 5).
informational content is complicated by its medium and reach. Exacerbated by the end of 
bipolarity in world order, there are today significant increases in national, sub-national, 
transnational and individual sources of news driven variously by capitalism’s growth and the 
demands for political diversification after the Cold War. According to journalists and UN 
reports, ‘Iraq’, ‘Rwanda’, ‘Cambodia’, ‘the Balkans’, ‘Chechnya’, ‘East Timor’, 
‘Afghanistan’, ‘insurgency’, ‘massive capital flight’ and ‘human rights violations’, for 
instance, have made inroads against the traditional domination of the domestic news of 
Europe and North America in global information circuits (Utley 1997; Marthoz 1999, 80-81). 
A 1998 comparison between CNN and BBC-World television content indicated that 
combined European and North American items dominated at 63.4% and 53.6% for the 
respective stations. Relative airtime by region also showed that in the period surveyed, 
‘Africa’ occupied second spot with ‘Asia’ at five and ‘Middle East’ at six, with ‘Australasia’ 
and ‘Latin America’ coming last at eight and nine (Roe 2001, 275-276, tab.3-4). While 
making allowance for periodic fluctuations of newsworthiness, this western dominance is 
less overwhelming than expected. Some analysts attribute this to post-Cold War fluidity 
where ‘facts’ of otherness impinge upon forums of national consciousness through varying 
scales of shock and violence (Roe 2001; Strobel 1997). Disembedding of issues across time 
and space poses difficult dilemmas for newsmakers in terms of framing information 
importance on both national and global levels, and oftentimes inverting one for the other 
where terrorism, economic and environmental disasters are concerned. Additionally, the 
causality of what is to be reported as front-page, national or global might also be linked to the 
pure media forms themselves in their transmission, channelling and reception.
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2.3.2 Power Within the Medium
A medium, often construed as the conduit through which information passes, is 
effective only to the extent that the information is suitable for feeding into the transmitter, 
channel and receiver components. As described in Figure 1, the latter three can never in 
practice be regarded separately from the social forces husbanding their introduction and use. 
Utilising this model, it was shown in the ICT component of information globalization that 
technologies both ‘push’ social use, as well as being in turn, ‘pulled’ forward in evolution by 
social demand. This means that media has co-evolved the power to link source and 
destination simultaneously. Moreover, this twin dynamic created the one-dimensional power 
of technological reach towards far-flung comers of the globe connecting peoples and cultures 
whether they wish it or not.
To understand the specific power of the various media, the four mainstream examples 
of the newspaper, radio, television and the Internet will be examined in respective order in 
terms of their characteristics in presenting news. The newspaper was historically linked to 
news demand and a direct child of the Gutenberg revolution (Zaret 2000; Schmid 2000). 
Print on paper enjoyed the advantages referred to earlier in terms of lightness, portability and 
repeatability of information contained within both time and space. Not surprisingly, along 
with its sister form, the book, the newspaper evolved to serve politics, economics and lately, 
entertainment interests, as a recording medium and event-making register, and subsequently 
an organ of opinion on both the record and event. Its reliance on text demanded a certain 
literacy, intelligence and literary inclination on the part of readers.13 The need to read 
information naturally excluded sections of populations without basic education while at the
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same time, in a nationalistic sense, it united those who read and responded to the language of 
print (Stamm 1985; B. Anderson 1991). All this worked to create, in Habermas’ parlance, a 
public sphere of social communication and contestation,14 potentially shaping information 
catering to particular avenues of relevance. Not surprisingly, every contemporary newspaper 
presently contains an agenda, divided into sections with matching ‘correspondents’ and an 
editorial page commenting authoritatively on what it considers important issues. 
Furthermore, opposite the editorial page is usually a page for readers’ letters. Thus, through 
the evolution of both its readers’ services and formats, newspapers exercise editorial control 
over their readership in two and three-dimensional forms through framing (Keeble 1994, 
ch. 12).
Radio in contrast to newspaper is ‘purely auditory, consisting of speech, music, 
sounds and silence, and since...the ear is not the most “intelligent” of our sense organs, their 
deployment has to be relatively simple.’ (Crisell 1994, 5) Indeed most scholars would agree 
that radio had been invented in a drive for communications simplicity, as one might recall, 
for naval and transoceanic uses without the costs and effort of cable laying. In radio 
programmes, everything had to be ‘voiced’ and listenable: it worked on the time dimension 
and relied on evocation of mental pictures in building rapport with the audience. The power 
of radio lay in four features. Firstly, speech, music, sounds and silence concentrated 
reception of information to only one sensorial entry point -  the ear -  and this enabled radio­
communicated information to present an easy immediacy to the hearer (Cantril and Allport 
1971, 9-10). Secondly, once this information reached the brain, it had to be interpreted and
13 This is evident from sampling literature defining newspaper forms and journalistic creeds. See for reference: 
Bush (1929, 2-14), Rucker and Williams (1965, 3-7), Keeble (1994), and Lacey and Longman (1997).
14 Habermas’ public sphere will be elaborated in Chapter 3.
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‘imagined’ by the other senses of touch and sight. One scholar mentions the ‘bacon and eggs’ 
speech invocation (Crisell 1994, 8) as an example of the evocative power of listening, and so 
one might say the same when politicians use references to ‘Nazi death camps’, ‘infidels’ and 
‘new colonialisms’ to draw castigative parallels to genocides, invaders and MNC 
encroachments. Thirdly, radio’s premise of using a human voice as the dominant 
presentational form, or to supplement other sounds, generates a personal appeal that visual 
media such as television, film and newspaper cannot match (Crisell 1994, 120-125; Cantril 
and Allport 1971, 18). In political terms, addresses such as ‘dear citizens’, ‘dear comrades’ 
and ‘my fellow...’ prefacing a monologue or debate on air seldom fails to honour and 
privilege a physically absent, but nevertheless real, presence of the individual listener 
(Scannell 1996, 77-80, 89-92). Post-mortems on the causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
have attributed the radio ‘voice’ as the psychological context-setter and ultimately the media 
trigger for the mass bloodbath between Hutus and Tutsis (Kellow and Steeves 1998). 
Fourthly, radio reception equipment has also arrived at the stage where it ranges in size from 
high fidelity boxes to pocket-and-earphone inserts allowing it to be diffused cheaply and 
personally in great numbers across vast distances. A similar miniaturisation has accompanied 
the progress of radio transmission equipment. Radio’s power lies then in its voice 
transcription, blending of personability, and omnipresence. Hence its moulding of 
information content and impact is a manifestation of two and three-dimensional power of 
shaping opinions.
Television comes into its own as a medium fusing the characteristics of sound and 
sight, and within the latter, motion as well in the form of moving pictures. Both space and 
time dimensions are jointly involved in a broadcast in this medium, thereby inherently
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amplifying the complexity of its power over content. Television’s power lies in its selection 
ability, framed by the possibilities of camera and sound capture in tandem. Unlike the 
newspaper, the television camera is recording more than still life. Events happen and 
personalities orate, but they are projected to television viewers as either live dramas, as 
stored time-delayed occurrences, filtrates of capricious editing, or narrative biases 
irrespective of whether the content covered is a riot, election campaign or war.15 Coupled 
with sound accompaniment at every stage of movement, television produces and reproduces 
degrees of experience for the viewer. Coverage of political arguments on radio and television 
thus differ significantly in terms of the latter revealing additional sensorial details in regard to 
countenance, posture, eye contact, dress sense, and crowd noises, mattering as part of a 
holistic picture. It is not surprising that television has been described by McLuhan and others 
as a sense-surrounding medium demanding more attention than most other mass media 
(McLuhan 1974, 31-32, 329-334).16 Television’s power involves the audience’s senses in an 
atmosphere of near-totality, and is more so today with the fusion of high fidelity and IT into 
its amplification capacities. On the other hand, others might argue that television’s 
representation of images appeals to the emotions of both the illiterate and gullible by 
presenting reality through simplified chains of causality (Condry 1989; Hartley 1999, ch.l 1). 
Here lies its power, or danger. Television’s basic power possibilities may be one, two or 
three-dimensional, or all at once, since the camera can ‘select’ and present ‘reality’.
15 This is apparently a wide consensus exemplified by the following works: Hofstetter (1976), Conrad (1982, 
125-143), R. Williams (1990,48-49), Scannell (1996,7-21, 80-89) and Kern and Just (1997).
16 In his last and posthumously published collaborated work, McLuhan coins ‘robotism’ as a synonym for the 
‘hot medium’. This is because television, like robot technology and ‘right-hemisphere thinking’ (right brain), ‘is 
a capacity to be a conscious presence in many places at once.’ It is a condition where the right brain is 
‘stimulated by bright, sensuous images, music and random movement’ on the screen while the left hemisphere 
is lulled into a dormant state by pixellated, rapidly pulsing electric pictures. (McLuhan and Powers 1992, 83, 
87-88)
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Television, with its joint time and space characteristics, is particularly relevant to
globalization’s time-space distanciation element, and its furtherance. Since the late 1960s,
when satellite facilities enabled extraterrestrial broadcasting across the globe, television has
featured the occasional live sports and concert event. However it was not until the late 1980s,
culminating in the first globally televised war in the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, that live,
regular and direct global commercial television came of age in the form of CNN. This added
a new layer of power relations in the form of reporting immediacy, and an acceleration of
1
‘speed’ in the globalization of politics. The events of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm have produced a bumper crop of literature surveying the effects of real-time television 
on military operations focussing on the elements of surprise and instant communicability, 
and needs no reiteration here (Dunsmore 1997; Kellner 1992; Mowlana, Gerbner and Schiller 
1992). Pertinent to the present argument are the power implications of live global television. 
Firstly, reporting immediacy refers to roving, or pre-positioned, dispersed news teams’ 
ability to project live moving pictures anywhere in the world and to narrate unfolding events 
almost instantaneously so long as they are equipped with portable satellite uplink facilities 
(MacGregor 1997, 2-18, 174-201). This increases the overall possibilities of creating news 
across the globe, eliminates the remoteness of a location, and ‘forces’ an artificial and 
immediate consciousness of proximity onto the viewer.
Secondly, as a corollary to news immediacy, the so-called ‘CNN effects’ are 
unleashed upon governmental policymakers. Giddensian notions of disembedding political 
realities and pressures of reflexivity are urgently thrust on foreign policy bureaucracies
17 Although mainstream globalization theorists (e.g. Giddens, Luard, Spybey) and proponents of media 
globalization (e.g. Thompson, Maherzi and Pool) credit the media for collapsing boundaries, the thesis of 
technological speed as an important political mover is specifically alluded to by James Der Derian (1990, 1998).
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through the rapidity of event-creation by global news. It gives reporters the ability to reveal 
credibility gaps in official actions and reactions arising from the time lag between event and 
formal response, or in select cases, to compel policymakers to confront unthought-of issues 
(Flournoy and Stewart 1997, 59-69; Strobel 1997, 57-90). One author has summed up the 
military and political implications of the CNN effects in terms of accelerant (i.e. reduced 
decision-making time), impediment (repulsion against decisive action), and agenda-setting 
agencies (Livingston 1997). The last effect is most obvious in contexts such as the disastrous 
US-led UNOSOM II relief mission in Somalia in 1992-93. Lastly, global real-time television 
offers policymakers and other situational non-state actors a regular electronic commons for 
initiating and exchanging views and threats (MacGregor 1997,13-16). It also adds potency to 
‘public diplomacy’ where politicians and non-state entities can appeal directly over the heads 
of governments to their populations, potentially generating psychological ‘fifth column’ 
support for all belligerents alike in diplomatic and military rows. Power in broadcasts tends 
to assume a fluid aspect depending on the competence of message and image-making, and 
other public relations arts.
The fourth main medium, the Internet, can be said to take real-time television to its 
ultimate development into a multimedia and multipurpose tool with applications in 
economics, business, politics, entertainment and other social uses. As it was pointed out in 
Chapter l ’s discussion on the globalization of ICTs, IT’s potential fuses with and rides upon 
pre-existing technology especially that of cable and satellite systems connecting computer to 
television, film, telephone and facsimile in time and space-efficient terms. The Internet is 
more than its formal definition as a global network of computers: it can deliver flexible 
combinations of radio, television and interpersonal communications to and from one or
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several terminals in common digital format, plus providing the full range of computing 
capabilities: calculation, databases, design, demonstration and simulation. Transmission, 
reception and channel components are almost indistinguishable and the decentralising feature 
of user-user and user-machine interactivity creates an unprecedented cybernetic space (hence 
‘cyberspace’) for interpersonal linkages that transcend or extend geographical contiguity.18 
The digital elements of simulation and dispersible presence available in IT add a further, and 
postmodern possibility, of constructing presences that do not exist in ‘real life’. In this sense, 
one can never be sure if information and ‘activities’ on the Internet can ever be pinned down 
as one, two or three-dimensional power structures in an age of ‘trojan horse’ virus attacks, 
official and mirror homepages, virtual combat, virtual cities, and virtual lives (Brown 1997, 
211-226; Holmes 1997; Wilbur 1997, 5-22).
2.3.3 Power Within Media Ownership and Control
So far, the discussion of power within a medium has focussed exclusively on 
technological and operational form, but there is another ‘meta-level’ at which media power 
operates -  the firms, their corporate owners, and market activities. With the end of the Cold 
War, the popularity of the ‘Washington Consensus’ on free enterprise economic strategies, 
and the WTO pattern of sustained market liberalisation trends in telecommunications, global 
capitalism naturally forms the backdrop for examining power. As Strange argues, in political 
economy, there are two forms of power: relational and structural.19 The ‘relational’ 
corresponds in meaning to both this thesis’ working definition and to one-dimensional
18 This potential is outlined by a US government report titled Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for 
Cooperation. It was produced by a telecommunications working group which included public testimonies from 
major IT industry players and private sector chambers of commerce. (Gore and Brown, 1995)
19 Strange defined structural power as ‘the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political 
economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their 
scientists and other professional people have to operate.’(1994, 24-25)
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power, while the ‘structural’ corresponds to two and three-dimensional power, 
simultaneously. Once electricity began to transform communication, beginning with the 
telegraph, the tendency in Europe was to concentrate financial control in either state- 
approved private monopolies or outright state ownership. In the other major centre of 
innovation, the US, the profile was mixed, with certain media run wholly privately, while 
others, such as radio, were started off as approved commercial monopolies guided by US 
Navy and government priorities (Herring and Gross 1936; Luther 1988, 13-14, 22-23; 
Winston 1998, 27-29, 77-87). These early forms of ownership coincided with international 
rivalries, which tended to reinforce the power of the state in communications matters.
Yet in the US, where private interests had been instrumental in funding each new 
electrical ICT, they naturally wished to take their commercial profits. As such, the American 
market for telecommunications evolved a dynamic of competitive tension between monopoly 
and privatisation which in time allowed corporations such as General Electric, AT&T, ITT, 
Time-Wamer, Cable and Wireless, Reuters, AP, UPI, and eventually CNN, to flourish both 
by developing new commercial uses for existing communications inventions, and by cross- 
acquisition and alliance with rival companies across the Atlantic. Since the 1900s, over a 
span of 70 years, the shifts in government control to market-driven mass media 
corporatisation trends resulted in what Mattelart has mapped as ‘a locus of the new power’ in 
mass media ownership (Mattelart 1994, 62-65). Not surprisingly, this trend coincided with 
the eclipse of European geopolitical and economic power in world politics, and the 
emergence of a visible American ‘hegemony’ of social, military and economic models in the 
western world in strategic competition with the Soviets (Schiller 1992, 45-61). It is at this 
point that structural power enters the picture of media control. Applying Gramscian analysis,
95
where hegemony is built up by creating a form of consensual standard of superiority 
(Gramsci 1971, 161, 349-350), it can reasonably be argued that US media corporations had 
grown dominant beyond their national boundaries through business economies of scale 
arising from cross-ownership of complementary and rival systems such as telegraph-and- 
newspaper, telephone-radio-and-cable — subsequently adding radio stations, news wire 
services, television, satellite, film-making, Internet services and so on. All this was abetted 
by the Cold War-driven ‘military-industrial complex’ (H.I. Schiller 1992, ch. 2-6). This 
enabled a US ‘hegemony’ in R & D, oriented towards both setting international 
communication standards and controlling the supplies of that most malleable product, global 
news. The critiques of Herbert Schiller, Theodor Adomo and Max Horkheimer linking mass 
communications and the American empire, along with the elements of deception inside mass 
culture industries (Adomo and Horkheimer 1986, 120-167) argue for the media as dependent 
variables of structural power in a global political economy.
Today, following the early American example, transnational conglomerates of the 
likes of News Corporation, AOL-Time-Wamer, Bertelsmann Media Group, the Berlusconi 
Group, Sony, and CanWest Global Communications, just to name a few, operate in apparent 
global oligopoly with chameleon-like corporate identities. There are innumerable cross­
media, transnational and cross-corporate takeovers in a frenzied global marketplace, made 
possible by the ideology of economic liberalisation, institutionalised in the WTO (Tunstall 
and Palmer 1991, 2-6; Economist 1998b). However, this is an unstable oligopoly as attested 
to by many visible counter-trends. An oligopolistic mode of structural power is secure insofar 
as the players are able totally to limit consumer choice, especially to non-price competition, 
create insurmountable barriers to market entry by newcomers, and wield political clout by
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way of size and cartel bargaining. On all these counts, resistance or counter-power is being 
mounted from a number of fronts.
Firstly, economic globalization can be a contested development: national 
governments and regional organisations such as the EU are taking a regulatory interest in 
clamping down on global potential for monopolies. Witness for instance the Italian 
government’s proposal in early 1999 to legislate curbs against Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation’s plans to secure 100% broadcast rights for Italy’s Series A and B football 
matches by acquiring an 80% stake in Telecom Italia’s Stream pay-television arm (Ball 
1999). Across the Atlantic, the US government persisted with an anti-trust suit against 
Microsoft Corporation over the latter’s imposition of Internet Browser conditionality in its 
popular computer WINDOWS operating system (IHT 1999c). At the time of writing, 
Microsoft was still negotiating a settlement with both the US federal and state governments 
over WINDOWS access for rival software companies (Buckman and Kulish 2002). And in 
October 2000, the EU approved the AOL-Time Warner merger only after the two partners 
agreed to forego any exclusive music distribution deals with the Bertelsmann Group, which 
had also agreed to sell stakes in AOL’s European subsidiaries (Andrews 2000). It is 
worthwhile noting that although the European approach to corporate scrutiny is to ensure fair 
competition within an industry, and for the US, to protect consumer choice, both governing 
approaches seek to prevent monopolies (Davis and Raghavan 2001).
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Secondly, governments are still screening the political advances of media and 
telecommunications MNCs on national interest grounds.20 Witness the continuing 
enforcement of ‘public interest’ legislation against media companies in Britain, China, 
France, India, and in much of the developing world. CNN makes it a standard ‘good business 
policy’ not to offend national sensibilities in broadcasting and instead makes national 
broadcasters partners in the World Report series. Even Murdoch’s News Corporation has 
amended subsidiary Star TV’s satellite news content to please Beijing in order to facilitate 
further business opportunities (ST 1998; IHT 1999a). Conversely, authoritarian-style media 
monopolies within territorial states have become increasingly undermined by the advent of 
CNN-type global networks functioning as a diplomatic arena for political fencing, by the 
signal spill-overs of satellite television, and by the information liberating effects of the 
Internet. The pressures towards capitalist market liberalisation worldwide are another source 
of pressure on national regimes to relax state dominance in telecommunications and media. A 
tension thus obtains between market-oriented and dirigiste approaches towards controlling 
ICT companies at the present moment.
Thirdly, the ever lowering costs of ICTs, along with infinitely growing and 
segmenting telecommunications and entertainment markets have ushered in the entry of more 
small players, including some with national backing, serving niche markets. For example, 
NASA, INTELSAT, the European Space Agency and Hughes Corporation have been 
challenged by more than two dozen space industry newcomers in one or both categories of 
satellite construction and launching since the 1960s. Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia,
20 Resisting, controlling, or at the least, filtering the capitalist-technology dynamic of the free flow of 
information across borders has historically been a latent interstate bone of contention, but the advent of 
commercial direct broadcast satellites since the 1960s has stoked overt national sovereignty defences over
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Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom, 
including new private operators such as PanAmSat, have all entered the market 
(SatNews.Com 1999). In 2001, an estimated 15,000 companies, including both nationally 
and privately-owned ones, comprise the satellite industry (Satfinder 2001). These clearly 
serve as exemplars of the multiple counter-hegemonic sites of resistance identified by one 
study of US satellite policy (Comor 1998, 209-210). In the international news provision 
market, counter-hegemonic efforts began in the late 1960s with South-South news sharing 
networks such as the Inter Press Service, the Pan African News Agency, and in the 1990s, 
the Asian News Network and Channel News Asia. These are limited, however, to serving 
regional and developing country news. In the Middle East, the Arabic satellite television 
station Al-Jazeera has since 1996 gained prominence as a regional news provider with Arab 
cultural lenses (Seib 2001). The same counter-oligopoly trends are equally observable in the 
mobile phone and Internet Service Provider markets.
Lastly, consumers are also being empowered by the proliferation of choice on cable, 
satellite and in Internet services. Market surveys have shown, for instance, that satellite and 
cabled digital services do not necessarily enjoy accelerating sales in spite of free decoder 
giveaways. Consumers may well be saturated with choice, prefer tailored, localised 
information provision, or resist overly rapid format changeover (Parker 1997, 38-41; Robins 
1999, Pfanner 2002). The sluggish performance of BBC World's foray into the global 
television news market in fiscal 1998-99 was, for instance, attributed to consumer 
indifference stemming from more attractive local alternatives and CNN’s successful attempts 
to ‘go native’ in marketing niche programmes (Economist 1999b).
telecommunications issues in bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental forums. (Leeson 1984; Blatherwick
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The above instances of counter-hegemonic power appear as corrections within the 
‘marketization’ of the transmitter, channel and receiver components of information flow. The 
ephemeral coincidence of the demand and supply of information provision is neither 
economically nor politically optimal in the eyes of governments and consumers. 
Governments, whether elected or non-elected, police standards, while news providers enter a 
profitable market with governmental connivance or self-seeking profit motives, hence 
restoring competition to the market. On a deeper level, all these moves to correct the market 
are an outcome of constructive power exercised against rival forms. Before ‘anti- 
competition’ or the ‘preservation of national security’ can be used as explanations for 
clampdown, states must define the ‘undesirables’. Perhaps China and the EU have in 
common fears of untrammelled market power in information provision. Similarly, the 
creation of alternative service providers, both private and state-controlled, and regardless of 
their initial financial viability in a market of information, is designed to ensure choice stands 
as a check on monopolistic structural power. In this way, long-term accessibility to the 
transmitter, channel and receiver components will be kept open by finance or by fiat because 
information audiences and sources will always be vigilant on account of their need to keep 
information accessible. The audiences and sources have historically been the willing 
privatisers of the transmitters, channels and receivers, as we have seen in the development of 
the telegraph, television, satellite and Internet. In this analysis, the structural power of News 
Corporation or AOL-Time Warner will not significantly obstruct editorial freedom through 
achieving monopolistic market positions. When the counter-power of constructing their
1987).
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practices as ‘undesirable’ remains present and demonstrable, media corporations will always 
be mindful of being self-appointed censors or seekers of pure profit.
2.3.4 Power Towards and Within Destination (Audience and Noise)
The destination of information flow is its audience, which is defined by media 
scholars as ‘the unknown individuals and groups towards whom mass communications are 
addressed.’ (O’Sullivan et al. 1994, 19) The process of communication and the media 
employed seem to be coterminous with the audience in an arbitrary relationship. This has to 
some extent been bome out by the initial optimism with which the promoters of the 
telegraph, telephone and radio projected in terms of usage. More often than not, the audience 
proved elusive and behaved in unexpected ways. The Internet, for instance, began life as a 
US military project and has since been appropriated as a space for hosting terrorist 
propaganda (e.g. Tupac Amaru, Zapatistas), social matchmaking, and business advertising 
alike, as well as a channel for ‘virus bombing’ retaliation by opponents of the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The instability of the term ‘audience’ has divided media 
scholarship in myriad ways and by briefly tracing the variety of attempts to measure an 
audience, the power relations linking information source, media, and media control will 
inevitably surface. In the midst of such soul-searching fragmentation, media research has 
been driven back towards relocating media theorising within its sociological roots. In 
studying the reception of information within society, the intangible concept of noise (Figure 
1) becomes more visible in terms of factors intervening in the way people interpret and use 
information. The purpose of the following survey of ‘audience reception’ research is to 
interpret how the source or sender may or may not affect the destination or recipient in 
intended ways. This inconclusiveness will reveal that information reception whether
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nationally, or individually, may subjectively enjoy a ‘power of interpretation’ which the 
source may not have prefigured.
Research into audience responses began almost coincidentally with the introduction 
of mass radio broadcasts in the interwar years. The BBC’s public service monopoly faced 
competition from programmes beamed from continental Europe almost from the start, 
prompting the institution of listener surveys in retaining its listeners. Not long after, the 
Nazis’ use of propaganda spurred ‘effects analyses’ further afield in America where local 
researchers using quantitative methods pinned down ‘audiences’ based on simple 
stimulus/response questionnaires (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1968, 120-136; 
Lazarsfeld and Field 1946). In 1938, the radio play of H.G. Wells’ War o f the Worlds 
triggered panic among thousands in parts of the US, spurring a major study into radio­
induced psychology (Cantril 1940). Clearly, this was one and two-dimensional power 
persuasion at work. Adomo and Horkheimer, of course, took effects analysis to the extreme 
of criticising mass mediated culture in film, newspaper and radio as orchestrated deception 
for an industrial age (Adomo and Horkheimer 1986, 120-167). The key assumption in effects 
analysis was a docile audience. For almost 20 years, effects studies have emphasised media 
power in action in situations of political campaigns, advertising strategies, creation of social 
realities, norms, institutional change and cultural change (McQuail 1977, 73-90). If this had 
gone unchallenged, it would have skewed power origins exclusively towards the information 
source and media components, with noise treated as a pure technological bug.
The next shift emphasised audience and ideology in context. The ‘uses and 
gratifications’ (U & G) scholars focussed on the question ‘ask not what media do to people,
but ask what people do with media.’ (Palmgreen, Wenner and Rosengren 1952, 11) This 
opened up vistas of, firstly, looking at the audience as actively goal-driven in using media 
when faced with rival choices of need-satisfaction through other socially available avenues of 
gratification. And secondly, media and information sources can, through their unique 
characteristics, exposure and socialisation effects, induce certain gratifications at key 
moments (Palmgreen, Wenner and Rosengren 1952, 33-37). Knotting both social psychology 
and sociology together, U & G began an analysis of the audience, with concepts such as 
identity, values and belief-acquisition, and transactions, that view man-the-actor as an 
integral component of the world he moves within (Blumler 1952; Palmgreen and Rayburn II 
1952; Wenner 1952). It is only by adopting a U & G approach that one might assert that in 
some developed countries in the 1990s, a consumerist demand-driven shrinkage of 
intellectual and foreign news has taken shape, and mainstream news space dominated by 
pragmatic forecasting and the cultural aesthetics of social escapism (Economist 1998a; Feiler 
1998). The possibility of manipulation was now less important than the nature of the 
audience itself. And in cases where media effects appear as unexpected from the view of the 
source, ‘noise’ can be attributed to audience beliefs that operate in the hidden second and 
third dimensions of power.
U & G is a short step from exploring the agenda-setting possibilities conditioning 
audience behaviour, particularly the role of ideology operating in text-reader relationships. 
This approach saw meaning becoming ‘encoded’ in messages for transmission and having to 
be ‘decoded’ by the audience. Here, a dominant ideology may operate uniformly at both 
source and destination, thus maintaining a circular hegemonic discourse in culture, economy 
or polity. However, this model allows for resistance and independence on the part of
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audiences, for they may possess ethical, religious or other ideological systems which do not 
instantaneously match the encoded text. Possibilities for independence will exist where 
textual meanings are decoded in negotiated modes, where the dominant ideological discourse 
is accepted but in adaptation to specific local, individual conditions; or in opposition modes, 
where the ideological codes are deliberately misread or re-read according to audience- 
specific preferences (Hall 1980; Eco 1984; Morley 1980). This last mode can be exemplified 
by the respective responses in the late 1990s of Tibetans and Montenegrins to Chinese 
discourses of a ‘Chinese socialist state’ and Serbian adherence to a rigid Yugoslav Federation 
as legitimations of dictatorship. In many ways then, ideological readings suggest hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic power relations of the Gramscian variety.
The final cluster of audience theories takes the scrutiny of audiences into the 
heterogeneity-privileging postmodern realm. Audiences are viewed through lenses of almost 
limitless subjectivity. One approach hails from French poststructuralist theory and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis: audiences are subjects unto the media they are receiving or using; and the 
meanings they derive are similarly reproductions of what the media depicts as real in 
discursive form. This approach dominated cinematic studies beginning in the mid-1970s 
(MacCabe 1974; Sobchack 1995; Friedberg 1995). Another strand stresses the ‘ethnographic 
approach’ where the audience’s individual, cultural, religious or geographical specificities 
are utilised as perspectives through which to apprehend their subjective modes of reception 
of mediated information flows. It takes off from the anthropological obsession with seeing 
the world from the native’s point of view (Moores 1993, 3-5, 32-69, 117-140). In this light, 
one researcher has argued that the apparent worldwide popularity of Dallas in the early 
1980s had more to do with individual emotional appeal and gender-differentiated empathy
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than any blanket exercise of hegemony by American culture (Ang 1985, 1990). This same
author has even argued for the next-step conversion of all of audience studies into the
postmodern realm on the grounds that
...variation — e.g. in audience readings and pleasures — is not the result of 
autonomy and independence, as the liberal pluralists would have it, but emerges out 
of the inescapably overdetermined nature of any particular instance of subjective 
meaning production. The latter is traversed by a multiplicity of power relations, the 
specifics of which cannot be known ahead of time precisely because their 
articulations are always irreducibly context-bound. (Ang 1996, 171)
This comment sums up the micro-agencies of power existing in the shift from media 
and source-dominant effects analyses to the focus on audiences’ uses-and-gratifications, 
ideological conditions, and postmodern film studies, and on to ethnographic studies. The 
audience appears to possess a subjective independence in interpreting information, but on the 
other hand, attention is drawn to how obscured power lurks in socialisation forces which 
require more than Lukes’ two and three-dimensional explanations if we are to relate 
audiences to the politics of information flow.
The preceding examinations of power repositories and relations within information 
flow now allow the following conclusions about power:
(1) Information sources, including information-creation in inexorably social contexts, are 
need-driven, embedded in structure and agency, and involve the human factor in 
newsgathering, inside or outside newsrooms and bureaucracies. Information thus contains 
biases reflecting the two and three-dimensional power of those persons and practices who 
comprise the source.
(2) The media, comprising transmitter, channel and receiver components do not act as neutral 
conductors; instead their formats bear evidence of their social creation, and this endows 
information transmission and reception with power in terms of specific, subtle impacts on the 
audience. Newspapers demand intellect and literacy in reading and impose recorded realities
, on information. Radio presents information personally and emotionally through auditory 
representation. Television as a multi-sensory medium, possesses two and three-dimensional
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power to determine ‘eventfulness’, and this is supplemented with more potency by the time- 
acceleration factor and time-space distanciation effects of real-time satellite broadcasts, 
thereby connecting local politics into an electronic global arena. The Internet takes two and 
three-dimensional power to a new extreme in its fusion of high fidelity in picture and sound 
reproduction with simulation-capable IT in both real-time and delayed time.
(3) Media ownership’s impact on information control shows mixed results: the ownership of 
fledgling media companies has evolved historically from relational power to structural 
power, through privatisation towards oligopolies combining various media formats. 
However, oligopolistic structural power in its two and three-dimensional senses is challenged 
by governmental regulation and outright clampdowns, consumer preferences, technological 
diffusion, and market expansion which emboldens new corporate entrants. Both media 
ownership, and the resistance against oligopoly, demonstrate the power to construct and 
counter-construct access.
(4) Analysis of the destinations of information flow reveals that audiences and their reactions 
are potentially co-constituted by the media and information sources. Hence, audiences are 
partly vulnerable to construction by power. And where noise appears to produce unexpected 
effects on the audiences’ reception of information, it has been suggested by some studies that 
the human audiences possess their own individual or collective power in interpreting 
information received. Hidden power relations seem possible in both directions. The source 
and the media socialise the audience. The audience may yet demonstrate independence in 
response, which then compels change in the market-sensitive media.
, Power emerges as omni-directional, non-hierarchical, fluid and lacking substantive centres. 
Although Lukes’ one, two and three-dimensional power schema has been useful in 
interrogating power within each flow component, it is unable to account for the fragmented 
result of power relations within the whole process of information flow. No singular grand 
narrative of information power is ever likely to be possible (McQuail 1994, 379-382; 
Eldridge 1993, 348-349; Braman 1995; Alleyne 1995, 2-5; Couldry 2000, 39-61), given the 
nature of information as a carrier of meaning, as elaborated in the Introduction. Information 
is, at core, a construction and it can, in turn, structure reality in its very formation, and in the 
ways it is projected. Even media ownership is vulnerable to others’ long run portrayal of it. 
Power in information and its flow does not reside permanently and visibly in physical 
coordinates, due to the ever-globalizing reach of each new ICT, the contemporary spread of
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capitalist knowledge industries, market liberalisation and surveillance, as well as the 
geopolitical fluidity unleashed by the collapse of international bipolarity.
In this vein, the postmodernists rightly argue that knowledge is no longer unilinear, 
fixed, nor homogeneous as it was in modernity, and this is reflected in the new 
problematiques and inquiries into power. Jean-Francois Lyotard’s analysis of the postmodern 
condition has postulated that technological transformations alone, as in communications, are 
individuating the knower and knowledge, and increasingly rendering knowledge a product 
for consumption (Lyotard 1984, 3-5). Vattimo has made the parallel point that the world is 
today a society of communication in the sense that information flow depicts the world 
through ‘images’ and it is simultaneously a world ‘known and constructed’ and 
‘distinguished’ by its self-expression through ‘the human sciences’ (Vattimo 1992, 16). 
Michel Foucault further extends the argument of information heterogeneity into the analysis 
of contemporary societies and ourselves as constituted by ‘regimes of truth’, which he also 
terms ‘ “general politics” of truth’ (Foucault 1980, 131).
In his genealogical studies on asylums, prisons and sexuality, he has outlined a shift 
in the political economy of power from the crude relational form used in this Chapter’s initial 
working definition to structural forms including subtler procedures, mechanisms and 
disciplines, as through corrective penal systems, and subjectivizing the individual within 
disciplinary discourses such as the human sciences. All this evolution occurred in keeping 
with modernity’s premise of ‘extending’ control over circumstances, and aiming towards the 
perfection of human life. Truth then, as composed in disciplinary discourses, is ‘a thing of 
this world’. It is dressed firstly in scientific and institutional garments designed to sanction
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jointly specific truthful objects and corresponding falsities, and secondly, in the derived 
status of the experts who authoritatively coin them, as well as all the techniques and activities 
directed towards truth seeking (Foucault 1980, 131-132; 1991, 24-31, 136-139; 1984, 386- 
388). In this vein, it is not difficult to comprehend the operation of late twentieth century 
capitalist knowledge practices and ideological rivalry within a framework of manufactured 
truth.
Similarly, with reference to information sources, the media as transmitters, channels 
and receivers, media ownership, and fractured notions of audiences, each component can be 
said to contain their own versions of regimes of truth in the forms of nuances in phrasing, 
justifications for choices of transmission/reception, exclusionary programming, and 
ideological motivations. Each of these is not absolute and unchallengeable on their own. 
Within each flow component, as we have seen, truth is often rivalled by counter-truths, for 
example, in the way that news production inevitably provokes charges of bias, or where 
newspapers, radio, television and Internet compete for representational ascendance, access 
and coverage amongst one another.
Power should then be analysed through intangible descriptive categories such as 
‘system of differentiations’, ‘types of objectives’, ‘means of bringing power relations into 
being’, ‘forms of institutionalization’ and ‘degrees of rationalization’. The exercise of power 
operates when it is ‘elaborated, transformed, organized; it endows itself with processes which 
are more or less adjusted to the situation.’ (Foucault 1982, 223-224) Power can even be said 
to operate as situations of conflict where a pole of antagonism provokes its own confronting 
force, for conflict itself implies a power condition or relationship. The abstraction of power
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relations leads one to construe it in the form of a discourse (or discipline): it is holistically a
regime of truth, but in its specifics, it is
.. .made up of a limited number of statements for which a group o f conditions of 
existence can be defined...; it is from beginning to end , historical — a fragment o f 
history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself posing the problem o f its own 
limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes o f its temporality rather 
than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time. (Foucault 1997, 
117)21
Foucault arrived at this definition through a deconstruction of the emergence of psychiatric 
discourse in the nineteenth century. The sexual, penal norms and pathological symptoms of 
individuals were initially dispersed and distant from the family, judicial systems and the 
search for clinical precedents in police methods until they were intentionally compared, 
delimited and specified in relationships of meaning with one another. Human agency acting 
under a cult of inventive methodology thus established the scientific bases for law and order
99(Foucault 1997, 42-46). In Foucaultian terms, power is never construed as a singular object 
but instead as an exercise, a relation, a specific set of conditions of existence defining itself, 
and therefore functioning as a discipline in both senses of systems of control behaviour and 
science. Power and information constitute one another, and being discourses, possess no 
specific hub but may manifest ‘agents of liaison’ who function to deploy these discourses in 
operationalising subjection of individuals, societies, states and institutionalising control
9 *>
(Foucault 1980, 51-52, 62). The physical manifestations of these agents in information 
globalization would be in the form of government leaders, diplomats, financial analysts, 
journalists and non-state actors acting as initiators of information as ‘news’, ‘reports’, and 
‘studies’ characterising situations in degrees of desirability or undesirability. An example of
21 Italics mine.
22 Foucault’s understanding of discourse as a vocabulary loaded with a limited range of unique meanings, 
judgements and commitments is echoed by two of his postmodern contemporaries, Connolly (1983, 2-3) and 
Laclau (1990,28-29).
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the political implication of power as discourse is given by Foucault himself in a comment on 
geography:
Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, 
displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge 
functions as a form of power and, disseminates the effects of power. There is an 
administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass 
via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms 
of domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory. And the 
politico-strategic term is an indication of how the military and the administration 
actually come to inscribe themselves both on a material soil and within forms of 
discourse. (Foucault 1980, 69)
Likewise, when power is applied as discourse within information globalization, one
can reasonably argue that information sources, media, media owners, and audiences possess
their own discourses, rival and counter-discourses, which may or may not coincide, but are
more likely to conflict. This conflict is seen in the NWICO debate on western imperialism in
reporting developing countries, and the presumption of ‘Hollywood’s invasion’ of domestic
media markets and social consciousness. The NWICO debate can then be deconstructed into
Third World protest discourses against the global news agencies, the media technologies’
implications, media ownerships, and possibly a discursive reflection on their hegemonic
construction of their docile home audiences as well. Alternatively, discourse analysis is
equally applicable to the political information context contained in the following excerpt
from a single International Herald Tribune editorial authored five days before NATO
hostilities against Serbia in March 1999:
While Slobodan Milosevic wages his war against civilians in Kosovo, he is also 
cracking down on freedom of expression at home in Serbia. This is no coincidence. 
Every time the United States threatens Mr. Milosevic and does not follow through, he 
has an excuse to turn on those he regards as internal enemies. Repression of all 
independent media in turn allows the Serbian dictator to fill his airwaves with hateful 
nationalist and anti-American propaganda. Whipping up nationalist support for his
23 This is acknowledged even by scholars of the bureaucratic power of information control. (Sadofsky 1990, 13- 
24)
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brutal campaign against the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo then helps him solidify his 
grip on power despite the economic misery he has brought on....
Poison at home promotes instability throughout the neighborhood. Official media 
helped produce the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in the first half of this decade. Now 
they are providing a cover for Mr. Milosevic’s crimes in Kosovo. Europe and the 
United States once again are vacillating on whether to stand up to this evil. Until they 
do, it will continue to expand. (IHT 1999b)
Here is an implicit sampling of conflicting discourses which are symptomatic of the contrast
and conflation of news and audience political perceptions within information globalization:
Slobodan Milosevic’s exercise of sovereign government in Serbia versus his deeds of
misgovemment from a US and European viewpoint; normatively independent media versus
the turpitude of repressing the media; righteous European and US concern for Kosovar
Albanians versus officially-organised domestic criminality in Serbia and Kosovo with
‘neighbourhood’ consequences. These battles of discourses served as trials of scrutiny that
clearly preceded the decision for the subsequent exercise of hard military power by the
parties scripted into this discursive contest. Once the campaign got underway, UN Secretary-
General Annan declared Kosovo a ‘human rights tragedy’ and a test for the international
community: ‘with the eyes of the world on us, it is imperative that we aid the uprooted and
brutalized people of Kosovo now...’ (Annan 1999). Whose eyes, whose world and whose
imperative to aid is clearly an issue of discourse, here probably shaped by those who
commenced the military bombardment.
2.4 Information Globalization Implies Space for Scrutiny
The preceding expositions in this Chapter have shown that information flow in its 
components comprise omni-directional and decentred power relations that are best analysed 
using the postmodern concept of power as discourse. Discourses in a Foucaultian definition 
are transversal formations of information which subjectify persons, societies and nation­
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states in a selective constellation of meaning and which possess unlimited capabilities of 
legitimising the deployment of more traditional forms of hard power. Hard power such as 
military strikes, occupations, embargoes, severance of ties, and physical demonstrations are 
oriented towards achieving certain objectives structured intrinsically to the discourse itself. 
The interplay of diverse discourses within information globalization presupposes an 
existence of a space for discursive conflict, which may also serve at times as an arena for 
benign inter-discursive dialogue towards pacific ends in international relations. Chapter 3 
follows on by elaborating the nature of this ‘global information space’ and accounts for the 
great likelihood of discourses acting as defences for nation-state communitarianism, in a 
globally cacophonous politics. Communitarian discourses then become the foundation for 
foreign policy, and hence of soft power itself.
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CHAPTER 3
GLOBAL INFORMATION SPACE, DISCURSIVE COMMUNITY
AND SOFT POWER
3.1 Introduction: Politics within Global Information Space
The concept of space is integral to the structural effects of information 
globalization. The latter’s three components, that is, the reach of ICTs, globalizing 
capitalism, and post-Cold War fluidity, impact on nation-state arrangements by 
precipitating a new sense of scrutiny from both ‘outside-in’ and ‘inside-out’ in regard to 
the politics of identity, community and security. In this regard, information 
globalization’s impact upon foreign policy can only be evaluated through the former’s 
spatial transformation of the latter’s borders of accountability, that is, the uncoupling of a 
territorially bound power centre from its circumscribed enclosure of authority into a 
decentred wider sphere of alternative authorities around the globe.
This Chapter will elaborate on the polycentric and malleable notion of the ‘global 
information space’ in terms of its composition of overlapping layers of scrutiny and 
contestation enabled by ICTs, transnational capitalist practices and ideological 
efflorescence in post-Cold War politics. These overlaps produce an imperfect but 
operational global public space that is vulnerable to domination by discourses carried or 
initiated at every stage of the information flow. The idea of a ‘public’ space, which was 
originally derived from the context of a national democracy, is predicated on two 
consequentialist arguments made since the dawn of western civilisation. Firstly, it 
developed from the need to manage common consequences arising from particularistic 
interests affecting other particular parties within connectable proximity, with a view 
towards attaining a jointly optimal outcome for all. Secondly, ‘the public’ developed from 
a free-market driven need for the dissemination and consumption of information
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independent of absolutist government beginning in the seventeenth century. This 
historical argument led to the concept of a public sphere as one where intellectual critical 
and rational debate (Habermas 1991, 27, 52) occurred on matters of governance and any 
matters deemed of interest to the subjects of a collective authority.
It will be argued that global information space, as a global public sphere, 
resembles the features and faults of the national public sphere, except for the unrealised 
potential of world government. Each nation-state presently acts in the capacity of 
particularistic interest with respect to one another, and to any institutions loosely 
administering international, and transnational non-state issues. To the 1891 nation-states 
currently in existence, might be added numerous transnational, national and sub-national 
non-state actors, with their own particularistic interests. These interests pose a difficulty 
of central governance in global information space where they frequently conflict over 
their relative prioritisation. This in turn leads to the further challenge of constituting order 
between the extremes of anarchy and world democratic government. Being also 
characterised by surveillance and discursive activities, this space tends to resemble a 
Hobbesian state of nature in terms of the availability and trial of ideas from multiple 
sources. Its interpretation as either anarchy or world democracy would then depend on 
one’s form of analysis.
Within this intra-space conflict of ideas, discourse becomes available as power as 
argued in Chapter 2, and in this light, the idea of ‘world public opinion’ may supervene 
over interest diversity. Especially amidst the fluidity of the post-Cold War era, discourses 
that attract or mould a politically sizeable coalition of interests can potentially exercise 
hegemony and deny human differences through international regimes and humanitarian
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interactions. It becomes not only a question of democracy and the protection of particular 
interests within a struggle for world public opinion; it is also an arena of struggle over 
meanings of identity and community.
The nation-state will be defended as a necessary agent of national identity and a 
sense of particularistic community amidst a cacophonous global information disorder. 
Towards this end, a soft power foreign policy has to be employed to support community 
and identity, and at this point, discursive power becomes soft power. Soft power is the 
ability to achieve one’s goals through the appeal of ideas, instead of coercion, and as it 
will be argued, is based on projecting a credible communitarian existence to public, 
omnidirectional political audiences. The detailed characteristics of soft power as a foreign 
policy instrument will thus be enumerated after outlining the nature of global information 
space, the ramifications of world public opinion, and the reactionary value of the nation­
state, all as implications of information globalization.
3.2 Global Information Space as Polycentric Space: Media, Economic and Political
Global information space is the direct consequence of information globalization 
acting as a multidimensional information flow inducing a climate of scrutiny. To 
comprehend the former’s polycentric characteristics, a layered analysis needs to be 
rendered of each of information globalization’s three components: the global reach of 
ICTs, globalizing capitalistic practices, and post-Cold War world politics. These 
correspond to discussions of global media space, of economic space, and of political 
space. It will be argued that these overlap one another to form a political global 
information space.
1 According to official membership or permanent observer status at the UN, 17 January 2002.
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Global Media Space
First, consider how ICTs have transformed space. Each of the communications 
technologies from stone through papyrus to the Internet has clearly established linear and 
bilinear connectivity between two points in physical geography. They shrink distance 
according to their differential rates of speed in transmission, channel and reception. 
Territorial space, as the examples of the British Empire and American superpowerdom 
historically indicate, is mastered from a metropolitan centre in so far as information of 
social, economic and political changes in the ‘periphery’ can be efficiently tackled with 
instructions and material force (Headrick 1991; Hugill 1999). Besides the control and 
response speed, the evolution of ICTs, beginning especially with electricity, opened up 
another non-state, non-territorial dimension: the space within networks of ICT terminals. 
Conversational space between two telecommunication points has always existed all along 
electric cables, and this potential is multiplied exponentially when the exchange enables a 
simultaneous teleconference. The same is achieved by radio and television, but with more 
features added to conversational space: quality sound and sight. The earth-orbiting 
satellite contributed simultaneity to this list, and overcame the disadvantages of cable 
laying. The microchip, working through computer and Internet not only enhanced two- 
way sight, sound and simultaneity, it also transformed electronic space into cyberspace. 
Cyberspace, inspired by the foundational concept of cybernetics, allows limitless 
information storage, retrieval, simulation and feedback.
In this regard, McLuhan’s concept of the electronic global village usefully informs 
the analysis of transnational media space. Internet and interactive radio and television 
formats ensure ‘that we live in an electric environment of information coded not just in
<http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm>
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visual but in other sensory modes.’ (McLuhan and Fiore 1968, 7) These fused 
communication media ensure that human senses relating to media are ‘outered’ and 
‘innered’ in consciousness simultaneously: experiencing information via media becomes 
a total experience by placing the viewer and actor into each other’s positions through 
visual, sonic and feedback possibilities in almost real time. This is the action of time- 
space distanciation and the disembedding of social experience from locality, causing the 
participants involved to experience reflexivity of self-examination in reaction to 
information received from elsewhere. McLuhan and Powers go on to elaborate this as 
acoustic space where experience is had from all directions in the respective senses 
(McLuhan and Powers 1992, ch. 3-5, 7-8; McLuhan and Fiore 1968, ch. 1). Cyberspace 
has neither fixed centre nor margin; anywhere can be a centre so long as ICTs exist. 
National borders are irrelevant to cyberspatial existence, only ‘centers of thought and 
influence’ matter (McLuhan and Powers 1992, 89-91, 93-94, 113-118; McLuhan and 
Fiore 1968, 180-186). It is in this sense, using ‘cyberspace’ as a metaphor for the global 
electronic newspaper, 24-hour satellite and cable television, radio and Internet, that one 
can assert that a global media space has been in operation since the early 1990s. At the 
same time, global print news in the form of Time, Newsweek, Economist, Wall Street 
Journal, Financial Times and the International Herald Tribune, have also proved their 
ability to coexist with and augment the more efficacious reach of round-the-clock 
electronic media. Here audiences have been enticed and retained by most newspapers’ 
diversification into web editions, the offering of rapid and inclusive editorial forums 
online, and in general, offering news features on both paper and Internet tailored to 
individual tastes (Crampton 2001; Borzo 2001). In this media space, coextensive with 
satellites and cables, national politics can be supported, queried and bombarded with
2 McLuhan’s foresight in imagining the electronic global village is complimented by Michael Vlahos’ 
imitative concept of ‘infosphere’, which he describes as a fusion of the world’s communication networks, 
databases and sources of information into a heterogeneous ‘electronic interchange’. (1998)
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information from any political actor virtually anywhere and anytime with discursive 
power at omnipresent transmission terminals.
Global Economic Space
Economic spaces, previously defined and limited by ideology and technology 
nationally, and by geopolitics of formal empire, have increasingly grown in 
interconnection since 1945 into a pattern of global economic space. As Chapter 1 has 
pointed out, capitalism is by nature a practice based on information-seeking production 
and consumption in relation to the function of price movements and factor allocations. 
Relying on the efficient connectivity within media space, entrepreneurs will always seek 
out the best prices, and sellers supply according to profitability. A space dimension, 
encompassing even time, inherently exists in the search for market equilibrium in 
transactions. To illustrate the political choices behind all these spatial information 
practices, they must be traced firstly, as a recent historical victory of a neo-liberal 
political momentum and its embodiment in ideas; and secondly, as a catalysed result of 
ICT effects.
First, consider the globalizing trajectory of neo-liberalism. Markets in the pre- 
1945 periods have operated in closed mercantilist fashion whether they occur in the guise 
of ‘continental systems’, ‘empire preferences’, or in mixed feudal and market forms in 
pre-modem societies. It required the conjunction of World War Two and the rise to 
worldwide geopolitical pre-eminence of the US that allowed the widespread incorporation 
of a neo-liberal form of capitalism into national economies. American economic 
leadership, or benign hegemony according to certain accounts (Kindleberger 1974; 
Krasner 1976; Strange 1989), created the Bretton Woods financial system and a free trade
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regime called the GATT. These were essentially systems of interlocking surveillance and 
multilateral cooperation dedicated to greasing the operation of capitalism by spotting 
traffic flow (i.e. goods, money, practices) problems and remedying them wherever they 
occur, nationally or transnationally. While these measures were boycotted and rivalled by 
the central planning model of the communist bloc for 45 years, the non-communist 
economies integrated themselves into cross-border flows of trade, capital and currency 
convertibility mechanisms. Although most economic historians would treat 1971 as a 
hiatus in the postwar economy when the US unilaterally ended the fixed dollar-gold 
conversion rate it maintained since 1945, external and multilateral flows continued to 
generate a widening transnational economic space (Van der Wee 1991, ch. I, VI; Agnew 
and Corbridge 1995,164-207; Greider 1997).
This neo-liberal transnational economic space was upheld initially, but not 
completely, by American interests through the Marshall Plan, other unilateral, IMF and 
World Bank loans, and positive trade discrimination measures to aid the strengthening of 
her European, Asian and other non-communist allies. The majority of newly-decolonised 
developing countries, who were nominally neither members of the western nor Soviet 
camps, were inducted into this capitalist economic space by both their opportunism in 
development planning, and their need to retain post-colonial sources of wealth generation 
through access to the markets of the former colonial metropoles (Van der Wee 1991, 401- 
404; Worsley 1984, 297-328; Skidelsky 1996, 87-88). In this way, most Third World 
economic spaces, in spite of their domestic hybrid practices of Keynesianism, 
protectionism and central planning, were joined into a neo-liberal capitalist surveillance 
system.4 Dependency theorists have elaborated extensively on the camouflaged neo­
3 This term refers in a general sense to the principles of elimination of trade barriers and limited 
governmental economic intervention at home and abroad.
Surveillance is written into the IMF and World Bank mandates. See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2.
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imperialist nature of these post-colonial trade and financial links (Frank 1971), but these 
ideological arguments of an unequal capitalist world system still do not negate the 
broader argument that a transnational economic space was evolving into a global one. 
Ultimately, even the counter-plan of a communist economic bloc in the form of 
COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), proved futile by the late 1970s. 
The USSR and China saw benefits in selling natural resources and limited amounts of 
light industrial products to the non-communist world to earn the foreign exchange 
necessary for purchasing western and Japanese technology for their domestic 
development.
Although this is not the place to debate closed and open models of development, it 
is important to note, from the above description, that development in the postwar and 
postcolonial contexts placed many of the world’s nation-states in a spatial quandary 
against the western vision of neo-liberal multilateralism, which was effectively the only 
viable ‘engine’ of recovery and growth (Skidelsky 1996, ch. 7-8). An autarkic indigenous 
path of development for the Third World meant depressing standards of living and getting 
limited mileage from scarcities of capital, technology and skill. For the non-communist 
combatants of World War Two, turning inward meant a possible financial collapse akin to 
the interwar precedents of post-Versailles Germany, mercantilism and the ferment of 
Marxist revolutionary conditions. Among the less-developed members of COMECON, 
Stalinism provided a limited boost for short-term growth. But over the long term, central 
planning revealed its sharp contradictions in demand and supply, as well as technological 
stagnation, which became the ironic price of maintaining an enforced economic stability. 
In contrast, and in spite of cyclical economic contractions, capitalist economic space 
created within it a flourishing trade in consumer and industrial goods, and effected 
transfers of skilled and unskilled labour. It encouraged individual investors and MNCs to
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go beyond national territories to exploit imbalances in development needs according to 
the ‘invisible hand’ of demand and supply. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods financial 
architecture provided emergency credit facilities to states in the form of the IMF and 
World Bank. That a neo-liberal global economic space was, by demonstration effect, in 
the ascendance was reinforced by the events of 1989-91 when the ‘Second World’ 
collapsed politically and economically; or in the case of China and Vietnam, reinvented 
themselves as hybrid-capitalists to fit into the neo-liberal system of economic 
surveillance.
The other prime generator of global economic space is the specific linkage of the 
market to the global capabilities of ICTs. The latter have affected actors and activities in 
terms of time-space compression, speed and variety of economic information. 
Computerisation of stock exchanges and the introduction of live satellite news on 
television and Internet translate into rapid updating of prices and financial confidence, 
thereby catalysing the speed and volume of buying and selling reactions. On a larger 
scale, technology enables time and space to be compressed into simultaneous trading on 
exchanges in overlapping daylight time zones, and some stocks such as Unilever, are 
cross-listed in London and Amsterdam, or in the case of HSBC Holdings, cross-listed in 
London and Hong Kong. Trading can take place literally 24 hours. When one exchange 
closes for the day, another picks up at another site. Additionally, the Internet-enabled on­
line trading networks are giving established physical bourses competition on price, speed 
and in virtual time (Henriques 1999; Treaster 1999). The easy accessibility of round-the- 
clock trading offers the individual investor broadened choices of trading hours and 
location while experts caution that ‘after-hours’ trading in light volumes can exaggerate 
price swings, trigger excessive volatility, and cause lapsed state protection for investors
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(Wyatt 1999; Morgenson 1999). Policing Internet transactions is also likely to be 
complicated by volume, speed and location.
ICTs have also transformed intra-MNC trade and corporate working styles. 
Within MNCs, new concentrations and further specialisation beyond a physical division 
of labour between production stages and units is now a reality. Cities such as New York, 
London, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore, equipped with advanced ICT infrastructure 
become companies’ ‘command points’ in organising economic strategy, research and 
development, as well as marketplaces for financial and other data services for firms 
(Knox 1995, 232-247; Sassen 1998, 179-182). These services, which rely on cyber and 
fibre-optic networks, are then contracted out to pure information corporations such as 
British Telecom, AT&T and Compaq to manage as exclusive intranets operating via the 
infrastructure of the worldwide Internet (Sassen 1998, 185-194). Rival ‘Silicon Valleys’ 
in Bangalore, Hong Kong, Seattle, Singapore and Tel Aviv are new actors within a global 
Internet economy. On the micro-level of the work team and department within the firm, 
videoconferencing in high-technology collaboration across continents, remotely 
networked supplier-customer chains and ‘teleworking’ from home are now equipping 
even medium-sized firms with unprecedented market flexibility. Product development is 
speeded up using resources of several locations simultaneously and skilled recruitment 
can access labour markets beyond local environments (Economist 1999c; IHT Sponsored 
Section 1999a; Tedeschi 1999). This global essence o f ‘e-business’ is accentuated by the 
time-space connectivity of satellite transponders. All these point to the discursive power 
of problem construction and solution being shifted sideways and downwards from the 
major industrial states and corporate headquarters.
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Clearly, global economic space has evolved as the triumph of neo-liberal market 
ideology and efficient media technologies. The latter ensures that capitalist activity is 
coterminous with the physical expanse of the globe, and not just with the formal 
international links between countries; while states now serve as (de-) regulatory bases in 
freeing up resources and skills for economic efficiency across geography. This state of 
affairs does not mean that market imperfections disappear as the 1970s oil shock, the NIC 
‘miracles’, Third World debt and currency volatility attest. The playing field of actors has 
nevertheless become vaster, more competitive, allows the dispersal of advantage and 
generates intensified demands for factor-of-production-hospitable development and 
governance strategies. This ideational aspect of organising for economic competition 
nationally, subnationally, or supranationally becomes political at global forums where 
nation-state representatives increasingly concede attention and bargaining space for 
corporate and individual non-state entities. This bargaining process is a political struggle 
in the sense of it being an attempt at authoritative allocation of values amidst conflicting 
spatially based welfare requirements, played out among and between states and non-state 
actors (Sinclair 1999). The importance international diplomacy attaches to state- 
sponsored business promotion missions, World Bank and IMF reports on political and 
economic stability, along with economic confidence ratings by Standard and Poor and the 
Morgan Stanley Capital Index, have collectively politicised information within global 
economic space.
Global Political Space
Global political space is also an arena of struggle for group survival, material 
distribution, and domination. Although this thesis has argued in Chapter 1,5 that terrestrial
5 This section, like the previous two on media and economic spaces, is a deduction from the third 
component o f information globalization (Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3), as well as from the general empirical- 
transactional accounts of globalization.
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space can only be called global in the 1990s, its origins lay partly in the imperial 
ambitions of ancient empires such as the Babylonian, the Greco-Roman, and the Chinese. 
Global politics however began in earnest with the historical constitution of the nation­
state. The latter was designed to safeguard a collectively defined good in an attempt at 
mastering space for specific benefit to the exclusion of ‘others’. In this way, the question 
of the largeness of the ‘the majority’, the commune, the city-state and the nation-state as a 
successful social venture, along with the identification of the excluded categories, are 
perennial ideational controversies of both politics and economics.
The present Westphalian pattern of sovereign nation-states that arose from the 
seventeenth century onwards had maintained throughout its evolution a rigid distinction 
between domestic and international spaces for politicking, honoured more in the breach 
than in observance. Yet the distinction remains enshrined in the UN Charter as a 
fundamental principle. This pattern of relations in international space has led some 
thinkers to organise the study of politics in this space under the categories of 
‘international society’ or ‘anarchical society’. In this international space, there is no 
common authority akin to the enforcement capabilities of domestic government. Instead, 
this space had witnessed conflict-prone relations between groups of self-govemed 
peoples. Yet this ‘anarchy’ in relations does not exclude a modicum of cooperation and 
peaceful coexistence based on common norms voluntarily adhered to under a modus 
vivendi of bilateral or multilaterally recognised ‘national interests’, or in the extreme case 
during the era of imperialism, under military subjugation (Bull 1977, 16-19; Wight 1977, 
ch. 1-6). While it may appear that these norms evolved across time through practical 
inheritance, they were equally shaped by changes in states’ relative economic, military, 
technological and ideological capacities to lead or resist imposition (Watson 1992, 299- 
325).
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The military history of the world since the seventeenth century has both 
demonstrated the relative failure to overturn the pattern of nation-state forms of political 
organisation, and the dominance of the nation-state as the prime pursuer of conflict and 
stability in inter-group relations. World Wars One and Two confirmed it and so did the 
Cold War. The Cold War seemed to some observers to be an anomaly in both weakening 
the territorial sanctity of the nation-state with the threat of air-speeded nuclear war whilst 
simultaneously granting it de facto protection under the strategic imperatives of 
maintaining ideological-territorial defence perimeters (Herz 1962; Halliday 1983, 42-44; 
Clark 1997, 128-147). Communism, despite its class-based world view being opposed to 
national constructs, thrived against its free world adversaries by employing both static 
border defence and ‘wars of national liberation’ on a case-opportunistic basis from Korea 
in 1950 to Afghanistan in the 1980s. Containment by the ‘free world’ mirrored this 
strategy, precipitating a relative stasis in international space. And even though 
decolonisation of former imperial territories and the growing wealth and influence of 
western MNCs had threatened to return the post-1945 international society to its 
fragmented medieval predecessor, such a trend was arrested by the security dynamics of 
the Cold War. Tenuous new Third World regimes were propped up by Washington, 
Moscow and their proxies against ethnic and political separatist fissures in places such as 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Philippines and Indonesia. The USSR itself comprised 15 diverse 
‘nationalities’ united under communist autocracy. Where nationalist exceptionalism and 
alternative centres of ideological allegiance arose in Yugoslavia, China, India, Egypt, 
Ghana, Iran, Afghanistan and among member-states of the Non-Aligned Movement, they 
were mindful of, and weak relative to the concentrated ideological, military and economic 
power of the key bipolar centres. No ‘third force’ could convincingly operate 
internationally except for the consumption of domestic political constituencies; hard
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(military) security as well as soft (economic) security could only be ensured by de facto 
adherence to one pole or the other. This was because no aspiring great power could, for 
much of the Cold War, match the overwhelming ideological and nuclear projection 
capabilities of the superpowers. In this way international security conflict matched 
dominant orderings of international space.
The growth of multipolar fluidity was, however, rendered inevitable by sustained 
trends in horizontal and vertical technological diffusion in the armaments, high 
technology and ICT categories, as well as by positive economic growth afforded by 
capitalist economic space, and the corresponding under-performance within the rival 
socialist economic space. These technological and economic trends shifted significant 
amounts of hard power from Moscow and Washington, and created rival power centres 
where weakness or none had existed before. Britain, France, Germany and the original 
European Community states rebounded from postwar frailty to become a major market 
and business core. Japanese power was economic, and potentially a renovated regional- 
military form. Chinese power was clearly economic and regional-military. Indian and 
Pakistani military power went nuclear. Additionally, economic power was further shared 
outwards amongst newly-industrialising countries, MNCs, regional trade groups and 
transnational investment funds. This diffusion of hard power effectively enabled a 
levelling up of national and non-governmental hard power across the globe, and created a 
strategic stalemate where ideas, as foreign policy instruments, had wider manoeuvrability 
in the spaces between hard power conflict.
The power of ideology, concentrated originally since 1945 in two statist centres, 
was also eroding from rigid legitimacy over time, and from challenges of socio-economic 
diversity in governance and development worldwide. It soon became clear, mediated by
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ICTs, that neither pure ideological forms provided catch-all solutions. The decisive coup 
de grace against bipolarity was the Soviet acknowledgement of the twin crises of 
ideological and performative legitimacy beginning around 1988 with Moscow’s 
abrogation of the Brezhnev doctrine of socialist intervention vis-a-vis its East European 
satellites. Prior to that, beginning in the mid-1980s, Islamic fundamentalism was already 
an emerging contender, and the Chinese way of market socialism had reinterpreted 
Marxism pragmatically.
The diffusion of hard power, joined by the weakening of any dominant ordering of 
global ideology enabled the diversifying tendencies above and below nation-states, that 
is, decolonisation and transnational capitalism, to stake self-legitimating claims against 
the status quo. This has translated into a crisis of borders, causing the increasing 
decomposition of international political space into a ‘global political space’ where nation­
states compete on a stage crowded by discrete MNCs, international organisations and 
transnational ethnic, terrorist and social protest groups, all with convenient access to 
global media space. The incoherent political aims of collective state intervention in the 
1990s from Somalia to East Timor are symptomatic of the vagaries of a global political 
space. Peacekeepers, civilian administrators and combat forces with UN and World Bank 
monies are deployed to police human rights and build democracy in contexts where civil 
combatants discursively depict themselves as oppressed nationalisms opposed to one 
another, delegitimating ‘old states’ and inventing new ones. The results of interventions 
years later tend to prove ambiguous as the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Haiti 
illustrate: a superficial civil order is achieved atop a fragile domestic authority split into 
obstinately partisan camps, with development, law and order dependent upon 
international aid and imposed peacekeeping, and further subject to local practices of 
patrimonialism and corruption (Kovaleski 1997; Hedges 1999; R.J. Smith 1999; Wheeler
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and Morris 1996). Global political space appears to reopen all frontiers to politics as 
forms of multidimensional struggle for authority, identity and resource distribution.
In sum, the mapping of global information space as a composite of global media, 
economic and political spaces is an outcome of the generic set defined as information 
globalization in Chapter 1. Global information space is a product of late twentieth century 
technology, economics and politics, which cumulatively produce multi-level globe- 
extensive space for ideational political struggle. Since this space is constituted primarily 
of practices (rather than physical geography), and the exchange of symbolic designs (e.g. 
ideologies, reports, opinions) preceding action, discursive power matters in the way it is 
used by parties engaged in political struggle to react to and construct the parameters of 
definable social order favouring their particularistic existence. Furthermore, given the end 
of dominant ideological verities after the Cold War, polycentrism of symbolic power is a 
natural feature rendering this global space an informational contesting arena where 
opinion plays a critical role.
The sceptic might object to the description of global information space as a 
political arena, considering the fact that geopolitics has already treated the dominance of 
space by political and economic means, or that the pre-existing FPA literature suffices to 
engage globalization by looking at the environmental settings of policy-making. 
However, these objections fail to accept that ideas politically transform international 
relations and domestic governance in the era of boundary-defying ICT activity, 
informational capitalism and the diversity of ideological competition after the Cold War. 
Traditionally, geopolitics a la Mahan, Haushofer and Mackinder, tended to privilege
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physical and material control of space and the resources within it.6 Its critical version has
only begun to define geopolitics as a mapping of
how it came about that one state’s prospects in relation to others’ were seen in 
relation to global conditions that were viewed as setting limits and defining 
possibilities for a state’s ‘success’ in the global arena. (Agnew 1998, 2)
In this sense, global information space is complementary to geopolitics by emphasising
the constructive power of ideas in subjecting others without tangible controls. It is also an
improvement upon Anthony Smith’s attempt at coining the ‘geopolitics of information’
(A. Smith 1980), which narrates the imputed western control of information as a threat to
the rest of the world in political economy terms, without considering how continuing
ideological multipolarity can be a bone of contention among foreign policies.
FPA too has generally not kept pace with the changes brought by globalization, 
especially in its aspect of reopening all frontiers to multi-level political struggles, which 
invite unorthodox non-state and supra-state interventions affecting foreign policy. Once 
again, information affects foreign and domestic politics without visible physical control 
due to conditions of porosity accounted for by global information space. This is 
insufficiently explained by conventional FPA, which primarily scrutinises processes 
within state boundaries (Light 1994). Foreign policy, by definition, operates in spaces 
constructed by states, and it behoves the analysis in the next section to show how notions 
of world public opinion in global information space carry implications of an 
informational Hobbesian state of nature for states’ foreign policies.
3.3 Global Information Space as Public Space: World Public Opinion and a ‘State of 
Nature’
Global information space as a world public space can be comprehended when one 
defines the former’s composites as an amplification of the characteristics of a ‘public’, or
6 A current example of geopolitical study fixated upon physical and material control is Blouet (2001).
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a ‘public sphere/space’. Habermas’ sociology of a domestic bourgeois public sphere 
usefully informs analysis at this point. He has attempted to trace the varied strands and 
evolution of notions of the public as ‘open to all’, promoting group welfare, conferring 
‘public recognition’ on someone’s reputation, the exercise of open critical judgement, and 
attracting all forms of attention, including expressing anti-government positions 
(Habermas 1991, 1-2). What emerges from his work is an untidy genealogy of contextual 
practices in European history that he ascribes to the consequences of struggle for public 
participation.
According to Habermas, the idea of the public was a Greco-Roman legacy, which 
by the twentieth century, bore little resemblance to its origins. Between Greece and the 
late medieval period, generic notions of the public and private were understood and 
practised only by the political elites comprising monarchs, lords, nobles and the Church 
clergy (Habermas 1991, 3-11). It was however, the rise of a class connected to finance 
and trade, or in short, incipient agents of economic globalization, which laid the 
foundations for bourgeois features of publicness (Habermas 1991, 15-23). Like the kings 
and nobles in earlier periods, this class brought themselves into political consequence 
through emerging and independent bases of power. Merchants needed to ‘traffic in 
commodities and news’ which enriched the embryonic absolutist state’s treasury and 
material power. An economy arose which became intermeshed with politics and 
administration, requiring information of social, governing and trade news to be provided 
on a regular basis. Furthermore, after the invention of paper printing, newspapers arrived 
in the seventeenth century, and before long, the absolutist state saw fit to use them for the 
open promulgation of laws and official movements. There came a point where official 
domination of news production evolved into an irksome regime that ran counter to 
commercial interests, which had by then differentiated and consolidated into the
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bourgeois-proletarian divide. The merchants, bankers, entrepreneurs and manufacturers, 
who comprised the bourgeoisie, were negatively affected by the narrow-minded 
authoritarian demands of mercantilist policy, which they saw as stifling private initiative 
and livelihood. A civil society, literate and critical of government strictures arose to claim 
property and professional rights. This manifested itself in the flourishing of not only 
newspapers but intellectual journals, coffee houses, salons and Tischgesellschaften (‘table 
societies’). (Habermas 1991, 30-55) The latter were the nascent self-proclaimed spaces 
for social interaction among equals, generating art, philosophy and literature, and which 
functioned as alternative centres of interpretation and discussion of ‘common concerns’, 
apart from Church and State. Before long, this bourgeois public sphere constituted a 
political threat to monarchic absolutism and pushed for inclusive parliamentary politics 
where none existed before in Europe (Habermas 1991, 36-37). Participants of the public 
were simultaneously property owners and ‘the role of human beings pure and simple.’ 
(Habermas 1991, 56) In this way, a bourgeois public could accommodate other classes 
and non-state groups eventually.
Habermas’ public sphere, despite being situated domestically, sees ‘rational- 
critical debate’ as a feature of publicness that is applicable to diplomatic debates and 
economic disputes in global space. Furthermore, public space was a product of fledgling 
elites’ struggles against status quo groups and hegemonic practices utilising critical 
thinking and symbolic demonstrations of independence to pursue their causes. Open 
clashes of arguments checked domination, and trials of ideas and exposure were endemic 
to ‘publicity’. Also, the anchoring of ‘common concern’ as a plank for creating a public 
deserves exploration. Seen in another way, through discursive lenses, once an issue is 
sufficiently agreed in numbers as a matter that affects all, it triggers a rivalry and conflict 
among possible solutions. Another major theorist of the ‘public’, Thomas Dewey, posited
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that the ‘public’ existed whenever ‘indirect consequences’ followed from persons or
entities engaged directly in transactions. If there were no indirect consequences, the
transactions would be ‘private’. The public therefore
...consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of 
transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those 
consequences systematically cared for. (Dewey 1954,15-16)
Dewey’s prescription for a systematic resolution was the democratic state.
Leaving aside the question of creating a world democratic state as a world public 
authority for the moment, the characteristics of global information space compares rather 
favourably with the combined Habermas-Dewey list of public attributes. Firstly, actions 
in global space, whether economic or political, are mediated into heterogeneous debating 
positions by technologies that connect states, MNCs, non-state actors and international 
organisations. This debate is clearly critical, and rational in so far as each participant has 
a clear interest to defend. The diversity of resources, needs and outlooks endowed upon 
states and non-state actors by acts of history and nature will ensure that any worldwide 
agenda of environmentalism, human rights, trade and so on, would require a certain 
amount of argument and bargaining, even if unanimous cooperation is consequentially 
achievable. Secondly, as it has been argued in the preceding section, global media, 
economic and political spaces are products or residues of military, ideological or 
economic struggles engaged in initially, but not exclusively, by nation-states. Indeed 
contemporary world political and economic relations have witnessed hegemonic projects 
countered by anti-hegemonic movements, and players adopting strategies to carve out, 
however successfully or unsuccessfully, collective, non-conformist arrangements. 
Communism had its internationalist projects, so do liberal internationalists and Islamic 
fundamentalists.
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Thirdly, the feature of indirect consequences is mirrored in how global 
information space locates its existence. Primarily because territorial nation-states existed 
cheek-by-jowl on a common international space, their relations came to be governed by 
diplomacy, war, trade, population movement and the spillover effects of climatic change 
and natural disasters. Technology, especially of electronic forms, in tandem with 
transportation advances, made international contact ever more inevitable along with other 
modernities such as capitalism and news production. Ultimately, these trends led towards 
globalization, which by rendering territorial and political boundaries porous, introduced 
more actors into a hitherto state-monopolised international space, thus rendering it 
‘global’. Media, such as satellite television and Internet, or issues such as economic 
contagion and air pollution, now ensure a de facto global commons needs addressing at 
all levels of human association.
A global public space, like national public spheres, logically coexists in a 
performative sense, with and for public opinion. Public opinion can be understood 
generally as ‘an expression of dominant conviction backed by an intention to give effect 
to it,’ and on a second linked level, is ‘a manifestation of the evident wish of the majority 
for the taking by governments of a particular course.’ (Dafoe 1933, 7-8) In its operational 
specifics, it is less clear. Habermas has shown that public opinion might act as a critical 
normative sounding board against official exercise of power and leadership in some 
instances, while in others, such as in the context of twentieth century capitalist advertising 
and mass social programmes, public opinion is moulded according to ‘a staged display of, 
and manipulative propagation of, publicity in the service of persons and institutions, 
consumer goods, and programs.’ (Habermas 1991, 236, 237-250) Walter Lippmann has 
also elaborated the formation of public opinion in terms of ‘the triangular relationship 
between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to
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that picture working itself out upon the scene of action,’ and it is the total or partial 
selection of these ‘pictures in our heads’, which become public opinion (Lippmann 1960, 
16-17, 28-29). These doubts about public opinion’s autonomy and true moral value are 
further compounded when one ponders its composition in a mass political system (Bryce 
1981, 3-9; Lowell 1981, 10-16). It may be a sum of individual wills, the outcome of a 
clash of individuals or groups, or between the two, or even a mirror of majoritarian rule in 
a democracy. According to other possibilities, public opinion may be manufactured by 
elites with near-exclusive access to prominent organs of expression such as parliament, 
mass media, and officially designated public channels. Non-elites can then be effectively 
marginalized from forming public opinion by informal and legal means alike.7 In non- 
democratic environments, populist leaders and dictators might claim general will or 
popular support on socio-cultural psychic grounds, devoid of proof of volition in opinion 
formation. Yet, despite the controversies of operation, public opinion has always mattered 
to the stability and efficacy of governments, as countless free elections, ‘staged’ elections, 
revolutions and mass street protests since the eighteenth century have shown.
The concept of world public opinion is only a little different, in that the scale of 
the difficulties in ascertaining public opinion are magnified several times. World public 
opinion’s fundamental normative and political weight lies in its ability to present moral 
condemnation or approval, sanction material actions such as punishment by diplomatic 
and economic withdrawal, or trigger military attack, not unlike the imputed effects of 
elections, mass protests and revolutions in the domestic. Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano 
have argued that world public opinion has power in so far as it possesses
7 Even in constitutional democracies, it is not clear that public opinion on domestic and foreign policies are 
democratically derived from unmediated individual choice (C.W. Smith 1939, ch. X-XIII, XXIV; 
Lippmann 1960, ch. XXI-XXVIII; Mueller 1973; Glynn et al. 1999). It is worth noting that in the argument 
of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis the contradictions between the liberal and capitalist components of 
liberal democracy alone distort the formation of genuine public opinion (1986).
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(a) a moral component where a minimal universal moral standard is shared 
internationally;
(b) a pragmatic component where evaluations are based on ‘interests which 
relevant nations were supposed to share, where issues [are] discussed in terms of 
practical costs or benefits;’ and
(c) a national fear of isolation with respect to an assumed ‘world community’, 
‘international community’ or ‘international public’. (Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano 
1998,19-26)8
The two authors derived this notion from studying the common reference to ‘world 
opinion’ in the reports and editorials of two ‘quality newspapers’ -  the International 
Herald Tribune and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. This evidence-based 
formulation, while analytically useful, cannot obscure the controversies of opinion 
formation. Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano have assumed the automaticity of nation-states 
existing within an international society, which exists by virtue of certain shared 
behavioural norms and interests, but do not account for its pattern of derivation. Nation­
states are not consistently and operationally solid blocks of collective will and their 
relative variations in political systems, culture, geography, development and military 
profiles may complicate coherent opinion articulation and aggregation. To the extent that 
nation-states are unitary points of opinion, they must be strong and enlightened 
communities able to articulate domestic majorities of opinion, or possess the ability to 
impose uniformity on them. Between states, inequalities of power may well lead to 
clashes of interest being resolved through default of hegemony by one or several groups 
of nation-states amassing an insuperable combination, or modus vivendi, of relevant 
ideological power in the manner Hobbes envisaged on the level of individuals. This might 
explain ‘Pax Britannica’, ‘Pax Americana’, ‘the West’, ‘the Soviet bloc’, ‘Latin American 
regionalism’, ‘the African voice’, ‘the Confucian challenge’, and ‘the Islamic world’9 as 
coalitions of world public opinion centred upon particular worldviews. As international 
spaces evolved into post-Cold War global spaces, the number of opinion centres
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multiplied as NGOs and international organisations gained voice through globalizing 
economic, environmental and technological processes impacting upon national schemes 
of welfare.
A host of questions can be raised about world public opinion processes. How does 
one analyse the composition of world public opinion when unequal entities ranging from 
political dissidents, fundamentalist terrorists, investment companies, the UN, and NATO 
invoke emotion and evoke uneven political shifts within and among states through 
satellite television, Internet and newspaper issue coverage? Will reactions to such world 
public opinion follow the course of liberal democratic procedures with legal trappings of 
enforceability? On a world scale, is it desirable to ignore the relative silence of the 
minority, or majority, of the less powerful and less developed on specific issues 
concerning their livelihood? Any sample of issue-specific UN members’ opinions during 
crises such as the Balkans, terrorism, or the Arab-Israeli conflict will tend to witness the 
US, Britain and pro-western UN personnel invoking the ‘international community’s 
opinion’ as moral justification, while the Russian, Chinese and many non-permanent 
members refer only conditionally to the same phrase. Frequently, the non-western 
members refer to world public opinion to denigrate hegemonic aggression and unwanted 
external interference in sovereign matters.
For example, some months after the bombing of Serbia got underway in 1999, UN 
Secretary-General Annan echoed NATO-led moral justifications for facilitating a 
multinational humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, in the absence of a specifically 
worded UN mandate, by describing certain players’ dominant voices as follows:
8 These authors have significantly derived their conclusions from statistical analyses. Earlier attempts at 
explaining world opinion qualitatively as political approval and disapproval can be found in Robinson 
(1954) and Bull (1958).
9 The last two categories are from Huntington (1996, 102-121).
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The international community is united in its pursuit of a peace that allows the full 
and speedy return of the Kosovar Albanians to their homes in safety and dignity. 
How that peace is achieved is now the focus of intensive negotiations, involving 
the large Western governments and Russia, the United Nations and all who seek 
peace with justice for the people of Kosovo. (Annan 1999)
In September, the Chinese foreign minister dissented in a UN debate on Kosovo that
[s]uch arguments as ‘human rights taking precedence over sovereignty’ and 
‘humanitarian intervention’ seem to be in vogue these days... The outbreak of war 
in Kosovo sounded an alarm for us all. A regional military organisation, in the 
name of humanitarianism and human rights, bypassed the United Nations and took 
military action against a sovereign state. It created an ominous precedent in 
international relations. (Crossette 1999)
This pattern of denigration of an implied consensual world public opinion, or its
equivalent, continued in the prelude to the installation of a UN peacekeeping mission in
East Timor in September 1999. Following widespread rioting by pro-Indonesian militias
on the ground in the wake of a UN-supervised referendum on the territory’s
independence, White House spokesman Joe Lockhart insisted
The point we made very clearly and forcefully is that they need to demonstrate 
that they are prepared to assert control in East Timor or we believe they should 
invite an international presence. (M. Richardson 1999a)
This sentiment was backed up by the UN Secretary-General’s ultimatum to Indonesia to
quell the violence within 48 hours or face Security Council intervention. Statements
supporting the ultimatum were also issued by Britain, and some member states of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group, including Australia and Japan. Indonesia’s
instant reaction was to reject the warning of the opinion of the ‘international community’:
Why should we be the subject of so much abuse, so much accusations, and so 
much pressuring? Don’t hector us. Don’t pressure us. Don’t give us ultimatums, 
like within 48 hours you shall do this or that. (M. Richardson 1999a)
Yet within seven days of this rejection, Indonesia acquiesced to a unanimously approved
UN Security Council Resolution authorising a peacekeeping force for East Timor. Jakarta
however called for the peacekeeping force to conduct itself in an ‘impartial and neutral
manner’ so as to be ‘credible’. Jakarta also asked that the composition of the force ought
to include ASEAN because the latter’s members would understand regional sensitivities
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(IHT 1999d). This episode goes to show that world public opinion, whatever its 
expression, is neither straightforward, nor initially representative, in communication. In 
the Timor case, it involved threats from some quarters, and revulsion from the target 
state. This suggests that, like the Habermas-Dewey-Lippmann understandings of public 
opinion, world-scale opinion is not democratically perfect either.
In a third instance, involving the Arab-Israeli conflict, the potential target of world
public opinion denied its validity altogether. In November 2000, following the latest
spiral of Israeli-Palestinian violence in the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Authority
issued a proposal for an international observer force to act as a buffer between Israeli
troops and Palestinians in time for a UN Security Council discussion. Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak dismissed the idea in realist terms:
We do not believe in rewarding violence and any international presence will 
become eventually a reward to the Palestinian violence. (Richburg 2000)
An Israeli government spokesman was more blunt:
They [the Palestinians] are trying to impose upon Israel a Palestinian state which 
will be achieved in violence and struggle, and through negotiation... [W]e don’t 
trust much the UN or any other international organizations. The Americans, yes. 
(Richburg 2000)
In this context, world public opinion is presented as somebody’s trojan horse.
A study of public opinion and global ethics contained in the first ever UNESCO 
World Culture Report 1998 reinforces the impossibility of consistency and representative 
justice within any imputed world public opinion. Combining Gallup research 1993-96 
based upon 18 countries, and the World Values Survey 1990-93 covering 42 countries, its 
tentative ‘world climate of public opinion’ revealed that while a thin homogeneity of 
values were upheld across countries and by regions, they were highly qualified by 
diversity. ‘Democracy’ was broadly idealised but ‘not accompanied by a truly universal
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endorsement of human rights.’ ‘Tolerance’ is also supported ‘though only partially
applied to foreigners (not in the labour market) and though not encompassing all
minorities, such as homosexuals.’ (Van der Staay 1998, 276) Statistically, the survey on
‘political matters’ showed
[a]bout half of the total population (of the countries covered) approve [d] of the 
human rights movement (58%) or show[ed] a reasonably high level of political 
interest (51%). (Van der Staay 1998,266, 286, tab. 22A)
Among regional clusters approving the human rights movement, Africa (76%) and
Central and South America (70%) registered the highest ratings, with Eastern Europe
(59%), Western Europe (56%) and North America (53%) in the centre, while Asia (45%)
ranked lowest (Van der Staay 1998, 266, 286, tab. 22B). Incidentally, data for the ‘Middle
East’ was not available. In addition, the results for identification with geography revealed
that
[identification with one’s home town is the strongest (40%). Smaller[, but still 
substantial,] numbers identify with a province (19%) or with their country as a 
whole (29%). Identification with a continent (4%) or with the world (7%) is rare. 
(Van der Staay 1998, 266,286, tab. 22A)
This last set of statistics is most telling: a strong primary orientation to immediate town
localities, and a secondary but sizeable one to the country, which can be read as ‘nation-
state’.
Social surveys are never totally free of sampling difficulties but the above 
suggests that the bases of world public opinion are diversity and locality. These elements 
have been characterised by Christopher Hill as the ‘empire of circumstance’ in the sense 
‘that circumstances, rather than hope and abstraction, have the final say in shaping our 
lives, praxis and experience.’ (C. Hill 1996, 112) Circumstances which affect how global 
or local actors wish to articulate world public opinion will include ideas, emotions, 
temporal and historical givens such as ‘balances of power, correlations of forces, 
geographical position, the means of production, social class, [and] levels of technology.’
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The dynamics of circumstance can be seen in global forums on human rights where states 
such as China, Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore counter a largely 
Americanised ‘world consensus’ on universal liberal human rights with coalitions among 
themselves,10 regional partners, independent academics, and other de facto allies among 
the ‘silent majority’ of non-westem states, as well as corporations with large physical 
investments in their territories.
To the extent that any one protagonist in a global contest ‘wins’ through deadlock, 
split world public opinion, or claims a mythical but powerful ‘proportion’ of world public 
opinion on their side, world public opinion becomes nothing more than a political 
expedient in the absence of a world democratic state. And to the extent that world public 
opinion is converted or divided towards one’s cause, it is also a particular vindication of 
successful discursive power expressed in diplomacy and other policy instruments. In this 
sense, global information space as public space for political trials of opinion is a 
discursive Hobbesian state of nature, of war of all against all, where only power matters 
in securing one’s ends. In Hobbes’ account of natural existence, mind and bodily strength 
are potent counterparts to one another although the ultimate purpose of using them singly 
or in tandem is in successfully overwhelming the opposition (Hobbes 1929, 94-98). Here 
lies the distinction between discursive power, as soft power of information, as a counter 
or preface to hard power such as military and economic sanctions. The capacity to 
galvanise world public opinion is soft power manifest. Yet this state of nature cannot be a 
liveable place unless, as Hobbes understood it, it upholds independent sovereign 
communities where men can pursue their immediate needs. Within global information 
space then, the group appears to provide a container of discursive meaning.
10 The subject of Chapter 5 -  the Asian Values Debate.
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3.4 Nation-State within an Informational ‘State of Nature’: Order, Developmental 
Community and Ethical Identity
Global information space as a polycentric public forum theoretically connotes 
open-ended possibilities for freedom of choice and action that can be expressed between 
the two extremes of regulated competition in democracy, and anarchy. Anarchy can mean 
dissension over ideas of good governance, complete moral relativism of all information 
production and reception, and ultimately neither the possibility of mediation nor dialogue 
at all levels of information flow among individuals and groups. Anarchy is pre-nation­
state disorder. This is the extreme negative pole of a global informational state of nature 
and an undesirable condition, especially when cooperation across all boundaries, at all 
levels, may be minimally necessary for goal attainment in a polycentric world, lest private 
solutions be resorted to, resulting in uneven results and net losses. It would seem logical 
to posit straightaway that the other polar extreme ought to be dictatorial uniformity, 
where diversity is resolved by a one-size-fits-all formula. However, this goes against the 
nature of the global information space: polycentrism and its public attributes, especially 
the common consequences of private actions, and the struggle to deal with them in 
utilitarian modes. The central problematique of the global informational state of nature 
would be how to manage a plurality of interests towards a semblance of order.
If anarchy represents the polar extreme of ‘non-solution’ in the face of diversity, 
then the opposite extreme ought to be one which privileges diversity, yet simultaneously 
possessing features for conflict adjudication where interests expressed in information 
flows collide, that is, general global democracy. Democracy is understood here as a 
political process invoking (a) the minimisation of conflict within society, (b) the common 
stakes in common solutions, while (c) acknowledging equality of participants’ identities 
in actualising them. This definition respects a balance of Habermas and Dewey’s public- 
private distinctions whilst acknowledging Locke, Mill, Tocqueville, Barker and Held’s
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defence of the pursuit of a common good despite diversity and property ownership by 
individuals.11
Assuming that democracy of information flow is the benign and desirable end of 
the spectrum of possibilities of existence in global information space, it is necessary to 
inquire what it is and how it is achievable. It is necessary to begin by unpacking the three 
key concepts intrinsic to the definition of democracy adopted above in order to break 
down the requirements of a strategy to achieve them. First, if democracy is to work as a 
common spatial system, interest conflict must be reduced to a least-disruptive level 
sufficient to enable democratic norms to work, be it elections, reasoned arguments, the 
law, or the exercise of time-mandated and popularly legitimated leadership. One needs to 
consider if every idea and report of interest articulation and problem representation must 
be heard at all levels of democratic participation before decision-making can be 
attempted. A directly related problem would be the accountable size of the participants: 
should they be listened to individually or by group, and if the latter, in what numbers, on 
what elocutionary standards, or standards of ‘expertness’? On a global scale, the 
magnified considerations of size and normativity of representation, the disposition of 
participants towards negotiation, and compromise, are especially relevant and pose a need 
for central arbitration and ordering if conflict is to be minimised. Hence it must be asked 
if the desirable representative category should be nation-states, regions, non- 
geographically-derived groups, or individuals.
The flip side of conflict of interests could just as easily be approached as the 
second aspect of operational democracy, namely, agreeing on a ‘common problem’
11 See the extracted views of Locke, Barker, Lippmann and Mill on the advantages and pitfalls of liberal 
representative democracy in Utley and Maclure (1957); and in particular Mill (1904), especially Chapter VI 
“Of the Infirmities and Dangers to which Representative Government is Liable”(pp.l03-124); and De
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requiring the subordination of separate and individuated interests to certain overriding 
purposes. Aims, rational utility, and definitions of a public good, are all dependent to 
varying degrees on how participants perceive them according to location, socialisation, 
and ascriptive factors. Even the shaping of mindsets cannot be proportionately related to 
the diversity of socialising sources in terms of culture, prior identity, historical 
tendencies, climate, and physical geography. These psychological filters of problem 
comprehension will pose severe problems in terms of achieving a commonality of will 
and problem acknowledgement.
Approaching any consensus, whether on procedures for negotiation, or outlining 
the problem itself, will involve trials of constitutive identity and goals.12 The third aspect 
of democracy tries to satisfy this diversity of constitutive identities and goals of 
participants by recognising each as equal to begin with, but this in turn poses the 
perennial dilemma of choosing between procedural and substantive equality, since both 
meanings rarely coincide in constitutional and practical terms.13 John Rawls’ theory of 
justice initially marginalised this question outside the confines of a nation-state.14 
Subsequently, he tried accommodating his conception of a liberal democratic ‘just state’ 
to the rest of the world by constructing a minimalist scheme of coexistence he called the 
‘law of peoples’. This law defined the reciprocal acceptance of equality among ‘well- 
ordered’ peoples as a precursor to that between states. The main bases of this equality 
include mutual respect among free and independent peoples ‘as organized by their 
governments’; the assumption of a ‘duty of nonintervention’ by them; as well as the
Tocqueville (1982, 55-77). David Held reiterates the same conditions in his proposition of ‘cosmopolitan 
democracy’. (1995, 282-283)
12 A consistent caveat against internationalist projects since World War Two (Friedmann 1943, 163-191; 
Barnett 1997; Bellamy and Jones 2000, 207-214).
13 Mill, “Of True and False Democracy; Representation o f All and Representation o f the Majority Only.” 
(1904, 125-154)
14 John Rawls initially regarded ‘justice as fairness’ within a liberal democracy as prior to and more 
important than that between states. Interstate matters can be sorted only according to a modified ‘Original
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observance of existing treaties and obligations, including basic human rights (Rawls 
1993, 54-63). In this way, both liberal and non-liberal well-ordered states can coexist 
without a world democracy. The preservation of well-ordered peoples is a primary task of 
states. The secondary one is to bring all states to adhere to the law of peoples. In this 
regard,
[h]ow to do this is a question of foreign policy; these things call for political 
wisdom, and success depends in part on luck. They are not matters to which 
political philosophy has much to add. (Rawls 1993, 73)
Attaining the operational conditions for the scale of workable global democracy is
probably an insurmountable task, short of its imposition through a world empire. In sum,
the key obstacles are: the difficulty of reaching consensus on size and form of
representation; a minimal possibility of common problem recognition and choice of
solution; and the difficulty of sustaining the equality of the participants through
consensus-seeking.
Nevertheless, these criticisms of a global democratic solution for the complete 
elimination of a state of nature from global information space do provide my analysis 
with insights into what is required for managing conflicting discourses. The very notions 
of consensus and equality are themselves bom of human conflict, and their resolution 
towards the democratic ideal, where possible, must lie in analysis of conflict within a 
structurally hostile environment (Davies 1980; Eckstein 1980). Towards this objective, 
the Hobbesian state of nature is a useful vehicle in the search for workable order, since 
the Hobbesian scheme also presupposes autonomous human agents generating a pre­
social structure of conflict through antagonistic self-maximising behaviour. This 
behaviour leads to the search for security within community, and the articulation of a
Position’ of equality, allowing state representatives sufficient knowledge to make rational choices. 
Domestically just states would coexist without conflict abroad. (Rawls 1973, 377-379)
144
scheme of multiple, sovereign groups of men.15 This will address the foundation of soft 
power as the protection and promotion of community. Additionally, in applying a 
Hobbesian analysis of human conflict, more caveats can reasonably be made about the 
futility of making a world democratic order an inflexible goal, if after all it cannot 
realistically be achieved. The next best solution might be found in organisational forms 
below the scale of a world state: a global information space where soft power is utilised in 
relations among sovereign states. After all, as was stated at the start of this section, the 
main problematique of global information space is to move interest plurality towards the 
condition of a liveable order, in whatever form.
To Hobbes, the fundamental goals of human existence would correspondingly be 
the issues over which men will fight over: ‘competition’, ‘diffidence’ and ‘glory’ (Hobbes 
1929, 96, ch. XIII). ‘Competition’ is the aggressive striving for material gain, which in 
the informational state of nature would translate as the securing of orderly information 
flows as both a means for conditioning wealth-generating activities, and as an end in itself 
of desirable earthly existence. An ideology legitimating community and power is 
fundamental for man’s pursuit of a livelihood, and in post-1945 capitalism, positive 
socio-economic reports supporting or reinforcing a comfortable political and economic 
status quo would be equally beneficial. ‘Diffidence’ is a negative reason for fighting: in a 
state of nature, participants are blind to prospects of confidence and trust in daily 
tragedies of competitive violence to secure the first objective of acquisition. The 
perpetuity of power-based modus operandi and a vicious cycle of life-threatening 
violence are the outcome of this second reason. In informational terms, ideologies, or 
even rival expressions of news realities, often assert universal claims excluding and 
antagonising one another normatively. The third goal ‘glory’, refers to man’s need for
15 This justification for employing Hobbesian analysis is supplied by Navari (1978) and Forsyth (1979).
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reputation or identity. It is a need for a sense of individual being and self-worth, and 
across time, an accumulated desire for friendship and popularity. Towards these ends, 
information flow becomes a resource for participants’ competitive standing. World 
democracy would theoretically solve the war of all against all by ordering competition 
with norms and respect diversities of interests and strengths, whilst guaranteeing basic 
need fulfilment.
Hobbes of course never articulated explicit notions of democracy, but he argued 
for a government of laws through the erection of a sovereign as a focus of common 
authority through which all interest claims would be peacefully adjudicated. Hobbes also 
did allow for as many commonwealths16 to exist as necessary to allow man to escape the 
state of nature, and stopped short of advocating world government as a final solution to 
anarchy. Organising into commonwealths would be a first step towards goal fulfilment 
with minimal loss of life, material interests, reputation and so forth. Hostile diversities 
will have been reduced to tolerable jousts between a number of collective bodies of men, 
and this would be an inter-commonwealth (or interstate) state of nature. Measured against 
the democratic ideal postulated at the desirable end of the spectrum of global information 
space possibilities, organising social existence towards a world democracy would 
theoretically be a second more definite step towards eliminating any remnants of the state 
of nature between the collectives of men. But Hobbes argues that the interstate state of 
nature is sufficiently tolerable in its concurrent possibility for de facto peace through 
armed vigilance short of physical combat, and the ability of states to uphold industry and 
livelihood within frontiers (Hobbes 1929, 96, 98, 129, ch. XIII, XVII). At this point, the 
immediate desirability of a world democratic state weakens.
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Organising for nationhood and statehood discursively could be seen as a primary 
securing of the relevant order, identity and community needs of mankind in global 
information space, and these correspond to the human preoccupation with competition for 
gain, glory and diffidence identified above. The arguments for nation-state discursive 
community can be waged two ways. Firstly, in the absence of a global democracy, 
national ideas defend highly differentiated local realities of order, identity and community 
against the potentially hegemonic manipulation of world public opinion. Secondly, 
national ideas sustain pre-existing or voluntarily chosen local modes of achieving the 
same three basic human needs. Building on these broad aims of creating a communal safe 
haven from an endless state of nature among individuals, three micro arguments follow: 
the nation-state is a security enclosure; it is a developmental (and materialist) community; 
and acts as an ethical community for individual fulfilment.
Taking the argument of a security enclosure first, discourse legitimates the use of 
monopolised force for the protection of a limited number of individuals. Here Hobbes and 
other contractarians articulated the ‘size principle’ of community: the joining together of 
numbers of individuals and small groups must be large enough in comparison with a 
commonly identified enemy as to allow security of the former to be obtained through 
deterrence (Hobbes 1929, 129, ch. XVII; 1978, 166-167, ch. V). Extrapolating this 
ideationally, discourse is strength in will when it appeals singularly to, or both, primordial 
loyalties and expedient historical logic to cement a necessary and sufficient unity for the 
goal of self-preservation. At the same time, discourse instils definitions of ‘us-versus- 
them’ and constitutes territorial and metaphysical inside/outside boundaries in politics, 
economics and culture. Defence of a local space within global information space’s 
vulnerability to power politics is necessarily an ideological and deliberate representation
16 In the Hobbesian lexicon, a synonym for ‘states’, and possibly ‘nations’, according to the argument of
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of ideas and events favouring one community over all others. Not surprisingly, in both 
peacetime socio-economic disturbances, and civil and international wars, nation-states 
resort to a clash of words and justifications in media forms prior to and during actual 
hostilities. The natural presumption made in this thesis and elsewhere is that politics 
operates first in the minds of humanity and hence in symbols (e.g. language, ideas and 
pictures). Ideas activate the defence or retreat from securing safety in human associations. 
Even in his time, Hobbes argued that transmissions and demonstration effects of 
proximate events, philosophies of politics, and past histories have had subversive impact 
against commonwealths:
(1) [On the demonstration effect of political betterment:]
[A]s False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different Government in a 
neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the forme already setled...So 
also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the 
Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common­
wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other the Athenians...For the 
constitution o f man’s nature, is o f it selfe subject to desire novelty; when therefore 
they are provoked to the same by the neighbourhood also o f those that have been 
enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them not to be content with those that 
solicite them to change; and love the first beginnings though they be grieved with 
the continuance o f disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear 
themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.
(2) [On subversion by media:]
[M]en have undertaken to kill their Kings, because Greek and Latine writers in 
their books and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull and laudable, for any man so 
to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant...From the same books, they 
that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular 
Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I  say, 
they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under 
a Popular Government: for they find no such matter...I cannot imagine, how 
anything can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing o f such books 
to be publickely read, without present applying such correctives o f discreet 
Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime.1
With these warnings, Hobbes suggests not merely censorship of information as a foreign
and defence policy, but a reasoned defence of raison d’etat in terms of the qualities of a
Canovan (1996).
17 Hobbes (1929, 251-252, ch.XXIX; 1978, 246, ch. XII). Italics mine.
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united commonwealth delivering its self-protection through self-policing obedience. One 
might label Hobbes as a progenitor of the international power of information.
It is also noticeable that the argument for security did not distinguish nation and 
state for both concepts share common premises in discursively uniting individuals in 
common security, and this overlap applies all the more when the argument for a national 
developmental community is attended to. In this usage, ‘developmental’ refers to 
economic development associated with the process identified in Chapter 2 as 
‘modernization’, of which the expansion of information is part. Especially after 1945, 
modernization became the dominant pattern of newly independent nation-states although 
its arrival in Europe and the Americas occurred earlier. Prior to modem industrial society, 
that is, in agrarian society, a semblance of statehood was already functioning in varying 
degrees of centralisation and decentralisation as monarchies and feudal networks. 
Agrarian society did not require the vast mobilisation and congruence of culture and 
polity: economy and life rituals could be subsistent, discrete and flexible according to 
individual, immediate family and tribal needs. Furthermore, elites had neither the 
incentive nor the will strictly to circumscribe or include the semi-literate and illiterate 
masses in power sharing, nor did the latter desire to (Gellner 1983, 8-18; Crone 1989, ch. 
2-5). It was the onset of industrial methods and its attendant modes of living and 
occupation that generated new discursive community.
The nation arose out of the imperative to homogenise people culturally for 
employment in a new social milieu of purposive regular production in which worldviews 
of systematicity, the regimentation of advantage, and large scale differentiated skill 
education were commonplace (Gellner 1983, 35-57,140-141). Mass education, and hence 
mass socialisation, of individuals were instituted to produce community-internalising
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selves dependent on access to a high culture of production for material exchange, and a 
collective identity moulded to suit states administering the complex social infrastructure 
of need-provision (e.g. welfare, schools, hospitals, citizenship responsibilities). Progress 
towards the modem industrial community was accelerated by print capitalism, which as 
Habermas pointed out, was a necessary facilitator of market operations across 
geographical distance. Benedict Anderson has taken the impact of print capitalism 
further, arguing as Innis has done (Innis 1972), that on one level, printed language 
cheaply and rapidly disseminated a sense of associational cultural ontology and historical 
time to readers with the appropriate linguistic ability (B. Anderson 1991, ch. 2-3). On a 
secondary level, print languages created ‘unified fields of exchange and communication’ 
by fixing standardisation of language above regional and village-level vernaculars, and 
below the elite languages of the hitherto feudal rulers. The book and newspaper started 
this, only to be amplified by radio and television onwards.
With access to common literature in common language, new socio-economic 
elites were formed, uniting old and new, and enfranchising territorial inhabitants into the 
consciousness of nation-states as imagined, sovereign communities (B. Anderson 1991, 
205-206). This argument for nation-states as units of development is accentuated and 
valued in global information space, where capitalist practices of MNC investment and 
trade depend on, and investigate, economic conditions through information instruments 
such as the IMF, private consultancy reports and other products of the political economy 
knowledge structure. In short, to paraphrase some business writers, the competitive 
advantage of workers in global capitalism requires ‘nation-states’ as economic 
guarantors, and corporatist structures of mediation between local welfare and mobile 
investments.
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The third micro-argument, the ethical, flows partly from the first two: the nation­
state delivers physical security and acts as a promoter and shelter for wealth-generation, 
thereby demanding reciprocal allegiance from its citizens. This is a conception of material 
ethical good satisfying the gain and assurance of possession concerns in a state of nature. 
This leaves the aspiration to ‘reputation’ or the search for identity to be addressed in the 
ethical notion of the nation-state as community. The source of the ethics of identity 
begins with the fundamental relationship between the individual and the community.
For the individual existing under natural law, freedom in both positive and
|  A
negative senses, plus equality and justice, comprise his self-worth. Existing alone, in 
relation to similarly atomistic individuals, appears theoretically ideal in allowing 
unfettered pursuit of the goals of self-worth. In practice, freedom, equality and justice 
contradict one another to the extent that the individual cannot achieve any of them in any 
degree. This is because there is no arbiter and no framework for adjudicating conflicts 
arising from atomistic actions without regard for fellowship; natural law justifies every 
individual authoring every action maximally, allowing inequalities of power to be 
decisive. However, within a community, a willed association of individuals interested in 
joint guarantees of self-worth forms the normative basis of existence (Herder 1969, 304- 
311, bk. VIII, ch. IV-V). Freedom is secured through reciprocal respect, familiarity, 
priority of mutual assistance over outsiders, and the possibility of realising ambitions that 
cannot cause grievous harm to others. Equality is secured through implicit and explicit 
membership rights and duties, while justice is served through mutual agreement on rights, 
wrongs and procedures of pacific arbitration. Individual identity is thus anchored in a 
community because the latter is a discourse of privileges and corresponding duties 
marking itself out to be unique (Walzer 1983, ch. 2; 1994, ch. 4-5; Sandel 1992; C.
18 A common assumption from Rousseau through Rawls.
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Taylor 1992). This is a communitarian-cum-ethical particularistic claim that undergirds 
the principle of nationality by treating the ‘thick’ value of preferential treatment by a 
bounded group as moral existence. (D. Miller 1997,49-80)
To sum up, the Hobbesian-derived micro-arguments for establishing an ideational 
safe haven from the state of nature support nation-state formation discursively in terms of 
defining security/order, fulfilling development needs, and enveloping individual identity 
within a communitarian one. Ironically, nation-state discourses mitigate the informational 
state of nature in so far as they defend a somewhat tolerable version of anarchical 
international relations. The discursive value of the nation-state in fact fulfils, in a 
minimalist way, the political definition of democracy set out at the start of this section. A 
nation-state reduces parochial interest conflict among individuals by uniting them in 
national collectives aimed at common problem solving. Additionally, the individual’s 
desire for equality is safeguarded by the contracting into community. This universal 
preference for an imperfect, minimalist and democratic plurality of sovereign, equal 
nation-states seems to have withstood two world wars and decolonisation without any 
credible alternative transnational lobby working towards a world democratic state.
When globalization became an acknowledged phenomenon by the 1990s, some 
scholars (L. H. Miller 1985; Albrow 1996; Ohmae 1996) argued that it was time to 
recognise that the nation-state had become technically and normatively incompetent in 
dealing with the distributive justice of functional interdependence arising out of 
globalization. Hence there existed a need to think seriously about global democratic 
governance. Such a call however assumes that political theory can apply internationally 
and globally without prefixes. But in reality, global democratic governance may be no
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more substantial than a discourse of domination whitewashed as conscientious world 
public opinion carried through global information space on an issue-specific basis.
And although the Hobbesian scheme has helped analysis by treating the ‘Other’ in 
terms of rival nation-states mounting discourses of domination against fellow units, the 
same pro-national community arguments (i.e. securing order, and fulfilling both 
development and individual identity needs) can also be extended in part to non-state 
communities within global information space. Whether an MNC, or the average human 
rights NGO can claim communitarian allegiance on par with the nation-state is largely a 
theoretical possibility, relatively under-examined by empirical studies. Nevertheless, in 
cases where national allegiances exhibit indecision or suffer weak legitimacy, non-state 
discourses do claim communitarian appeal. Such is the case with the perceived sheltering 
and welfare provision capabilities of human rights NGOs in Chile in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and in Afghanistan and East Timor in the 1990s. While NGOs do not have the military 
power to create community, they possess the flexible skills of presenting mediatory 
credentials, and appealing to victims and bystanders for humanitarian protection against 
localised and global ‘states of nature’. Only after allegiances are realigned by non-state 
discourses,19 the requisite hard power can be induced into play through the UN, the US, 
or other sympathetic states, so as to make territorial community coexistent with discursive 
community. This has happened in numerous UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor, 
Bosnia, and in human rights scrutiny across borders, as in Chile (Chapter 6). These non­
state discourses matter to foreign policy because they challenge its primacy.
Global information space thus seems destined to be an unending arena of struggle 
where ideas triumph when they have proved themselves performatively and persistently
in fulfilling basic human needs. World public opinion, as it has been argued previously, 
operates in the realm of circumstance tied to locality and diversity of social formations, 
yet is ironically clouded by its own subjective idealism. In this environment, the 
propaganda of the nation-state, or communitarian, discourse normatively entails the soft 
power instrument of foreign policy.
3.5 Soft Power as Long-Term Propaganda of Community Discourse
The communitarian discursive defence of a nation-state begins with foreign 
policy, which at its heart, is a common practice of delineating and managing the inside- 
outside territorial dichotomy. The inside manifests stable community, order and identity 
while the outside must either be fought, ameliorated or convinced into favouring the 
community’s cause. Foreign policy has its many power instruments ranging from the 
diplomatic, military, economic, covert and propagandists, which have been employed in 
varying combinations throughout the evolution of international relations with its 
Westphalian trappings. With the advent of information globalization precipitating a 
global information space by the 1990s, the Hobbesian dichotomy referred to earlier 
between hard and soft power has become accentuated with the latter gaining equal if not 
preceding presence in relation to events.
Soft power is that entire range of policy options covering government-linked 
academic statements, NGO declarations, official propaganda, idea-dominance in 
international regimes to ‘cultural imperialism’. It is co-optive power, or the ability to 
attract support through idea appeal, to get others to ‘want what you want’.20 Although 
Nye publicised the term in the 1990s, the range of complementary dimensions he cites —
19 This is consistent with the cautionary comment o f globalization theorist Scholte (2000). Chapter 4 will 
explain that non-state actors impact foreign policies indirectly through discourses.
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American democratic freedoms, popular culture, intellectual resources, technology, 
educational institutions, international institutions committed to certain principles of 
modus operandi, and military applications of information disclosure — have been 
practised whenever politics involved appeals to superior reason, or physical force 
mobilised for the sake of shared moral principles (Nye Jr. 1990a, 29-34; 1990b, 167-170; 
Nye Jr. and Owens 1996, 29-30; Axworthy 1997, 185-196). This was the case with 
Socratic Athens, and the actions during the Peloponnesian War as recorded by 
Thucydides. An ancient Chinese tract on military strategy listed as a foremost priority the 
psychological manoeuvring against enemy plans with the object of acquiring physical 
infrastructure intact and bloodlessly.21 As Habermas’ history of the public sphere shows, 
the public earned its existence through the demand for information and its circulation 
against the monarchic monopoly of authority. Not surprisingly, just as the cafe societies, 
merchants, artists and workers gravitated towards liberalism, democracy and other 
Enlightenment and twentieth century mass ideologies against royal absolutism, the 
fifteenth and sixteenth century monarchs, as forerunners of secular popular government, 
had previously struggled to invoke worldly supremacy as a moral standard on the bases of 
portraying excesses of papal overlordship in temporal matters (Ullman 1970, 136-158). In 
each struggle for spatial legitimacy, ideas and their transmission affected an audience or 
an enemy through changes to power meanings favouring their initiator.
Bearing in mind how foreign policy originated, the ideational appeal of soft power 
and the instances of deployment in contextual ‘common causes’, it is evident that soft 
power foreign policy inheres within social structure and community where the latter is
20 Nye Jr. (1990a, 31; 1990b, 166); Nye Jr. and Owens (1996, 20-21); Keohane and Nye Jr. (1998, 86-87); 
Nye Jr. (1999b, 24-25). The Canadian foreign policy elite have also begun to enunciate a parallel claim to 
pioneering ‘soft power’. See Axworthy (1997, 192-193).
Sun Tzu’s Chapter I (Estimates) of The Art o f War deals with the importance o f moral synergy of a 
sovereign state in meeting conflict from outside. Chapter III (Offensive Strategy) calls for taking a target 
state ‘intact’ by deploying non-war strategies to fracture its plans and alliances. (1971)
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indistinguishable from the former. Ideas become power when they form, or are 
demonstrated, in a community that appear to solve the basic order, identity and 
community problematiques stemming from a state of nature. This is directly related to the 
communitarian arguments of the last section: the operation of a need-satisfying nation­
state as a repository of a successful idea of organising living together, resource utilisation 
and so on. Such a generic idea can spawn related ideas in the social sciences, politics, 
economics or ideologies which other aspiring communities-to-be (e.g. separatists, anti­
colonialists, idealists), rival nation-states, or their individual constituents might find 
worthwhile emulating. This is the Weberian notion of prestige abroad arising naturally 
from the demonstrable cohesion and augmentation of state monopolies of power at home 
(Weber 1948, 159-160). The flow, or deliberate projection, of prestigious ideas externally 
could take the following forms: specific nationally-targeted propaganda missions; 
attempts to institutionalise modus operandi and values as implicit and explicit norms and 
rules in news patterns; IT interface and presentational formats (e.g. Internet protocols, and 
‘sound byte’ reporting of wars etc.); or in the authoring of charters of international 
regimes. Hence soft power reveals two forms: national prestige, and the external 
institutional type, structural power. The latter may be understood as Strange (1994, 24- 
25) intended it to be, the power to predetermine outcomes of others and collective actions 
to the wielder’s benefit.
In its essence, soft power is the long-term propaganda of community discourse. 
The nation-state as a community unto itself escaping an ungovernable state of nature 
generates its own system of subjective collective meaning in the Foucaultian sense. This 
discourse is propaganda in two ways. Firstly, both propaganda and discourse assume ‘that 
the world is completely caused but that it is only partly predictable.’ Secondly, discursive 
community is realisable only through changes to social attitudes effected by adjusting the
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symbols that orientate them (Lasswell 1995; Lippmann 1925, 40-74; Lumley 1933, 21- 
44). Propaganda, as defined in Chapter 2, is the short term and specific influencing of 
social action by affecting the thought and decision processes of men through information 
manipulation and presentation. Operationally, soft power defines itself as long-term 
propaganda, which becomes obvious through its three employment characteristics.
Firstly, the communitarian basis of soft power poses the question of how to 
‘package5 a way of life in the best possible light whilst minimising its shortcomings. In 
Nye and Owens5 understanding, for example, American liberal democracy's appeal has 
been increasingly
...endangered by the growing international perception of America as a society 
riven by crime, violence, drug abuse, racial tension, family breakdown, fiscal 
irresponsibility, political gridlock, and increasingly acrimonious political 
discourse in which extreme points of view make the biggest headlines. (Nye Jr. 
and Owens 1996, 36)
This cuts to the fundamental strategic choice: how can the virtues of individual freedoms, 
benign ‘check-and-balance5 government and artistic creativity from Leonard Bernstein to 
Stanley Kubrick be promoted as American normative visions to non-American and non- 
western societies? World public opinion on good governance theoretically cannot be 
orchestrated in American favour if there are too many discordant signals and indices, 
producing a fractured image of ‘American ideology5. Nye calls this the national 
credibility criterion (Nye Jr. 1999a). Yet recent Cold War history showed that this is 
relative: the Soviet bloc provoked American soft power strategies which emphasised a 
strongly contrasted western freedom, consumerism and ‘objective truth conditions5 
against the Soviet bloc's extremes of totalitarian myth-making and oppression. 
Furthermore, the bipolar resilience of superpower rivalry ideologically coded the various
22 Linebarger’s definition (1948) cited in Whitaker Jr. (1960, 5).
23 Refer to contributions by Benton, Ratcliff, Berding, Truman and Eisenhower in Whitaker Jr. (1960). See 
also Tuch (1990, 15-34).
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shades of then pseudo-liberal democratic South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, 
Singapore and other Latin American authoritarianisms into a single ‘Free World.’ The 
USSR ran for a while a systematic propaganda offensive drawing on the universality of 
Marxism-Leninism encompassing Albania to China until fissures appeared through 
official and unofficial statements and reports of nationalist dissidence from then- 
Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Hungary and Maoism in China. Events such as the 1956 
Hungarian Revolt and 1968 ‘Prague Spring’ openly gave the lie to utopia under Soviet- 
style governance. Perhaps the superpowers can be faulted for trying to force 
communitarian diversity into straightjacketed global ideological dichotomy, but the 
schism between representing ideal images to investors, potentially friendly audiences and 
governmental detractors on the one hand, and the often less-controllable social currents 
on the ground, remains and is intensified by information globalization penetrating time 
and space boundaries.
Nevertheless, freed of Cold War strictures beginning in the 1990s, soft power is 
almost fully liberated in its range of diplomatic possibilities in conditions of ideological 
flux, globalized capitalism and global media space. The worldwide debate on defeating 
terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks also underscores the 
absence of a credible and progressive Islamic state model among Muslim populations. 
Some commentators suggest that discouraging would-be recruits from Osama bin Laden’s 
cause would be for an Arab-Islamic state to demonstrate that it can deliver an attractive 
combination of domestic capability for peaceful political change, along with the delivery 
of advancing standards of living (Friedman 2001). As the case studies of Singapore and 
Chile will show, each national image has to be convincing enough to resonate with 
audiences abroad for any chance of successful foreign policy steering. Theoretically, a
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neat corporatist nation-state arrangement reducing large-scale social dissent for the sake 
of a higher common national branding might be the ideal base for propaganda strategy.
Secondly, a direct implication of organising for soft power is to acknowledge the 
public omnidirectionality of audiences. The propaganda of communitarian discourse in 
global information space has to assume that the contested but nevertheless emotionally- 
appealing notion of ‘national interest’ must resonate domestically and be harmonised 
globally if it is to have any credibility.24 Successful propaganda always aspires to the 
nobility of truth claims regardless of the morality of policymakers’ motivations, and this 
is more so today than in the early stages of total war (1914-18) when domestic and world 
public opinion could easily be swayed through censoring limited print, telegraph and 
radio communication outlets. Global information space, as an implication of information 
globalization, emancipates more non-state and new state actors onto a global arena of 
politics today because of spatial control defying technology, economics and geopolitical 
fluidity. The onus is more on nation-states to attract or counter world public opinion vis- 
a-vis their causes with consistent and believable information streams.
Thirdly, the need for consistency and credibility in information supply (Nye Jr. 
1999a) requires foreign policy practitioners to tap unorthodox strategies for getting their 
message across as a precondition of action, or inaction, as it may be the case when 
domestic troubles prompt intense scrutiny abroad. Once again the experience of Cold War 
political warfare prompts the way: foreign policy needs to be coordinated across 
economic, cultural, diplomatic and military departments so as to speak and act with ‘one 
voice and one action’; world and domestic public opinion need to be converted through 
particular images and arguments; the man-in-the-street must be educated into pulling his
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weight for a national effort; and finally particular media forms and ownerships must be 
adapted to communitarian purposes (Kintner and Komfeder 1963, 281-294; Clews 1964, 
11-30, 69-87; Tuch 1990, 4-5, 39-49; Lasswell 1933). Discourses of nationalism, 
liberalism and socialism have historically begun this way and have in some tragic cases 
become incompetently intertwined and vitiated by excessive physical force as 
imperialism, Nazism, communism and Serbian fascism have shown in the twentieth 
century. There is no guarantee that the latter will not recur in the era of global information 
space, as soft power can easily be diluted by hard power in the hands of insensitive 
leaders. Nevertheless, the costs of exercising hard power without the complementarity of 
soft power will be staggering when reactionary forms of hard power arise in response. 
Witness the frequency with which multilateral humanitarian interventions in the Balkans 
and the Middle East in the 1990s run into opposition from neighbouring states, resistance 
on the ground, and lack of great power support after a fait accompli.
What the foreign policy-maker needs to be able to do sensitively, is to wield a 
discursive power that legitimates and resonates with a perceivable subjective reality. 
There can be no definite quantitative indicator of success, except perhaps in international 
voting forums. Foreign policy goals are more tangibly accomplished when coalitions of 
the convinced and abstained are favourable in size to one’s cause, or large enough to 
frustrate large scale anti-national measures such as imposed international legal norms, 
diplomatic boycotts, economic sanctions, and military intervention. A caveat needs 
adding at this point, that non-state actors must be taken into account in any application of 
soft power because of their ability to use the same, except in the first characteristic of soft 
power — packaging national community — where they will need states’ collaboration if 
it is to be done. As will be elaborated in Chapter 4, NGOs and individuals (such as
24 A contemporary manifestation of this is the rising obsession with public relations strategies in foreign
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human rights victims) act on the conscience principle of shaming, or lobbying, for change 
to state practices that they regard as undesirable. It is rare that they seek explicit 
overthrow of governments. The activities of shaming and lobbying rely on circulating 
partial and impartial information as widely as possible. In this way, they function in the 
age of satellite television and Internet by reaching omnidirectional audiences with ideas 
that must be credible in opposition to the foreign or domestic policies they seek to 
change. In these latter aspects, non-state actors have equal standing with bureaucrats 
within soft power foreign policy.
Tentatively, a spectrum of soft power results can be posited. On the weaker end, 
academic and purely international elite debates result in stalemate with little policy 
impact. In the middle, global non-state-actor-inclusive regimes and networks are 
negotiated to accommodate non-uniform agendas and particularistic interest aggregation. 
At the other extreme, a national soft power becomes globalized to the extent that total 
political hegemony results through the complete conversion of opinion at all levels of 
social existence to a particular cause. This becomes the cultural imperialism of one 
community. This is represented in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Soft Power Spectrum
Weak Strong
< ►
Elite and academic debates Regimes and policy networks Cultural imperialism
3.6 Survival in Global Information Space
In this Chapter, the implications of information globalization have been elaborated 
in terms of globally enlarged spatial accountability. Drawing upon ICT implications,
policy. See Kunczik (1997).
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global capitalist dynamics, and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity, analysis of spaces for 
political action have revealed that a global information space has existed from the 1990s 
onwards. This space is both polycentric and public in character, and a common site of 
struggles for definitions of order, community and identity. But unlike a national public 
sphere, there is no central reference point for governance. Global information space, as a 
public space, is connected with the operation of world public opinion, which, like its 
national parallel, is a product of unpredictable power politics. However, in a world 
context, opinion emanates from nation-states and non-state actors alike, focussed upon 
selectively defined common consequences. World public opinion has been argued to be 
potentially unrepresentative, being mostly the subjective creation of articulate actors 
operating without representative mechanisms.
Given its vulnerability to power discourses of world opinion, global information 
space is similar to a Hobbesian state of nature within which the nation and its co-referent, 
the state, necessarily assume roles as containers and guardians of the basic order, 
community and identity goals of mankind. The nation-state is a normative community by 
default in the absence of a world democratic state. Nation-states are also discursive 
communities as they define human well-being within them, and simultaneously keep at 
bay the threat of anarchy from outside. Discourse as power simultaneously legitimates the 
nation-state in the eyes of its citizens, rival nation-states and non-state actors. The latter 
however have the partial potential of discursively challenging national allegiances 
because they can also offer solutions to developmental and identity issues. In this way, 
discourse can either delineate or confuse domestic and foreign policy.
25 Definition from Morgenthau (1950, 40). Similar understandings o f cultural imperialism are shared by 
scholars such as Thornton (1980), Tomlinson (1991) and Said (1993).
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Foreign policy traditionally has a wide range of hard and soft power instruments 
at its disposal to navigate the global state of nature, but given the political uncertainties of 
opinion presaging action in global information space, soft power as the long-term 
propaganda of community discourse, assumes equal importance to hard power. Soft 
power’s three operational features -  of promoting coherent attractiveness of national 
community, omnidirectionality of audiences, and the need for consistency and credibility 
of information supply -  point to a spectrum of possibilities of foreign policy outcomes 
ranging from minimal impact elite stalemates of opinion to total conversion to one’s 
cause through cultural imperialism. Rendering concrete the operation of soft power 
through foreign policy is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4 
SOFT POWER IN FOREIGN POLICY
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4.1 Introduction: Foreign Policy as a Compass, Information as Magnetic Force
As has been widely argued, foreign policy is composed of processes of framing and 
pursuing the interests of a nation-state beyond its borders. In its scope, it links domestic and 
external spheres of politics, but the compass of action is always directed towards the 
‘foreign’, which can be identified as a negative image of the value of national statehood. The 
magnetic needle of the compass is the national interest and points the direction and modality 
of instrument and strategy for the government. This compass metaphor is useful in 
illuminating the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of national interest directing foreign policy at any given 
moment in time.
Just as the magnetic needle on the compass can be deflected randomly according to 
the varying and permanent presences of metallic and other magnetic objects, foreign policy 
can just as easily be swayed by new forces of technology, changing military profiles, trade in 
commodities, neighbours’ political attitudes, and ideas. The latter factors act on the social 
and spatial context in which the compass of foreign policy is located, thereby affecting the 
perceived direction of the national interest. Naturally, questions of foreign policy ‘agency’ 
arise against the ‘structure’ of the seemingly objective magnetic forces. This is the subject of 
this Chapter: how will foreign policy operate when information acts as a magnetic force 
across the domestic-external boundary? This is a salient question under the conditions of 
nation-states operating in a global information space. It is proposed to expedite this task by 
arguing that the three characteristics of soft power elaborated in Chapter 3 operate in two 
representative sets of foreign policy processes adapted from the FPA literature. They are: the
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idea of leadership in foreign policy, which will develop the theoretical suffixes ‘inside-out’ 
and ‘outside-in’; and the politics of policy-making, which will be amended as the 
‘intermestic politics of foreign policy’ to incorporate the intrusiveness of other transnational 
non-state political actors due to globalization. As stated in Chapter 1, these two sets are 
chosen on three assumptions linked to the larger issue setting of global information space, 
namely:
(1) The hypothesis must accommodate and adapt to the contemporary porosity of 
policy-making and diplomacy in the context of multidimensional information flow.
(2) The hypothesis must be able to elaborate the ‘publicness’ of foreign policy­
making in terms of the participation of increased numbers of players within and 
outside governments, whether as policy initiators or feedback agents.
(3) The hypothesis must accept that the onus of defending identity and community 
lies intellectually with policy-making and policy-makers.
These will be contextually reiterated at the relevant sections of this Chapter.
4.2 Leadership in Foreign Policy
In the context of boundary fluidity, porosity and information flow, the leadership
component in foreign policy is pertinent for study as a conduit for soft power projection in
terms of representing holistic causes in the midst of the global discursive cacophony.
Defining a political leader is to define a clear focal point: someone elected or appointed to
head a party, government organ, or the entire nation-state itself. He or she is simultaneously
the symbolic head of a number of people contracting to form the body politic. The leader (or
decision-maker) in foreign policy is no less involved in politics. George Modelski’s ‘theory
of foreign policy’ ascribes an important role to the foreign policy leader in terms of his or her
.. .ability to act and their responsibility for acting ‘on behalf of their community. One 
community, and the state into which it is organized, cannot have more than one set of 
policy-makers who speak and act on its behalf; the availability of policy-makers is the
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distinguishing mark of a community organized for foreign policy purposes, a
community organized into a state. (Modelski 1962,4)
International relations since Thucydides has essentially been a game played among 
represented groups, although from the mid-twentieth century onwards, non-state actors have 
crowded onto the same arena. Each representative must therefore be a leader in performative 
terms of aggregating, articulating and pursuing agendas for the well being of the community 
of followers. The term ‘foreign policy leader’ refers generically to the policy-making elite: 
the Head of State (where applicable), the Head of Government, the foreign minister and his 
immediate deputies, as well as persons intimately connected to all of the preceding by 
bureaucratic, political or nationalistic ties. These general observations on foreign policy 
leadership supply a setting that is clearly compatible with the three characteristics of soft 
power enumerated in Chapter 3: the reliance upon communitarian credibility at home, 
omnidirectional audiences for foreign policy, and the demands for presentational competence 
in information concerning foreign affairs and national stability.
The foreign policy leader’s forte lies in his representational power and authority 
derived jointly, democratically or otherwise, from his community (Bums 1979; George 1980; 
Caldwell and McKeown 1993). Representation involves discursive power in the sense of 
defining the short and long-term national interest, meeting the demands, and corresponding 
strategies of a crisis situation, and above all, in the abstract but nevertheless identity-relevant 
sense of national dignity. By some accounts, all these are collectively classed as ‘raison 
d'etat’ but this term is inadequate in elaborating personal leadership as a critical point of soft 
power emission. Operating in global information space means that the foreign policy leader 
is permanently a world public actor, a natural defender of discursive community, and a 
processor of inflows of information. He decides whether these inflows constitute a threat to
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the symbolic enclosures of nationhood. Due to the tendency for contemporary foreign affairs 
to be a conflation of multiple and indivisible issue-areas, unlike most domestic policy debates 
(Rosenau 1967, 39-50; Waltz 1967, 283-293), the leader is apt to employ all the intellectual 
resources he can muster to frame the interests, self-worth, the necessity of sacrifice, and bold 
initiative required of his national audience. As far as possible, he has to lead according to his 
own vision of a future. Furthermore, given the omnidirectionality of discursive power in a 
globally-mediated world, the leader has also got to consider moderating or incorporating 
messages for hostile and neutral world audiences.
To adapt Robert Jervis, the leader is a significant point for issuing the signals and 
indices of foreign policy activity. Signals are ‘statements or actions the meanings of which 
are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors’; hence they are 
information transmissions. Indices, in contrast, ‘are statements or actions that carry some 
inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be 
inextricably linked to the actor’s capability or intentions.’ (Jervis 1989, 4-32)1 According to 
the information flow concept in Figure 1 (Chapter 2), signals and indices are most likely 
issued at source. Hence the leader is also partly responsible for any accurate perception or 
misperception of adversaries’ and allies’ foreign policy situations along components of the 
flow, leading up to nationally-desirable or undesirable outcomes for the short and long term. 
Although the study of foreign policy leadership employs a wide range of angles in explaining 
causality and expression of decisions, the purpose here is to cull selectively from pre-existing 
literature the operational aspects of running a soft power foreign policy. Being concerned
1 On the privileging of the leader as issuer of signals and indices, see Jervis’ Chapter 4 ‘Signals and Lies’. The 
same assumption of the leader as issuer of signals and indices is made by Hermann (1993).
2 This view is shared by Henry Kissinger. See Stephen Grabaud’s intellectual biography o f him. (1974, 10-12)
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with frontier management, leadership in foreign policy can be dichotomised into ‘inside-out’ 
strategies based on domestic sources, and ‘outside-in’ strategies based on the globalized 
sources of soft power.
4.2.1 Leadership Inside-Out
Just as ‘foreign policy’ exists on the assumption that the components of a nation-state 
are united in certain kinds of allegiance, the leader who wishes to wield soft power 
effectively needs a coherent polity backing him. Foreign policy is, of course, dependent on 
the interchangeability of hard strengths and constraints ranging from territorial size to 
material resources. However, when soft power is involved, a coherent polity can be built or 
weakened by the degree of availability of leadership intelligence, foresight, the cultures of 
both elite and public opinion, and congenial leader-follower relations, along with its social, 
economic, political and bureaucratic performance at any given moment in time. In short, the 
latter are the unquantifiable humano-philosophical factors that constitute the basis of 
diplomacy as attraction to one’s ideas (Nye Jr. 1990b, 166). Due to its communitarian 
foundations as elaborated in Chapter 3, soft power is charged and re-charged from a 
leadership’s domestic arena prior to outward projection. It is the task of this section to 
elaborate how these humano-philosophical factors contribute to the generation of ideational 
strengths domestically, for use abroad.
Firstly, leadership as a social practice draws its sustenance from culture and 
socialisation factors (Bums 1979, 49-137; George 1980, 4-12). Culture can simply be 
understood as a particular set of beliefs, habits and traditions informing modes of life 
persisting through time. Socialisation comprises agents (e.g. teachers, bureaucrats,
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counsellors, politicians, parents) and processes (education, punitive learning, rule-following, 
parental influences etc.) of transmitting culture from the old to the young within the 
population. While it is doubtful that the strains of culture can be scientifically analysed, it is 
widely acknowledged that the cultural beliefs and practices of a people can be deliberately 
formed through nationalism foisted downwards through an elite consensus, or spontaneously 
moulded, and reinforced through common historical experiences of social tumult and triumph 
(Steiner 1983, 373-412; Walker 1990, 11-13). Studies of political leadership and diplomacy 
have drawn on the psychic and philosophical repository of communities for creating causality 
in leader-follower relationships of attraction. In this way, cultural symbols, not excluding 
myths, recurrent themes, values, even fantasies and other popular imaginations, serve as a 
ready repository of resources for leaders to work up a following (Mazlish 1990, 253-266).3
Using cultural explanations, one might argue that American leaders draw on the 
heritage of their War of Independence and the Lincolnian ideals to push for neo-liberal 
national regimes globally, or that there is a French sense of great power grandeur driven by 
the echoes of 1789, Napoleon, and de Gaulle. Similarly, in dealings with newly emergent 
nation-states and powers such as China, Egypt, India, and Indonesia, a certain amount of 
shared anti-western, and anti-capitalist, radicalism is to be expected at some point in their 
dealings with other state representatives and non-state actors at diplomatic forums. It is the 
personnel driving foreign policy who would project their psychological experience of history. 
Variations of historical-national traits manifest in foreign policies according to other equally 
dependent variables such as innate leadership personalities, their adolescent experiences, 
extent of education, the openness and accountability of their governmental systems and so
3 See also Bums on ‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ leadership (1979, ch. 6-14).
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on. Some leaders may latch on to a messianic philosophy in order to propagate soft power 
first at home, then abroad (e.g. communism). Others such as Castro, Kim II Sung, Sukarno, 
Ho Chi Minh and Zhou Enlai may simply have been ‘schooled’ in the university of 
revolutionary and economic upheaval into a transnational cohort who are susceptible to 
sharing one of their own’s anti-imperialist ideas. Witness the radical themes of sections of 
the Non-aligned Movement in the 1960s for redistributing international economic and 
information flows. Other contemporary examples of soft power leaders reveal that regional, 
passive, or less-ideological characteristics can also serve foreign policy goals: Presidents 
Mandela (South Africa) and Havel (Czech Republic) offer themselves as international 
‘voices’ of suppressed human rights and peace mediators on the basis that they have once 
been leaders of the oppressed in their countries; alternatively, the joint leadership of US, 
Japanese, Canadian, and increasingly, Singaporean diplomats in promoting rapid trade 
liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific region stems from their countries’ common recent 
experiences as pro-regime free-traders.
Secondly, if leadership is to be exercised in terms of a convincing projection of a 
model society and organisational showcase abroad for economic and security ends, then the 
burden of responsibility must weigh upon the unity of elites and masses alike, however 
ordered. Since antiquity, kings and elite rulers of empires and nation-states have asserted 
tributary claims, moral, cultural and military superiority on the basis of physical displays and 
assertions of grandeur. Examples include the Socratic assertion that principles of virtuosity 
and right living were limited only to Hellenes guided by philosopher kings (Plato 1987, 198- 
199, pt. VI, bk V), the Roman imperium’s presumption of natural colonial administration of 
inferior peoples from a self-regarding centre, or the Chinese ‘celestial’ empire’s political
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cosmology of claiming the ‘mandate of heaven’ for its Emperor. In each case, the 
metropolitan civilisation used a combination of coercion, through display of superior military 
power, and holistic cultural appeal transmitted through law, art and writing to develop a 
suzerain system of relations between superior and subordinate proto-state communities. In 
other words, each metropolitan civilisation incorporated satellite entities into a distinct 
worldview of hierarchical relations. In Europe, this pattern of thinking persisted into the 
Middle Ages despite the decline of Rome. In fact the ‘Barbarian’ Goths, Vandals and Franks 
copied Roman laws and government practices while encamped within and around the 
militarily moribund empire and pressuring it politically (Moss 1935, 64-71). In their time, the 
medieval forerunners of contemporary political theory generally regarded the Church as the 
repository of soft power sanctioned by God, but they disagreed over whether it covered both 
temporal and spiritual matters spatially. The medievals also derived ‘corporation theory’, or 
the idea that the temporal ideal of government was one of a functionally-complemented, 
consent-based, and collectively self-governing body politic (Marsilius 1980, 15-18, 51-55, 
dis. I, ch. V, XIII). A majority of these philosophers did so for the purpose of secularising 
monarchic authority as the upholder of territorial organisations of ‘the good life’. This paved 
the way politically for the principle of equal procedural sovereignty marked by the Peace of 
Westphalia 1648.
In the contemporary world, one finds echoes of a cohesive framework of govemment- 
society relations serving as a source of extra-national power of attraction in the ‘mission 
civilisatrice’ of late European imperialism, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and in the 
promotion of American-style liberal democracy and modernization in the Third World 
especially between the 1950s and the 1970s. Unlike the post-Cold War period, these attempts
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at soft power were all heavily interfered with, although some might argue ‘complemented’, 
by the use of force from gunboat diplomacy, military advisors and bases, to transnational 
domestic subversion networks (e.g. communist underground cells and CIA ‘black 
operations’). Liberated and active soft power today is unique in that there is vastly less 
backing for it by hard power. The transnational attraction of the ‘Third Way’ around the turn 
of the last century, expressed as modernised, globalization-acclimatised social democracy is, 
for example, not bome by gunboats but by images of President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair 
and Chancellor Schroeder delivering the socio-economic goals of the good life at home in 
terms of pruned social welfare, investment-friendly taxation, and an emphasis on centre-left 
community (Dionne Jr. 1998). Presidents Vicente Fox and Ricardo Lagos of Mexico and 
Chile4 respectively, are reported to be recent adherents to the ‘Third Way’ as well. Similarly, 
under the worldwide expansion of investment activities, scrutinising practices by 
international and non-state financial authorities are compelling nation-states to package 
themselves as coherent industrial or capital investment havens. Some states have resorted to 
the art of ‘branding’ their images to attract investors (Kunczik 1997). In a way, all these 
developments re-embed leadership theory in considerations of the project of the corporatist 
state5 in modem political economy, and the stress on philosophical and social unity for the 
sake of attracting transnational business-driven development. Leaders who wield such 
corporatist soft power are likely to fuse academic and public relations qualities in their
4 See references to Lagos in Chapter 6.
5 Although my usage of this term is not meant to recommend dictatorial modes of governance in pursuit of 
forging a cohesive base for foreign policy, theorists of the bureaucratic-authoritarian form of corporatism 
describe such a reality from Latin American cases (e.g. Argentina and Brazil) from the 1960s. Political regimes, 
captured by elites dependent upon foreign trade and investment, restructure domestic politics in such a way that 
democratic competition is ‘disciplined’ into regime-approved hierarchical channels of political communication. 
Potentially destabilising groups such as trade unions are all incorporated as part of the bureaucratic apparatus 
(O’Donnell 1979, 85-105).
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diplomacy, or hire new kinds of professionals to perform information promotion tasks in the 
place of orthodox diplomats.
In one sense, the cultural and cohesive society elements of the humano-philosophical 
factors can be construed as the ‘structure’ from which leadership inside-out springs, hence 
the nominally independent ‘agency’ of leaders is another set of factors for consideration. 
Whilst distinguishing structure and agency is inherently difficult in sociological theory, as 
explained in Chapter 1, it can be asserted that leaders enjoy an independent source of power 
in so far as they exercise intrinsic talents and traits to secure a role conception matched to the 
political situation at hand (Kissinger 1969, 20-26; Walker 1983, 86-107). Leadership is 
fundamentally a leader-follower relationship. Henry Kissinger argues that it is ‘the 
decisions....made by individuals who will be above all conscious of the seeming multiplicity 
of options,’ (Kissinger 1969, 27) and this can be elaborated through three ‘contemporary’ 
types. First, a ‘bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership’ exists in the sense that the West 
exemplifies modernity in form: most recognised problems can be solved on a rational- 
technical basis and professions such as law and business are highly valued for their problem­
solving expertise; furthermore, decisions are made and viewed administratively as bargaining 
and compromise between two positions of disagreement. There is a low appreciation of 
historical and national particularities. The pragmatism of this leadership type
...is based on the conviction that the context of events produces a solution[;] there is 
a tendency to await developments. The belief is prevalent that every problem will 
yield if attacked with sufficient energy...Problems are segmented into constituent 
elements, each of which is dealt with by experts in the special difficulty it involves. 
(Kissinger 1969, 29)
The second type, the ideological, depends on the worldview and doctrinal properties 
of an ideology for guidance in foreign policy. For Kissinger, communism typified this model.
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Marxism-Leninism filtered truth for communist statesmen through fixed interpretations of 
‘objective’ factors such as social class, correlation of economic and political forces, and 
conditions of historical revolution. Unless one is the progenitor of that very ideology, there is 
less room for ‘subjective’ initiative except to interpret the scientific laws of history and apply 
correct strategies for attaining utopian futures. Ideological leadership tends to be dogmatic 
and holds relatively rigid postures of hostility to non-conforming leaders and their countries 
(Kissinger 1969, 34-38). In many ways, religious fundamentalist and nationalistic 
governments are classified as ideological leaderships in the way they stake out entrenched 
positions on human rights, development, information policy and military security for reasons 
of domestic and regional consolidation (Cemy 1979, 59-85).
Thirdly, there is the charismatic-revolutionary type of leadership exemplified by 
Castro, Hitler, Sukarno and Khomeini, and perhaps more recently Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and 
Chavez in Venezuela. This is characterised by leading a struggle for independence or 
national revival, and being ‘sustained in the risks and suffering of such a course primarily by 
a commitment to a vision which enabled him to override conditions which had seemed 
overwhelmingly hostile.’ (Kissinger 1969, 39; Cemy 1979, 76-79) The source of 
‘charismatic revolution’ lies in the subtle motivation of visions of a utopian future. This 
definition has been supplemented by a more detailed study of charismatic political leadership 
that concluded that it is a leader-follower relationship with four specific properties:
(1) The leader is perceived by the followers as somehow superhuman.
(2) The followers blindly believe the leader’s statements.
(3) The followers unconditionally comply with the leader’s directions for action.
(4) The followers give the leader unqualified commitment. (Willner 1984, 8)
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The qualities of charismatic leadership are useful reference points for this 
examination of ‘inside-out’ leadership as soft power. Firstly, how is a leader able to 
demonstrate the strength of his personality as writ large upon his following? It lies in 
perception, particularly in the cultural socialisation and information which the leadership is 
schooled in and which it draws on for legitimacy. Weber has described the state as a relation 
of ‘men dominating men’ based on three inner justifications of legitimacy: the authority of 
tradition or behaviour patterns sanctified through ‘ancient recognition and habitual 
orientation’; the authority of charisma as ‘absolutely personal devotion and personal 
confidence in revelation, [and] heroism’; and authority based on legal and statute rule- 
governed function (Weber 1948, 78-79). These are the cementing links of leader-follower 
mutual recognition and very clearly correspond to Kissinger’s three types of foreign policy 
leaders. One might be doubtful in an age of public opinion and global media as to whether 
charisma holds ground in foreign policy anymore. The answer will have to be partly refracted 
through the previously cited aspects (2) and (3) of charismatic followership: why do 
followers believe in the representational capacity of leadership and follow a lead?
Alternatively, bearing in mind the numerical disparity between leader and 
community, one must ponder if public opinion can lead decisively and consistently. The 
Almond-Lippmann theories of public opinion in foreign policy argue ‘no’ on the basis that 
spontaneous ‘general willed’ decision-making is a fiction.6 Bearing in mind the observations 
about the nature of global information space and issue-area complexity in foreign affairs, the 
reality is likely to be opinion-formation engendered by elite-interests and political structures 
acting as opinion leaders and mediating variables in giving voice to, harmonising, or
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mobilising public support for foreign policy (Risse-Kappen 1991; Holsti 1992; Hermann and 
Hagan 1998). Lastly, international relations, as it has been argued in earlier chapters, is 
normatively a game of grouped entities, hence a leader of his group has to draw power from 
his national constituency in so many ways reminiscent of political corporatist arrangements. 
It is to represent coherence against external adversity, a beacon of self-righteous good 
governance to potential friends and foes, as well as to invite global investment to ‘reside’ in 
an attractive territorial-economic climate. This is easier said than applied: it is ultimately up 
to the individual agency, affected by cultural and socialisation structures, to mix and match 
leadership types (read ‘styles’) to foreign policy situations and goals. One half of soft power 
leadership is thus constructing a problem discourse matched to a desired solution discourse.
4.2.2 Leadership Outside-In
The soft power of foreign policy leadership is however less commonly derived from 
the exclusive interplay of factors located outside the leader’s national territory. The model of 
American structural power associated with Strange, Kindleberger and more recently, Nye 
and Owens (Nye Jr. and Owens 1996, 29-33), is a fresh exploration of the possibility of 
‘outside-in’ leadership. In consonance with the thesis that structural power is the power to 
determine the structures setting parameters for the working of political institutions and non­
state actors within the world political economy (Strange 1994, 24-25), soft power leadership 
aims to promote, circulate and if possible, institutionalise ideas favourable to a national 
cause. Although it is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, that a single nation-state can 
duplicate the postwar moment, purpose and overriding power which enabled the US, and to 
some extent Britain, to draft the nascent ‘constitutions’ (GATT, IMF and World Bank) of
6 A sceptical school of thought on the decisiveness of public opinion on foreign policy centred upon the various
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global economy, the amorphous political potential of global information space offers 
opportunities for any soft power-capable nation-state to shape agendas of existing institutions 
to their benefit and to influence the conversion of other actors to these agendas. This is where 
the soft power leadership of external origin can globalize and penetrate the domestic agendas 
of nation-states. This can be explained through regime theory and epistemic communities.
International regimes are ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision­
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.’ (Krasner 1982, 186) These may be institutionalised in formal terms with a full 
secretariat, compliance monitoring body, regular conferencing, or an informal declaration of 
principles for conduct on specific issues with no international legal sanction. In many cases, 
such as arms control treaties, human rights and trade conventions, national legislative 
ratification is required for regimes to take effect. This represents domestic enforcement of 
external ideas. Soft power then becomes ‘binding’ as structural power. The stakes of getting 
ideas written into regimes are thus high, and the informational nature of regimes enables 
leadership to mount campaigns for a global audience. Regimes are common problem solving 
pacts, a public good, or a means to supply it. The motivation is generally statist and involves 
the arbitraging of national interests towards joint action. The means of arbitraging are ideas 
that serve as critical roadmaps of policies where deadlock exists, or suggestions for 
coordinating shared principles of agreement (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13-20). 
Occasionally, visionary leadership may produce the institutionalisation of an idea before a
works of Walter Lippmann (various works) and Gabriel Almond (1956,1960).
7 Norms, as information of measurement, and advocacy of political and socio-economic standards, have real 
impact upon states through regimes. (Raymond 1997, 205-245)
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problem actually arises, such as the nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific, South America, 
and Southeast Asia.
Regime-formation however rarely occurs through multilateral spontaneity, rather as 
Robert Keohane pointed out in a rational-market theory of demand for regimes, a ‘political 
entrepreneur’ is necessary in reducing the ‘transaction costs’ of initiating cooperation. 
According to this logic, entrepreneurial leaders arise only when potential profit is perceived 
to be sufficiently large and consequent upon joint cooperation (Keohane 1982, 338-339). 
This ‘profit’ is not necessarily monetary, although trade and anti-pollution regimes certainly 
deliver such results. It could simply be the reduction of long-term political risk and 
uncertainty involved with certain issues. The nuclear non-proliferation regime, which took 
effect in 1970, and was renewed through 1995, represented a centrepiece of efforts by the 
erstwhile USSR, the US, Britain, France and more recently, China, to preserve the global 
nuclear status quo since the 1960s. Obviously, the soft power of non-proliferation ideas was 
set back in 1998 where India and Pakistan were concerned. This illustrates a perennial 
problematique within regime leadership: how is this sense of ‘profit’ to be extended 
equitably to all participants, and does regime learning occur in response to changed 
circumstances as the Indian and Pakistani tests show? Ultimately, the entrepreneurial leader 
must know when to don the hats of the intellectual and structural power-bargainer to sustain 
common foci in collaboration. In some accounts, for instance, both US presidents Woodrow 
Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt have had to swap the intellectual hat for the realist one, just 
to gain their allies’ acquiescence to their respective new world order designs with varying 
degrees of success in 1919 and 1945 (A. Williams 1998, ch. 1-5). Briefly speaking, the 
entrepreneurial element is in the ‘start-up’ initiative, while ‘structural power bargaining’ is
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the translation of material state interests into bargainable items; and the ‘intellectual’ consists
o
in the generation of fresh ideas by the entrepreneurial visionary, with overlaps of these roles 
becoming increasingly common.
At this point in the evolution of international society, these permutations of leadership 
as diplomacy are reflective of the cumulative scientific, social and economic complexities of 
progress, often necessitating the creative transformations of knowledge expertise beyond 
state-bound forms. One additional innovation is the epistemic community. This is ‘a network 
of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’ (P.M. 
Haas 1992, 3) The epistemic community of individuals plies its trade in coordinating 
national, international and now, global non-state networks towards ascendancy in solving 
problems where uncertainties of issue-salience across time and space prevent coordinated 
policy-making and regime maintenance. The epistemic community may or may not solve 
problems by itself, being dependent on the accommodating spirit of national political wills in 
transnational forums. Nevertheless, it is leadership potential on its own if it sheds light on 
cause-effect relationships in problems and consequently shapes states’ responses to them. 
Not unexpectedly, epistemic communities have arisen in military technology, environmental, 
developmental, and security confidence building arenas in international relations. They may 
come in the form of think-tanks, formalised transnational NGOs, eminent persons working 
groups supported by intergovernmental organisations, or academic institutes with national 
links. The leadership bases of an epistemic community can broadly encompass the 
pragmatism of problem-specific regime formation, or may be the independent initiative of a
8 These distinctions are adopted from Young (1991, 288-299).
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group of citizens, scientists and interest groups concerned about environmental, human rights 
or peace causes (P.M. Haas 1992, 12-20; Stone 2001). Above all, their territorial scope is not 
a limiting factor, with participation of international organisations and non-state actors as a 
standard feature. Due to its amorphous self-definition of being merely policy-relevant, the 
leadership of an epistemic community may owe allegiance to national interests to the extent 
that their mission is a sub-set of an idea strongly associated with one or more states.
In a way, one might say that in the struggle between international and global frames 
of action, the epistemic community is a nascent civil society body mediating the two but 
always exhibiting uneven degrees of partiality. The economists John Maynard Keynes and 
Harry Dexter White have, for example, been jointly regarded as the epistemic authors of the 
Bretton Woods financial regimes, bridging the official policy positions of London and 
Washington in the postwar era (Ikenberry 1993, 68-75). Much in the same vein, Third World 
state protests against debt burdens and unequal economic globalization at the World 
Economic Forum (Davos) and WTO have been taken up by epistemic communities-cum-aid 
organisations such as Third World Network, Action Aid, and the Grameen Bank (Runyan 
1999; Khor 1999). While these tend to assert that neo-liberal prescriptions by the World 
Bank-IMF-WTO epistemic communities are indifferent to realities on the ground, through 
being associated with western governments and MNCs, many development NGOs continue 
to act as funnels for official aid monies to developing countries (Stiles 2000). In fact, 
European states such as Britain, Norway, the Netherlands and Germany have issued a joint 
declaration to constitute an anti-poverty epistemic community based on civil society 
collaboration, academic inputs, and empowerment of the recipients (Herfkens et al. 1999).
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4.2.3 Summary: Contours of Soft Power Leadership
Leadership in foreign policy thus emerges as a vast field of information contestation
intrinsic to the discursive defence of community within global information space. Global
information space has given the informational strengths of diplomacy special prominence. In
this milieu, leadership is a weighty vessel of soft power provided that it can be anchored to
ideas, and floated on circumstances. Two hypotheses, respectively, Leadership Inside-Out
and Outside-in, are derived from the preceding discussions:
Leadership A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership
Inside-Out Inside-Out by projecting a communitarian base, by its credibility as a
(LIO): source of information, and by targeting an omnidirectional audience.
Leadership A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership
Outside-in Outside-in by exercising political entrepreneurship through international
(LOI): regimes, and by forming epistemic communities.
Given its brevity, this section could not have done more than provide a taxonomy of sources 
of ideas in social structures and individual agencies. Ultimately, the sets of meanings 
constituting power-community can only be articulated by leaders able to draw on domestic 
repositories of knowledge and legitimacy, tap epistemic communities, or operationalise joint 
regimes of nationally favourable knowledge-based practices for constructing benign global 
environments. In this context, the ideational threats may arise not just from structural power 
of the American form, but also from global non-state networks which assert policy-relevant 
knowledge.
4.3 Intermestic Politics of Foreign Policy
The issue of the possession of policy-relevant knowledge within global information 
space leads directly to the consideration of the second set of soft power-relevant foreign 
policy processes: the politics of foreign policy-making. This is a collective label
encompassing associated sub-fields of FPA known as the ‘governmental/bureaucratic politics 
model’, the .‘politics of policy making’, ‘foreign policy as a political process’, ‘new 
diplomacy’ and ‘democratic foreign policy’ (Allison 1971, 144-184; Hilsman 1971; Wallace 
1971; Halperin 1974; Butterfield 1966; N.L. Hill 1970; Skidmore and Hudson 1993). Despite 
their subtle differences, all of these have in common the assumption that the practice and 
making of foreign policy is a political activity in the symbolic sense defined in Chapter 2, 
and in the form of competing agendas of institutional and non-institutional groups inside and 
outside government. Their ‘weapons’ and ‘resources’ of politicking lie primarily in values, 
and in mobilising ideology, expertise, prestige, status and other forms of information. In 
cases where these groups include assertive militaries and police forces, the potential threat of 
physical force may also constitute an asset in affecting policy (Hilsman 1971, 49-50). In the 
main, however, foreign policy is an exercise of unity and the employment of information is 
more applicable and efficacious in gaining position, allies and neutrals, rather than risking 
communitarian unity in a prospect of outright civil war when arms are employed for coercion 
to secure objectives.
Since these groups operate on the basis of claiming policy-relevant knowledge, the 
advent of information globalization ensures that foreign policy-making becomes exposed to 
interested parties that transcend national borders, perhaps located within another state’s civil 
society, or even outside the governing framework within one’s national territory.9 Foreign 
policy is thus being made in a context of porosity: sources of information pervade decision­
making from unexpected directions. A porosity of information boundaries for policy-making
9 The precedent for this has been that groups within a government have been mobilising and exchanging support 
with those outside government within a national territory. See Halperin (1974, 230-232) and Newsom (1996).
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will tend to sharpen conflicts of interests among groups claiming legitimate inputs into 
policy-making, thereby encouraging groups to adopt modes of discursive leadership to get 
their way. They use modified versions of soft power leadership ‘inside-out’ or ‘outside-in’ 
according to situational experience. Lastly, because of both the condition of porosity and the 
competitive nature of political processes, foreign policy-making within global information 
space compels nation-states to take account of multiple actor inputs into their policies.10 Thus 
the ‘politics of foreign policy-making’ enables an examination of the exposed cross­
boundary nature of pursuing a foreign policy today, and the operation of soft power by non­
state actors upon states. This model should henceforth carry the prefix ‘intermestic’ 
(international and domestic) to reflect this reality. Although this term was introduced by 
scholars to analyse US foreign policy-making during the Cold War (Manning 1977),11 it is 
even more pertinent today as a shorthand for boundary penetration and complexity for all 
states within global information space.
This section next elaborates the characteristics of the intermestic foreign policy 
process with a view to drawing out its detailed soft power operation. First of all, foreign 
policy as governmental action is a ‘political resultant’ in the sense that ‘what happens is not 
chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion 
of [interested parties] with diverse interests and unequal influence.’ (Allison 1971, 162; 
Hilsman 1971, 117) Secondly, bargaining is involved vertically and horizontally as a 
decision-making mode. Taken together, these first two characteristics require drawing
A.M. Scott (1982), Strobel (1997) and Rosenau (1997a) take this explanation of group politicking in policy 
formation across borders and into global spaces.
10 Keohane’s proposition of ‘international multiple advocacy’ for the conscientious interdependence-sensitive 
formulation of US foreign policy through consulting ‘foreign-interested parties’ is a useful starting point for the 
foregoing analysis. (1993)
11 There are also implicit allusions to a concept of ‘intermesticity’ in Bloomfield (1982).
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discursive lines of issue-relevance with the power of information at the disposal of interested 
parties. This means that the communitarian bases of soft power foreign policy must be 
cohesively mapped out among the policy-shaping parties, otherwise cacophony results and 
the attraction in soft power is dissipated.
Thirdly, the bargaining among interested parties on foreign policy issues is 
determined by their non-physical and non-coercive resources on the grounds that if the 
political resultant is to be stable, it should be backed by the conviction of voluntary choice 
among initial objectors. The outcome will then be manifested as a unified policy position 
(Hilsman 1971, 188-191). This means the release or control of information are the prime 
tools of policy-making participants. This is linked to the fourth and final characteristic of the 
way in which various participants’ might wield information power; they do so through 
tactical negotiating positions, ideologies, philosophies, photographic evidence, and prestige 
based on office, prior performance, or precedent (Allison 1971, 168-169, 175-179). Once 
again, soft power evidently has to be used to congeal and shape a coalition of common 
interest, and the way to do it is to employ discursive practices. The field of public 
administration studies further informs this analysis by arguing that the essence of 
bureaucratic power is sourced from organisations’ self-constituted, or govemmentally 
constituted, authority to prescribe or espouse expertise (Michels 1960; Neumann 1960). This 
is no different from the Foucaultian explanation of discipline as power, or truth regimes 
conferring power upon their expounders, particularly within the widely accepted modem 
milieu of both theory and practice of international relations.
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To further investigate soft power operation in the intermestic politics of foreign 
policy, we can develop two operational formulations from the discussion above:
(a) multiple actors, multiple inputs: the intermestic correlation of forces; and
(b) competition of ideas and their resolution: ‘intermestic socialisation’ and ‘multipolar direct 
emulation through demonstration’.
These two sets reflect the dynamics of multi-actor play and will facilitate the explanation of 
how information, as various forms of ideas, affect foreign policy globally.
4.3.1 Multiple Actors, Multiple Inputs: The Intermestic Correlation of Forces
The notion of the intermestic determinants of foreign policy is contiguous with the 
cumulative impact of globalization on political practices within and between states. During 
the twentieth century, assorted developments in the western hemisphere arising from the 
complexity of modem science, health, industrial conditions, the increasing scale of war 
casualties and inter-cultural contact, stimulated the formation of groups of ordinary citizens 
to organise first nationally, then internationally, to further their mutual philanthropic and 
intellectual interests. The epistemic communities of social scientific area studies (e.g. 
African, Asiatic and Orientalist), the International Red Cross and the International Women’s 
Association are examples of what some authors have termed movements motivated by 
individualism and rationalism aimed at advancing mankind’s future well-being (Boli and 
Thomas 1999a; Field Jr. 1972; Halliday 2001). The non-state actor can be said to have been 
bom from the domestic fragmentation of national interest and centralised state power.
By the time of the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, the term ‘democratic foreign 
policy’ had grown to signify a more complex and fractious domestic process of making 
policy. Politicians came to believe they had to heed the ‘peoples' voice’ in addition to the
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voice of commerce at home and abroad. Furthermore, technical and philanthropic non-state 
actors had begun making their small-scale presence felt on the sidelines of intergovernmental 
meetings of the League of Nations. Yet it was not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that 
the activities of agents of interdependence came to be contextualised theoretically in a 
serious way within the study of international relations.12 By the 1970s, against the 
background of stymied socio-economic development of the newly decolonised nation-states, 
and the proliferation of MNCs operating in neo-liberal transnational spaces, Keohane and 
Nye’s conceptualisation of ‘complex interdependence’ crystallised the prominent role played 
by international organisations and non-state actors in the world politics of nation-states 
(Keohane and Nye Jr. 1989, 1972). In the interwar years, Marxism-Leninism had also 
contributed another strong transnational non-state element: the revolutionary parties 
representing a purported world proletariat (A.M. Scott 1982, 3-68). Nevertheless, whether it 
was the interwar years or the Cold War, nation-states were still politically primus inter pares 
and the intermestic could all be subordinated or subsumed into a composite ‘national 
interest’.
What has changed since the early 1990s is the liberation of soft power for political 
action through the arrival of global information space. Non-state actors are quickly proving 
as adept as nation-states in exercising several forms of soft power across the spatial and time 
boundaries of national interests13 within the context of satellite communications, the Internet, 
global capitalism and post-Cold War geopolitical uncertainty. In a significant way, national 
interests are rapidly confronted by the transnational complications of issues such as
12 David Mittrany made a start with A Working Peace System in 1943, but it took more than a decade longer for 
works such as Ernst Haas’ Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (1964) to 
launch serious debates about non-state and intergovernmental actors in International Relations.
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environmental pollution, energy shortages, arms proliferation, immigration, the poverty- 
effects of global capitalism, cross-border inter-ethnic wars, refugee flows, and the 
conundrum of applying human rights law transnationally. These issues invite new 
perspectives, and this is where non-state-actors attempt to span national boundaries in 
prescribing solutions.
At this point, the term ‘non-state actors’ needs further clarification. It covers 
actomess that is not formally controlled by nation-states (Keohane and Nye Jr. 1972; Josselin 
and Wallace 2001, 2-4): individual citizens, social activists, cyber-hackers, politicians, 
terrorists, separatist movements, the International Federation of Airline Pilots’ Associations, 
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, even MNCs. However, not all of these exercise soft 
power as their main instruments, an obvious case being terrorists. The rest of this discussion 
is concerned with the majority of non-state actors which regard themselves as non­
governmental organisations (NGOs), and with NGO-associated individuals who operate both 
domestically and globally.
The NGO is defined here as a formal or informal organisation that actively promotes 
causes of conscience and welfare which nation-states are reluctant or unable to provide.14 For 
example groups like Greenpeace articulate ‘global-level’ environmental visions on nuclear 
waste disposal and maritime pollution which many nation-states cannot or will not pursue 
because of their concern for ‘national interests’. Similarly, Amnesty International, and human 
rights groups such as the Proyecto International de Derechos Humanos, dare to push for
13 The ideas o f spatial and time dimensions of national interest come from Frankel (1970, 76-93).
14 This is adapted from the de facto NGO directory, the Yearbook o f International Organizations (UIA 2000, 
2404-2405, app. 2), Fisher (1997), and Aall, Miltenberger and Weiss (2000, 95-103).
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human rights adjudication according to universalist conceptions of human rights law 
regardless of international sensitivities and politicians’ constraints.15 NGOs such as the 
Grameen Bank, Catholic Relief Services and Oxfam also demonstrate freedom in sponsoring 
community-based alternative development in South Asia, Central America and East Africa 
because they are able to communicate and join efforts with local participation. NGOs and 
associated individuals are also the type of organisational actors that states are not: they are 
‘unburdened with large bureaucracies, relatively flexible and open to innovation, more 
effective and faster at implementing development efforts, and able to identify and respond to 
grass-roots needs.’ (Fisher 1997, 444) Although some NGOs may depend largely on funding 
from states and international organisations, in addition to private donors, their 
implementation^ and ideological flexibility remains substantial because they are not directly 
responsible to an electorate. Furthermore, their operating milieu is in the soft realm of 
spreading ideas for improvement, exposing and defining social ‘wrongs’. This broad mission 
allows them to claim a membership appeal across many cultural and geographical 
boundaries, although at the time of writing most NGOs that operate transnationally are 
headquartered in the Scandinavian countries, the Benelux countries, Britain, Switzerland and 
Austria. Nevertheless by 2000, the breakdown of NGO membership by geographical region 
showed that 14% came from ‘[Eastern] Europe and Central Asia’, 13% from ‘Latin America 
and the Caribbean’, and 13% from ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’, compared to 33% from ‘Western 
Europe’.16 The broadness of membership and the specific ranges of their agendas allow 
NGOs to compete almost equally with nation-states in the information flow processes within 
global information space. NGOs can manoeuvre in the interstices of post-Cold War 
ideological uncertainties, utilise capitalism’s information networks for publicity, and attract
15 See Chapter 6.
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attention via protests on Internet sites. Their visual and psychological impact is amplified 
through global television reporting on physical protests against the EU, the US, the IMF or 
the World Bank. If the numbers of the transnational NGO ‘population’ indicate their political 
importance vis-a-vis nation states, then the statistics indicate a blooming in the 1990s; from 
51 in 1910, the total reached 110 in 1958, 5,000 in 1989 and by 1999, more than 26,000.17
In providing a holistic expertise on mapping and tackling problems on a global basis 
at the expense of states, the objectives, allegiances and resources of NGOs are likely to be 
drawn into an existential transnational civil society by issue (Lynch 1998; Anheier, Glasius 
and Kaldor 2001). These actors assert a watchdog role vis-a-vis states’ domestic and foreign 
policies by providing an expose of abuses in global information space and invoking the 
collaborative sanctioning power and authority of other state, non- and sub-state groups (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, ch. 1-2; Stanley Foundation 1999, 16-19). The network is the post-Cold 
War modus operandi of NGOs. It is a horizontal and reciprocal pattern of communication 
allowing, where necessary, intimate asymmetrical support among all parties in the network 
(Burt 1982, ch. 2). This intimacy is created through shared values, and in many cases bound 
by an idealism of altering the norms of human society towards greater humaneness as 
development and human rights NGOs attest. However, there are also others who share the 
commonality of revising the social status quo in the direction of fascism. Examples include 
right-wing associations of landowners and ex-military officers in Latin America or neo- 
fascist groups in Europe. Due to their propensities towards physical violence, these groups 
stretch their NGO status to the limits of terrorism (Payne 2000).
16 Figures from Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor (2001, 6-7, tab. 1.2).
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For NGOs, the discovery of this intimacy is itself the product of communications 
exposure. An individual or isolated group making little political headway in one location 
learns of another pursuing identical or parallel goals, and they make contact to combine 
efforts for their respective ends. Some NGOs may, from their inception, actively seek 
solidarity across professional, social, economic and political frontiers (Keck and Sikkink 
1998, 12-15). Or it could be a matter of accidental legitimacy, engendered by increased 
contact through the global reach of ICTs, and the ever closer social communion produced by 
the expansion of capitalism into the Second and Third Worlds. This is the solidarity of soft 
power towards a common target. And in terms of welfare provision, NGOs can in some cases 
facilitate communication and relief for oppressed and neglected groups within state borders, 
as relief organisations such as Oxfam, Catholic Relief Services and Christian Aid 
demonstrate in Bangladesh, Costa Rica and Ethiopia. At the extreme, as recent private NGO 
attempts reveal, a nation-state can face retaliation through a panoply of ‘cyber-weapons’ (e.g. 
negative publicity and monitoring updates) in global information space depending on the 
issue, as with the controversy over proposals for a global Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, or maintaining a regularly updated website publicising the anti-corruption and
1Rhuman rights practices of nation-states.
All these forms of direct mobilisation can collectively be called the intermestic soft 
power of the multi-actor correlation of forces. To correlate is to relate two strands of ideas or 
actions. A correlation of forces is basically a coordination of two or more actions either in 
simultaneity or in reciprocity to achieve a common goal. This usage is partly borrowed from
17 Figures have been obtained from Figure 1.1 in Boli and Thomas (1999b, 23) and Economist (1999d).
18 Consult Kobrin (1998); also the websites of Transparency International and Human Rights Watch listed in the 
bibliography, as well as Amnesty International’s <http://www.arnnesty.org.uk>.
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Marxist-Leninist and Soviet explanations. Karl Marx did not specifically use the term but he 
intimated it on the basis that national working classes could only liberate themselves by 
liberating each other in a coordinated international strategy. Reflecting on European politics 
in 1864, Marx wrote
It was not the wisdom of the ruling classes but the heroic resistance to their 
criminality by the working classes of England, that saved the west of Europe from 
plunging headlong into an infamous crusade for the perpetuation and propagation of 
slavery on the other side of the Atlantic. The shameless approval, mock sympathy, or 
idiotic indifference, with which the upper classes of Europe have witnessed the 
mountain fortress of the Caucasus falling a prey to, and heroic Poland being 
assassinated by, Russia...have taught the working classes the duty to master 
themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their 
respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; 
when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate 
the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private 
individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations. (Marx 1983, 364- 
365)
When the last three lines are taken out of historical context, they describe the contemporary 
NGO’s mission. It was the erstwhile USSR, beginning from the Khrushchev era, which 
coined the ‘correlation of forces’ as the Marxist-Leninist reading of the status of class 
warfare at any given moment (Light 1988, 267-269). On a theoretical level, the correlation 
would be interpreted in terms of how various groups within society adhered to the respective 
antagonisms of bourgeoisie and proletariat. A study of the correlation would assess how 
these alignments affect the relative degrees of success of either class in any political, social 
or economic conflict at any moment in history. This applies both domestically and 
internationally (Lider 1986, 70-71).
In translating the reading of the correlation of forces into plans for subverting world 
capitalism through fomenting violent revolution, armed intervention, or electoral alliances, 
Marxist-Leninists would have to judge whether the correlation of domestic or international
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forces favoured any action at that particular moment using socialist states as instruments and 
bases. If the correlation was perceived to be ripe for action, the proletarian leaderships of all 
socialist states would make an alliance among themselves to reinforce this favourable 
correlation either worldwide, or in a specific region. In the event that the correlation was 
unfavourable, propaganda could be assiduously employed to convince world and national 
public opinion otherwise (Lider 1986, 69-70). The USSR would put out the line that 
socialism was catching up economically with the West, that it was the natural ally against 
exploitation, and that Marxism-Leninism was an inevitability in the world and more 
imminent in a particular region. This may be buttressed by public gestures such as visits by 
revolutionary leaders to Moscow and Soviet-Cuban military deployments to the Third World. 
The US would be expected to counter this propaganda by warning of Soviet hegemony and 
poor record in economic delivery. Soviet propaganda would counter that the US was playing 
at deception to support corrupt bourgeois reactionaries and so on. A reading of a favourable 
correlation in the aftermath of propaganda would then serve as a basis for intervening in ‘the 
domestic affairs of individual countries where the class struggle takes an acute form’ with the 
aim of furthering the Marxist-Leninist cause (Lider 1986, 130; Halliday 1999, 72-90). If a 
complete revolutionary change in the targeted state is achieved, it would further strengthen 
the correlation of forces favouring the victorious class, writ international. If the intervention 
was unsuccessful, it would set back the loser’s respective correlation of forces.
Under globalization, the intermestic correlation of forces would differ from Marxism- 
Leninism by replacing narrow class warfare considerations with diverse and modular 
agendas of environmentalism, human rights, good governance, and developmental idealism. 
The idea of intervening across boundaries to make alliances for political causes is retained
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(Burbach, Nunez and Kagarlitsky 1997, ch. 9). Of course there are NGOs today that are 
remakes of Cold War era left wing movements, but they indict capitalism for both 
impoverishment of the Third World and environmental neglect. Also, unlike the class-state 
alliances fostered by the Soviet bloc, NGOs operating under conditions of globalization are 
predisposed towards bandwagoning with all global actors wherever they can make common 
cause with, including states and non-organised protesters. The intermestic correlations of the 
1990s rarely advocate armed revolution to subvert a state although they might condemn 
political systems wholesale on the basis of subjectively described unjust practices. 
Intermestic correlations maintain a second thread of continuity with their Marxist-Leninist 
forebears in engendering action through the power of information, acting upon subjective 
world public opinion.
Monitoring and campaigning by mixed NGO and state coalitions for sanctions against 
deviant state behaviour frequently operate through pre-existing global regimes such as the 
UN, IMF and WTO, which in turn, claim authority from state membership to police states 
whose domestic measures and international behaviour are seen to undermine economic 
stability, global welfare, or global military security. At the WTO summit in Seattle in 1999, 
the physical and cyberspace-assisted NGO protests were bitterly divided along multiple issue 
fault-lines over trade-labour, trade-environment, and liberalisation-versus-protectionism 
linkages. This affected national bargaining positions among state representatives already split 
into regional and North-South coalitions by not only extending the fronts of confrontation 
outside the forum, but also amplifying dissent against the US. President Clinton drew the ire 
of Third World delegates when he agreed with those sections of NGO protests encouraging 
him to push for clauses imposing trade sanctions against states without developed world
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standards of labour welfare. Clinton also argued that globalization issues were of such 
complexity that it would now require the active admission of NGO inputs in policy 
formulation (Knowlton 1999; Sanger 1999; Stevenson 1999). There are numerous 
admissions from World Bank and WTO officials that NGO inputs are increasingly included 
in drawing up national funding plans, where NGOs do not hesitate to point out where these 
regimes may have flouted their own rules (O’Brien et al. 2000, ch.2; Kahn 2000). Today, 
NGO impact through international forums thus constitutes a second form of intermestic soft 
power input into national foreign policy.
A third form could be attributable to NGO and MNC decisions, whether exercised 
independently or collectively over an investment climate within a nation-state. Initially 
developmental, environmental and human rights NGOs launched publicity campaigns to 
shame MNCs into taking up social responsibilities where they operate. Witness for instance, 
Greenpeace’s 1995 campaign forcing oil producer Shell to retract its planned dismantling of 
the Brent Spar oil platform in the Atlantic. In 2000, coordinated pressures were applied by 
the Nicaraguan Union of Chentex Workers and the American National Labor Committee on 
Taiwanese clothing manufacturer Chentex Corporation for anti-union attitudes and 
underpaying workers at a Nicaraguan jeans factory (Gonzalez 2000). Today, a more 
cooperative approach exists where MNCs could utilise joint expertise such as 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the Greenpeace-World Wildlife Fund originated Forest 
Stewardship Council, and Transparency International, to survey state-suitability for 
investment or form an NGO lobby for socially responsible investment plans (Gereffi, Garcia- 
Johnson and Sasser 2001). This soft power will have an effect through determining capital 
and trade flows towards a state.
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A fourth form of intermestic soft power exercised indirectly through correlating 
forces is that discussed in Chapter 3 as the contested notion of world public opinion 
comprising states, non-state actors and populations. Like the other three described in this 
section, this amorphous political body of opinion overlaps into assisting the discursive 
construction of whether a state is aberrant in military, human rights and economic activities. 
When such a discourse is repeated consistently among NGOs and at forums such as the UN 
and IMF for example, ‘global power’ might be orchestrated against the aberrant state through 
measures ranging from boycotts to legal intervention. In the 1990s, Myanmar was sanctioned 
by individual UN member states, who were also its key export markets, due in part to joint 
publicity over human rights abuses coordinated among western states, Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar’s National League for 
Democracy through the UN (BBC The World Today 1997; Wain 1998). While the overall 
effectiveness of sanctions remains in doubt, Myanmar’s economy has stagnated as one of the 
world’s poorest, and the military regime’s illegitimacy continues to inhibit its presence in 
international forums where both the US and EU hold seats. The Yangon regime has 
incrementally conceded to pressure by allowing in, most recently in 2001, a UN-appointed 
Brazilian human rights expert, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, who certified some progress but 
warned that NGO humanitarian assistance was necessary to alleviate poverty (Jendrzejczyk 
2001). In East Timor, Human Rights Watch, together with a local women’s aid group, the 
Forum Komunikasi Untuk Perempuan Loro Sae, continue to monitor Indonesian and UN 
peacekeepers’ compliance with the terms of the UN agreement for withdrawal brokered in 
1999. Their reports have the effect of keeping open the agenda of prosecuting ‘crimes against 
humanity’ committed by Indonesian troops on the island prior to the UN intervention (Jones
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and van Zael 2000; Mydans 2001).19 Conversely, to avoid incurring the penalties imposed by 
anti-national global power, national interests in foreign policy-making must today harmonise 
discursively with a favourable intermestic correlation of political forces, or divide a hostile 
alliance by adopting some parts of externally-sponsored agendas and rejecting the rest.
4.3.2 The Competition of Ideas and Their Resolution: Intermestic Socialisation and 
Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration Effects
Intermestic politics are inseparable from the competition of ideas between interested 
parties aiming for change in a state’s foreign policy. Within a global information space 
interpenetrating the domestic, decision-makers must assume that all information inputs are 
given for a partisan purpose (Halperin 1974, 135-136), whether other-national, NGO- 
specific, or arising from some global mixed coalition. When Amnesty International, Morgan 
Stanley Capital Index, or the IMF, puts out a report on issue-specific conditions within a 
country, the information is meant to present ‘road maps’ for policies, to provide ideational 
‘focal points and glue’ for reform and dissent within the state, or even to trigger the 
‘institutionalisation’ of certain ideas in the absence of innovation (Goldstein and Keohane 
1993, 11-26). These are uses that can be made of the ideas entering the foreign policy 
calculations of those who make the final decision and implementation. Yet this merely 
suggests how ideas compete, while explaining little of why some ideas triumph over others.
For a start, Rosenau’s early study of cross-national linkages classifies three general 
ways in which ‘external’ political processes impact on the ‘internal’ (Rosenau 1971, 319-
19 The clearest confirmation of NGO influence on UN decision-making over East Timor comes from a member 
of the Singaporean delegation to the UN Security Council. He supported the ‘distinguished’ input of Human 
Rights Watch and the International Peace Academy representatives who argued for an extension of the UN 
presence to ensure that legal justice is done. (Singapore-UNSC 2001) The UN mandate has since been extended 
to post-independence East Timor in early 2002.
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320). First, a ‘penetrative process occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in 
the political processes of another.’ The participants in such a process range from military 
invaders, MNCs to members of foreign political parties. Second, the ‘reactive process’ is one 
where domestic responses unexpectedly occur due to the gravity of external developments. 
Examples are nationalist backlashes against the construction of foreign military installations 
in a neighbouring country, or in reaction to perceived humiliations from accepting external 
aid. Third, an ‘emulative process’ takes place when an external action produces a reaction of 
similar pattern domestically. This is also known as the demonstration effect. Clearly, 
Rosenau does not distinguish hard power from soft power, which is of more concern here. 
While global information space privileges soft power, it does not admit clear distinctions 
between penetration and reaction across borders. Borrowing partly from Rosenau, it is 
proposed to treat the methods by which certain ideas triumph transnationally in two 
categories: intermestic socialisation (IS), and multipolar direct emulation through 
demonstration (MDED).
IS is consistent with soft power as attraction rather than coercion, and takes into 
account the benign elements of international regimes, their transnational reach, and their 
commonly-expressed mandates for socialising states and non-state actors into normative 
communities. It is one way in which ideas in international relations, when administered, 
operate to change the actions of states and the lives of citizens. It is socialisation in the sense 
that ideas are institutionally and geographically agreed and sustained upon the principle of 
state signatories promising to effect legal adherence to regime norms and rules in relevant 
domestic and external matters. Although implementation as either domestic or international 
law depends on a state’s domestic political will, once a sizeable majority of states ratify the
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regime, it can be invoked over time by non-state actors and signatory states alike to 
psychologically compel compliance through generating critical reports and creating a 
discourse for change involving domestic lobbies, transnational groups, other states and 
international organisations. This is the normative-political, and in some cases legal, effect of 
regimes such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention Against 
Torture, and the recent treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. In Chapter 6’s 
study of the Chilean case, it will be seen that the information arising from such regimes 
crosses boundaries and may modify national jurisdiction.
MDED is a more passive concept and retains the emulative process of ideas carried 
throughout global information space. It accounts for the adoption of ideas through 
demonstrations of superior performance by information-carrying agents, within groups of 
states and non-state actors, or through bilaterally-agreed exchanges. The prefix ‘multipolar’ 
is added to acknowledge the omnidirectional attraction of soft power in a fluid post-Cold 
War ideological context. A general comparison can be made with the demonstration of two 
or more new models of television sets in an electrical store before incidental and prospective 
customers who already own television sets at home. The customer may buy on the 
impression that the new set is better than his existing one on either subjective or objective 
criteria.
MDED is thus focussed on the proven success of ideas and its near-universal 
‘exploitability’ as soft power. It is clearly a result of post-Cold War ideological multipolarity. 
Post-communist and developing countries in search of political economy models of good 
governance and export-oriented industrialisation, constitute the audience and ‘global market’
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for the diverse ideas of countries and NGOs that are subjectively promoted as successful in 
certain spheres of politics. For example, the US-Soviet propaganda form of trade fairs has 
been copied and improved upon by Japan, European and many newly industrialising states. 
Similarly, developing countries from the Middle East and Africa are also deploying
international public relations campaigns through global media and business diplomacy to
0 (\attract MNCs to their countries. NGOs like Greenpeace and Amnesty International have in 
fact preceded states in organising fairs promoting their causes; most have done so by holding 
exhibitions and selling charity products. The Internet has greatly amplified their reach. In 
situations where there is a lack of Great Power consensus and will, such as in preventive 
peacekeeping and the treaty banning Anti-Personnel Landmines, NGO-state collaborations 
with creative leaderships make a difference. In these two issues, Human Rights Watch, 
Handicap International, Landmine Survivors Network, Australia and Canada, armed with 
decent records in the field to match, take advantage of the vacuum of ideas by propounding 
initiatives in speeding up treaty approval, improving peacekeeping training for future 
missions, or volunteering to lead peacekeeping tasks in new troublespots (Keating 1993, 231- 
234; Hampson and Molot 1998; Cameron, Lawson and Tomlin 1998; M. Richardson 1999b; 
Moore 1999). These windows for exercising soft power are dependent on circumstances, and 
the ability to exploit them consistently depends very much on maintaining as spotlessly clean 
a record as possible over time. In this regard, Canadian soft power over peacekeeping matters 
was diminished in 1998 by retrospective reports of its contingent’s excesses in Somalia 
(Oliver 1998). MDED as soft power is generally state-reliant, but it does not preclude the 
possibility that NGOs alone can enlarge upon, associate with, or criticise such forms of
20 In the late 1990s, Bahrain for example touted itself as a pro-business ‘friend of the West’ while the member- 
states of the Southern African Development Community were selling their economies anew as ‘an African 
Renaissance’. (IHT Sponsored Section 1999b, 1999c)
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model governance to augment their own soft power inputs into states’ foreign policy 
calculations. In Chapter 6, it will be shown that anti-Pinochet NGOs cited Britain’s 
demonstration of fair play in judicial procedures as a discourse for shaming the Chilean state 
into making amendments to its domestic legal system.
4.3.3 Summary: Contours of the Intermestic Politics of Foreign Policy
The operational context of foreign policy-making historically has never been neat,
and the existence of global information space has only exacerbated the competitive politics
of making a coherent foreign policy. Due to issue-complexity ranging freely across national
boundaries and the global flow of information, other actors, in addition to states themselves,
can claim national policy relevance on the basis of knowledge and global interdependence.
Economies, human rights, and good governance are current examples where inputs to
decision-making are no longer pure intra-national bureaucratic politics. Transnational and
domestic non-state actors performatively create an ‘intermestic’ field of ideas which are
expressed politically in national foreign policy formulation through either (a) an intermestic
correlation of forces competing on a particular issue; or (b) a global competition of ideas
resulting in the triumph of some through IS and MDED. These can be expressed in the
following hypotheses:
Intermestic The intermestic correlation o f  forces joining state and non-state
Correlation o f  parties can shape foreign policy change through direct
Forces (ICF): mobilisation o f  ideas, sanctioning standards through global
regimes, non-state self-constitution o f  expertise, and 
manufacturing subjective world public opinion.
Intermestic Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-state actors hold states
Socialisation to account through regimes they sign on to.
(IS):
M ultipolar Multipolar D irect Emulation through Demonstration occurs
Direct when states and non-state actors emulate ideas that have been
Emulation proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining particular
Through objectives.
Demonstration
(MDED):
These are entirely public discursive rivalries in the global information space. Nation-state 
foreign policies have normatively to engage with them through soft power. And although soft 
power can also be employed by non-state actors, the latter are deficient with regard to the 
communitarian aspect. Non-state actors evoke a sense of community among their audiences 
only in modular forms, and unlike nation-states, they cannot deliver on the majority of basic 
human needs, especially since they do not possess military force and territory.
The constituent concepts of intermestic politics of foreign policy now remain to be 
illuminated in a case study. In keeping with this Chapter’s layout, Chapter 5 will next 
illustrate the LIO and LOI hypotheses through the case study of Singaporean foreign policy 
in the Asian Values Debate. Chapter 6 will likewise illuminate the ICF, IS and MDED 
hypotheses using the case of Chilean foreign policy in the Pinochet Extradition Controversy. 
In each study, the components of global information space both justify the choice of cases 
and explain them empirically.
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CHAPTER 5
LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY, FROM INSIDE-OUT AND 
OUTSIDE-IN: SINGAPOREAN FOREIGN POLICY AND 
THE ASIAN VALUES DEBATE 1992-99
5.1 Introduction
The objectives of this Chapter are to illustrate the validity and limits of the interlinked 
foreign policy leadership, from the inside-out (LIO) and the outside-in (LOI), hypotheses. 
Singaporean foreign policy and its active input into the Asian Values Debate in 1992-99 are 
put forward in this regard as a suitable case study. The LIO strategy represents coherence 
against external adversity, a beacon of self-righteous good governance to potential friends 
and foes, as well as an invitation to investors to endorse an attractive economic territory. This 
is easier said than applied: it is ultimately up to the individual agency, affected by cultural 
and socialisation structures, to mix and match leadership styles to foreign policy situations 
and goals. One half of soft power leadership is thus constructing a problem discourse 
matched to a desired solution discourse. The other hypothesis, LOI, is almost synonymous 
with structural power as the power to determine the structures setting parameters for the 
working of political institutions and non-state actors within the world political economy. It 
also emphasises leadership promoting and if possible, institutionalising, ideas favourable to a 
national cause.
This Chapter will proceed by first justifying Singapore and its foreign affairs in 
relation to the Asian Values Debate 1992-99 as a case situated in global information space, 
and will concurrently provide the historical and contemporary contexts for Singapore’s 
ideational conflict with the external world. Singapore’s history and continuity as a trading 
state sensitive to external information currents, will be highlighted as the groundwork for the
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country’s engagement with the Asian Values Debate. Thereafter, an introduction to the
Asian Values Debate will be given, and a scheme of the debate as a foreign policy issue
summarised for further reference. This issue will next be examined in terms of how the
Singapore state could be construed as participating in the debate using the LIO hypothesis
which can be stated as:
LIO: A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through
Leadership Inside-Out by projecting a communitarian base, by its 
credibility as a source o f information, and by targeting an 
omnidirectional audience.
The limitations of LIO will be highlighted where they occur in the testing. Thereafter the
same approach will be adopted for illustrating the LOI hypothesis, which can be expressed
as:
L O I: A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy objectives through Leadership
Outside-in by exercising political entrepreneurship through international 
regimes, and by forming epistemic communities.
The conclusion will describe how the Singaporean case study has illuminated the validity and
weaknesses of both hypotheses about leadership in foreign policy.
5.2 Singapore and Global Information Space
The choice of Singapore and the Asian Values Debate is made for three sets of 
reasons: the country’s long-term involvement in global information space, its contested 
border porosity in relation to foreign policy decisions, and the consequential clash of ideas 
across borders. These reasons have been stated in the thesis’ Introduction. To preface 
analysis and assist clarity, a short chronology of Singapore’s history is appended below:
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Table 1: Chronology of Singapore’s Political Milestones
1819 The British East India Company establishes the colony of
‘Singapore’ by recognising a local Malay potentate and 
purchasing from him the island of ‘Temasek’. The Company 
planned to transform the island into the ‘emporium’ of the East.
1820s-1920s Liberal colonial policies towards immigration from China and
India.
1942-45
1956
1959
1963-65 
1965 (August)
1970s- 1980s
1990
1993
1994 
1997-99
Japan occupies Singapore during World War Two.
The first local government is formed by the Labour Front, under a 
self-governing constitution that provided a partially-elected 
legislature. Several series of negotiations between local 
nationalists and the British in 1956-58 yielded the constitution of 
1959 allowing complete internal self-government. The British 
retain control of defence and foreign affairs.
Following elections for a fully-elected parliament in which it won 
a landslide, the Peoples’ Action Party forms the country’s 
government.
Federation with Malaysia.
Independence is thrust upon Singapore, following irreconcilable 
racial, economic and political differences with Kuala Lumpur. 
Foreign policy is tuned towards themes of survival and external 
interdependence.
Constant battles with the foreign media over interference in 
domestic politics. Singapore emerges as a newly-industrialising 
country.
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew resigns to allow Goh Chok Tong 
to succeed. Lee remains in Cabinet as Senior Minister.
The UN World Human Rights Conference in Vienna.
The Michael Fay caning affair.
The Asian Financial Crisis.
Since its founding, the Singaporean nation-state has been consistently enmeshed 
within the three intrinsic spheres of global information space: the global media space, global 
economic space and global political space. Singapore’s involvement in the global media 
space originated with its founding by the incipient arm of British imperialism, the trade-
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based East India Company. This company tolerated the proliferation of newspapers reporting 
purely commercial news for the benefit of foreign merchants in Singapore, but imposed 
‘gagging’ orders on newspapers for publishing outside mercantile matters. One order 
required newspapers to be licensed, and to submit material to the local government for 
vetting. Two concerns were behind this: firstly, the company disliked criticism of its 
operations; and secondly, preventing the vernacular press from stirring up racial strife in 
India and other profitable colonies was equally important (Turnbull 1995, 5). This began a 
historical pattern whereby the Singapore-based media was either struggling against or 
subordinated to the overriding interests of the government of the day. The history of 
Singapore’s pre-eminent English language newspaper The Straits Times is testimony to a 
long-running tension between the local media acting as a check against political excesses, 
and a conscientious supporter of a dominant political order. At its inception, the Straits Times 
was founded by Singapore-based foreign mercantile interests not only to report commercial 
intelligence, but also to transplant the press atmosphere created by ‘the laws and customs of 
England’ by affording protection to the colony from the abuse of power by the governing 
elite.1 The vernacular press was, by contrast, split into the three Asian Languages of Malay, 
Chinese and Tamil, serving respectively the interests of the three main Asian communities 
living under colonial rule. Of the three, the Chinese and the Tamils (or nominally ‘Indians’) 
were numerically dominant and had immigrant roots that tended to focus their media 
concerns upon culture-specific matters and events in the ‘mother countries’ of China and 
India respectively. The Malay press likewise followed a parochial media focus upon their 
community (Tan and Soh 1994, 8-23). In these divergent ways, the pre-independence 
Singaporean presses could not have reflected nor constructed a singular understanding of a
1 According to the editorial of the first issue of the Straits Times (ST) 15 July 1845 quoted in Turnbull (1995,
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Singaporean identity. The readership of the Straits Times was an exception for reflecting the 
loyalties of a thin, English-educated, Asian and European-descended elite. And during the 
Japanese Occupation, their temporary overlordship complicated this diversity by 
superimposing Japanese language media on this cultural mosaic.
Wielding these diverse information flows into a viable Singaporean nation was a 
formidable task facing the Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) government upon achieving self- 
government. This task was not made easier by the wider Cold War and decolonisation 
politics afflicting Southeast Asia, China and India. Malays could be swayed by the media 
narratives of Malayan and Indonesian independence from neighbouring Malaya and 
Indonesia. The Chinese were vulnerable to cultural and ideological propaganda from Maoist 
China, while the Indians were susceptible to Indian nationalism. The centrifugal pull on 
Singaporean loyalties beyond its borders had in fact been experienced by both the Labour 
Front administrations, which preceded the PAP, and the PAP administration itself under the 
two self-governing constitutions negotiated from the British in the 1950s. The Straits Times 
advocated stability based on the preservation of the status quo and was perceived to articulate 
European commercial interests. Unsurprisingly, it was attacked by nationalists for its 
neocolonialism (Turnbull 1995,198-219). Meanwhile, the respective Asian language presses 
favoured self-government or independence along racial lines. Communist propaganda also 
resonated among large sections of the Chinese community about colonialism’s threat to 
Chinese identity if ‘socialist’ independence was not achieved. During Singapore’s brief 
federation with Malaysia (1963-65), vernacular newspapers exacerbated tensions between the 
PAP in Singapore and the Malay-Chinese-Indian Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur.
17-18).
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Vernacular newspapers were both used by politicians to stir up readers’ passions across the 
border, as well as placing politicians in difficult positions of defending communal interests 
once partisan lines had been sustained by editorials against ‘others’. Several serious racial 
riots in Singapore during and after the federation experience were publicly blamed on the 
incitement of racially biased media (K.Y. Lee 1998c, 551-569, 605-607).
Due to these precedents, the PAP government has consciously maintained a ‘national’ 
media policy emphasising the nation-building role of media channels, whether newspaper, 
radio or television, in avoiding the incitement of racial and religious hatreds within 
Singapore, or in neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia. Furthermore, Singaporean media 
could not become agents of foreign interests, especially in the light of anti-colonialism, 
communism and the federation experience. They instead ought to inform objectively within 
the limits set out above, to educate, and to build a national consensus on desirable values. 
Debate and dissent would be tolerated so long as it did not diminish nation-building efforts.
Radio was not significantly politicised because its introduction in the 1920s was 
government-controlled, and it remains regulated today despite privatisation in the 1990s 
(Kuo and Chen 1983, 65-69; Tan and Soh 1994, 63-66). It has served as a mouthpiece of the 
government of the day, whether they were the Japanese, the British, or the PAP, in 
countering the respective propaganda of external radio broadcasts during the Japanese 
Occupation, or communist radio from Peking and the Malayan jungles during the 1960s. 
Following the launch of digital radio in Singapore in 1999, the Deputy Prime Minister 
explained:
2 Summarised in Birch (1993, 17-24).
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Each listener feels that he or she is the only person being addressed by the radio 
presenter.
That is why radio remains a valuable link between the Government and 
Singaporeans...Even in our present peaceful times, radio can go beyond entertaining 
Singaporeans, to educate, motivate and help us form the national consensus. (Chang 
1999)
And this fact of government-regulated domestic radio coexists with the wide availability of 
the BBC World Service and other FM, MW and SW broadcasts from the outside.
The history of television in Singapore closely followed radio’s. The government in 
1963 introduced it with the same aims as radio and the press: to inform, entertain and to 
cultivate a national identity. On the other hand, the government was aware of the educational 
and economic contributions of television from the outside to the wider goal of material 
development. Although live and delayed satellite television broadcasts were packaged into 
national television programming since the 1970s, along with the fact that imports of foreign 
programmes reached 55-70% of airtime in 1983 (Vans 1984, 146, tab. 1), it was CNN’s 
demonstration effect which accelerated developments in 1990-91. CNN’s worldwide real­
time reporting of the Gulf War brought not only a rise in local audience numbers for news 
television, but also demand from the business community for more sources of market- 
sensitive news from the Gulf (Tan and Soh 1994, 73-75). In the 1990s, the government also 
saw advantage in encouraging the global media firms to locate headquarters, re-broadcasting 
and post-production facilities in Singapore in the way that high-technology MNCs were 
being enticed into the Singaporean economy. This was complemented by the advanced 
satellite broadcast infrastructure on the island, and the liberalisation of the domestic 
telecommunications market following the WTO agreements in 1996 (STS 1996; Satnews 
Asia Online 2000). At the end of 1997, the country hosted 208 accredited correspondents and
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camera crew, representing 69 foreign media companies performing national terrestrial, as 
well as regional and global satellite programming functions. These range from Associated 
Press and Reuters to the BBC, CNN, CNBC Asia Business News, Disney and HBO (Home 
Box Office). (Ministry of Information and the Arts 1998, 276)3 Although there are no 
available global comparisons with hubs such as New York, London and Hong Kong, these 
statistics show that foreign media have a large in situ presence to scrutinise the host country.
In another instance, in terms of daily newspapers, Singapore had 12 in 1970, but only 
8 in 1996 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-124, tab. IV.8). This ranked Singapore in 1996 above the 
world median of 4 newspapers per country, and thirteenth among Asia-Pacific and South 
Asian countries.4 These statistics by themselves do not reflect the diversity of media 
availability in relation to the country’s size of 659.9 square kilometres and a small population 
of almost 4 million. For instance, although the government-linked Singapore Press Holdings 
Group controlled 100% of the eight local dailies from 1996 to the end of the period of this 
study (Ministry of Information and the Arts 1998, 275-276; Country Profile Singapore 
2000:Mass Media),5 foreign daily newspapers, such as the Asian Wall Street Journal and 
International Herald Tribune, as well as weekly journals such as Time and Asiaweek, have 
been available at news stands and through both private and public subscriptions. By 1999, 
these external print media outnumbered the local dailies by 14 to 8.6 In terms of radio 
receivers per 1,000 inhabitants, the number rose from 241 in 1970 to 741 in 1996, making 
Singapore the third highest in Asia-Pacific and South Asia that year, and putting her way
3 It is noteworthy that most of the 26 foreign television (satellite and cable) broadcasters set up shop in 
Singapore at the height of the Asian Values Debate, between 1992 and 1998. (R. Lim 1998)
4 The world median for daily newspapers, as well as the regional ranking of 25 Asian countries, were calculated 
by the author from Table IV.8 of UNESCO (1999a, IV-106 -  IV-133). Comparisons of this type were otherwise 
unavailable.
5 Ownership has since increased to 13 newspapers and four magazines in 2000.
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above the 1996 world average of 417 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-228, IV-8, tabs. IV.14, IV.S.3).7 
Meanwhile, measures for television receivers per 1,000 inhabitants showed a fourfold 
increase from 96 in 1970 to 385 in 1996, making Singapore second highest in Asia-Pacific 
and South Asia, and exceeding the world average of 238 for 1996 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-228,
Q
IV-8, tabs. IV.14, IV.S.3). Furthermore, under the Singapore One communications 
infrastructure masterplan, all Singaporean homes have been equipped for access to 
commercial cable television and Internet-based multimedia applications at the end of 1999. 
These wired outlets provide complementarity and competition to the Government-linked and 
privatised ‘Singapore TV 12’, Television Corporation of Singapore channels in English, 
Mandarin, Malay and Tamil, as well as the local radio stations run by the Radio Corporation 
of Singapore, the Armed Forces and the National Trades Union Congress. By this time, 
Singapore was rated as having achieved a 45.84% personal computer-to-home ratio, which is 
the world’s third highest after the USA and Luxembourg (Tee 1997; Tanzer 1999; ITU 1999, 
A-23, tab. 6). In 1998, the number of Internet users (per 100 persons) in the country ranked 
one of the highest in Asia and the world at 17.39, which compared favourably with Japan’s 
13.26, Denmark’s 18.87, USA’s 22.19 and Sweden’s high of 39.53 (ITU 1999, A-18, tab. 4). 
Singapore’s Internet policy emphasises light touch regulation, and .blocks objectionable 
pornographic and ethnically sensitive sites where feasible, but treats web vandalism and 
hacking as conventional crimes punishable in a court (D.T.E. Lim 2001).
These statistics indicate a high level of media exposure for a small population. 
Admittedly, ordinary Singaporeans’ access to direct-to-home satellite television is still
6 Table of “Foreign Media,” in Country Profile Singapore 2000: Mass Media.
7 Regional ranking also derived from Table IV.14, pp.IV-221 -  IV-229.
8 Regional ranking derived from Table IV.14, pp.IV-221 -  IV-229.
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prohibited at the time of writing, but most foreign channels such as CNN, BBC and CNBC 
Asia Business News are widely available and uncensored via Cable and Internet. The country 
is thus exposed to many global webs of information discourses. The potential for value 
conflict with the external had already been proved in the press arena beginning in the late 
1950s. During the 1959 election campaign that facilitated the PAP’s entry into government, 
the party’s candidates accused the Straits Times ’ expatriate staff of neglecting the interests of 
a self-governing Singaporean nation-in-waiting. Furthermore, the paper failed to foster a 
climate favourable to federating with Malaya. The newspaper not only countered with 
editorials of its own, but took the issue to the International Press Institute’s General 
Assembly, complaining that the PAP had threatened press freedom. The Institute sent an 
inspector to Singapore who found that both the party and the newspaper had over-reacted in 
the heat of electioneering (Turnbull 1995, 214-219). In 1971, the PAP government’s frictions 
with the press soured over national security issues when the Internal Security Act was used to 
detain three senior executives of the Chinese language paper, Nanyang Siang Pau, on 
charges of stirring Chinese racial emotions against the government’s language policies. 
Meanwhile, an English paper, the Singapore Herald, had its license withdrawn because of 
foreign funding and its participation in ‘black operations’ run by communists. A third paper, 
the Eastern Sun, closed voluntarily when allegations were made public about Hong Kong- 
based communist funding for its operations (Turnbull 1995, 287-293). Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew faced criticism for these actions at the International Press Institute conference in 
Helsinki later that year. He defended his actions on the grounds that the integrity of the 
nation-building effort by an elected government was a priority over the freedom of the press, 
and that the latter should contribute to nation-building instead (Turnbull 1995, 293).
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In the late 1980s, the Singaporean government took Time, the Far Eastern Economic 
Review, and Asiaweek to court for inaccuracies in reporting government policies, and 
refusing to publish the Government’s replies. They were accused of misrepresenting local 
political events, court proceedings against opposition politicians, and the detention without 
trial under the Internal Security Act of persons involved in a 1987 ‘Marxist conspiracy’ to 
topple the government. In each case, the Government either sued for libel or gazetted the 
journal concerned for restricted local circulation, instead of enforcing an outright ban 
allowed under existing legislation (Tan and Soh 1994, 38-42, 55-56). This had the effect of 
compelling some of the publications concerned to temporarily terminate distribution, and 
involved the country’s foreign relations with discursive conflicts over freedom of the press 
abroad, particularly with the US. This pattern continued well into the 1990s. The 
Singaporean government maintained the position that domestic politics ought to be only the 
business of Singaporeans, and that the offending papers had interfered in Singaporean 
politics through biased reporting and in refusing to publish the government’s letters of reply.
To date, the Singaporean government’s jousts with the domestic and foreign media
have primarily been with the newspapers. One reason for this is historical, as the earlier
account of the press showed; the other is suggested by Prime Minister Lee himself when he
elaborated in a speech the difference between television and newspaper:
Television depends on pictures rather than words. The press uses language to make its 
points. Readers respond rationally to words whereas viewers respond emotionally to 
images. So the press can make up for deficits of television pictures because the press 
communicates ideas whilst television transmits images or impressions. Nevertheless, 
the press are not merely passive reporters of events. (K.Y. Lee 1990)
The analysis points to a clear appreciation of the media’s power of construction. This is why
Singapore’s official media posture, as restated by Prime Minister Lee to the Commonwealth
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Press Union in 1990, literally on the eve of the Asian Values furore, placed a premium on
communitarian discourse as the best defence:
It (the Singaporean government) will not allow interference by foreigners in its 
domestic debate. Singapore's voters are English-educated unlike voters in other 
countries in Asia. Singapore is a totally urban society with state-of-the-art 
telecommunications and no government can effectively censor what the people read. 
But the government can and will insist on no foreign interference in die domestic 
politics of Singapore. We do this by insisting on our right to reply.
...[I]t brings home to Singaporeans that regardless of the pontifications of foreign 
correspondents and commentators, it is the values of the elected government of 
Singapore that must and will prevail. J^inisters in Singapore are-iational and logical 
people. They do understand the Western world and the changes which Western 
technology has brought about. They welcome, indeed they embrace, these changes. 
Singapore has found its niche in the world as a centre for trade, finance, banking, 
transportation and telecommunications because its ministers have recognised and 
embraced these innovations. But the Singapore Government cannot change its stand 
that the political process of Singapore is reserved only for Singaporeans. (K. Y. Lee 
1990)
The embrace of the external is reinforced by the Singaporean economy’s thorough 
and deliberate interconnectedness With global economic space even prior to Independence in 
1965. Retrospectively, it can be seen in equal measure as a colonial legacy and a result of 
Singapore’s government policies. The British empire had supported free immigration, and 
developed the administration, harbour and light industrial processing facilities for the 
purpose of servicing both regional trade, and trade with the rest of the far eastern 
possessions. Malayan rubber and tin, in particular, were processed in intermediate stages and 
shipped from there to fulfil the needs of the metropolitan industrial revolution in the 
nineteenth century.9 Post-Independence, the PAP government pragmatically toned down its 
democratic socialist rhetoric and continued to engage closely with a primarily western-driven
9 Much of this trading function was set out broadly, and in the case of rubber and tin exports, with foresight, by 
colonial founder and Lieutenant-Governor of Singapore, Thomas Stamford Raffles. See his official 
correspondence excerpted in Moore and Moore (1969, 44-107), and on Singapore as a strategic conduit for 
primary products (pp.476-483). Refer also to Turnbull (1989, ch. 2-4).
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international political economy. Through a combination of realistic resource appraisals, and 
Cold War exigencies, the new government paid lip service to anti-colonial ideals while 
intensifying efforts to invite western and Japanese MNCs to underwrite dependent capitalist 
development.10 In the geography of dependency, Singapore aspired to being the semi- 
peripheral economy servicing the consumer-driven and capital-rich core. Statistical figures 
from the mid-1980s to 2000 reveal the ratio of external trade to GDP at a consistent 3-to-l,11 
indicating the extent to which the country is integrated into post-1945 neo-liberal regimes. 
This engagement is manifested in Singapore’s foreign economic diplomacy with the world at 
large: the relentless initiatives and refrains of open and complementary collaboration in 
industrial parks and ‘growth triangles’, as well as GATT- and WTO-consistency of its 
bilateral and multilateral trade, have all endeared the country to global economic networks of 
financial services, transport and communications, computer software research, manufacturing 
and engineering, and increasingly, Internet-based electronic commerce. The Republic is in 
turn an active campaigner for structures such as free trade agreements and inter-regional 
economic forums between Asia and Europe, Asia and North America and, more recently, 
with Latin America (Henson 1994; Goh 1996; Tan and Gan 1999).
Singapore’s profile in capitalist economic globalization is also intertwined with its 
positioning in the political component of global information space. As a weak state created at 
the height of the Cold War, its foreign policy leadership had to align international political 
loyalties to regime survival. Circumstances were such that it was economically tethered to 
both pro-westem and radical anti-colonial states, and faced simultaneously with transnational
10 The official political and economic surveys of 1965-66 set this out clearly. Consult the respective “General 
Review” sections of the Singapore Year Book for 1965 and 1966. (Government Printing Office 1967a, 1967b)
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communist and racial subversion. Regime survival has become nearly indistinguishable from
national economic survival. This is reflected in a somewhat elitist or soft authoritarian system
12of foreign policy-making. The (economic) survivalist ideology was easily translated into an 
omnidirectional pragmatism by the late 1960s. This pragmatism manifested itself in a curious 
series of postures between 1965 and 1990 which initially included delaying the withdrawal of 
British military bases for security and economic reasons; actively courting Indian, Egyptian, 
Israeli, and Burmese support for recognition and defence assistance; signing up to 
regionalism under ASEAN; keeping the US at arms length; and opening trade links to both 
the USSR and China. Around 1967, against the backdrop of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ military 
withdrawal, Singapore took the initiative to improve ties with the US. Staunch support for 
Washington’s war in Vietnam began, and in 1978-80, Singapore stood with the US in 
condemning both Vietnam and the USSR for territorial violations in Cambodia and 
Afghanistan. However in 1983, Washington’s invasion of Grenada was attacked on the same 
grounds of the infringement of sovereignty. Singapore was also initially reluctant to endorse 
the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, and only did so under pressure from its 
ASEAN neighbours (Soh 1965; ST 1965; Chan 1969; Buszynski 1985; Rajaratnam 1987a, 
493-494). This sort of selective and delicate non-alignment required the maintenance of an 
independent domestic and ideological identity so as to maximise the country’s 
manoeuvrability vis-a-vis the rest of international society.
11 Obtained by comparing the 1987-94 range found in Ministry of Information and the Arts (1995, 19), with the 
1995-97 range in Ministry of Information and the Arts (1998, 349-352, apps. 13, 17), and the website, 
Singapore Statistics: Top-Line Indicators (2000).
12 Interviews with [ex-foreign minister and] Senior Minister S. Rajaratnam (1987a, 491-492; 1987b, 524-526, 
533-535, 539). In reflecting on the foundations of foreign policy in terms of his experience as the first foreign 
minister, Rajaratnam described the survival of the country as being dependent on Ibn Khaldun’s ‘asabiyya’ 
qualities (unity and resilience through adversity) and the proper ordering of the roles of captain and passengers
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The preceding elaboration of Singapore’s deep involvement with the three
components of global information space -  media, economic and political -  provides the
background for the next justification for this case study: the country’s consistent border
porosity in relation to foreign policy decisions. The acknowledgement of porosity was made,
for instance, in Lee Kuan Yew’s 1966 speech on ‘being Singaporeans’:
The foreign policy of Singapore must ensure, regardless of the nature of the 
government it has from time to time, that this migrant community that brought in life, 
vitality, and enterprise from many parts of the world should always find an oasis here 
whatever happens in the surrounding environment...
The foreign policy for Singapore must be one as to encourage first, the major powers 
in this world to find it -  if not in their interests to help us -  at best in their interests 
not to have us go worse: “If you do not like me as I am, then just think of what a 
nasty business it could be if I am not what I am.”
The second point is that we must always offer to the rest of the world a continuing 
interest in the type of society we project. (K. Y. Lee 1968, 87-88)
The concept of an open oasis rendered materially and socially inviting to individual talent
and the rest of international society is understandable due to the country’s geopolitical
realities. Its Asian population composition -  Chinese, Malays and Indians -  will always be
vulnerable to transnational ethnic appeals originating from their respective ancestral
homelands. Singapore’s geographic location as a maritime, air and lately, ICT junction, will
ensure that it will be a nodal point of global capitalist flows. In the face of continuous
economic competition in the 1990s from London, New York, Tokyo, and regionally, from
Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Shanghai and Sydney, the Singaporean nation-state is
also likely to aspire to retain its coveted investment-friendly status of being the world’s first
or second most competitive locale.13 It has achieved this by embracing the opinions and
on a ship. There is little indication that this has changed in the 1990s. Many observers concur (Ul-Haq 1985, 
279; Leifer 2000, 6-8).
13 For a summary of Singapore’s economic rankings by the World Economic Forum and the International 
Institute for Management Development, see Ministry of Information and the Arts (2001, 15).
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preferences of certain global capitalist elites whether they are economics professors, Chief 
Executive Officers or risk analysts. The Singaporean state is engaged in foreign policy 
whenever it conducts foreign and domestic economic policies (Acharya and Ramesh 1993, 
134-152; Rodan 1997, 148-178), and with an influx of foreign media agents drawn in by 
technology, trade and investment, the external scrutiny of domestic processes is intensive to 
the degree that the country’s leaders and citizens draw both criticism and plaudits for their 
excessive fiscal and social discipline (STWE 2000).
This porosity gives rise to the third justification for this case study: Singapore’s
vulnerability to a consequential clash of ideas across open borders. In 2001, consultants A.T.
Kearney and the journal Foreign Policy quantitatively measured globalization by the degree
of openness exhibited by each state. They ranked Singapore first because
The country far outdistances its nearest rivals in terms of cross-border contact 
between people, with per capita international outgoing telephone traffic totalling 
nearly 390 minutes per year. Singapore also boasts a steady stream of international 
travellers, equal to three times its total population. (“Measuring Globalization” 2001, 
59)
But it issued a caveat:
Yet in recent years, Singapore has struggled to maintain high levels of trade, foreign 
investment and portfolio investment which help support its globalization lead. The 
Asian [economic] flu is partly to blame...But Singapore’s slow progress in 
privatizing state industries, its failure to win endorsement for a regional free trade 
agreement, and its tight controls over Internet development have also slowed its 
integration with other countries...But if Singaporean officials are somewhat 
authoritarian, at least they are honest. (“Measuring Globalization” 2001, 59, 61)
This potential for value and identity conflict in a globalizing milieu leads to the 
salient role of the Singaporean foreign policy establishment, which has taken offence at 
foreign ideas and wishes to defend local political identity in the ‘soft’ battleground of the 
Asian Values Debate. This has had discursive consequences for ‘hard’ political practice
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worldwide, and in particular, for post-Cold War US-European human rights foreign policy
agendas. This debate involved no troops, missiles, mineral resources or direct casualties, but
has been about defending and projecting political community amidst post-Cold War political
fluidity. Singapore’s Minister for Information and the Arts interestingly described
Singapore’s ‘defence’ against external influences as a national immunisation against
unwanted ideas with demonstration effects:
[W]e need a kind of semi-permeable membrane to preserve our own bubble in 
Singapore. It cannot be an impermeable skin because we need constant interaction 
with the world outside. It cannot be completely porous either because the internal and 
external environments will quickly equalise. It has to be semi-permeable like the wall 
of a cell so that an osmotic pressure difference can be maintained.
There are two aspects to maintaining the bubble. One is preventive; the other is 
immunological. Preventive actions include immigration controls, police action and 
censorship of materials which come in. Preventive actions have to be selective and 
intelligent. We cannot be comprehensive because there are too many movements in 
and out of Singapore...
In addition to preventive measures, we need an immune system which fights infection 
within the bubble. While we can minimise contamination, we cannot expect our 
environment to ever be germ-free....Central to our immune system is the value 
system we internalise. We must therefore pay particular attention to the way our 
values are preserved and transmitted. In any society, the main temples [that] preserve 
and transmit values are homes, schools, religious organisations, clan and cultural 
organisations, and national institutions like the SAF [Singapore Armed Forces]. If our 
values are strong, we will remain Singaporean, however our economy is 
internationalised and wherever our people travel. (Yeo 1994)
In the light of this statement, the Asian Values Debate is, as its label implies, a clash of ideas
versus ideas in global information space with portents for transforming populations’ attitudes
and governing arrangements behind borders. That this discursive conflict reproduced itself
through real consequences for governance can not only be seen in this Chapter’s list of
events involving Singapore and other Asian countries in the imposition of legal and fiscal
standards by ‘others’, but also in how the US ambassador to Indonesia in 1993 reported the
aggravated policy challenge of defending US interests in a region inflamed by the publication
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of Huntington’s initial thesis on ‘clash of civilisations’ in Foreign Affairs. He noted that 
many senior Asian officials assumed the new tone of US foreign policy was civilisational 
warfare.14
5.3 Introducing the Asian Values Debate
The Asian Values Debate is centred upon an exceptional set of ideas with utility, or 
implications, for the way nation-states are governed, with a view to achieving prosperity and 
moral livelihood for their citizens. At face value, the debate appears merely academic, but on 
the plane of policy implications and a discursive interpretation of past, present and projected 
realities, it is political in its effects on relations between states. Hence the appending of the 
element of ‘good governance’ to the Asian Values Debate.
The political impact is channelled across borders according to the characteristics of 
information flow. ‘Asian Values’ derives its referent from one part of the world and once 
transmitted in the vicinity, resonates among like-minded or ideologically-stalemated political 
constituencies in control of domestic and foreign policies in an imputed and self-referent 
region of origin. This discourse is then projected across the Pacific and other global channels 
where ‘global standards’ are being worked out.15 As it will be shown through the following 
summary of the Debate, it is a political struggle marrying theory and praxis within global 
information space, where ideas for global society, order or segregation contest with power 
backing from assorted local centres.
14 Reported in Harries (1994, 109). This view of tangible effects is backed up by Singaporean diplomat Bilahari 
Kausikan (1993,25-41).
15 Refer to the 1993 UN World Human Rights Conference in Section 5.4.1.
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The Asian Values Debate had existed at some level since the era of nineteenth 
century European imperialism in Asia. European demonstration of superior technology, 
especially of firepower, had induced questioning of Asian civilisation in the pan-Asian 
region from China to India. Nationalism, in the region tended to be anti-colonial, anti- 
western, and syncretic in their attempts to fashion a semblance of indigenous ideologies with 
elements from the West. Witness post-independence Indonesia’s attempt at moulding 
nationalism, socialism and communism together in ‘Nasakom’, Gandhi’s satyagraha concept 
and righteous non-violence, as well as Mao Zedong’s sinicised reading of Marxism- 
Leninism.16 Due to the coincidence between the decolonisation process and the Cold War, 
the proper differentiation between indigenous ideologies could not be made. The latter were 
collapsed politically into ‘pro-communism’ and communism, or ‘pro-democratic capitalism’ 
and the ‘Free World’.
The ideological variety began to surface however with the waning of the Cold War. 
Rising Asian economic prosperity centred on the first four newly-industrialising countries of 
the Asia-Pacific -  South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore -  in the shadow of 
Japan’s success, followed by the second tier comprising Malaysia, Thailand, China and 
Indonesia, accentuated Asian uniqueness. China was also starting to face increased western 
censure over the human rights atrocities committed during the June 1989 Tiananmen Incident 
and her attitudes towards Hong Kong’s handover. This pattern of a ‘western crusade’ over 
human rights was repeated over the rest of non-communist Asia. Indonesia, for example, was 
abrasive towards the West following the latter’s criticism of its suppression of dissent in East
16 As early as the 1960s, studies of Asian political systems have suggested that a geocultural reckoning, be it 
balance, or confrontation, would be in the offing as soon as the decolonised Southeast Asian political region
220
Timor in 1991. Singapore itself, through the speeches of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
attempted to disabuse the West of imposing change upon China. Lee said the West was 
foisting values on ‘a Chinese civilisation of 4,000 years by an act of Congress, or [by] 
cancelling Most Favoured Nation status.’ (ST 1993a) US foreign policy, during the final 
months of the administration of George Bush Senior, had slowly begun to turn towards a 
human rights emphasis reminiscent of the Carter Administration. In 1993, President-elect 
Bill Clinton made human rights promotion a priority of US foreign policy, having castigated 
his predecessor for ‘coddling tyrants’ around the world (McNulty 1992; Clinton 1993). By 
this time, ethno-religious genocide in the Balkans had begun to feed debate on cultural 
exceptionalism in the ‘new world order’. The lines of the respective foreign policies were 
aligned for a confrontation that was to follow.
In the years 1992-93, the Asian Values Debate was sparked simultaneously in the 
realm of newspapers, television17 and international relations journals. This had two sources. 
Firstly, Harvard academic Samuel Huntington published his ‘clash of civilisations’ reading of 
the post-Cold War agenda for western foreign policies (Huntington 1993a). Secondly, 
Singaporean diplomats such as Kishore Mahbubani and Bilahari Kausikan were astounded 
by the post-Cold War western mood of triumphalism they experienced abroad in both 
diplomatic and academic encounters (Kausikan 1995-96, 279-280; Mahbubani 1998a, 9-10). 
The latter motivated them to vent their reactions in the journals Foreign Affairs, The National 
Interest and Foreign Policy. Another Singaporean diplomat and distinguished ex-UN official, 
Tommy Koh, started debate in the pages of the International Herald Tribune by replying to
attempted to synthesise exceptionalist paths of development which delivered tangible material and social 
progress (Sih 1959; D. Wilson 1972; Pye 1974).
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an article in late 1993 that criticised the publication of Mahbubani’s initial ‘West and the 
Rest’ article in The National Interest (Mahbubani 1998b, 37-56) and other Asian ruminations 
on value difference. No single person coined ‘Asian Values’, it was a convenient shorthand 
for everything purported to be distinct about Asian political culture. Much of the Singaporean 
role in the Asian Values Debate explained elsewhere will cover the entire trajectory of the 
debate, since the Singaporeans re-ignited it in the 1990s after 50 years of dormancy.
A list of 10 [East] Asian Values was presented by Tommy Koh, in his reply in the 
International Herald Tribune:
1. An East Asian does not practise ‘the extreme form of individualism’ but instead 
reconciles his/her existence with the community at local and national levels.
2. ‘East Asians believe in strong families’, which explains lower divorce rates in Asia 
vis-a-vis the West.
3. East Asians revere education at all strata of society.
4. ‘East Asians believe in the virtues of saving and frugality.’
5. ‘East Asians consider hard work a virtue.’
6. ‘East Asians practise national teamwork.’
7. The Asian version of a social contract between citizen and state operates. The 
government maintains law and order and provides for citizens’ basic needs: jobs, 
housing, health care and education, and treats them with ‘fairness and humanity’. In 
return, the citizens become law-abiding, respectful of authority, diligent, promote 
their children’s education, and practise self-reliance.
8. In some parts of Asia, governments build ‘stakeholder’ societies by granting a 
large percentage of shares in public corporations to citizens.
9. East Asians want their governments to police a morally wholesome environment.
10. ‘Good governments in East Asia want a free press but, unlike the West, they do 
not believe that such freedom is an absolute right.’
Koh went on to conclude that ‘these ten values form a framework that has enabled societies
in East Asia to achieve economic prosperity, progress, harmonious relations between
1 8citizens, and law and order (Singapore and Tokyo are the two safest cities in the world).’
17 Especially Lee Kuan Yew’s interviews with CNN and other television networks cited throughout this 
Chapter.
18 Tommy Koh, “Does East Asia Stand for Any Positive Values?” IH T11-12 December 1993 reproduced in T. 
Koh (1998, 349-351). Koh’s general list has seen very slight variations on the same communitarian theme when 
compared to other comparable writings from Singapore and elsewhere in Asia. See Mahbubani (1998c, 57-80)
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To this list, Vietnamese and Chinese (i.e. PRC) politicians have amplified the priority of
economic and social human rights over the civil and political human rights (Zhu 1997).
Moreover, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed and then-Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim of Malaysia emphasised the socio-economic ascent of East Asia from the miseries of
decolonisation and development, whilst retaining traditional values, into an Asian
‘Renaissance’ (Mahathir and Ishihara 1995; Mahathir 1998, ch. 4-5).19 Some Japanese
scholars and politicians have also maintained their continuity with this recent bandwagon by
insisting that Japan’s success is also a signal that the West ought to learn something from
Asia’s ‘Pacific Century’ (Funabashi 1993; Mahathir and Ishihara 1995). Much of this debate
reached its zenith in the 1992-99 period, for it was not merely coincidental but impelled by
the end of the Cold War, the globalization momentum in communications, culture and
economics, and significantly by the human rights and democracy platform of the Clinton
Administration’s foreign policy. This much is admitted by proponents of Asian Values and
its corresponding implication for twenty-first century good governance (Kausikan 1993;
Mahathir and Ishihara 1995; Wain 1997; Mahbubani 1998a, 9-10; 1998b, 37-56). At the
core, there is a search for ideological equality perhaps best expressed by Lee Kuan Yew’s
closing statement in his Foreign Affairs interview:
Let me be frank; if we did not have the good points of the West to guide us, we 
wouldn’t have got out of our backwardness. We would have been a backward 
economy with a backward society. But we do not want all of the West. (Quoted in 
Zakaria 1994, 125)
Lee Kuan Yew’s lists of values and comments on them can be read from a speech he gave in Tokyo (K.Y. Lee 
1992a) and Lee’s interview in Zakaria (1994). The Singaporean list can be read ideologically as resonating with 
Confiician and neo-Confucian philosophy and this gives it a certain amount of credibility depending on the 
interpretation one sides with. In other words, Confiician precepts can justify extensive paternalistic government 
through its emphasis on orderly relationships and sacrifice for fellow men. At the same time, the emphasis on 
cultivation of the self can equally be used to align it with liberal individualism, while its embrace of virtuous 
nepotism can legitimise corruption - two points Asian Values critics seize on. The following Confucianist 
studies underline this duality: Chen (1986) and de Bary and Tu (1998).
19 See also excerpts of interviews with Mahathir in Sheridan (1999, 104-105). Anwar Ibrahim’s (1996) version 
is noticeably qualified by a much less combative stance than Mahathir’s or the Singaporeans’.
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Ranged against the proponents of Asian exceptionalism are a more varied coalition. 
The ‘extremists’ broadly include the Clinton Administration and the so-called ‘US/Western 
liberals’, ex-Hong Kong Governor Christopher Patten and an Anglo-Hong Kong School,20 
the Filipino, the Taiwanese and the South Korean schools (Clinton 1993, 1995; Huntington 
1993b; Neier 1993; Jones 1994; Lingle 1998, ch. 3; 1996; Hernandez 1998; T. H. Lee 1995, 
1996; Kim 1994). Although this is not the place for pondering the subtle distinctions between 
each, these can be said collectively to reject Asian exceptionalism on four general grounds:
1. Asian values are also universal values as recorded in the original 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, both 1966 UN-endorsed International Covenants on 
Economic, Social, Cultural and Civil Rights and those on Civil and Political Rights, 
as well as possessing similarities to Max Weber’s thesis of Protestant ethics (Neier 
1993, 49-50; Jones 1994, 27-28; Patten 1996, 8; De Bary 1998, 17-29).
2. Asian advocates are turning Confucianism on its head and straight]’acketing the 
complexity of Asian developmental paths. Confucianism used to be seen as a bane of 
development, but is now justified as a means to prosperity. ‘Asian’ heritage is also 
wider than the Sinic-Confucian and Buddhist roots of East Asia; its Hindu, Malay and 
Muslim strands have been ignored.21
3. Asian democratic showcases such as Taiwan and South Korea reveal that 
Confiician thought is equally supportive and amenable to liberal democratic routes to 
good governance (De Bary 1998, 134-157; T. H. Lee 1996, 6-8; Huntington 1993b, 
39-40; Jones 1994, 24; Kim 1994).
4. Asian material prosperity is based upon the learning of western values such as the 
belief in progress, free trade, economic and individual liberties. Central to this is the 
argument that knowledge and technology-applications cannot work for prosperity in 
an oppressive polity (Patten 1996, 9-10; Huntington 1993b, 42).
These ‘extreme’ positions largely represent a perspective centred upon Francis Fukuyama’s
initial 1989 ‘end of history’ liberal democratic triumphalism.
20 This group is characterised by a denial of Asian-Western value incompatibilities, particularly prominent 
before the Hong Kong handover of July 1997. (Armentrout 1995; Patten 1996; 1998a, 146-172; Ng 1997)
21 Made most pointedly by Patten (1998a, 157-166; 1996, 7-8). These opinions however ignore the fact that Lee 
Kuan Yew and others in the ‘Singapore School’ argue that East Asia is a discursive entity of Confucian and 
neo-Confucian cultures, and which excludes some Hindu-Islamic versions, while Mahathir’s line technically 
includes all Asia.
224
Ironically, Fukuyama has located himself among a ‘moderate opposition’ within the 
Asian Values Debate. It is a location shared equally by an umbrella coalition of NGOs 
identified with the alternative NGO Bangkok Declaration (Asian Cultural Forum on 
Development 1993) in the prelude to the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna. This moderate opposition argues that whilst differences in developmental stages and 
historical contingencies occur between Asian states and the rest of the world, existing Asian 
governments have not delivered justice with economic growth, but instead cloaked their 
shortcomings behind selective Asian Value-legitimised authoritarianism. Confucianism, as 
Fukuyama, Emmerson and Glazer argue, has many facets, some of which support the 
authoritarian characteristics of family cohesion and stoic work ethics, while others reject 
political authoritarianism by justifying rebellion against power abuses and neglect of popular 
welfare (Fukuyama 1995, 1997; Emmerson 1995; Scalapino 1997; Glazer 1999). Liberal 
democracy is still valid for Asian adoption if it can graft itself onto traditional family- 
oriented ethics, and offers the same, if not better material and ethical goods than authoritarian 
versions.
The Asian Values Debate is clearly conflated at several levels of theory and praxis, 
and which can be more usefully analysed as a global contest of political information if it is 
conceived of at three levels:
Figure 3: Scheme o f the Asian Values Debate
1. Philosophical Value and Systemic Difference Argument
(a) Primacy of communitarianism versus primacy of individualism
(b) Primacy of order and harmony versus primacy of competitive idealism
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2. Normative Governing Differences
(a) Which type of government: democratic or authoritarian?
(b) Which type of democracy: liberal or illiberal?
(c) Which is the superior economic development formula: mixed state-guided capitalism or
classical economic liberalism?
(d) How large should the role of social discipline be in all-round development: more or less?
Communitarianism versus individualism/polyarchy.
3. Policy -  Political Consequences
(a) Human rights as conditionality or marginality in foreign (and economic) policies?
(b) Should foreign policy question domestic and regional political legitimacy: ideational
incitement to change or maintain inter-state consensus?
(c) Should value advocacy be a way of putting down geoeconomic competitors?
Evidently, the polarised arguments of systemic difference lead to the prescriptive 
level of advocating normative governing types, which in turn translates into road maps, to 
use Goldstein and Keohane’s term (1993, 12-13), for policy-political implementation. LIO 
and LOI thrive on translating empirical and ideational content into foreign policies. In this 
sense, the Asian Values Debate involves advocating and defending, a la ideological conflict, 
rival versions of global fiiture(s) in social organisation. The stakes involve not merely foreign 
policy elites, although foreign policies are still dominated by them, but also the populations 
they claim to represent. Like ideology, the Asian Values Debate is fuelled by 
institutionalisation via outside-in strategies in regimes articulating certain governance 
philosophies for new, weak, transitional, and reforming states. In short, following 
Foucaultian discourse, power operates according to which side one adheres to within the 
Debate. This section has given a flavour of the latter, prior to its possible analysis on the
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basis of LIO and LOI. The following study of the ‘Singapore School’ demonstrates how LIO 
foreign policy can operate by translating ideas into policy.
5.4 Singapore’s Leadership Inside-Out Strategy
As established in Chapters 3 and 4, soft power is based on ‘communitarian 
attractiveness’ and its demonstration, and hence possesses three characteristics. Firstly, it 
uses a communitarian base as an ideological showcase. Secondly, it presupposes an 
omnidirectional audience in the interaction among nation-states within an anarchic global 
information space. Thirdly, it places a premium on projecting consistency and credibility of 
information about a country. LIO encapsulates all of these as a soft power foreign policy 
strategy. It works on the assumption that the foreign policy leadership enjoys a reasonably 
stable following as its resource base in two senses. First, they must draw upon a set of 
cultural symbols and other socialisation factors derived as uniquely as possible from their 
nation-state of chosen citizenship. Secondly, in order that these symbols and factors can be 
projected as a model for emulation and respect by other actors in international relations, the 
coherence of the ‘model’ must depend on the degree of unity of elites and masses alike 
within the particular nation-state. Hence the importance of domestic political cooperation for 
foreign policy ends. This model to be used as soft power must assume the free attractiveness 
and transmittable form of an idea that can be sold in toto, or adapted with minimal 
modifications to other actors bilaterally, or multilaterally. The object of LIO is to get others 
to empathise and to support one’s way of life, thereby securing it from physical and non­
physical harm. Potentially, LIO also shapes global futures by supplying a map of future 
governance. LIO is discourse as power abroad.
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The seeds of the LIO in Singapore’s foreign policy vis-a-vis the Asian Values Debate 
are found in both the post-Cold War context and the historical factors arising from the 1959- 
65 period when the country passed from self-government under British supervision, to formal 
independence as a republic. The historical factors will be explored first. Like many newly- 
decolonised and newly-developing states confronted upon achieving statehood by Cold War 
geopolitics, Singapore’s foreign policy was consciously steered according to the strength of 
domestic assets and vulnerabilities in regard to situational (geography), material and 
ideological factors. As her first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew noted, unlike many of the 
neighbouring states, the Republic could not refer to an idyllic territorial past when planning 
its future (K. Y. Lee 1968, 86-87). If anything, the distant past was one of existence as ‘war 
booty’ at the peripheries of the Malay, Javanese, Sumatran and Japanese empires (Wolters 
1970, ch. 6-7; Thio 1991), while the more recent was that of the economic and migrant plural 
society of British colonial creation.22
It was the last that most enhanced the importance of the situational factors. As stated 
earlier in the introduction, the integrated regional and world economic role of Singapore was 
introduced consciously by British policy over a period of 146 years. The overwhelming 
importance of trade and communications hubbing services were one set of colonial legacies, 
the other was the microcosmic pattern of economically-induced Asian migration into the 
country. The result of this was a mix of predominantly Chinese, and substantial Indian 
(Tamil and Ceylonese), Malay (relatively indigenous) and Eurasian cultural strands 
managing a strategic emporium. The physical geography amplified the inter-Asian and global
22 The concept of plural society is elaborated by J.S. Fumivall as a ‘medley of peoples’ who ‘mix but do not 
combine...Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As
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importance of the territory continuously too: the island lay astride the sealanes connecting the 
South China Sea and Pacific Oceans to the East, and the Straits of Malacca and Indian 
Oceans to the West. This fact, and the maritime proximity of the major centres of mineral, 
agricultural, and subsequently manufactured goods in Southeast Asia, made the island a 
natural crossroads of material exchange. With the free movement and transit of goods and 
people, the interactions of culture, technology and other information flows occurred naturally 
on the island. At the same time, geography had also dictated that the island possessed no 
natural resources.
These situational factors contributed directly to the gelling of material and ideological
factors in a pro-active foreign policy in 1959-65 and continuing thereafter. Materially, the
country could only be wedded to support a neo-liberal posture on international economic
flows. In 1966, an official instructional tract on foreign policy propounded ambitious
priorities in spite of sizeable pockets of poverty, the lack of natural resources and recent
communist and communalist disruptions:
.. ..[A]s our standard of living is the highest in Asia, outside of Tokyo, we have a high 
standard of living to maintain for a population which is predominantly young and is 
growing at a rate which will bring it to 4,000,000 by the turn of the century...Our 
commercial organisation -  in banking, insurance and brokerage firms, the dock 
facilities, the storage [s]pace, the agency houses -  is unique in its intricacy and 
responsiveness, and the more who make use o f it, the more assured our prosperity, 
and the more people who have a realistic vested interest in our survival, as friendship 
is underpinned by finance.23
This drive to involve as many external parties as possible in the stakes of a global city
thriving on intermediary roles located in Asia continued unabated after the end of the Cold
War. Moreover, pronouncements on foreign policy now more boldly underlined the need to
individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling.’ (1948, 304-305) A survey of the 
colonial origins of Singapore’s plural society is given in H.E. Wilson (1972, ch. 1).
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exploit opportunities to sustain the country’s accommodation as the thirteenth largest trading 
nation, and a position among the world’s top 10 in terms of per capita GDP (H.K. Lim 
1996).24 All this amounts to a new expansiveness in not only supporting, but actively shaping 
by words and deeds, multilateral political contexts (Chong 1998).
The ideological factors follow a similar trajectory. Ideologically, the Cold War 
loomed large in the domestic struggle for independence in 1954-65 (Bellows 1970; Chan 
1985). With the support of Beijing, Moscow and then-Indonesian President Sukarno, the 
Malayan Communist Party pursued domestic ‘anti-imperialist’ subversion against the local 
British representatives, the Malaysian government and the ruling PAP in Singapore. In both 
open front and underground activities, the Communists attempted to frustrate the non­
communist socialistic nationalists’ plans to crystallise a self-governing polity acquiescent in 
the economy’s western-oriented trade and financial links. At this time, the most successful 
socialistic nationalist faction led by Lee Kuan Yew had temporarily allied with the 
communist open front under the umbrella of the PAP from its founding in 1954 till 1961. 
They realised that their counter-propaganda against the communist hold on the civic cultural 
and economic associations of the Chinese majority had to be conducted abroad on the 
diplomatic front as well. This was an early attempt at soft power linking non-communist 
Singapore-style socialism to the dominant Third World currents of the 1960s. During the 
years in the Malaysian Federation (1963-65), Prime Minister Lee exercised what Peter Boyce 
has termed ‘power without authority’ in foreign affairs (Boyce 1965). Under formal British 
and Malaysian auspices, Lee had embarked on Afro-Asian, Australian and New Zealand
23 Thompson (1966, 81). Italics mine.
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tours to drum up support for the normative vision of a non-communist Malaysian and 
Singaporean society. Lee’s diplomacy also aimed to debunk communist charges of British 
neocolonialism in conniving in the formation of the Federation, its territorial retention of 
military bases, and its non-revolutionary character of independence. In fact the viability of 
genuine independence for a small state was an obsession with the country’s foreign policy up 
till the 1980s.
Meanwhile in domestic society, the economy and political arrangements were being 
‘reengineered’ by the governing party for long-term competition in the regional and world 
economy. Politically, it helped that the PAP was a disciplined umbrella party, cross-cutting 
race, class and professional cleavages. Its electorally-mandated dominance since 1959 
enabled it to use its uninterrupted time in office to implement long-term infrastructure 
building projects and to assure investors that investment regimes would not suffer from the 
gyrations of political change, and ultimately to deliver a comfortable standard of living (Chan 
1976; B.H. Lee 1986). The PAP itself learned corporatism from its erstwhile partners and 
enemies, the Chinese chauvinists and communists (K.Y. Lee 1998c, 172-173, 321-324). 
Using a combination of associating citizen groups, trade unions and civic associations with a 
parapolitical grassroots network both to provide transmission channels and feedback for 
government policies, public political culture became nationalised into a ‘survival ideology’ 
(Chan 1971, 1976). The latter signified a combined sense of unity of purpose, voluntary 
sacrifice and paternalistic cohesion in making the ‘Singapore Inc.’ vision work in spite of
24 Judging by the consistent ranking of Singapore within the top 10 in the leading political economy and 
business indices such as the Global Competitiveness Report, these aspirations have been met throughout the 
1990s (World Economic Forum 1990-99).
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communist threats and ejection from a stillborn Malaysian common market.25 The PAP’s 
effective political communication through the commercially consolidated pro-government 
local media reinforced this sense of ‘survivalism’. The social and economic spheres of public 
life took the cues from the political prioritization of material modernization. As noted by 
academics studying Singapore’s public policies in the 1970s and 1980s, the imputed generic 
communitarian roots of all Asian cultures, and primarily the Chinese Confucian version, 
were re-articulated and tapped to support official policies of corporatism (Tamney 1996, 25-
9  f \  •50; B.H. Chua 1997). Political opposition and social behaviour were, by turns, exhorted 
and compelled by the threat of anti-crime and disorder legislation to be ‘loyal’ in avoiding 
activities such as strikes, riots, mass protest, street crime, and excessive individualism which 
could undermine diligence, trade and foreign investment. If deterrence failed, the government 
would police social and industrial harmony using its legislated powers.
Society was fostered towards macroeconomic goals through extensive educational 
opportunities and an informal contract, legitimised by the ruling party’s regularly large 
electoral mandates, to deliver First World standards of living in approximately two 
generations. Economic hospitality to external links was ensured by the visible delivery of air, 
sea, road and power utility facilities that have been widely acclaimed by international and 
regional economic monitors (Ho 1996, 23-52; UNCTAD 1998, 76). This was supplemented 
by the Industrial Relations Act (Amendment) 1968, the consolidation of the pro-govemment
25 A study has labelled the ‘Singapore Inc.’ state shaped by the combination of political and economic adversity 
a ‘developmental’ one in the sense that all, social, political and economic arrangements are singularly oriented 
towards achieving high economic growth (Perry, Kong and Yeoh 1997, 6-12). It helped that the PAP leadership 
consistently stressed cohesiveness within itself (Lam 1999). This vision of Singapore as a corporatist state is 
made explicit on the official government website <http://www.singapore-inc.com/writeup.html>.
26 The World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle (1993, 178) draws attention to Confucian thought as an 
underpinning of successful development bureaucracies in Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, China 
and Taiwan.
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National Trades Union Congress and the practice of ‘tripartism’ in industrial relations. 
Tripartism meant that labour grievances and pay demands were negotiated behind closed 
doors in a collegial setting with key employers’ representatives, trade unions and government 
seated around a common table. To accommodate wage adjustments regularly, the 
government created a National Wages Council where all three tripartist partners consensually 
set the tone for changes according to real and projected productivity and GDP growth and so 
on (Deyo 1981, 2-15, 41-51; Drysdale 1984, 404-412).21 The management of political 
feedback was also structured in like manner, via an extensive network of Peoples’ 
Association Community Clubs, Citizens’ Consultative Committees, Residents’ Committees, 
Town Councils and Community Development Councils, all alongside the Westminster-style 
inspired Parliament.
If this formula was authoritarianism disguised as pragmatic corporatism, it has been 
described as soft, being more the result of effective leadership-follower communication, and 
of a realistic appraisal of situational and material factors. Despite nearly unbroken economic 
growth except for recessions in 1973, 1985-6, 1998-9 and 2001, opposition parties came 
close to undermining PAP dominance in the 1984, 1988, 1991 and 1997 elections, but their 
combined share of total votes peaked at barely 40%. This figure did not translate into 
anything more than 2-4% of parliamentary seats under the first-past-the-post electoral 
system. In the last election in 2001, the PAP reprised their 1970s majorities by garnering 
75.3% of total votes. Furthermore dissenting sections of nascent civil society remain 
confined to a handful of issue-based, English-educated intelligentsia over matters such as the 
threat of golfing ranges to wildlife, or national identity negotiations. The majority of these
27 This particular aspect of corporatism has been singled out for praise by the World Bank’s East Asian Miracle
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have lobbied the government on their causes in a neo-Confucian manner through private 
member bills in the PAP-dominated Parliament; through letters to the press, Members of 
Parliament, Ministers and government agencies; or have called for consultative forums with 
the government (Z. Ibrahim 1998b; B.S. Koh 1998). The outcome of the pioneering civil 
society conference in 1998 showed a split between the English-educated ‘quality of life 
advocates’ and those representing ethnic socio-economic self-help groups over the role of 
these groups in bettering state-society synergies. The latter were generally more 
communitarian in calling for reinforcing corporatist arrangements in the future of the 
Singaporean nation-state.28
Although there are various summaries of the ‘Singapore Model of Development’ 
(SMD), it may be represented in shorthand by the three ‘Cs’.29 Firstly, the ‘Credibility’ of 
political promises, programmes and personnel, including talent promotion and 
uncompromising anti-corruption vigilance. Secondly, the ‘Cohesion’ of the nation-state, 
expressed in the qualities of teamwork, diligence and harmony of purpose in the face of 
common threats. And thirdly, ‘Confidence’ in paternalistic leadership, its virtues in 
implementing strict law and order, and its planning for a long-term communitarian good. 
Ostensibly these link to the dominant discourse of culturally and historically-derived political 
and social order. The Singaporean political leadership has consistently defended and 
promoted these as its basic governing philosophy since 1959. That the SMD became 
politicised in the Asian Values Debate following the end of the Cold War was due to the
(1993,165-166, 187-188), as well as by the report’s evaluator, Stephen Haggard (1994, 99-104).
28 See the conference contributions in Koh and Ooi (2000). Interestingly, the major government representative, 
Minister of Information and the Arts George Yeo, preferred to interpret ‘civil society’ as the non-political action 
of ‘civic organisations’ in welfare and nationalism issues. (Yeo 2000)
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change in threat perceptions towards one focussed upon the flow of ideas undermining 
domestic and global security. A list of specific post-Cold War reasons that prompted 
Singapore’s initiation of and engagement with the Asian Values Debate follows.
First, with the collapse of communism, ‘western triumphalism’ rapidly converted into 
a global crusade of scrutiny against countries that did not measure up to the yardstick of 
liberal democracy. Aside from Lee Kuan Yew, three senior outspoken Singaporean 
diplomats, Koh, Mahbubani and Kausikan, have spoken and written of their intellectual 
umbrage at largely western-dominated forums where the new Asia, of both the NICs and 
market socialism (i.e. China and Vietnam), was becoming pigeon-holed as candidates for 
assisted liberal change. In policy terms, the advent of the Clinton Presidency in 1993 
introduced the primacy of democratization and human rights proselytising (enlargement of 
democracy) as a centrepiece of a New World Order, with European states not lagging far 
behind, over issues such as China and the Tiananmen Incident, Hong Kong’s handover, East 
Timor, North Korea, the Middle East, and Cuba et cetera (Clinton 1993, 1995, 1998; Wain 
1995). Already in the late 1980s, the Singaporean government fought a series of long- 
running libel battles with prominent western-owned publications such as Time, Asian Wall 
Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review and Asiaweek over the misrepresentation of 
domestic politics and official sanctions against opposition politicians. Criticism of 
Singapore’s press laws, judiciary and human rights record mounted throughout the 1990s, 
stoked in part by Singaporean salvoes rebutting western criticisms of illiberalism and
29 This schema is inferred from the consistency of official speeches on the subject (K. Y. Lee 1993b; ST 1996b; 
ST 2000a), and which has been reflected in most academic scholarship. (Huff 1995; Perry, Kong and Yeoh 
1997; Quah 1998)
30 Both Kausikan (2000, interview, 19 May) and Tommy Koh (2000, interview, 24 April) confirmed this point 
to me in their interviews in April-May 2000. See also Kausikan (1995-96); Mahbubani (1998a, 9-10); and 
Zakaria (1994, 110-113).
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dictatorial impropriety (K.Y. Lee 1990). In policy terms, the first Clinton Administration was 
noticeably cooler in ties with Singapore, a fresh sore being the 1994 Michael Fay caning
<5 1
affair where Singaporean-Asian style order was castigated by the White House and 
sanctions were threatened.
Secondly, the bigger target of democratic enlargement was China’s transition, which 
would affect Singapore’s fortunes indirectly but adversely if unchecked. Having a thoroughly 
external orientation in economy and politics, Singapore’s fears for a rapidly democratising 
China should be read as a conjunction of the following. First, a failed Soviet-style 
perestroika path privileging political over economic reform might destabilise China. This 
might prompt a reactionary and militant elite into taking the helm, provoking military crises 
with not just Taiwan and Japan, but also all of China’s neighbours over territorial disputes in 
the Himalayas, the South China Sea and over missile proliferation in the Middle East (ST 
1993a; K.Y. Lee 1996, 1997, 1999). Next, sudden democratisation might splinter the 
country, reprising the post-Vietnam War refugee influx into Northeast and Southeast Asia on 
a vaster scale, further straining still-delicate inter-racial political balances in many of these 
countries, leading possibly to civil and external nationalistic wars. Singapore has in fact been 
unofficially dubbed the ‘third China’ by Southeast Asian governments since 1965. A third 
factor would be Singapore’s massive economic stakes in mainland China. Since the Deng 
Xiaoping reforms, Beijing has officially endorsed Singapore as a political and economic 
model and has specially invited Singaporean public and private corporations to set up city-
31 A diplomatic row over values was ignited when Singapore caned an American teenager for vandalism. See 
Section 5.4.2.
32 See Section 5.5.2.1.
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scale experiments in several industrial parks in the coastal provinces, all except one of which 
are performing well.
The reaction against western hubris and concern over the stability of China are fused 
in the wider, third reason: the search for political equality with the West, especially with 
American unipolar tendencies in the more fluid post-Cold War context. Singaporean 
diplomats weave this theme without exception into their inputs into the Asian Values Debate 
(K.Y. Lee 1993a; T. Koh 1998b). In a way, it is not surprising that a ‘Singapore School’ 
came to represent an ‘othering’ for America’s foreign policy elite during the Clinton 
Administration, which aimed, during both the 1992 and 1996 election campaigns, to focus on 
fixing domestic ills and promoting a new idealism in foreign policy. Singapore’s discourse 
on Asian Values is a form of discursive power premised upon the ability of an SMD, 
culturally-derived and uniquely synthesised, to deliver material and spiritual goods from an 
exceptionalist standpoint. The SMD is labelled as a ‘shock’34 in its selective non-conformity 
towards the predominantly western norms of post-1945 international order. For Singapore, 
equality was to be achieved without disturbing the economic and military ties with the US 
and EU which had developed since the 1980s.
Singapore’s LIO strategy can be summarised according to the components of the 
Asian Values Debate expressed in Figure 3 earlier. Although there is no single document 
spelling out the LIO in detail, its objectives, as gleaned from the preceding analysis, are (a) to 
put up a credible wall against perceived western sermonising on political liberalism in
33 See Huntington (1993b); Neier (1993); Jones (1994); Lingle (1998, ch. 3; 1996) and the discursive conflict in 
the western media over the Michael Fay caning in Section 5.4.2.
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development prognoses, (b) to galvanise an Asian or non-westem political front in support of 
China’s self-determined political and economic transition, and (c) to assert normatively 
Asian countries’ political equality with the West after the divisions of the Cold War. The 
danger the strategy is designed to counter straddles intellect and coercion, and the response is 
designed to be both subtle and forceful. In terms of spelling out ‘value and systemic 
differences’, Singaporean foreign policy leaders have chosen to stress cultural 
exceptionalism centred around order, family, community, diligence and respect for authority, 
as opposed to a stark set of contemporary ‘western values’ overindulging individualism and 
freedom. The latter are considered unhelpful for many developing countries’ quest for 
modernization. At the same time, given its own experience, the Singapore School has paid 
tribute to good (conservative) western values such as public accountability, fair play and faith 
in scientific solutions where possible, as well as admitting to a few negative Asian Values 
such as corruption. The position on ‘normative governing differences’ proceeds from here: 
the SMD represents one workable non-westem vision of good government. Ratified by neo­
liberal and western economic intelligence agencies, such as the World Bank, the World 
Economic Forum and the International Institute of Management and Development, the SMD 
is empirical evidence of the credibility of Asian Values. It is an indigenous synthesis of non­
liberal methods joined to circumstance and a largely East Asian psychic repository favouring 
progress. Singapore offers itself as a global idea for emulation without imposition. Finally, 
on the plane of ‘policy-political consequences’, Singapore will use discursive political 
communication to affirm the SMD and its connection with an Asian and non-westem 
exceptionalist argument in bilateral, regional and global forums to outflank or stalemate
34 The credibility of the SMD’s threat to political liberalism’s global hegemony is highlighted in large sections 
of Huntington’s book Clash o f Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), and is the target of the 
western liberals highlighted in ibid.
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western political value impositions. The clearest statement comes from Lee Kuan Yew’s
Foreign Affairs interview:
It is not my business to tell people what’s wrong with their system. It is my business 
to tell people not to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not 
work. (Quoted in Zakaria 1994,110)
This statement is intended to be read not as a closure of interstate discourse but a closure on
the forceful implementation of ideology through indiscriminate coercion. The same points
above will also be interpreted as the LIO’s flip side, that is, the LOI strategy, later. The
analysis now turns to an assessment of how far the LIO has succeeded in three significant
chronological events at the height of the Asian Values Debate: the UN Human Rights
Conference at Vienna 1993, the Michael Fay caning affair 1994 and the 1997-99 Asian
Financial Crisis.
5.4.1 Singapore and the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna
Singapore’s Asian Values LIO strategy became part of the context leading up to the 
1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna. In 1992, a pivotal year between the 
effective collapse of the USSR and the Conference, two events which were intertwined with 
larger trends, figured prominently in Singapore’s perception of over-the-horizon threats. The 
first was the arrival of new Hong Kong governor Chris Patten and his proposals to 
democratise the colony in preparation for its handover to China in 1997. The second was the 
prominence of US President-elect Clinton’s hardline stance on advancing human rights as a 
plank of American foreign policy. The larger trends were the restiveness of the Third World 
against a perceived unipolar arbitration of a New World Order, and increasing acrimony 
along regional and ‘civilisational’ lines over issues of armed, ‘humanitarian’ interventions by 
the UN and the West in ethnic conflicts around the world. Whether Huntington’s thesis of 
intercivilisational conflict was prescient or realistic in 1993, the rhetoric of confrontation was
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nevertheless fleshed out at the 1992 Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Jakarta and the 
ASEAN-EC Dialogue in September and October 1992 respectively when the West, including 
both the US and European Community were mentioned by name as instigating a new 
imperial order of rights against the rest of the non-westem world (Wallace 1992; Kikuta 
1992; Xinhua 1992b). China, Iran, Syria, Iraq (sic), Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam were 
outspoken in denouncing specific pressures against their economic and foreign policies on 
liberal human rights grounds. The imbroglio over ethnic cleansing in then-Yugoslavia lined 
up Arab and Asian Muslim states against ‘western hypocrisy’ over Iraq and Bosnia. China 
was still undergoing western sanctions over the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, alienated by the 
outgoing Bush Administration’s sale of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, and the Clinton manifesto 
threatened to add the withdrawal of MFN trading status to the list of bilateral disputes.
Against this background, Singapore was most concerned with defending China’s 
integrity, for the longer term strategic reasons enumerated earlier, and to influence and 
stabilise a realist thread of continuity in the transition of the US’ Asia policy from Bush to 
Clinton (George 1992). A soft threat was to be met by soft power. Senior Minister Lee was a 
natural instrument, the country’s first prime minister and widely perceived to be consummate 
in the art of domestic government. He was a person held in high, albeit controversial, regard 
throughout Asia, especially in Beijing. On the one hand, Lee warned of dire consequences 
for Asia-Pacific stability should London and Washington force China to democratise 
immediately. He alluded to Patten’s Hong Kong proposals as a democratic trojan horse in a 
battle to mould China to western liking (K.Y. Lee 1992b; M. Richardson 1992). On a second 
level, Lee argued that since Chinese society, along with much of East Asia was culturally 
unlike the West, their political systems were unsuitable for direct grafts of liberal democracy
240
in the quest for political and economic development. Stark choices between democracy and 
authoritarianism were less relevant than opting for a hybrid system delivering social 
discipline to seed and sustain economic development (Branegan 1991; ST 1993a). The 
‘failure’ of the Soviet formula was highlighted and the path of the newly industrialising 
countries, along with the SMD, were cited as more viable for developing and transitional 
countries, such as China. Mahbubani, in turn, lambasted western human rights double 
standards over Yugoslavia, Myanmar, Algeria, Peru, China and ASEAN. While all countries 
in Asia should adhere to ‘certain basic standards of human rights’, a comprehensive approach 
to rights would have to give way to dialogical nuances in prioritising rights. He called openly 
for ASEAN states ‘to encourage the West to be honest in discussing the complex issues of 
democracy and human rights.’ (Mahbubani 1992) In a March 1993 interview with CNN 
Money line, Lee outlined the fundamental difference between the American and Asian 
viewpoints:
You have had it so good for so long, you have taken food, medicine, clothing, the 
comforts of everyday life so much for granted, and you have concentrated on the 
intangibles -  free speech, freedom of publication, freedom from arrest, privacy of the 
individual, and so on. And the result has been less than ideal, and you go marauding 
around the world pretending to be Democrats, and we are in a very democratic way, 
because we cannot afford to be otherwise, minding our own business, sorting out our 
business within ourselves. (Dobbs 1993)
Lee explained in a separate article that he was not encouraging the US to disengage from
trade and military commitments in Asia, as these were necessary ingredients in the Asia-
Pacific societies’ rise to prosperity and stability, but that any Asia policy must respect the
coterminous increase in Asian states’ economic (market and productive) ‘power’. Hence US
relations with both Japan and China must reflect equitability. ‘Economics, politics and
security -  they must be considered as a whole when formulating a China policy’ not human
rights alone (K.Y. Lee 1993a).
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Using the analytical scheme set out in Figure 3, it is clear that the collective 
Singaporean position had adopted a ‘strategic fuzzy logic’ in drawing up a median position 
between Asian value exceptionalism and accommodation to the ‘West’ on the intellectual 
level of value and systemic differences. Moreover it then leaned towards a hardline 
exceptionalism on the level of normative governing differences, and returned to flexibility on 
specific policy-political consequences. This complex modulation was an attempt to avoid 
total alienation of western stakes in the Asia-Pacific while asserting an independence based 
on value difference. In terms of media effects, Lee Kuan Yew in particular, and the 
‘Singapore School’ in general, had gained attention as articulators of a general Asian 
exceptionalism in human rights, development and governance attitudes; it became the 
benchmark against which opinion for and against exceptionalism inside and outside Asia is
1  c
expressed. In terms of real policy results, China, Indonesia, Vietnam and ASEAN (the 
organisational collective) had to varying degrees of overtness, substantially supported and 
cited the Singapore School and the SMD as justifications for their upcoming positions at both 
the Asian preparatory meeting at Bangkok in March and the Vienna UN Human Rights 
Conference in June 1993 (Wanandi 1992, 7,8,19; Economist 1993; Lu 1992; Makabenta 
1993; Patten 1998a, 150). In the reported positions at Bangkok and Vienna, those espousing 
exceptionalist lines (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan) had 
actually hardened their cultural exclusivity arguments on all three levels (i.e. value and 
systemic difference, normative governing difference, and policy-political consequences) of 
the Asian Values Debate. Opposition to the latter and to the Singapore School came from not
35 Greg Sheridan has described Singapore as the ‘origin, epicentre and exemplar’ of the Asian Values Debate 
(1999, 64-81). See also Economist (1992), Branegan (1993); Bowring (1993) and the scholarly debates by US 
policymakers and academics (Huntington 1993b; Neier 1993; Jones 1994; Lingle 1998, ch. 3; 1996).
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only the countries comprising the West, but also from the Philippines’ pro-westem tilt, 
Japan’s and Thailand’s ambivalence (Dixit 1993b), as well as the extra-conference voices of 
the majority of Asia-Pacific NGOs, all of whom argued that human rights protections 
marched lock-in-step with development (Dixit 1993a; Loh 1993; Asian Cultural Forum on 
Development 1993). Nevertheless, the hardline position on Asian Values was supported by 
an ‘Arab-Islamic bloc’ of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen and even#the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation, plus Cuba. This Asian-Islamic opposition coalition was however drawn up 
against a sizeable number of ex-Soviet bloc, African and Latin American states supporting 
universalist and western positions (Kaufman 1993; Traynor 1993).36
Singapore’s strategic fuzzy logic benefited its diplomatic image and goals at Vienna. 
As its foreign minister, Wong Kan Seng put it, while murder is always murder and ‘no one 
claims torture as part of their cultural heritage’, the Singaporean experience ‘is that economic 
growth is the necessary foundation of any system that claims to advance human dignity, and 
that order and stability are essential for development’, hence ‘a pragmatic approach to human 
rights is one that tries to consolidate what common ground we can agree on, while agreeing 
to disagree if we must.’ (ST 1993b) The Singaporean delegation was perceived by key 
players of both polarised camps to be simultaneously intellectually partisan but 
diplomatically realistic (D’Ancona 1993a; Bone 1993; D’Ancona 1993b).37 On this basis, it 
was asked to be a mediator behind the scenes in the final drafting sessions at Vienna (Chai
1993). The leader of the delegation claimed that
36 The parallel campaigning by a majority of NGOs favouring human rights universalism was ignored when 
China successfully pressured the UN convenors to exclude them.
37 Singaporean Foreign Minister Wong’s speech was widely cited as a thermometer of divisions at the 
conference, and a marker of the path toward a thin universalism.
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.. .we have a pragmatic approach, not an ideological approach as both groups do on 
their edges. I think we did something right because both groups came to ask us for 
help in reaching some compromise text...It’s accepted that we are not a human rights 
violator. So when we put forward an alternative viewpoint, rationally argued, we 
cannot be accused of using this as a shield for abuse. (Chai 1993; Kausikan 2000, 
interview, 19 May)
The final text of the Vienna Declaration acknowledged human rights universality while 
allowing significant exceptions on national, regional, historical, cultural and religious 
particularities, while the agreed post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights suffered 
curtailed powers (United Nations 1995, 25-71, paras. 1.5, 1.8, 1.36, II.B.22).38 In short this 
was a ‘win-all’ result for Singaporean soft power, albeit intertwined invisibly with a broad 
use of Asian soft power on the Asian Values Debate.
In a postscript, a report authored in 2001 by a UN-appointed resource person at the
Vienna Conference commented that following the Declaration, most signatories had failed to
fully implement ‘good practices’ in national human rights regimes by the time of the
prearranged 1998 review conducted by the UN General Assembly (Dias 2001). The
monitoring of states’ implementation was inadequate with both states and international legal
bodies not coordinating reports, hence inhibiting rapid responses to human rights violations.
The UN Human Rights High Commissioner Mary Robinson criticised all member states for
not giving practical meaning to the Declaration. The Singapore delegation countered that
rights and responsibilities must be treated contextually:
No time and no society has found all the right answers for mankind for all time. It 
would be arrogant and unwise for us to pretend that both in the UDHR (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights) and VDPA (Vienna Declaration and Programme for
38 The pyhrric victory of human rights at Vienna is echoed by most newsreports. (Mills and Amsterman 1993; 
Awanohara 1993)
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Action), we have found the perfect answers. History tells us we have not. Let us 
together temper our celebrations today.39
That this 2001 report chose to single out the Singaporean comment for an indication of
dissent against the Vienna Declaration signified the resonance of Singaporean discourse
since 1993.
5.4.2 The Michael Fay Caning Affair 1994
Less than 12 months after the Vienna Conference, a law enforcement action on 
Singaporean soil served as another lightning rod for the Asian Values Debate. Despite the 
relative amity of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit at Seattle 
involving East Asian and American heads of state in November 1993, American-East Asian 
tensions had produced rows over the human-rights-MFN trade link with China, Japanese 
trade protectionism, and continuing irritations with Indonesia and Myanmar over the 
treatment of dissidents and separatists. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis remained 
interpreted by both Asian and western policy-makers as a strategic hint of Washington’s 
post-Cold War strategy: ‘the West’ was now increasingly confronting a Confucian-Islamic. 
connection of ideology, economics and military strength. Against this background, one 
commentator has dubbed Michael Fay the first American casualty of the clash (Emmerson
1994).
Michael Fay was an 18-year old American student at an expatriate school in 
Singapore indicted by a Singaporean court for vandalising public and private property.40 He
39 Excerpt from the Statement by the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the UN, 3 November 1998, 
reproduced in Dias (2001, 59).
40 Fay’s crime was spray-painting more than a dozen cars without permission and retaining the public street 
signs he and his group of friends from the Singapore American School had pilfered.
was initially sentenced to six strokes of the cane, four months imprisonment and a S$3,500 
fine under the law. Fay was not the first foreign national to be convicted by local courts for 
crimes on Singaporean soil to cause controversy. Yet the conjunction of the simmering Asian 
Values Debate with the above events provoked both the social conscience and the 
commercial opportunism of large sections of American media and society (Latif 1994, 7-37, 
91-101). Singapore’s exercise of soft power in the run-up to the Vienna Conference probably 
made it more of a target for liberal and democratic foreign policies in ‘the West’. In the Fay 
case, the three-pronged western critique attacked the SMD simultaneously on the levels of 
value and systemic differences and normative governing differences. Firstly, caning was a 
barbaric and outmoded form of torture and inhumane punishment. Secondly, since the SMD 
believed in privileging communitarian order through strict observance of law, the 
‘Singaporean-Asian Confucian state’ was a reprehensible authoritarian example contrary to 
everything western, American, liberal and democratic. Thirdly, Fay was a young 
inexperienced individual deserving of leniency. These reasons were cited in President 
Clinton’s intercessionary letter to the President of Singapore, and in his public statements 
prior to, during and after the implementation of the sentence first read out on 3 March 1994. 
This critique resonated in the US media for months afterward (Branigin 1994; Wallace 1994; 
Pringle 1994).
Reported opinion polls and letters written by non-Singaporeans received by assorted 
US, UK and Singaporean newspapers showed that individual and non-governmental overseas 
opinion was divided on the issue (Kenny 1994; Austin 1994; Johnson 1994). A Newsweek 
poll for instance showed that 38% of the ‘US public’ approved and 52% disapproved of the 
Singaporean action. A separate phone-in poll taken in Fay’s hometown of Dayton, Ohio —
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one of American pollsters’ favourite political barometers for national sentiment — showed 
that out of 2,270 people who called the Dayton Daily News, 1,442 supported the caning while 
828 objected (Branigin 1994; Elliott et al. 1994; Latif 1994, 10,17). Singapore Press 
Holdings Group carried out a nationwide poll in Singapore across race, educational and class 
categories and found that upwards of 87% supported their government’s decision at the time 
of the caning.41 This solid national majority was backed by assorted Singaporean and non- 
Singaporean news interviews with people in the street in Singapore. This strong impression 
of a sizeable moral majority coalescing behind the Singaporean nation-state remained 
consistent42 throughout the four months of the affair and gave critical ballast to the credibility 
of partisan international conflict on the policy-political level of the Asian Values Debate, 
against which some chronological observations can be made.
Between the 3 March sentencing and the actual caning on 5 May, amidst US State
Department propaganda pressure and the media war over the merits of the SMD as applied to
Fay, the Singaporean government basically stood firm on its brand of law and order. In an
indirect insight into the normative effect the case was having on Clinton’s decision-making
dilemma, on 19 April, the latter said the following on America’s MTV in response to a 20-
year old student’s query about Fay and America’s inability to keep crime down:
...[0]n the one hand, I don’t approve of this punishment, particularly in this case. 
Now having said that, a lot of the Asian societies that are doing very well now have 
low crime rates and high economic growth rates, partly because they have very 
coherent societies with strong units where the unit is more important than the 
individual, whether it’s the family unit or the work unit or the community 
unit....What’s happened in America today is, too many people live in areas where 
there’s no family structure, no community structure and no work structure. And so
41 Assorted telephone polling and statistical counting of letters to the Straits Times Forum Page reported in Latif 
(1994, 15-17).
42 That is, without alternative polls, changes in polls, or dissenting controversies and opinions expressed by 
significant Singaporean public personalities in the media at home and abroad.
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there’s a lot of irresponsibility. And so a lot of people say there’s too much personal 
freedom. When personal freedom’s being abused, you have to move to limit it. 
(Clinton 1994)
This argument was to prove prescient. Nevertheless, in response to Clinton’s private letter for
clemency in early May, as allowed under the Singaporean Constitution, the President of
Singapore, acting under the advice of the Cabinet reduced the six strokes to four. The official
explanation for doing so was that
[t]o reject his appeal totally would show an unhelpful disregard for the President and 
the domestic pressures on him on this issue. Therefore even though the Cabinet found 
no merit in Fay’s petition, it sought a way to accommodate President Clinton’s appeal 
without compromising the principle that persons convicted of vandalism must be 
caned. (ST 1994a; M. Richardson 1994)
The statement also said that account was also taken of Singapore’s good relations with the
US and its special role in the Asia-Pacific in making the reduction. It also qualified that while
similar reductions of sentences would be considered upon appeal for Fay’s fellow offenders,
‘this is an exceptional decision which will not be a precedent for future cases’, nor would
sentences be commuted outright. The Clinton Administration’s official response continued to
be hostile. In Singapore, public reaction was momentarily split into a slightly dominant
moderate section and a minority hardline section, both of which were pro-caning and pro-
Asian Values, except that the latter were less supportive of the government for making
concessions to the US (Nathan et al. 1994). Yet this was a propaganda bonus for the
Singaporean government, which could, and did, reasonably claim that diplomatic quarter had
to be given to a friendly state without compromising socio-legal principles at home, and in so
doing, it had acted with the best intentions between extremes (Fernandez 1994). This was a
reprise of the strategic fuzzy logic of Singapore’s Asian Values Debate input. That the
discourse of Asian Values was not permanently damaged was underlined by the consistency
of media reports acknowledging that Singapore went ahead with caning without showing any
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sign of unease over the information war preceding the action (M. Richardson 1994; PA 
Newsfile 1994).
The coalitions of international support for Singapore as an Asian state and the SMD 
were already in position for what followed in terms of policy-political consequences. On 5 
May itself, Clinton called the caning a mistake and questioned the proportionality of the 
crime and its punishment (Walker 1994). On the same day, US Vice-President Albert Gore 
and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Winston Lord expressed regret 
over Singapore’s action but stressed it was time to move on and take account of the larger 
bilateral relationship with Singapore (Pringle 1994). At the same time, Winston Lord wrote 
to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in a memo leaked to the press, warning in 
reference to Fay’s caning and other recent quarrels with Asia that the Pacific spirit of comity 
forged at the 1993 APEC Summit was potentially giving way to charges that ‘we are an 
international nanny, if not bully’ and that ‘without proper course adjustments, we could 
subvert our influence and interests.’ (P. Wilson 1994) Yet on 10 May, US Trade 
Representative Mickey Kantor publicly opposed Singapore’s bid to host the WTO’s first 
ministerial meeting in 1996 without stating any reasons (Stewart 1994). Unidentified US 
sources speculated that this was in retaliation for the Fay caning. The next day, the State 
Department argued that the Kantor threat was merely a personal opinion and that no firm 
decision had been made (Nathan and Ngoo 1994). This duality of threat and accommodation 
in the US reaction continued well into mid-June. The Singaporean government replied that 
WTO decisions were collectively made according to proper procedures and that the country 
was prepared to underwrite the cost of the entire meeting. On 24 May, Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong reiterated his country’s official belief in severely deterring crime and argued that
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[t]he important point is that the US and Singapore have substantive relations...And if 
it cannot survive this episode, then the relations are not worth having... You believe in 
the freedom of the press. And so the noises appear. (Chuang 1994)
Subsequently, within days, Singapore’s bid for the WTO hosting was publicly supported in
Asian quarters: Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand supported Singapore in the spirit of
ASEAN solidarity; Hong Kong felt that Singapore’s bid should be regarded ‘positively’;
while Japan claimed ‘because of the dynamic growth of Asia, we think it is very meaningful
to host the WTO ministerial meeting in an Asian country, whether in Singapore or
otherwise.’ (ST 1994b, 1994c) In reaction to Kantor’s reiteration on 6 June that major
economic powers had aligned against Singapore’s bid, Japan’s foreign ministry was
culturally more explicit on 8 June:
As far as our position on Singapore’s proposal is concerned, although we have not 
decided on the issue, we are sympathetic as an Asian nation to the proposal to hold 
the first ministerial conference somewhere in Asia. (Kwan 1994)
The sum of the diplomatic skirmishes again clearly showed how the value and systemic
differences of the Asian Values Debate translated into direct action on political governance.
Admittedly, the international support for Singapore could have masked other hard 
bilateral interests for cooperation, but the non-governmental melee, particularly in Canadian, 
American and British newspapers showed that Fay had pegged the SMD as a potentially 
difficult, yet enviable target, of much intellectual fencing over value and systemic differences 
in political organisation. The SMD as a vehicle for efficacious Asian values had worked well 
enough to ‘defend’ Singapore. Support for the SMD was varied but vociferous. Newsweek 
scrutinised the SMD and highlighted the fact that while sexual promiscuity was frowned 
upon in Singapore, Singaporean tourists flocked to Thailand’s sex parlours and that the 
authoritarian culture was being challenged by the rising Asian middle class; meanwhile, it
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acknowledged that the city-state’s 58 murders and 80 rapes in 1993 showed up Los Angeles’
1,058 murders and 1,781 rapes for the same year (Elliott et al. 1994). Other surveys of
Singapore in the Daily Telegraph, The Independent (London), The Sun (Baltimore), Time,
The Ottawa Citizen and the Vancouver Sun, as well as articles by ex-westem diplomats and
‘Asia-hands’ such as Richard Armitage and Robert Manning, have admired an implicit
element of moral and performative superiority in the SMD which frustrated contemporary
American attempts to mould Asia in its liberal democratic image. Armitage empathised with
Singaporean-Asian cultural differences but insisted that the US heritage included an explicit
moral scrutiny arising from its foundational ‘city on a hill’ vision (Armitage 1994). Manning
wrote that Fay was not a political affair until the US publicly questioned ‘the legitimacy of
the Singapore system’ giving it no way to back down. Paying a backhanded compliment to
Singapore’s soft power on Asian Values, he said
I think it is a bogus issue because the Singaporeans have developed a very elaborate 
critique that looks at the United States’ murder rate, incarceration rate, education 
system, and breakdown of the family, even challenging [Secretary of State] Warren 
Christopher to walk the streets of Anacostia after 8.00[pm] at night, and so on. By 
pursuing this missionary approach, we have encouraged an Asian notion of a different 
approach to human rights. (Feulner et al. 1994)
The Sun (Baltimore)'s Roger Simon reflected the western rights lobby’s frustration in noting
that while ‘even a limited cruise missile attack would lay waste to much of the city-state and
allow US pride to be avenged[,]....you do have to wonder at just what we are angry about.’
Simon concluded that playing in someone else’s ballpark logically means following different
rules (Simon 1994). Other western commentators, wearied by public crime, took a leaf from
the Singapore book, and shifted the burden of creating a civilised community onto the
perpetrator, instead of the victim: neighbourhood vandals out of control, indisciplined
children and lax parenting, unsafe gun-and-drug-toting gangs and so on ought to be made to
pay. Long-time Singapore critic Ian Buruma’s comment on the frustration of disabusing
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divided western and liberal opinion on Fay, summed up the discursive attraction of the SMD
at both the normative and the policy levels on this occasion:
Singapore’s streets are indeed safer than London’s, let alone those of New York, but 
not because of corporal punishment. The low crime rate has more to do with general 
prosperity, and the intrusion of the state in every aspect of its citizens’ lives. 
Singapore is not so much a country as a large small town or, perhaps more accurately, 
a huge tropical boarding school. It is easy to control, and easy to make feel richer, 
through massive government spending on housing, education and public 
surveillance.... The difference is this: most free and open societies suffer from crime 
as private enterprise - vandalism, larceny, mugging, drug abuse. In closed societies, 
on the other hand, robbery, rape and even murder are institutionalised - crime as a 
state enterprise. To stress the importance of individual rights, even at the price of 
those rights being regularly abused by individuals, is not to indulge in political 
correctness; it is to prevent worse crimes from being possible. The protection of 
individual liberty is not simply a ‘Western value’. After all, countless Chinese, 
Koreans, Thais, Burmese and others have risked and often lost their lives to acquire 
it. For without such protection there can be no freedom to think. And without that 
freedom, civilisation would remain as barren as Singapore. Science, the arts, 
economic prosperity for an ever larger number of people; all these depend on the 
defence of individual freedom and the limitation of state control. It is not for nothing 
that many gifted Asians continue to go to France, the United States and Britain to use 
their talents. Few gifted Westerners, or other Asians flock to Singapore or Kuala 
Lumpur to do the same. Singapore is relatively rich, its streets are clean, and few 
people get mugged. These are notable achievements. And we must find ways of 
curbing crime in our own cities, but not by following the Singaporean example. 
(Buruma 1994)
5.4.3 The 1997-99 Asian Financial Crisis
In retrospect the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99 was a test of communitarian value 
discourses against rampant economic globalization, provoking not only intellectual ring- 
fencing but also prescriptions for reform. The crisis had rebounded upon the Asian Values 
Debate through the governance component threading through all three levels of discourse 
(Figure 3). The critique of Asian Values went as follows. Firstly, if Asian Values were 
different and presumptuously superior to western and universal values, they had ultimately 
failed in economic governance in the face of global capital movements. Secondly, the 
normative governing differences showed that an Asian neo-authoritarian practice of political
252
economy could not stand up to the scrutiny of the market forces. Hence thirdly, Asian-style 
good governance is a misnomer perpetuated by unrepresentative and inept elites as a defence 
against an inevitable embrace of a western liberal democratic model along with the teleology 
of modernization. Although many voices in western and Asian liberal circles took this line, it 
was the IMF and World Bank, encouraged by the US, EU, MNCs, transnational investment 
funds and individual financiers, who fronted the prescriptions for Thai, Indonesian, South 
Korean and Philippine economic overhaul.43
Although the IMF, the World Bank and their supporters placed only four Asian 
countries on their ‘patient list’, Singapore was indirectly involved through the fact of its 
participation in global economic space and its large input into the Asian Values Debate. 
Capitalist economic interdependence explained how the crisis came into being as a local ‘flu’ 
or ‘contagion’. Panic selling of the Thai Baht was triggered by information, both real and 
interpreted, that both state-run and private Thai property and investment projects were 
overvalued or on the brink of insolvency. Bad news spread via ICT networks, and the 
interlinked stock exchanges of the region involved with similarly profiled projects and 
companies were put under scrutiny by fund managers and investors. When these showed 
parallel symptoms, both real and imagined, the respective national currencies involved 
correspondingly suffered devaluation through panic selling and bearishness. This was how 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan felt the 
‘shockwaves’ of investor withdrawals. Aside from China, which had a non-convertible 
currency, the last three economies in that list endured the speculative attacks relatively well, 
shedding 15-20% of pre-crisis currency values compared to the rest which ran into the region
43 In this section, the spillover effects on Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador will be left out as these did not
253
of 40% upwards. The difference according to most analysts, was how foreign investors 
perceived the rigour and standing of domestic probity and confidence in the management of 
economic governance. Singapore, which had ‘led’ and abetted the more articulate Asian 
Value arguments at the beginning of the 1990s was now weighed with the baggage of ‘Asian 
Value failures’ (McRae 1997; Business Week 1997; Brittan 1997; Lingle 1998, ch. 4, 6; 
Clifford and Engardio 2000, ch. 7; Ries 2000, ch. 12) around the region — although her 
economy was hardly ravaged, avoided negative annual growth rates in 1997-99 and 
recovered fastest.44 The fate of Singapore’s LIO strategy amidst the financial crisis could be 
summarised in two dimensions: the inconvenient sample and the indirect target of ‘Asian 
misgovemance’ charges, and its opposite, the good governance consultant.
The direct intervention of the IMF and World Bank in four national economies 
showed the dominance of discourses diagnosing Asian misgovemance as the key problem. 
Prescriptions were for accountability, transparency and fair competition in government and 
banking regulations and tenders, and against corruption, cronyism and nepotism. The 
communitarian and family commitments of Asian Values were directly blamed for fostering 
the Suharto family’s web of corruption in Indonesia, the Chaebol-govemment nexus’ 
misallocation of resources in South Korea, corporate cronyism among mling parties and 
national companies in Malaysia, and the entrenched public sector culture of corruption in the 
Philippines. Singapore’s espousal of communitarian ethics ignored all these, charged the 
critics (Brittan 1997; Lingle 1998, ch. 4, 6; Clifford and Engardio 2000, ch. 7; Ries 2000, ch. 
12). Ironically, the city-state was also acknowledged to be the most corruption-free country
impinge significantly on Singapore.
44 Interestingly, this was also Asian Values critic Chris Patten’s prediction (1998b). See also Bowring (1998) 
and Porter (1999).
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in Asia and ranked regularly among the world’s top 10 cleanest by private consultants 
(Economist 1998c; Luther 1998). Singapore’s political economy too drew trend-defying 
attention for its flexible and consensual ‘tripartist approach’ to adjusting wages downwards, 
and rationally coaxing labour and management groups to acquiesce in emergency economic 
rebate measures jointly drawn up with the government.45 Meanwhile, unemployment (3.2- 
3.5% for 1998-99) resulting from the crisis did not reach proportions comparable to the rest 
of the region; and economic growth in 1997 ended comfortably at 7.6%, levelled off at 0.4% 
in 1998 and recovered to 10.7% by 2000 (Arasu 1998; Ministry of Information and the Arts 
2000, 114-115). This large pocket of stability and confidence enabled Lee Kuan Yew to 
claim on the one hand that Asian Values, especially as applied to the SMD, were not a 
wholly convincing explanation for economic downfall, while he conceded that they had to be 
finessed and re-applied for the rest of the region’s recovery (K.Y. Lee 1998a; Kassim 1998b; 
Plate 1999; L.H. Chua 2001). This was in contrast to Malaysia’s emphasis on the xenophobic 
aspects of Asian Values, that is, blaming neocolonial ‘outsiders’ for exploiting a 
community’s hard-earned prosperity — witness Malaysian premier Mahathir’s spat with 
financier George Soros over Malaysia’s difficulties.
Instead the SMD’s corporatist and prudential characteristics were a renewed 
attraction to countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, as well as the IMF and 
World Bank. Lee lost no time in defending the Singapore School. On the occasion of the 
2,550 birthday of Confucius celebrated by the Congress of the International Confucius 
Association in Hong Kong in early October 1999, Lee pointed to South Korean recovery 
within the past year as a vindication of Confucian traditions of placing community before
45 L.H. Chua (1998) surveying comments from Financial Times (London), New York Times and the Hongkong
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self. He said the symbolism of South Korean citizens lining up to donate gold jewellery and 
other personal treasures to aid official efforts at staving off national bankruptcy was critical. 
While this symbolic effort did not on its own contribute to economic salvation, it was ‘an 
intangible which would encourage foreign investors to augment their long-term prognosis of 
the country.’ However, Lee also cautioned that Confucian concepts of putting family and 
society before self
...must not be misconstrued to mean abusing one’s position to benefit family and 
friends at public expense.
That is the recourse of the ‘little man’ or xiaoren, who places self above society in 
direct contradiction to the basic tenet of Confucianist thought. (ST 1999b)
Later that month, in a moment of irony, when his erstwhile Asian Values detractor Kim Dae
Jung was South Korean President, Lee was invited to brainstorm reform at a forum organised
by the Federation of Korean Industries, at which he exhorted his audience of business
conglomerate representatives to build recovery through corporatism with the government:
If I were you, I wouldn’t argue with the President’s advisers whether you should or 
should not do it. You should say, ‘Yes, of course, but tell me how. If you want to 
break my company, hundreds of thousands of workers will be put out of jobs.’
It’s not you versus President Kim Dae Jung.
It’s the President’s advisers working with you to get outside help to try and reshape 
your corporations into more competitive units. (L.H. Chua 1999)
Earlier Thailand also invited Lee to consult on implementing IMF reforms, and this 
came on the back of Singapore’s contribution of US$1 billion to the US$17.2 billion IMF- 
brokered rescue package for Bangkok. Lee told Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai to foster 
a cooperative spirit among all sectors of Thai society and economy. While warning against 
cronyism between business and civil servants, he argued that ‘we have not become weak. We
Standard. See also L.Y.C. Lim (1999,109-113).
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have got into trouble by carelessness and stupidity. We will rise again.’ (Tang 1998b)46 On 
the same occasion, Premier Chuan also revealed he was thankful that Singapore’s Prime 
Minister Goh had earlier in the week ‘interceded’ for Thailand during a teleconversation with 
US President Bill Clinton on the Southeast Asian scenario, upon which the Clinton 
Administration supported Thailand by subsequently declaring that Thailand was going in ‘the 
right direction’ 47 Apparently, in that same Singapore-US telephone consultation during 
January 1998, Clinton also sought Goh’s feedback on Suharto and Indonesia (STWE 1998).
Indonesia was a more complex case for Singaporean soft power. While consultations 
with Singapore were visible, tangible signals of reform from the upper echelons in the 
Suharto government were equivocal. Singapore nevertheless pledged US$5 billion to the 
IMF-arranged rescue package for Indonesia, and supported the Rupiah by intervening in 
forex markets through the Monetary Authority of Singapore. The Singaporean government 
further proposed a US$20 billion multilateral export credit guarantee scheme to enable 
Indonesian firms to sustain imports of raw materials but this was only partially successful as 
Indonesia’s damaged credit reputation could not spark sufficient multilateral interest to sign 
up to Singapore’s ideas. Nevertheless, Singapore went ahead with it, unilaterally adjusting to 
a lower credit level of US$3 billion (Z. Ibrahim 1998a). Indonesia’s recurrent civil 
disturbances and weaknesses in leadership transition from Suharto to Habibie to Wahid did 
not help a corporatist effort to reform, and instead demonstrated the limits of Singaporean 
soft power in social contractual formulas (Spencer 2001).48 Right in the midst of all this 
bilateral rescue diplomacy, the IMF recognised the validity of the SMD in spite of its Asian
46 This Asian Value sentiment in forging recovery was echoed by Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan in an 
interview in Kassim (1998a).
47 Chuan Leekpai’s anecdote in Tang (1998a).
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Values association by jointly setting up with Singapore a ‘regional training institute for
financial managers’ in May 1998. In his speech at the institute’s inauguration, Singapore’s
Finance Minister Richard Hu noted:
If public institutions in East Asia were found wanting, it is not because they pursued 
inappropriate macroeconomic demand management policies, but because they failed 
to safeguard the stability of the financial system. Countries in the region had rushed 
to liberalize their financial systems and capital accounts before adequate safeguards 
were in place*9
Asian Values, in other words, also require the correct application of diligence and integrity to 
make communitarian policies work.
Finally it should be noted that a key lesson which Singaporean LIO drew from global
information space’s first high-speed regional, and mediatised, financial panic was to ensure
that Asian leaders needed to communicate values distinctly. As Lee Kuan Yew put it
The availability of [media] bandwidth and the inexorable shift from broadcasting to 
narrowcasting will have an enormous impact on all human societies, both west and 
east. This will make it difficult for governments to communicate their positions to the 
people. Without a clear enunciation of government positions and policies and the 
reasons for them, it is not possible to rally a people around common goals. Instead of 
a clear and consistent message, we will have a cacophony of media voices sending a 
plethora of messages, many contradictory. Because of the different interests and 
objectives of journalists and media owners, the government’s position may not get 
through at all. This will be bad for any society, democratic or otherwise.
Asian societies strike a different balance between the rights of the individuals and 
those of the larger community. There is a need to have an established official position 
known to its people. Asian governments will use whatever is the latest media 
technology for this purpose. This is not to say that the official position is exclusive. 
Indeed, information technology is rapidly undermining whatever monopoly control of 
the media governments might have had. Thus, along with the official view, many 
other views are available and known. It is important for a man to know what the 
official position is, whether or not he accepts it. (K.Y. Lee 1998b)
48 It remains to be seen if President Sukarnoputri, Indonesia’s third after Suharto’s downfall, can enlist social 
cohesion to aid economic recovery.
49 Hu (1998). Italics mine.
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This is a slight variation on Singapore’s media position articulated by Lee himself in 1990 
but it is a statement that Asian Values can be propagated in the face of globalization if 
discourse is used.
By way of an interim summary of the results of the LIO policy considered in the 
Asian Values Debate, three observations can be made. Firstly, as the Vienna Human Rights 
Conference and the Fay Affair indicate, Singapore’s LIO operated effectively as a setting for 
China’s defence and a platform for exceptionalism where international trends favour policy 
combativeness in a fluid ideological milieu. Concomitantly, world public opinion was also 
fairly malleable and open to partisan mobilisation by coherent ideas in both contexts. 
Singapore’s SMD presented itself as a corporatist and communitarian whole and a veritable 
showcase for discourse, although on a strategic level, fuzzy logic in putting across Asian 
Values had been employed in finessing goal achievement routes. Secondly, LIO requires 
consistent spokesmen able and willing to effect information formation, and ensure favourable 
transmission and reception. The Singapore School’s voice in the Asian Values Debate was 
put across by Lee, Koh, Kausikan and Mahbubani forcefully, and was amplified by the 
discursive support of favourably disposed national and subnational opinion sections. Thirdly, 
the LIO’s requirements for credibility in leadership projection sometimes requires a 
‘dogmatic consistency’ even when geopolitical or geoeconomic circumstances defy it 
generally, as the effect of the 1997-99 financial crisis showed. That Singapore did not 
crumble under macroeconomic adversity granted it a continued degree of moral high ground, 
which perhaps attracted to itself much indirect blame for the failures of others following the 
same values in general. A generalised discourse on Asian Values had proved real in 
economic backlash. On the positive ledger, the consistent credibility of the SMD saw
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Singapore’s consultancy sought after by crisis victims and rescuers alike, and this sustained a 
sense of equality in western perceptions as the Clinton Administration’s belated high regard 
for Singapore and the global political economy indices show.
5.5 Singapore’s Leadership Outside-In Strategies
Singapore’s LOI strategies in regard to the Asian Values Debate follow closely upon 
the LIO. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the gravity of foreign policy now shifts more 
emphatically into giving certain nationally-favoured ideas a semi-autonomous or autonomous 
life of their own outside their country-of-origin: soft power assumes structural form in 
regimes and epistemic communities in its ability to set parameters and performance standards 
in cooperative international relations, and in some cases, through institutional prescriptions 
for good governance. International regimes are ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.’ (Krasner 1982, 186) As a public good a regime requires a political 
entrepreneur to broach the concept. According to Robert Keohane, such an entrepreneur 
reduces the ‘transaction cost’ of initiating cooperation: perceiving profit, monetary or 
otherwise, deriving from joint action, a leader puts forward or innovates upon existing ideas 
to present a plan attracting partnerships (Keohane, 1982, 338-339).
The other manifestation of LOI, epistemic communities, often work parallel or 
directly with the logic of regimes. An epistemic community is ‘a network of professionals 
with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’ (P.M. Haas 1992, 3) It is a 
transnational policy shaping and advisory body which coordinates global networks and takes
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action where uncertainties of issue-salience across time and space prevent coordinated 
policy-making and regime maintenance. The epistemic community claims its information- 
expert function on the basis that global and domestic politics are thoroughly penetrated by 
modem techniques and neo-liberal economics, and hence face common and interdependent 
security problems. International organisations, think-tanks and NGOs joining in training and 
aid partnerships with states and individual scientific-technical consultants, are examples of 
epistemic actomess in international relations, whether they are monitoring human rights 
adherence or advising on governance.
The efficacy of Singapore’s LOI in regard to the Asian Values Debate can be viewed 
in two areas: firstly, its role in norm formation and innovation in regional and multilateral 
organisations such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), and APEC. These are regimes in which political entrepreneurial roles can 
be examined. Secondly, the epistemic community component is illustrated by the country’s 
attempt to establish a global constituency of ‘good governance’ advocates through a nascent 
foreign aid programme based on partnering, teaching or coaching expertise. With reference 
to the scheme in Figure 3, the LOI operates only at the third level of policy-political 
consequences as the first two levels of abstract ideas are collapsed into attraction and 
behaviour according to norms of actual state conduct and policy adoption.
5.5.1 Singapore as Norm-Setter in Multilateral Contexts
The Republic’s politically entrepreneurial roles, particularly in ASEAN, have been 
justified post hoc and in the present by the Asian Values Debate (T. Koh 2000, interview, 24 
April). Asian Values, though dealing primarily with domestic governance, has been
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abstracted into two principles of international process: the transformation of fissiparous 
nationalism through regional harmony, and an emphasis on consensus and teamwork in 
reaching national goals through regional cooperation. Hence in regional and multilateral 
terms, the Asian Values Debate impacted upon the evolution and struggle of norm shaping in 
ASEAN, ARF and the APEC. The standard of performance as well as the tangible results of 
regionalism have been attributed to an imputed ‘Asian way’ -  a diplomatic modus operandi 
encompassing the above two principles (M. Haas 1989, 5-10).50
The discursive justifications began with the ‘ASEAN Spirit’ or ‘ASEAN Way’. 
Singapore, as one of its original founders, desperately wanted its neighbours to guarantee in 
word and deed its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and leading on from this to 
create a pacific intra-regional climate for national development. This seemingly modest 
Westphalian condition was a revolutionary achievement considering the stillborn attempts at 
regional norm-creation in the 1950s and early 1960s based on extra-regional imperatives (the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation and the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East), anti-communism (Association of Southeast Asia), racial solidarity (MAPHILINDO51), 
or pan-Asian radicalism (NEFOS52). Although these involved state signatures, they did not 
strictly sanctify territorial demarcations according to geographic contiguity. Deeds in this 
period were even more worrying. Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, North Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, China, USSR and the US, all either supported or connived in separatist 
movements in the border regions of Thailand-Malaysia, Philippines-Malaysia-Indonesia, or
50 Haas asserts that the ‘Asian Way’ evolved from the conceptual foundations of fledgling Pan-Asian interstate 
conferencing in the late 1940s and 1950s, predating ASEAN in utilising Confucius, Buddha and Mohammed in 
rationalising conflict mitigation without ‘external power’ intervention. Michael Antolik has however dubbed 
this the ‘diplomacy of accommodation’ (1990).
51 Literally Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia amalgamated.
52 Newly Emerging Forces -  a pipedream of then-Sukamoist Indonesia.
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insurgencies in virtually every Southeast Asian country (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982, ch. 2, 8; 
Antolik 1990, 12-17). A nearly coincidental change of leaderships and policies in 1965-67 
which included critically, the coup which removed Sukarno in Indonesia, the tension-fraught 
ejection of Singapore from Malaysia, and the ending of military confrontation between 
Suharto’s ‘New Order’ Indonesia and the former two states, opened a window of opportunity 
for drawing anew a code of conduct for the region. An ‘ASEAN Way’ came to be embodied 
in the wording of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which was formalised within 
nine years of ASEAN’s founding (1976). The terms of the TAC were somewhat 
unremarkable in their call to respect Westphalian non-interference principles, refrain from 
the use of force, and to strengthen intra-regional relations on the basis of ‘traditional, cultural 
and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation which bind them 
together.’ (ASEAN National Secretariat 1979, 17, ch. II art. 3) Its operationalisation was 
however the unique point.
While Singapore cannot claim to be the sole originator of the TAC, its joint
enunciation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand represented a de facto
triumph for the Republic’s LOI on ‘protective sovereignty’. From here on, the use of the
ASEAN way in Singapore’s role within ASEAN shows up more clearly. Its diplomats have
spelt out the ASEAN Way as:
1. ‘[A] habit or a culture of cooperation and consensus-building, or musyawarah, 
among leaders of Southeast Asia....Even when relations among some members have 
been at a low ebb, they put their differences on the backbumer and have not allowed 
these to impede ASEAN cooperation.’ (Jayakumar 1997b, para. 29) In this speech, 
the Singaporean foreign minister went on to cite both the referral of territorial 
disputes within ASEAN to the International Court of Justice, and the constant annual 
meetings of ASEAN leaders as examples of this. An official Indonesian commentator 
dubbed this the ‘7-x’ (after 1998, 10-x) principle of reaching consensus, allowing ‘x’ 
to demur without actively objecting or openly jeopardising the image of a consensual 
community. (Anwar 1997, 28-29)
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2. Non-interference as a sacred principle of sustaining, peaceful coexistence of 
ideological and governmental diversity. ‘The surest and quickest way to ruin is for 
ASEAN countries to begin commenting on how each of us deals with these sensitive 
issues. Each of us deals with them in our own way, in our common effort to achieve 
harmony and stability in our societies.’ (Jayakumar 1997a) This is the ‘national’ and 
‘regional resilience’ connection in ASEAN.53
This operational code has ensured that no standing member of ASEAN has taken up 
arms against another since its founding in 1967, and it has allowed Singapore to use this 
jointly derived code to marshal ASEAN’s sustained crusade of delegitimisation against then 
non-member Vietnam’s illegal occupation of Cambodia in 1978-91 (Leifer 1989, 98-120; 
Lau 1991, 372-383). It is widely observed that by leading the propaganda charge at the UN 
against Vietnam over her aggrandisement of Cambodian sovereignty, Singapore was 
explicitly getting all the ASEAN States to reaffirm publicly the TAC and to manoeuvre 
themselves into maintaining a corporate solidarity which has been termed a ‘diplomatic 
community’ (Leifer 1989, 140-148; 1999; 2000, 84-88).54 More importantly, by conciliating 
rival intra-ASEAN threat perceptions of Vietnam and China during the various points of the 
Cambodian conflict, Singapore’s political entrepreneurship demonstrated obvious utility to 
its partners.
The religious adherence by ASEAN States to the ASEAN Way forged in word and 
deed over Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was to be even more severely tested after the 
Cold War. With Vietnam voluntarily reconciled with and admitted to ASEAN through the 
non-ideological cover of the TAC, the long-term vision of admitting the rest of Southeast 
Asia began to pose threats to the ASEAN Way. Leaving aside uncontroversial Laos, the
53 These parts of the lexicon of the ASEAN Way were first coined by President Suharto (1975, 8) of Indonesia 
in the late 1960s. Suharto is cited in Leifer (1989, 4).
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admission of Myanmar, then Cambodia, began to pose case-specific problems with 
pronounced disapproval from non-aligned, interested and great power parties, adding a layer 
of complication to the ASEAN Way. Both features of the ASEAN Way came under attack 
from within (Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, versus Thailand in disagreement) and without 
(US, EU, Japan versus China) on moral grounds. Singapore initially adopted a neutral 
position over admission, but ultimately the ASEAN Way won by default, partly against the 
background need to ‘close ranks’ in Southeast Asia against the perceived western liberal 
crusade. In a sense, this was a first test of ASEAN’s survival in global information space; the 
jointly originated and Singaporean-demonstrated ASEAN Way became a local norm of 
defensive communitarian response.55
The other trial of ASEAN by globalization in this period occurred simultaneously in 
the form of the 1997-99 financial crisis. This occasion saw the ASEAN Way flagging for 12 
months as Malaysia adopted economic nationalism, Thailand and Philippines followed IMF 
advice, while Indonesia dithered over IMF prescriptions, backtracked frequently, and became 
embroiled in domestic turmoil. Under duress from creditor states, investors and the politics 
of bilateral central bank interventions, ASEAN members rather hesitatingly adopted a ‘peer 
surveillance’ mechanism for jointly acting to forestall future financial crises, over Thai and 
Filipino suggestions for overt constructive interference. This was produced under 
Singapore’s moderating influence jointly exercised with Malaysia and Indonesia (Fuller
54 Leifer observed that the activity of a diplomatic community depends as much on norm-setting as peer group 
pressure.
55 Most observers concur on the diplomatic moral obligations of the ASEAN Way upon its members, but some 
such as Tobias Ingo Nischalke argue it is more the result of reluctance to veto than volition, especially amidst 
post-Cold War uncertainties, minus a Vietnam bogey. (Nischalke 2000, 101-107)
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1997).56 Yet this was insufficient to boost recovery. Singapore then initiated a call to adopt a 
series of bold measures to signal a spirit of regional resolve. The 1998 ASEAN summit in 
Hanoi heeded the call and agreed to forward existing ASEAN Free Trade Area plans towards 
2002, implement an immediate raft of investment liberalisation incentives, an ASEAN 
investment area, and negotiate for freer trade in services. Exceptions were however made for 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam on grounds of national reform adjustments. A year later, with 
the exception of Indonesia, the worst casualties of the crisis had largely turned the comer of 
recovery, but without completely vindicating the region-wide initiatives as IMF prescriptions 
continued along with weak investor confidence. In March 1999, ASEAN returned to the 
orthodoxy of the ASEAN Way by reiterating the importance of national discretion in 
managing exchange rates (CNN.com 1999).
Singapore also tried to clone this ASEAN Way into the expanded security forum 
known as the ARF, the inter-regional dialogue ASEM, and the transpacific economic forum 
APEC through the discursive and tactical device of an ASEAN core as the ‘driver’ of 
gradualist initiatives.57 In the ARF, this has had mixed results since its inception in 1994. It 
was an attempt to regularise security discussions with the US, Canada, EU, Russia, China, 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and subsequently India. China supported the 
ASEAN Way in so far as it preserved her tactical room for political manoeuvre over the 
contested and purportedly oil-and-gas-rich Spratly islands (Wain 1996; Jacob 1999b). The 
US, EU, Canada and subsequently Thailand and Philippines wished to quicken the ARF’s 
transition into OSCE-style confidence-building measures, conflict prevention and domestic
56 The adoption of ‘peer surveillance’ as a watered down intervention norm is the result of the operation of the 
ASEAN Way in treating cross-border assistance. (Ramchandran 2000, 78-83)
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democratisation measures (K.C. Lee 1995; Economist 1997; Jacob 1999a). All these strained 
the ASEAN Way as interests were divided and segmented on the sidelines of the forum, and 
the non-ASEAN states tended to introduce wider Asian and global security issues onto the 
agenda, complicating consensus (Jeshurun 2000). Nevertheless Singapore was regularly 
responsible for mediating the differences by reiterating to all that building dialogue and 
‘comfort levels’ were more important than lightning progress. Indeed she can claim a partial 
success for having comfortably engaged the critical Asia-Pacific heavyweights of China, 
Japan and the US in embryonic confidence-building.
ASEM, which was also a Singapore-mooted idea, proved to be another trial between 
two different diplomatic cultures: the EU representatives’ wish to discuss human rights 
conditions over initially East Timor, and subsequently Myanmar, became a recurrent 
controversy with ASEAN states, while the ASEAN Way would not admit such distinctions 
on grounds of domestic interference. The sheer number of the EU and Asian states, as well as 
their varying levels of development also made it difficult to coordinate joint projects on a 
consensual basis (Shmiegelow 1998; Machetzki 1998; Dijiwandono 1998; Maull 1998; 
Westerlund 1999). In the third arena considered here, APEC, which Singapore championed 
at its genesis in 1989, replicated the faultlines within ASEAN, and between ASEAN 
members, China, Japan, Canada and the US, on the desirability of maximum trade
CO
liberalisation. During the financial crisis of 1997-99, the US opposed a Japanese proposal 
for an Asian Monetary Fund which enjoyed widespread Asian support within APEC, but 
excluded its Chilean and Mexican members. The US insisted upon the primacy of the IMF
57 A clear sample of this ‘ASEAN Way-centrism’ is the emphasis on consensus and evolution in The ASEAN 
Regional Forum-A Concept Paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994). See also Mahbubani (1998d, 135-136).
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bailout facilities vis-a-vis APEC’s cooperative financial surveillance (Cheng 1998, 27-29). 
Conversely, APEC might still be said to have followed the ASEAN Way of saving national 
face by allowing members to implement grand visions according to their national timetables 
(Ueno 2000). However, at the November 1998 APEC Summit, the US representative, Vice- 
President Albert Gore, uncharacteristically confronted Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir to 
register his country’s displeasure over the arrest of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim, in a speech which appealed to the ‘brave people’ of Malaysia to delegitimise the 
link between authoritarian regimes and economic growth (M. Richardson 1998). 
Understandably, such behaviour was seen as violating the aspiration of making the ASEAN 
Way of diplomacy the hallmark of APEC.
5.5.2 Singapore’s Foreign Aid
For obvious reasons of geographical size, and despite building up one of Asia’s 
largest financial reserves over 30 years, Singapore’s foreign aid policy did not substantially 
manifest itself as block grants, physical gifts, loans or conditional assistance. Its foreign aid 
principle is that of a grateful globalist reciprocity in the transfer of development ideas. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs rationalised this posture historically:59 since the 1960s, the 
country had benefited enormously from ‘soft’ aid such as Colombo Plan training grants, 
scholarships, and the advice of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
consultants, notably Dr Albert Winsemius, as well as numerous formal and informal 
socialisation through nationally-sponsored undergraduate and postgraduate students overseas. 
Although the latter were exposed, like Lee Kuan Yew himself, to mainly Anglo-Saxon and
58 Intra-APEC fissures 1989-98 are surveyed by Findlay (1994, 137-139) and Cheng (1998, 21-32). These 
trends remain unchanged.
59 See the official website http://www.gov.sg/mfa/policv-singcoopl.html.
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then-Malayan universities, the political and corporate learning attitudes were self-consciously 
emphasised in the direction of selective copying. The filters for idea experimentation and 
application in Singapore were the earlier-mentioned situational, material and ideological 
factors determining foreign policy boundaries. It is in this sense that the SMD was branded 
diplomatically as ‘Singaporean’, and at the same time domiciled within geographic and 
cultural ‘Asianness’.
Ironically, the Asian Values Debate allows the dichotomisation of the SMD into a 
holistic informal version, and a segmented formal version run in partnership with more than 
20 states and international organisations. The former is the large-scale emulation of the 
SMD’s operating principles and specifics without comprehensive interstate agreements 
involved, and hence is largely coterminous with the case for Asian Values set forth in Section 
5.3. In Lee Kuan Yew’s consultative parlance, this holistic Asian formula is abstracted as: ‘ 
The more dissension, the more contention and the less consensus, the less you get on with the 
job.’ Part of East Asia’s success lies in this ‘high tolerance’ for subordinating the self to the 
needs of the nation and society, and this according to Lee, is exportable and being applied by 
China (Branegan 1991).
The segmented formal version is however more restrained in its claims. Formalised in 
1992, as the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP), it ‘offers training in areas where 
Singapore possesses expertise such as airport management, port management, banking and 
public administration’ and other modular aspects of technical development. The emphasis is 
on the ‘sharing’ and adaptation of aspects of development across time and space contexts.
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The Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Technical Cooperation Directorate
explained the implementation of the SCP in terms of Singapore
... sharing its governance standards or ‘best practices’. We have to be sensitive to 
cross-national differences and variations. We believe that ‘our’ practices have worked 
for us and which we hope will work for others according to their local circumstances. 
At all times, it is important for us to highlight the smallness and uniqueness of the 
Singapore context, geographical, political and social and so on....The basic 
philosophy remains that Singapore’s past development path is broadly similar to the 
experience of others in the present. Therefore through technical assistance, the 
learning course can be shortened. (Chng 2000, interview, 5 May)
As of May 2000, Singapore has signed 22 bilateral and third-country training programmes
(TCTPs) under the SCP, either to directly share development experiences, or to share
experience transfers in partnership with ‘advanced’ countries such as Britain, Germany,
Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and Norway. In the late 1990s, TCTPs had broadened
to include the Asian Development Bank, UNDP, IMF and the World Bank, in addition to the
ongoing courses for the Commonwealth Secretariat.60 Considering the diversity and
technicality of the SCP partnerships and idea transfers, the Director claimed that the Asian
Values debate, that is, at the level of philosophical and value differences (Figure 3) had little
impact on the other levels of normative governance and actual policy implications. ‘The aim
[of the SCP] is to help others to see and to realise their own potential.’ (Chng 2000,
interview, 5 May)
The next two subsections will scrutinise the holistic informal aid and segmented 
formal aid in terms of idea transfer and policy implementation in reference to some Asian 
states and general others. The latter surveys depend heavily on feedback salience of news 
reports as the programme administrators who were interviewed by the author have not
60 A sample is the publication of the Commonwealth Secretariat, Current Good Practices and New 
Developments in Public Service Management: A Profile o f the Public Service of Singapore (1998).
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actively followed up upon the results of experiential learning outcomes in the trainees’ 
countries (Tan 2002b, email, 25 Mar.). This is partly because this consciously epistemic aid 
policy is still in its infancy. Available data for courses handled by one of the SCP’s main 
local training agencies, the Civil Service Consulting Group, indicate a steady increase in 
demand for idea transfer from Singapore in 1997-2000:
Table 2: Demand for the Singapore Cooperation Programme 
By Numbers of Courses Conducted by the Civil Service Consulting Group, 
Singapore, for Foreign Officials61
YEAR NO. OF PROGRAMMES
1997 9
1998 9
1999 5
2000 15
5.5.2.1 Holistic Informal Aid
The application of holistic informal aid has been most visible in the cases of China 
and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, attempts with Indonesia, Philippines, Kazakhstan, and 
Britain. In the cases of China and Vietnam, the SMD’s appeal was visibly articulated only 
when reformist leaderships sensed ideological bankruptcy in pre-existing national Marxisms. 
For China, the death of orthodox Marxist economics occurred five years before Soviet 
perestroika and glasnost, and 10 years before the USSR’s collapse. In 1981, the Chinese 
government mouthpiece Peoples ’ Daily announced that among the NICs, the conditions for 
Singapore’s foreign trade policies, technology use and business management were similar to 
those existing in coastal Special Economic Zones (SEZs) being set up, and deserved learning
271
from. However, the commentary drew distinctions with Singapore’s ‘social system’ and 
circumstances (ST 1981). Meanwhile bilateral trade was taking off, the Soviet experiment 
had come to grief, and the tussle between reformers and conservatives within the Chinese 
Communist Party came to a head over the Tiananmen Incident. This gave impetus to 
‘paramount leader’ Deng Xiaoping’s symbolic tour of the Southern (SEZ-located) provinces 
in 1992, where he personally issued a call to leam from Singapore how to maintain social 
order and discipline (Deng 1994, 366).62 Since that announcement, senior officials ranging 
from Ministers of Propaganda Departments, Mayors and Chairmen of provincial parliaments 
have made regular study visits to the Republic to examine its legal system, anti-corruption 
policing, social security, public housing and industrial estates. A Hong Kong-based China 
watcher observed that the Chinese knew that capital, technology and other heavy and light 
industrial investments could be had from the West, Japan and other NICs, but the SMD 
exemplified a model for combining factors for development (Asiaweek 1993). Senior 
Minister Lee, Prime Minister Goh and others had consistently cautioned that while the SMD 
was a model for emulation, its transferability was qualified by differences in territorial scales, 
development stages and mentalities in courting private investors (Chuang 1993; Yong 1993).
One mutually preferred vehicle for transferring the SMD is the ‘industrial park’: it is 
a territorial site combining housing, storage, power, communications and transport 
infrastructure, the coordination of which created an ideal production and business 
environment for all sizes of investments (Kwang 1993). One of several Sino-Singaporean 
industrial parks, at Suzhou in Jiangsu province, was to serve as ‘flagship’ of
61 Provided by the Civil Service Consulting Group in Singapore during the author’s visit on 4 May 2000, and re­
verified by Tan (2002a, email, 22 Mar.).
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intergovernmental development transfer and collaboration. It began life in 1994 with much 
promise as a carbon copy of Singapore’s first nationally successful Jurong Industrial Estate, 
with heavy capital outlays from government-linked and other private investors. However, by
1997 it was widely acknowledged to be making a loss and suffering from conflicts over 
corporate and legal culture with its local Chinese municipal partners. It had turned out that 
municipal leadership changes in Suzhou had revived centre-periphery grievances with 
Beijing, and led to local officials setting up a rival industrial park in the vicinity, and 
directing interested investors away from the original (L.H. Chua 1997). Even after Lee Kuan 
Yew elicited a public reiteration of priority for the original Suzhou project from an 
embarrassed President Jiang, political rectification suffered from bureaucratic politics on the 
Chinese side. By July 1999, an exasperated Singaporean government renegotiated its 
commitment to 35%, down from the initial 65%, and arranged for a handover to Chinese 
majority control in early 2001 (M. Richardson 1999c). Singapore’s other private sector and 
minimal government-partnered industrial parks have, however, mitigated the Suzhou fiasco. 
The Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park was in 1997 one of China’s better performers in terms 
of earnings per square kilometre (L.H. Chua 1997), while the Port of Singapore Authority- 
managed Dalian port contributed heftily to the government-linked company’s profits and 
global branding.63 Meanwhile, Sino-Singaporean ardour for industrial park collaboration has 
not cooled as China’s interior provinces have begun to request for Suzhou models, and in
1998 total Singaporean investments abroad in China overtook those in Southeast Asia, the 
US and Europe (L.H. Chua 2000; Aggarwal 2000).
62 Ironically in 1997, ex-US diplomat Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1997) called similarly for China to follow the model 
of ‘another Singapore, or even Taiwan’ in political economy and gradual democratisation.
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Vietnam too looked to the SMD as a source of regeneration following the UN- 
mediated Cambodian Peace Treaty in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc as an 
economic prop. Much like Beijing, Hanoi wished to preserve one-party government through 
economic reform. During Lee Kuan Yew’s 1992 visit to Vietnam, Vietnamese Prime 
Minister Vo Van Kiet announced an interest in learning from the SMD, and in particular, 
Lee’s personal experience in forging development, and if possible to engage him as advisor 
(AFP 1992). In October 1993, Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Do Muoi 
visited Singapore and remarked that most political and developmental perceptions of both 
countries were ‘similar or close to each other’; he also visited industrial estates, public 
housing, port and airport authorities on this occasion (Xinhua 1993). At the end of this visit, 
the Vietnamese delegation announced that Singapore had promised assistance on the scale of 
a ‘Vietnam master plan’ which would provide manpower training in finance, urban planning 
and infrastructure management, as well as assist in establishing export processing zones and 
construction of transport and communications networks. As in China, the groundwork for 
soft aid was being laid. A year later Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet called for the creation of a 
Vietnam-Singapore industrial park (VSIP) to facilitate expertise transfers. That same year, 
Hanoi’s official publishing house translated a 40-year selection of Lee’s speeches on 
democracy, development and human rights on the grounds that his thoughts deserved an 
audience in Vietnam (ST 1994d).
In May 1996, the VSIP was inaugurated at Song Be province near Ho Chi Minh City 
on the basis of public-private partnership and intergovernmental agreement. In his speech for 
the occasion, Prime Minister Goh reminded his Vietnamese partners that aside from political
63 See UNCTAD (1998, 76). The Dalian Port collaboration project enjoyed double-digit cargo growth between
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stability and a good workforce, high standards in park development and maintenance, along 
with transparent and consistent regulations, were vital for success (S. Tan 1996). In August 
1997, a Vietnam-Singapore Technical Training Centre was also launched to upgrade 
Vietnam’s workforce and to offer similar training for other Indochinese countries. Thus far, 
both governments have expressed a general satisfaction with the VSIP and other projects.64 
However, in 1999 Lee Kuan Yew remarked in an interview that Vietnam’s economic miracle 
would have to await a generational change in leadership. He said that the present leaders 
were still operating with a guerrilla mentality in a networked global economy (D. Lamb 
1999). By May 2000, it was reported that although Singapore was Vietnam’s number one 
foreign investor, the power struggle between reformers and conservatives in the mling 
Communist Party was impeding further pro-business measures such as clarifying contract 
law, reducing red tape and taxation (ST 2000b).
China and Vietnam have been the most visible candidates and qualified successes for 
holistic model transfer although some significant clashes of culture still occur over managing 
business. The SMD also attracted interest in the Philippines and Kazakhstan in 1991-92, but 
little resulted politically following Lee Kuan Yew’s lectures on communitarian discipline 
before democracy (Lu 1992; R. Chua 1993). Indonesia, after the removal of Suharto’s 
corrupted Asian Value governance, initially appeared ready to imbibe elements of the SMD 
following the continued profitability of the Singapore-Indonesia industrial park in Batam (T. 
Tan 1999),65 and President Abdurrahman Wahid’s request for Lee Kuan Yew’s participation
1996 and 2000 (Kwang 2000).
64 The Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs concurs with the Vietnamese government’s view that the 
Technical Training College was paying off in skill training. (Chng 2000, interview, 5 May) The Song Be 
industrial park was doing much better financially than Suzhou (T. Tan 1999).
65 This profitable industrial park operating since 1990 was relatively unaffected by the 1997-99 turmoil in 
Indonesia, partly because of its economic, managerial and geographic proximity to Singapore.
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in his eminent persons advisory panel on reforms in 1999. However, pending resolution of 
Indonesia’s post-financial crisis civil disturbances, the prospects of implementing aspects of 
the SMD currently look dim for Jakarta.
In a western context, the British New Labour government’s attempt informally and
selectively to duplicate the SMD in ‘modernising’ Britain has run into perceived
incompatibility with Asian Values. In 1996, then-British-Prime-Minister-in-waiting Tony
Blair visited Singapore for ideas on reforming Britain’s social welfare and trade unions to
meet the challenge of economic globalization. While acknowledging Singapore’s corporatist
labour relations and the social investor role of the National Trades Union Congress as an
inspiration for New Labour’s all-inclusive ‘stakeholder economy’, he drew a line at imbibing
Asian communitarianism, preferring the term ‘unified society’ instead as a universal basis of
progress (Wong 1996; ST 1996a). Most academic and media opinions supportive of the
stakeholder concept’s borrowing from the SMD identified it with how ‘Singapore’s policies
for state-administered pensions that are owned as personal property [can] demonstrate that
government can have a decisive role.’ (Gray 1997) In Blair’s first administration (1997-
2001) welfare reforms contemplated retaining basic state pensions but that
...people earning more than 100 Pounds a week would also have to contribute to a 
second pension. A new ‘mutual fund’, not unlike Singapore’s CPF (Central Provident 
Fund) would manage the investment of the second pension.
The then deputy social security minister Frank Field was impressed with the possibility of a
combination of the SMD with New Zealand and Australian programmes (Behrmann 1997).
There was also a suggestion that New Labour should consider copying Singapore’s
restrictive car ownership quota, known as the Certificate of Entitlement, as a solution to
traffic gridlock and urban pollution. The underlying idea was stakeholding: make motorists
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pay for their eligibility to drive, discourage retention of energy-inefficient old cars, and 
increase public funds for environmental projects (Green 1997). Whether Prime Minister 
Blair’s first term of office has produced visible adaptations of the SMD’s aspects in Britain 
remains in doubt even as New Labour won an electoral landslide for a second term on the 
promise of completing unfinished reforms. It is also doubtful if the SMD remains an 
inspiration at all for New Labour considering the fact that many opinions have criticised the 
Blair-Giddens Third Way as a disguised attempt to holistically transfer Lee Kuan Yew’s 
‘nanny state’ into British public policies. Ralf Dahrendorf, a predecessor of Giddens as 
Director of the London School of Economics, has slammed Blair’s admiration for the SMD 
as an ‘authoritarian temptation...in a free society.’(1999) By mid-2000, one observer 
concluded that Blair had dropped stakeholding and references to the SMD from his public 
vocabulary (Richards 2000). In this sense of applying the SMD to a western society, the 
SMD’s transmission to the recipient appears obfuscated by the ‘noise’ in the channel 
components of soft power.
5.5.2.2 Segmented Formal Aid
Officially Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not distinguish between 
holistic and segmented aid. The catch-all offer to all interested states to take home relevant 
aspects of the SMD under the SCP appears to temper the harsher fundamentals of Asian 
Values. Virtually all of the courses and seminars offered either bilaterally by Singapore, or in 
partnership with third countries and organisations, are basic or technical: civil aviation 
management, port management, environmental management, public administration, 
telecommunications, community policing, productivity, IT, banking and finance, and the 
English language. The Memorandum of Understanding signed with the World Bank in
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October 1999 to support the Bank’s development mandate in the region, especially in the
wake of the 1997-99 financial crisis, aims to draw merely on Singapore’s knowledge base in
corporate and financial sector governance, civil service and public management (S.H. Lee
1999). This poses the issue of efficacy in idea transfer by a motley ‘Singapore-IMF-World
Bank-UNDP-Developed country’ epistemic community:66 a heavy onus is placed upon the
learner’s ability to discriminate over applicability to his own developmental environment. In
an interview with this author, Paula Donovan, the Head of the World Bank Liaison Office in
Singapore identified ‘Open Economic Policies’, ‘Governance’ and ‘Social Protection’ as the
SMD’s points of excellence (Donovan 2001, email, 16 Jan.). In so far as the Asian Value trait
of the SMD is acknowledged, Donovan elaborated on ‘Social Protection’ as follows:
[W]e know that globalization entails ‘winners and losers’. Singapore has amassed 
considerable national savings, such that necessary enlightened adjustments could be 
made if volatility due to globalization inflicts unacceptable costs on some groups of 
its citizens. National cohesion and leadership is such that public as well as citizen 
sacrifices would be expected in the event of a serious national setback (and one 
already sees small examples of this e.g. topping up of the Central Provident Funds 
[CPF] of the poorest; cutting the CPF contributions by employers during the crisis 
etc.) (Donovan 2001, email, 16 Jan.)67
But this World Bank discourse also urges
that countries must have [the] wisdom to make sensible adaptations from available 
global experience. We see many countries interested in Singapore’s experience -  
especially in those areas which are relatively invariate to country size e.g.: judicial 
reform, public sector management, knowledge economy/continuous learning, fighting 
corruption, financial sector deregulation. Looking ahead, we would expect some of 
the emerging ‘public private partnerships’ -  their transparency and regulatory 
framework [-] to be other areas in which Singapore’s experience will be one of the 
many that other countries will want to look at. (Donovan 2001, email, 16 Jan.)
With qualifications, one might claim this epistemic SMD discourse via the World Bank
represents disembodied Asian Values grafted onto aspects of modernization.
66 The evidence of this is the way Singapore is positively presented as a model in official World Bank and IMF 
publications: the World Bank (1993); and Bercuson (1995).
278
This author managed to sit in on a one-day study visit conducted bilaterally for three 
directors of the Indonesian civil service in May 2000 (Civil Service Consulting Group: 
Programme for the Study Visit from Indonesia 2000). The following gaps in the visitors’ 
understanding of streamlining public administration were observable. Following an 
explanation about Singapore’s shift to the training philosophy of ‘individual learning 
roadmaps’ tailored to marry organisational and individual interests as the more efficient 
contrast to quota-derived training targets, one visitor commented that he would have 
difficulty reconciling the politics of horizontal geographical diversity, vertical seniority and 
positional-differences up and down his organisation. Additionally, while Singapore’s ‘Public 
Service 21’ vision thrived on anticipating continuous changes in public service delivery 
standards, the Indonesians were consistently wondering aloud how employees could be 
persuaded to accept change with negative consequences for their well-being. Frequently, the 
presenter suggested implementing consultative processes in reply. The ‘normative 
prescription’ of supportive social values as an underpinning of bureaucratic values is 
probably a missing dimension -  a.k.a. the Asian Values of communitarianism, self-discipline, 
rule-obedience, and the like.
On the other hand, English language training, productivity, telecommunications and 
IT may not require the bolstering of Asian Values as the success of Botswana in duplicating 
Singapore’s productivity movement showed. Being aware of Botswana’s vulnerability as a 
landlocked, export dependent country dwarfed by the larger neighbouring South African 
economy, and possessing only half of Singapore’s population, the political and economic
67 This should be read in conjunction with the World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle (1993) as well as with Lee
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elites of that country viewed the improvement of productivity in existing industries as the 
only guarantee for its long-term survival (Xinhua 1990). Not surprisingly, with the UNDP’s 
encouragement, the Botswanan government looked to Singapore to transfer the ‘software’ of 
human resource enhancement (Xinhua 1992a). The Botswana National Productivity Centre 
was the first of its kind launched in 1995. Its director in 1997, Lepetu Setshwaelo, who had 
been stationed, courtesy of the SCP, in Singapore for three weeks in 1994-95, claimed that it 
made a difference to his country as it gave him ideas. The staff at Singapore’s National 
Productivity Centre kept up a helpful liaison by email. In Botswana, the productivity concept, 
like its Singapore version, mushroomed into Work Improvement Teams in the public and 
private sectors. According to Setshwaelo, his centre trained 300 to 400 people annually and 
planned to expand to service requests from Lesotho and South Africa. Botswanan President 
Masire has lauded the transplantation of the productivity movement as a critical component 
of his country’s standing in economic competition (Menon 1995; M.H. Chua 1997), which 
according to many reports is a ‘miracle’ in Southern Africa.
If Botswana is a strong advertisement for the SCP, it remains to be seen if the Pacific 
Ocean state of Palau can make good on its admiration for Singapore’s ‘small island success’ 
techniques in the long term (ST 1997).68 If demand and supply is anything to go by, selective 
technique learning via the SCP remains potent evolutionary soft power for Singapore. The 
number of courses conducted for foreign officials in Singapore by the Civil Service 
Consulting Group have expanded 67% between 1997 and 2000,69 while course participants
Kuan Yew’s comments on South Korea in Section 5.4.3.
68 In its endorsement of Singapore as a model of small country public service management, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat drew attention in its report to the country’s ‘social discipline’ and a publicly-proclaimed 
communitarian ethos as a critical part of its material success. This is possibly Asian Values endorsed in clinical 
guise. (Commonwealth Secretariat 1998,2-3, 11-13)
69 Calculated from Table 2.
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are now drawn from all continents, and training partners sharing the SMD include the 
dominant neo-liberal global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. In forging 
partnerships with Singapore, these organisations have kept silent on Asian Values while 
openly embracing the segmented expertise of ‘best practices’ in public administration and 
central banking.
By way of an interim assessment of Singapore’s LOI strategies, five points can be 
observed. The first three derive from the country’s role as international norm-setter. Firstly, 
Singaporean soft power, in externalising its strong preference for ‘protective sovereignty’ as 
a regional behavioural norm, became accepted in the form of a treaty adhered to in spirit and 
letter. However, the country’s political entrepreneurial role was subsumed under the 
procedures of consensual decision-making, due ironically to the ASEAN Way, and hence 
cannot always be openly attributed. Secondly, once externalised as information in the 
channel, the TAC was consciously applied by Singapore as an ideational adhesive under the 
name of the ASEAN Way in forging an ASEAN common front against Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia. The ASEAN Way was used to justify political opposition to Hanoi, 
and unity within ASEAN. Thirdly, after the Cold War, the ASEAN Way’s adhesiveness 
frayed somewhat over the issues of admitting Myanmar and Cambodia, and over joint efforts 
to recover from the financial crisis. Attempts by Singapore to encourage ASEAN to stand 
together and steer the wider regional processes of the ARF, APEC and ASEM along the path 
of the ASEAN Way also produced bickering and mixed results as larger and more culturally 
differentiated diplomatic actors such as the US, China, Japan and the EU states were
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included. The ASEAN Way could not attract all after the Cold War, because the ‘noise’ of 
diverging interests and security perceptions obscured the channels for reception.
In examining Singapore’s foreign aid policies, the LOI also revealed mixed results. 
The fourth observation would regard the holistic informal transplantation of the SMD as only 
partially successful in coopting China and Vietnam into a common currency of governance. 
Size, cultural outlooks, and history complicated the SMD’s transfer in these two countries 
and elsewhere. Fifthly, the segmented formal aid represented by the SCP attempted to build 
and coopt an epistemic community without accentuating the Asian Value trait of the SMD. 
Whereas countries ranging from China, Botswana, Britain, Palau and Vietnam tried 
emulating SMD components, it could not be said that all unreservedly subscribed to 
Singapore-style Asian Values. Perhaps, as the neo-liberal collaborations with the World 
Bank and IMF show, the SMD is a chameleon discourse. Therein lies the paradox of LOI as 
soft power: one can package ‘a model’ freely and omnidirectionally, it is however up to the 
recipients to interpret the ‘power’ of transferred ideas through local filters.
5.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, Singaporean foreign policy and its participation in the Asian Values 
Debate in 1992-99 as a clash of discourses with policy implications for national governance 
and moral livelihood have served to support the twin hypotheses of Foreign Policy 
Leadership from Inside-Out (LIO), and from Outside-In (LOI). Singapore, in spite of 
limitations of physical assets, played a substantial role in wielding Asian Values as an 
informational instrument derived from the globally-acknowledged success of its model of 
development (the SMD) measured in terms of GDP, relative public safety and other material
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development indicators. In Figure 3, it has been pointed out that the Asian Values Debate had 
three levels. In the first (value difference) and second (normative governing difference) 
levels, the Singapore School has been philosophically stalemated by counter-ideological and 
academic arguments that Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions do not overwhelmingly 
favour pre-existing forms of neo-authoritarian to totalitarian forms of government (Tatsuo 
1999; Donelly 1999; Sen 1999).70 It is on the third level that the incontrovertible core of the 
Singapore School’s discursive strength lay: the SMD has delivered according to material 
indices of modernization, and hence this demonstrable ‘success’ lends post hoc justification 
to ‘Asian Values as a foundation of Good Governance’ as a discourse.71 In Foucaultian 
terms, the Singapore School is thus constmcted as a system of meaning for a purpose -  the 
soft power to engage and rival a hegemonic-aspiring and western-originated discourse of 
liberal democracy.
In LIO, where the Singapore School sought to use the Asian Values argument based 
almost exclusively on the SMD, it can be said to have achieved its objectives of defending 
China, exceptionalism in global political dialogue, and also the defence of its national 
particularism in the face of a legal and human rights row with the US. The LIO also required 
that Singaporean society maintain cohesion to underpin a rational unitary actor model of 
foreign policy implementation. This was achieved through the corporatist and communitarian 
aspects of the SMD, in spite of a wide range of external engagements, economic, geographic
70 The critics of Singaporean Asian Values are however not unanimous. Joseph Tamney argues that although 
Asian Values were drawn from tradition for legitimisation and cultivating progress ethics, the exposure to other 
civilisational influences through trade and communications will ensure Singapore will be neither ‘a typical 
Chinese country’ nor ‘a copy of the West.’ It will be a unique testing ground for modernisation in Asia. (1996, 
173-201)
71 Labelled by some as a ‘Singapore Puzzle’.(M. Haas 1999)
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and political. In this sense, LIO dealt more with the concrete achievements of level 3 of the 
Asian Values Debate, as opposed to the intellectual vagaries of levels 1 and 2.
For its part, when applied to Singapore, the LOI revealed a mixed result. Asian 
Values were propounded post-hoc as a norm-setter among Southeast Asian states. 
Singapore’s role as the ‘political entrepreneur’ in initiating and maintaining regime norms 
intact was subtle, even obscured within a communitarian context of regional processes. 
However, its role was clear in consequence when the ‘ASEAN Way’ as an ideational set of 
practices was manifested in the TAC and in the campaign against Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia, where the Republic led the ‘ASEAN voice’ in regional and international forums. 
By contrast, the ASEAN Way proved weak in attracting wider regional and culturally 
differentiated players in post-Cold War forums such as ARF, APEC and ASEM. Even within 
ASEAN, the ASEAN Way held strongly only if one regarded it as a defence of conservative 
regionalism amidst post-Cold War identity and financial crises. When the LOI was used to 
explain Singapore’s aid policies, Asian Values were seen to be partly decoupled from its 
good governance dimensions in the SCP, which segmented and promoted parts of the SMD 
selectively. This made a rainbow epistemic community of good governance possible, but it 
decomposed the exceptionalist rhetoric of Asian Values. Even in the rare cases where the 
SMD was copied with near totality (China and Vietnam), the results were uneven and could 
not be said to generate any solid epistemic community with the ‘Singapore School’. The LOI 
thus both showed up the incomplete efficacy of the SMD abroad, and hence its limitations as 
externalised information, interfered with by ‘noise’ in the channel and the reception of the 
idea.
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In sum, Foreign Policy Leadership from Inside-Out and Outside-In both depend 
heavily on the visible demonstration of reasonably established models around which strong 
self-evident discourses can be constructed to appeal to other foreign policy actors. The 
reception and endorsement of a national brand of ideas is another different matter. Responses 
by recipients to ideas in the global information space depend on how those original ideas are 
sluiced and filtered in the channels and reception components of information flow. In the 
perspective of the LIO, Singapore’s ripostes and arguments were based heavily upon the 
corporatist nature of the SMD which held up in transmission and reception globally despite 
the ‘noise’ of philosophical counter-arguments. An LOI application has shown up many 
significant qualifications: a national set of ideas, once externalised or transferred in 
operational political channels such as regimes and epistemic communities, is subject to much 
distortion from the multiple power applications of additional actors and their preferences.
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CHAPTER 6
INTERMESTIC POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY: CHILEAN 
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PINOCHET EXTRADITION 
CONTROVERSY 1998-2000
6.1 Introduction
This Chapter illustrates soft power through the permeable margins of the intermestic. 
As explained in Chapter 4, the intermestic condition entwines the international and domestic 
dimensions of politics, and is a manifestation of globalizing effects. The ‘intermesticity’ of 
any issue occurs when ICTs connect the emotions and implications of a physically remote 
event to audiences across time and space. As elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2, these 
connections are an infrastructure enabling assorted and dispersed parties, willing and able to 
involve themselves in information flow, to affect political outcomes around the original 
event, duplicate or even amend the original through representation. This intermesticity will 
be illustrated in this case study of Chilean foreign policy and the Pinochet Extradition 
Controversy 1998-2000.
This Chapter will proceed in a format similar to Chapter 5 and according to the three 
intermestic hypotheses set out in Chapter 4. The next two sections will justify Chile and its 
foreign affairs in relation to the Extradition Controversy as a case study of soft power in 
global information space, and will concurrently provide the historical and contemporary 
contexts for non-state activities in competition with Chilean foreign policy. The prime 
historical context is the 1973 military coup d’etat and the ensuing praetorian regime that 
endured till 1990, as well as its human rights legacy till 2000. Thereafter, a brief summary of 
the 503 days of the Extradition Controversy will be sketched using a four phase chronology 
to assist subsequent illustration of the hypotheses of the intermestic politics of foreign policy:
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Intermestic 
Correlation of 
Forces (ICF)
Intermestic
Socialisation
(IS)
Multipolar
Direct
Emulation
Through
Demonstration
(MDED)
The intermestic correlation o f forces joining state and non­
state parties can shape foreign policy change through direct 
mobilisation o f ideas, sanctioning standards through global 
regimes, non-state self-constitution o f expertise, and 
manufacturing subjective world public opinion.
Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-state actors hold 
states to account through regimes they sign on to.
Multipolar Direct Emulation through Demonstration occurs 
when states and non-state actors emulate ideas that have been 
proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining particular 
objectives.
Clearly, ICF concerns illustrating the direct means of wielding non-state soft power through 
networked sanctions; while IS and MDED concern the complementary, but more indirect 
means, by which non-state soft power takes effect through making comparisons and listings 
of state behaviour. The conclusion will consequently identify the extent to which the three 
hypotheses have been supported, and where it needs further explanatory capacity.
6.2 Chile, Global Information Space and Intermestic Penetration
The choice of Chile and the arrest of ex-dictator and Senator Augusto Pinochet in 
London is made, as was the case for Singapore and the Asian Values Debate, for three sets of 
reasons: the country’s long-term involvement in global information space, its consistent 
border porosity in relation to foreign policy decisions, and the consequential clash of ideas 
across borders. A short chronology of Chilean political history is provided below to aid the 
subsequent explanations of Chilean involvement with the global.
287
1540-1800
1808-1813
1818 (February) 
1800s-1900s
1929-30
1939-45
1964-70
1970-73
Table 3: Chronology of Chile’s Political Milestones
The Spanish conquistador Pedro de Valdivia founds a European 
colony in the Central Valley after marching southward from Peru. 
Immigration primarily from Spain, Ireland (mainly Catholics), 
France and Italy continued till the end of the 1700s. Settlement 
boundaries were temporarily checked by warfare between 
Spaniards and the Araucanian indigenous peoples in the South. 
The colonial economy was organised around the ranch: horses 
and mules bred for transport, cattle for food supplies to 
neighbouring Spanish colonies. Subsequently, crops were grown 
for export, along with limited mining of metals.
The conquest of Spain by Napoleon, as well as Napoleon’s 
installation of a puppet emperor in Madrid, created an opportunity 
for reevaluation by local elites of the metropolitan-colonial 
relationship. Liberal and nationalist ideas were publicised. After 
Spain recovered following Napoleon’s defeat, military 
confrontation with the fledgling nationalism ensued.
Following Spanish military defeats on several occasions, General 
Bernardo O’Higgins declares the Independence of Chile with the 
assistance of fellow Argentine rebel General Jose de San Martin.
An export economy based on agricultural and mining products for 
overseas markets is pursued, leading to periodic economic booms, 
but uneven wealth creation. Limited industrialisation helped 
produce a working class by the late 1800s. The War of the Pacific 
between Chile, Peru and Bolivia in 1879-1883 resulted in Chile 
gaining the nitrate and copper-rich Atacama desert. The system of 
government alternates between authoritarianism and liberal 
democracy. Civil wars break out frequently between political 
rivals. Two military coups occurred in 1924-5.
Great Depression hits Chile. Economic woes inspire experiments 
with socialism by governments between 1932 and 1941.
Second World War produces shifts in Chilean governing 
coalitions, mirroring the Allied-Axis contest abroad.
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, non-communist reform- 
minded Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva is elected to 
the Presidency.
Despite losing to Frei in 1964, Marxist Salvador Allende wins the 
elections in 1970, heading the first elected Marxist government in 
Latin America. Within three years, the economy is in crisis 
following nationalisation and resistance from business elites and 
the US.
1973 (11 September) With considerable support from business elites, Army
Commander in Chief General Augusto Pinochet implements a 
coup plan jointly coordinated with the Navy and Air Force chiefs.
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1973 (October)-1988 
(June)
The coup is justified as a mission of national salvation from 
communism. Military dictatorship lasts till 1990.
Various human rights NGOs and deputations from the UN and 
regional organisations investigate humanitarian conditions under 
Pinochet.
1974-8
1988-90
16 October 1998
2000 (2 March)
Pinochet’s intelligence agents execute opponents abroad in 
Operation Condor, including the assassination of ex-Allende 
minister Letelier in Washington D.C. Pinochet’s regime enacts an 
Amnesty Law for all abuses committed prior to 1978.
Pinochet loses plebiscite on his dictatorship and proceeds to allow 
presidential elections in 1989. Christian Democrat Patricio 
Aylwin of the Concertacion for Democracy is elected President, 
and assumed office on 11 March 1990. Pinochet continued as 
Army Commander in Chief till early 1998, when he is given a 
seat in the Senate under the terms of the 1980 Constitution drawn 
up by his regime.
While recovering from a back operation in a London clinic, 
Pinochet is detained for human rights abuses on a Spanish- 
originated warrant. (See section 6.4 for detailed chronology.) 
Ironically, the President at this time, the Christian Democrat 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, was the son of Allende’s presidential 
predecessor.
Senator Pinochet flies home hours after British Home Secretary 
Jack Straw announces his final decision against extradition.
Despite its relative geographical isolation, Chile is thoroughly enmeshed in each of 
the three components of global information space: the global media space, global economic 
space and global political space. Chilean involvement in the global media space began in 
earnest with the drawing of inspiration for Independence in the early 1800s from the ideals of 
both the American and French Revolutions. More will be said about this under the discussion 
of global political space. However, within the historical context of the development of media 
pluralism in Chile, the point made here is that the importation of ideas and models from 
abroad through local media showed consistency. The rise of printed newspapers in Chile, like 
its liberal bourgeois counterparts in Europe, originated from the intellectual and economic 
needs of the creole political and economic elites. The nature of the founding of Chile through
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Spanish empire, and the corresponding economic encouragement of migration from Spain, 
Ireland (Catholics primarily), France and Italy till the end of the 1700s, ensured that as these 
settlers composed themselves into a wealthy landowning elite, they would retain links of 
travel, education, politics and culture with Europe (Collier 1967; Collier and Sater 1996, 18- 
20, 29-35). Just as the printing revolution abetted the spread of anti-monarchic ideas in 
Enlightenment Europe and provoked reactionary controls, the first newspaper in Chile, 
entitled La Aurora de Chile, started life in 1812 as a mouthpiece of those sections of the local 
elite who had taken advantage of the Napoleonic occupation of Spain since 1808 to push for 
political autonomy (Buckman 1996, 156-157). The incitements to rebellion, derived 
philosophically from the ‘voice of reason and of truth’ and the inspiration of Socrates, Plato 
and ‘the most celebrated writers of England, of France, of Germany’,1 provoked the 
inevitable backlash when Spain’s King Ferdinand VII attempted a military reestablishment of 
colonial control following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe.
This pattern of media agents serving as indigenised proxies for imported ideologies 
and political realignments continued right up to the military coup of 1973 that compelled the 
mainstream media to dance exclusively to the tune of political and economic neo-liberalism. 
The proliferation of media ownership and opinions since Independence depended almost 
entirely on how the political elites fragmented themselves over the ideological direction of 
the country, and the emergence of counter-elites produced by social and economic change. 
Pre-coup studies showed it was not uncommon for political parties to own or purchase 
newspapers, radio stations, and subsequently television stations, to propagate their 
preferences, and to invoke selected national security and public decency legislation against 
media rivals (Burnett 1970, 23-41; Fagen 1974, 59-70). The initial split among the landed
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and industrial bourgeoisie’s worldviews into conservative news (e.g. El Diario Ilustrado and 
provincial dailies), moderate middle class reformism (e.g. the newspapers El Mercurio, La 
Segunda and Las Ultimas Noticias) and radical middle class reformism {La Tercera de la 
Hora, Flecha Roja, Boletin PDC, La Epoca, Radio Cooperativa, TV Channels 4 and 13), 
was supplemented by the socialist agenda {Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, and a couple of 
radio stations), the communist agenda {El Siglo, El Rebelde, Vanguardia Proletaria, Vistazo, 
Punto Final), and the mouthpiece of the govemment-of-the-day {La Nacion and TV Channel 
7).2 These are a sample of the more nationally and commercially prominent newspapers, 
radio and television channels which broadly represent, then and now, the three main political 
cultures of Chile of the Right (conservatism), Centre (middle class reformism) and the Left 
(socialism and communism). This is sustained regardless of the volatility in party name 
changes and the periodic closures of a few newspapers such as during the 1973-90 military 
regime. Most media tend to retain their traditional names.3 This diversity of opinion was 
accentuated by the penetration of the Cold War into Latin America. For example, the US 
military and the CIA respectively attempted to steer Chilean opinion by recommending an 
information management project to the University of Chile in 1965 for the purposes of 
mitigating civil war, and blatantly funded El Mercurio in 1971-72 to destabilise the elected 
Marxist government of President Salvador Allende (Davies 1999, 66-67, 84-85). A high 
point of global media space dynamics in Chile was reached in the 1970-73 period when the 
Allende government, given its distinction as the first freely-elected Marxist government in 
Latin America, if not the world, attracted the vitriol of the entire non-Left spectrum of media
1 From the maiden front page commentary in La Aurora, quoted in Buckman (1996, 158).
2 Culled from Burnett (1970, 23-41), Fagen (1974), and cross-checked with Heuvel and Dennis (1995, 117-127) 
and the Internet report Industry Analysis: the Media, News, Broadcasting and Publishing Industry in Chile. 
(2001)
3 Most media names demonstrate continuity in the 1990s, although most consensually accept or tolerate the 
dominance of economic neo-liberalism, much in the way the right wing and the governing coalition parties 
coexist. (Heuvel and Dennis 1995, 119-121, 126-127)
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in Chile. The latter were supported by western MNCs whose interests were being threatened 
by Allende’s nationalisation plans. Ironically, Allende’s government was determined to make 
a propaganda point to both Chileans and the world by adhering to the principle of ‘media 
freedom’. This was manifested through reluctance and brevity in clamping down on the 
opposition-run media, as part of the constitutional Chilean road to socialism (Fagen 1974, 
63). It is likely that this tolerance contributed to the opposition’s success in provoking a 
coup.
The subsequent autocratic military regime of General Augusto Pinochet was more 
pragmatic, but also cruder, in dealing with its media profile. The initial junta, and Pinochet in 
particular, perceived their mission in terms of war analogies. All hostile media were either 
destroyed or censored (Buckman 1996, 169-173). This compelled voices opposed to a 
dictatorship espousing neo-liberal economics to either go underground or enlist external 
channels for transmission. Between 1970 and 1986, the number of daily newspapers had 
declined marginally from over 40 to 37 (Wilkie, Aleman and Guadalupe 2000, 59, tab. 401), 
but the legal remnants were forced to toe a single editorial line (Buckman 1996, 169). 
Television ownership doubled from 53 to 145 per thousand inhabitants in 1970-85, but easily 
remained controlled in the absence of cable and satellite penetration. But it was radio, which 
more than doubled from 147 to 332 per thousand inhabitants between 1970 and 1985 
(Wilkie, Aleman and Guadalupe 2000, 66-67, tab. 408, 409), and along with the organising 
of oppositional information networks involving human rights NGOs, exile groups, the UN 
and international news agencies, that increasingly facilitated from outside the domestic 
contestation of the military regime. This author’s interviews, along with published 
journalistic accounts, confirmed the fact that radio, especially given its multiple frequencies
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on FM and AM, was much harder to suppress and easier to access both within Chile’s rugged 
terrain and worldwide. Radio became a popular means of receiving and broadcasting the 
alternative realities of material deprivation and human rights violations outside the urban 
centres, which were more tightly under military control (Valle and Hoya 2001, interview, 22 
May; Carter Jr. and Sepulveda 1964; Burnett 1970, 29-30). While pirate radios ( ‘radios 
piratas ’J within Chile connected Chileans with the harsher realities of Pinochet’s neo-liberal 
agenda, global radio broadcasts enabled Chilean exiles abroad to reach home audiences 
(Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 149). In 2001, Chile had 179 AM and 614 FM stations 
(Industry Analysis: the Media, News, Broadcasting and Publishing Industry in Chile 2001). 
Additionally, along with radio news, music was also a means of keeping the spirit of 
resistance alive. The music of Victor Jara, Inti-Illimani and others of the New Chilean Song 
movement bom of the 1960s, were then regarded as subversive by the military authorities 
(Jara 1983). However, such music retained a clandestine popularity, both at home and 
abroad, that survived the dictatorship.
The effects of the negative human rights attention the Pinochet regime was getting 
abroad as a result of networked reporting of abuses by NGOs, the UN and others had equally 
important effects. UN hearings on torture and disappearances generated adverse media 
comment, while the images of abuse caused Chile’s political alienation from much of the 
Non-aligned Movement and Europe. Even the US Congress and Administrations, especially 
Jimmy Carter’s and Ronald Reagan’s second term, criticised Pinochet, intensified contacts 
with the opposition, and occasionally threatened sanctions on arms sales (Constable and 
Valenzuela 1993, 289-291; Femandois 1991, 443-444). These diplomatic pressures, along 
with widespread external reporting of regime blunders such as the 1976 assassination of ex-
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Allende Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C., and the military’s flagrant petrol 
torching of two protestors in Santiago in 1987, intensified widespread revulsion against 
Pinochet’s Chile. Global media exposure hurt Pinochet further in 1987 when Pope John Paul 
II, on an official state visit, personally visited the only survivor of the torching (Buckman 
1996, 170-171). The 1976 assassination was captured in a journalist’s book and sparked an 
official inquiry in the US which triggered the removal of Pinochet’s security chief, General 
Manuel Contreras, and a successful, albeit limited, prosecution of a Chilean-American secret 
agent who surrendered himself in the late 1980s. The Pope’s gesture and the torching 
incident reinforced the negativity of exposure when the domestic Chilean press was observed 
to have been momentarily emboldened in adopting a more sceptical line towards the official 
version of events. In both cases, the causes and culpabilities were reported with significant 
variations between external media and official statements, which perhaps fuelled all-round 
media criticism (Buckman 1996, 170-171). The Pinochet regime faced additional, if belated, 
adverse publicity arising from the 1973 disappearance of an American student with left-wing 
sympathies when a Hollywood film based on the incident, titled Missing, was released in 
1982 starring Jack Lemmon (Ryle 1998; Weiner 1998).
All these incidents have since returned in the Pinochet Extradition Controversy as a 
mediatised ‘memorial sword of Damocles’ in affecting the atmosphere of fair play in 
transnational dispute settlement, and have rebounded in favour of the soft power of human 
rights NGOs. This diversion into how Chile has consistently been playing its domestic 
politics within global media space is necessary as it shows that even before the Internet era, 
the preservation of particular images and practices of ideologically polarised politics can 
challenge foreign policy. This is because paths have been long open for ‘outsiders’ to involve
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‘insiders’ and vice versa through information linkages. This is a significant magnification of 
Chile’s middle ranking as a communications-penetrated country, which in 1996 was 
numbered sixth (52 newspapers) out of 20 Latin American states for numbers of daily 
newspapers in circulation. It was ninth in the number of radio receivers (354) per thousand 
inhabitants. In terms of television ownership per thousand inhabitants, it was ranked seventh 
with 216.4 Available global comparisons also indicate Chile’s political media exposure is out 
of all proportion to its rankings. Chile is above the 1996 developing world average of 154 
and just under the world average of 238 for television receiver access. As for radio, it is 
above the 1996 developing world average of 244 receivers, and under the world average of 
417 (UNESCO 1999a, IV-8 - IV-9, tab. IV.S.3). For daily newspapers, it exceeds the world 
median of 4.5 In terms of Internet hosts per ten thousand persons, Chile ranked only 58 in 
1998 with 22.77 hosts (ITU 1999, A-25 -  A-26, tab. 8).
In terms of global economic space, the Chilean case demonstrates even more intense 
world linkages. It is possible to analyse the evolution of the Chilean political economy as a 
pendulum swinging between full and limited engagement with global capitalism. This can be 
seen in three phases: colonial foundations through Independence to the Great Depression of 
the 1930s; the Great Depression to the Allende government’s Popular Unity Marxist 
programme of 1970-73; and the Pinochet-era neo-liberalism to the present. The first period 
witnessed three modes of dependence: mercantilism, foreign expertise, and foreign loans. 
The mercantilist modus operandi of the Spanish Empire ensured that newly settled 
possessions such as Chile were organised with landowners and tenant farmers, mine-owners
4 Ranked by author from Wilkie, Aleman and Guadalupe (2000, 59, 66-67, tab. 401, 408, 409). Note that 1996 
is the latest year for which consistent comparative statistics were available.
5 The world median for daily newspapers was calculated by the author from Table IV.8 of UNESCO (1999a, 
IV-106 -  IV-133). Measures of this type were otherwise unavailable.
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and extraction labourers, producing agricultural and metal supplies exclusively for the 
welfare and enrichment of the metropole. All local development was secondary and 
incidental (Vitale 1969; Frank 1971, 44-79; Loveman 2001, ch. 2-3). This ensured that after 
the country gained its Independence by 1818, the local political and economic elites had little 
alternative but to rely on raw material exports for revenue generation, but with diversified 
markets. Independence also opened the doors to foreign expertise and capital where mineral 
deposits such as copper and nitrates were discovered in abundance. And where the local 
economic elites desired to transform themselves into an industrial bourgeoisie by producing 
consumer goods for home markets, or investing in copper and nitrate extraction, loans from 
the US, Britain and elsewhere in industrialised Europe were resorted to and liberally 
obtained. Export taxes were the prime revenue generator for the government. While nitrate 
exports propelled growth during the 1880s, and declined due to war and the rise of synthetic 
substitutes by 1920, copper remained stalwart, accounting for 28% of exports in 1928 and 
rising to 76% by 1970.6
This structural imbalance ensured that when the Great Depression struck in 1929-30, 
Chile was hurt significantly. Meanwhile, traditional exports of agriculture, nitrates, and most 
critically copper, continued, and so did reliance on foreign loans, increasingly from the US 
government and private sector. Recovery was slow and painful most of all for the working 
classes, where along with some intellectuals, soldiers and disaffected bourgeoisie, socialist 
and Marxist ideas took root (Silva 1996, 30-40). The brief attempts at socialist economics in 
1932 and 1938-41, when socialist military coup leaders and popular fronts comprising 
competing socialist and communist parties took power, all presaged the more serious
296
attempts to reform dependent capitalism under the non-communist Christian Democrats in 
1964-70. Reform was further intensified under the Marxist Popular Unity regime of Allende 
in 1970-73. By 1966, despite the dirigiste backlash, 57% of the assets of the largest 50 firms 
in Chile were held by foreign-owned corporations, the US firms Kennecott, Anaconda and 
ITT being some of the most prominent and politically controversial (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 
1976, 304-305). Even after Allende was elected in 1970, his anti-dependency programme 
proceeded with a mixed priority: nationalising outright strategic industries and allowing for 
mixed public-private ownerships (Oppenheim 1999, 40-41, 56-62).7 The severance of 
dependency by Allende ran into the difficulties of negotiating compensation with foreign 
corporations and the repayment terms of existing overseas loans. Some of these loans had 
come from the IMF, World Bank and the US EXIM Bank, all of which had influence on 
foreign investors through their official surveillance reports on the investment ratings of Chile 
(Farnsworth, Feinberg and Leenson 1976).8 While American interests were most aggrieved 
by Allende’s measures especially in copper, hence triggering the Nixon-Kissinger plan to 
foster a coup against Allende, both the real and imagined implications of Allende’s 
programme for a country long-sustained on world capitalism logically escalated the crisis of 
confidence with other aspects of economic linkages. This triggered reductions in both 
demand for and supply of Chilean products and raw materials by both domestic and external 
private interests (Farnsworth, Feinberg, and Leenson 1976, 361-365; Silva 1996, 41-57), 
exacerbating a domestic crisis that lent initial enthusiasm for a military coup.
6 Collier and Sater (1996, 77-89, 160-161, 202-205). Figures calculated from the “Commercio Exterior” 
sections of Boletin Mensual (1928a, 2; 1928b, 2) and “Cuadro I.A.4 Embarques de Exportacion” in Meller et al 
(1992,54).
7 This tone of tactical accommodation with some reformist sectors of capitalism is characteristic of Allende’s 
programme. Allende advisor Joan E. Garces has explained this attitude. (1972, 31)
8 In 1972, the Chilean Minister of Finance admitted that 78.4% of total short-term credit available to Chile came 
from US sources (Farnsworth, Feinberg and Leenson 1976, 349, fh 35).
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The military coup ushering in the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet on 11 September 
1973 swung the economic pendulum towards unfettered engagement with global economic 
space (Bosworth, Dombusch and Laban 1994; Velasco 1994). The regime suppressed labour 
activism, drastically lowered barriers to trade and capital, and welcomed the return of foreign 
investments. As a sign of a more complete immersion in dependent capitalism, it was more 
than symbolic that Kennecott, Anaconda and ITT had become in this episode the co­
conspirators of the ‘correction’ of Chilean politics. It was no less significant that the Pinochet 
government engaged Chilean graduates and sympathisers of the ‘Chicago School’ of 
economics personified by the ideas of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger to normalise 
the economy. Friedman himself legitimised the plan by visiting Chile in 1977 at the 
invitation of pro-Pinochet elites (Silva 1996, 101). The loans continued but in 1982-83, the 
next major world recession nearly replayed the damage of the 1930s. However, Pinochet’s 
team instituted drastic bank closures and consolidations for a limited period, and essentially 
preserved the necessary stability for capitalism. The confidence of global capital was 
relatively undamaged and Chile was among the first to rebound through export-oriented 
growth in the rest of the 1980s while much of Latin America was weighed down by the debt 
crisis, stemming from 1982.9 In the 1990s, heavy dependence on copper -  37-46% of exports 
-  was supplemented by exports of fruit and marine products (ECLAC 2000, 122-123, tab. 
92). The size of Chile’s participation in global economic space is seen in the rise of trade 
(imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP from 37% in 1974 to 65% by 1994, and 
stabilising between 43 to 46% for 1997-98 (IADB 1994-95, 79; ECLAC 2000, 193, tab. 132; 
Boletin Mensual 2000, 346). This material measure has to be supplemented by the Pinochet 
regime’s legacy of uncompromising economic neo-liberalism, safeguarded by the military’s
9 The comparative recovery of the Chilean economy can be seen from the measures of Latin American GDP 
between 1980 and the 1990s in Table 132 of ECLAC (2000, 192-193).
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pacific withdrawal in 1990 from direct politics in favour of a guided democratic process 
(Meller and Romaguera 1992, 49-50). In the light of this imposed neo-liberalism, it is notable 
that the presidential candidates of the Left and Right in the 1999-2000 elections only 
distinguished themselves by respectively citing British New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ and US 
Republican Newt Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America’ (Gallardo 2000; A. Elliott 2000).
From the perspective of 2000, this guided democracy was substantially a pact signed 
between hitherto domestic civil war combatants with global neo-liberal economic space 
considerations in mind. This is a direct manifestation of how the economic and political 
components of global information space intertwine. Historically, Chilean politics is 
interrelated with the external in terms of demands for external legitimisation, ideas and 
economic sustenance, and also demands by the external upon national politics for economic 
probity and competence, as well as strategic conformity to world political order. As has been 
argued in Chapters 2 and 3, order in global political space depends on how conflicting 
normative designs are discursively resolved by compromise or upheaval in the domestic 
realm.
Chile’s involvement in global political space is patterned according to a two-part elite 
perspective on foreign policy. It is a direct legacy of Spanish imperialism that a landowning 
upper class was fostered to dominate the majority who worked the land; and the system of 
extraction of agricultural, and subsequently mineral, products ensured that profits accrued to 
the upper class whilst the manual workers had their wages kept low and depoliticised as far 
as possible. In this hierarchy, it was the upper class comprised largely of mixed European 
descent, and wedded to the land and its people for their prosperity, who would have any
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grievance against colonial authority, or who would conceive of alternatives for governance 
without upsetting pre-existing hierarchical and horizontal linkages of wealth and power (Gil 
1966, 35-36; Loveman 2001, 100-103). This is the first part of elite logic. Given the 
destruction of Spanish prestige and control by the Napoleonic Wars, and the simultaneous 
appeal of the ideals of equality, liberty and nationalism evoked by the French and American 
Revolutions to those well-exposed members of the nascent Chilean elite, the stage was 
prepared to legitimise independence at home with ideas from abroad. Unsurprisingly, 
Chilean constitutions since 1822 have invoked expedient combinations of western 
communitarian10 and liberal11 ideals combined with elements of nationalism and 
modernization (Collier 1967, ch. 4). These seldom applied in practice to the majority below 
the elite unless sections of the former deliberately empowered themselves through new 
wealth, ballot or force. The second part of elite logic, conjoined to the first, was a pattern of 
calling for external intervention in intra-elite political disputes. These disputes frequently 
progressed towards irreconcilable positions, leading one side to force exile upon the other. 
Prior to the arrival of socialism and Christian democracy in Chile in the twentieth century, 
the issues which polarised the Conservative, Liberal and Radical Parties were nearly those 
which mirrored the bourgeois revolutions in nineteenth century Europe: secularism versus 
the socio-political role of the Church, legislative supremacy versus executive supremacy, and 
prioritising national unity over individual freedom. Nonetheless, there was consensus on 
capitalism. In civil wars in 1836, 1851, 1858, and 1891, the combatants’ foreign policies 
involved Peru, Britain, Argentina, Germany and the US in varying capacities of hosting 
exiles, ferrying troops, training troops, supplying arms, or blockading and dispersing rival 
leaders. These multinational accomplices were simultaneously traders and investors in
10 Especially Rousseau.
11 Especially the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.
300
agriculture and mining throughout the country (Zeitlin 1984, 56-133; Collier and Sater 1996, 
65, 108, 112-113, 155-156).
With limited industrialisation coinciding with the discovery of copper and nitrates, 
along with continued expansion of agricultural export production in the 1850s, a sizeable 
working class emerged over the next 50 years as a base for socialist and communist 
propaganda. This new left-wing elite, like its pre-existing capitalist rivals, sought to 
consolidate at home by interacting abroad as part of a proto-global, anti-capitalist and anti­
imperialist front (Munoz 1984, 12-17). This reached its first governing manifestation in a 
brief 100-day coup-installed socialist republic in the wake of the 1929-30 Depression. A 
second manifestation came in 1938-41, when in direct response to the Communist 
International, Chilean communists joined forces with socialists and the moderate landowner 
and middle-class-dominated Radical Party to form an elected Popular Front government. 
However, the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 weakened the communists’ enthusiasm for the Front, 
and it was not until the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941 that the communists changed their 
tune and got included in the next government (1942-46). This administration again took in an 
unstable Left-Right combination, thus reflecting the uneasy Anglo-American-French-Soviet 
anti-Axis coalition in World War Two (Gil 1966, 70-71). By this time, the US had begun 
marshalling Latin America as a bulwark against world fascism, and subsequently against 
anything left wing (Gil 1975, 169-170, 175-204).
Unsurprisingly, the respective alignments in the 1964-70 Christian Democratic and 
1970-73 Marxist governments faithfully reproduced Cold War divisions. The 1964-70 
Christian Democratic government had been heavily supported by both Chilean conservatives
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and the US as a non-communist, modernising and land-reforming alternative to the socialists 
and communists. The 1970 presidential elections however gave the socialists and 
communists a small numerical margin in a largely two-way ideological competition with 
three candidates, with the ‘losing’ two being Christian Democrat and Conservative. Given 
the intensity of international and domestic polarisation at the time, and the new Marxist 
President’s popular programme of aggressive nationalisation of local and foreign private 
corporations, not least of which involving the copper industry, the US and much of the West 
were naturally allied to every non-Leftist political party. President Allende’s Marxist 
inclinations led him to react by inviting Cuban, Soviet and Chinese assistance, and friendship 
of the Non-aligned (Munoz 1984, 40-47). Subsequent events in 1973 followed the pattern of 
many earlier Chilean political confrontations: the polarisation of social conditions, the 
incitement and assistance from outsiders, and the absolute pursuit of one agenda by force if 
necessary.
The Pinochet military dictatorship, although favoured by much of the anti-communist 
world order, could not escape external scrutiny and intervention through the media and 
economic spaces. The ability of non-state groups and individuals to publicise human rights 
abuses in world media circuits inhibited the regime’s foreign policy legitimacy with long- 
running confrontations with the UN, the US and European states (Spooner 1999, 93-99, 135- 
138). The unfettered return to Chicago School capitalism brought a debt crisis in the wake of 
the 1982-83 recession that roused an intense degree of domestic protests against military 
authoritarianism, and speeded up a democratic transition. With the winding down of the Cold 
War beginning in 1988, and the retreat of hardline authoritarianism elsewhere in Latin 
America and Asia, even the vacillations of US foreign policy tended to favour Pinochet’s
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exit. This Chapter begins with Pinochet’s engineered democratic transition with its 
authoritarian features of prioritising military courts over civilian ones, a partially appointed 
Senate, and the disproportionate military veto in the National Security Council. By the end of 
the century, global information space, with its structural features of external media, economic 
and political penetration within Chilean politics, invited intermestic coalitions of interests to 
induce Chilean foreign policy into reactionary postures over Pinochet’s legacy.
The explanation for Chilean border porosity as a second criterion for this case study is 
easier to make after outlining how the country is involved within global information space. 
The patterns of embracing foreign ideas and courting legitimisation sources abroad continue 
into the post-Cold War and post-dictatorship era. In much of the foreign policy analyses 
produced in the 1990s by serving foreign ministers, bureaucrats in the foreign ministry, or 
workers in research institutes, the history of foreign relations under Pinochet had been 
consistently written off as a ‘long isolation’ tied to the ‘praetorian ideology’ of dictatorship 
despite Pinochet’s international economic neo-liberalism (Femandois 1991, 441-447; Munoz 
1983, 229-249). In contrast, the foreign policy of democratic transition is characterised as 
‘foreign policy for democracy’, ‘international reinsertion’ into the community of nations, and 
engaging in multilateral cooperation on security confidence building, good governance, 
environmental protection, trade and combating drugs (Munoz 1989; Matus 1993; Munoz 
1996, 66-68, 73-78; Rojas 1997). The search for new approval meant not only the extension 
of capitalist integration into the Andean Pact and MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common 
Market), but also the endorsement of international human rights and democratic norms. In 
1993, Mario Matus, the Secretary of External Services of the Subsecretariat of the Chilean 
Ministry of External Relations wrote that
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as a result of the process of reinsertion of our country in the international system, 
certain regularities in the external actions of Chile can be appreciated and can be 
identified (or resumed) in the following: the fostering of human rights, independently 
of the political system; it manifests openly, as an aspiration, the generalisation of 
democracy as a system of government; in recognising and accepting the power and 
real capacity of Chile in the global context, the operational pragmatism will be 
privileged over the classical leadership norms of formality or protocol. Because of 
being a small (sic) country, we maintain a clear vocation in this respect, which does 
not mean rejecting bilateralism or plurilateralism in as much as it does not contradict 
[established] multilateral principles...12
This vocal assertion of comity with global libertarian and cooperation norms appears in
retrospect as an externally harmonised foreign policy. However by March 2000, following
the conclusion of the Pinochet Extradition Controversy and a change in foreign minister, the
official ministry website adopted a more cautious note about harmonising foreign policy with
global trends:
Her [i.e. the Minister’s] principal mission is to respond to the phenomenon of 
worldwide globalization with a foreign policy of a sense of [national] citizenship, in 
a manner in which Chileans are able to appreciate the benefits that result from such a 
policy. (Ministry of External Relations, Chile 2001)
This is an admission of the ideational challenge to Chilean foreign policy in the 
globalization context. Identities of the nation-state and its individual inhabitants are strained 
by the permeability of frontiers to agents and influences that can construct and reconstruct 
community. This is also the third justification for selecting Chile and the Pinochet 
Extradition Controversy as a case study. The historic pattern of Chilean society imbibing 
ideas from abroad and testing them politically at home, amounting to proxy ideological war 
with domestic casualties, was evidently exacerbated between 1970 and 1990. Allende’s 
reified Chilean road to socialism clashed with the non-communist conservative opposition 
between 1970 and 1973. During the dictatorship, remnants of the socialist and communist 
parties continued upholding a socialist alternative centred around Allende’s image as a
12 Matus (1993, 583). Author’s translation.
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symbol of hope, even while being forced underground. The wellsprings of the Extradition
Controversy of 1998-2000 partly originate here, with foreign policy being made into a
battleground by both sides. In his first annual message to the Chilean Congress as president,
Salvador Allende said
Our struggle against underdevelopment and dependence on foreign hegemony places 
Chile in a community of interests shared by other countries in Asia and Africa. 
Because of this, it is the decision of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) government 
to play an active role in that group of nations known as ‘non-aligned’.. .Our 
universalist view of the United Nations leads us to vote in favour of the recognition of 
the legitimate rights of the Peoples’ Republic of China. Our respect for the 
independence of nations requires us to condemn the war in Vietnam, and its extension 
to Laos and Cambodia. (S. Allende 1973, 168)
Conversely, on the third anniversary of his coup-installed presidency, General Augusto
Pinochet placed his imprint on the foreign projection of ‘anti-communist Chile’:
Without pretending to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, or of exporting 
what represents our own and original answer to the challenge in front of us, I 
proclaim this morning that, just as other sister nations that have suffered a similar 
experience [do], Chile stands today as a word of warning to other countries in the 
hemisphere and the world, as history will some day admit to the pride of all those 
who knew how to fight in defense of the freedom [of] our land, and to the shame of 
those who, yesterday and today, have chosen the road of weakness or of treason.
While a totalitarian imperialism sheds the blood of millions of human beings in an 
endeavour to enslaven the world, Chile had a September 11 [1973 coup] in which 
many patriots surrendered their lives to guarantee the freedom of our country and of 
our children. (Government of Chile 1976, 23, 53-54)
These are the respective statements of ‘two Chiles’ presenting themselves as rivals for future
international order with diametric claims of righteous community. Of course, this was also
Cold War rhetoric dressed in local colours, but post-1990, this civil war of Chilean ideals
transmuted into global-versus-national justice debates with the trial of Pinochet as a lightning
rod. The domestic human rights movement that had evolved in reaction to the persecutions of
the Pinochet regime was now augmenting its long-time external partners’ calls for realising a
humane new world order and prosecuting late twentieth century genocides and other crimes
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against humanity. The mixed state-NGO campaign for the adoption of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) is symptomatic of this. Meanwhile, the ‘Pinochet line’ 
has witnessed reformulation by the governments of the Chilean democratic transition into a 
defence of national sovereignty as a legitimate basis for a more equitable world order. Both 
the Chilean government and Chilean human rights alliances claimed the moral high ground 
of advocating desirable boundaries of rights adjudication. Incidentally, the Chilean defence 
of national sovereignty harmonised with one aspect of the global justice claim: the ICC is a 
common good for a just world order. The principal clash between the rival soft power 
campaigns turned on the timing and location of global justice.
The contours of Chilean participation in global information space, the historical 
porosity of its borders, the consequent and consistent clash of internalised ideas from abroad, 
and the rearticulation of this conflict externally implies an intermestic condition to Chilean 
politics. These behove the foreign policy actor to (i) adapt to the intermestic nature of making 
foreign policy in global information space by forging expedient coalitions of common 
interests, or discourses, with policy-relevant groups of expertise inside and outside national 
boundaries (ICF); (ii) attempt to socialise these policy-relevant transnational interest groups 
through regimes (IS); and (iii) convince others by getting them to emulate directly one’s 
ideas from demonstration of model projects (MDED). These hypotheses, ICF to MDED, will 
shortly be demonstrated following a contextualisation of the extradition controversy.
6.3 Contextualising the Pinochet Extradition Controversy in London as a Globalized 
Foreign Policy Issue Beginning in 1973
While the preceding section sketched out the evolution of structural patterns in 
Chilean interactions with the global, this section will situate the extradition controversy
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1998-2000 within these patterns in two complementary ways. First, the battle to indict 
Pinochet for human rights violations committed during his 1973-90 regime will be explained 
as a divided nation’s deliberate attempts to project its divisions externally beyond 1990 in 
informational forms. The rise of the non-state sector as a protagonist will be traced against a 
background of an incomplete transition from authoritarianism to democracy in institutions 
and political climate. Second, the global non-state activity that ignited the event of Pinochet’s 
arrest in London will be explained as a recent historical pattern, which inevitably 
complicated official foreign policy attempts to manage it.
The concept of an informational civil war waged by aggrieved sectors of the Chilean 
nation in partnership with internal and external non-state actors must be understood as an 
evolution beyond, whilst still encompassing, the 1970-73 Cold War antagonisms of the 
political Left and Centre-Right. As many writers have noted, the military junta led by 
General Pinochet had only militarily defeated the combined moderate socialist and hard core 
communist political groups in the country, and temporarily delegitimised in constitutional 
terms the role of all political parties (Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 272-276). The 
military’s actions of mass and selective arrests, tortures, executions, and the relatively new 
bureaucratic weapon of ‘disappearing persons’ without trace, decapitated most organised 
armed resistance along with pre-existing local government personnel. The anti-political 
utopian scheme of formally de-recognising existing political parties, at least till Pinochet’s 
voluntary plebiscite of 1988, left functional, moderate, and political grassroots concerns in 
both urban areas and countryside virtually unrepresented. If any legitimate (read non- 
antagonistic) demands were to be articulated to the military government, they could only be 
channelled via the mayoral system of pro-Pinochet civilian appointees, military bureaucracy,
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or the paralysed remnants of local civilian government. Public service provision, welfare and 
personal safety, once guaranteed by a system of reliable bureaucracy were no longer 
maintained at reasonable levels of efficiency. It is against this background that civil society 
emerged in the form of non-state individuals and groups replacing and duplicating former 
state and party functions in directing local production, alleviating unemployment, housing 
and estate maintenance, relief for the destitute, health care, neighbourhood recreation, food 
supplies and defending human rights (Oxhom 1995; Loveman 1995, 123-136). Non-state 
displacement of state protections in regard to human rights will be the main concern of this 
analysis of a civil war of human rights priorities between the winners and losers of the 1973 
coup.
Initially, defending human rights in the face of the intense repressive phase of 1973- 
78 fell upon the conscience of the Churches, especially the Catholic one. Historically, the 
Catholic Church had evolved into a key representative of the non-state sector immediately 
after Independence, and constituted a bulwark of humanist and religious principles against a 
modernising post-Independence political milieu oriented primarily towards secularisation. 
During the period of the short-lived Allende reforms, the Catholic Church had expressed 
annoyance at some Marxist changes. But it was only with the provocation of the scale of 
human rights abuses under Pinochet that it acted as an umbrella, voice and progenitor of an 
intermestic human rights network in Chile (Economist 1999a). This is a fact acknowledged 
by one of the most vocal human rights NGOs in Chile since 1973, the Association of 
Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (AFDD). (AFDD 1997, 15-19) At the initiative of 
Cardinal Raul Silva, a Committee for Peace was set up in 1974 which sheltered the nascent 
AFDD and other victims of the military coup, and their families, and provided legal and
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employment relief where possible. Under pressure from the military government, the 
Committee was disbanded in name but reconstituted as the Vicariate of Solidarity in 1976. 
The Vicariate claims its mission from both the Christian Gospel and the UN Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights: the general defence of human rights, especially the right to 
life, ‘expressed by deeds, which arise from having felt as one’s own the suffering of one’s 
neighbour...as did Jesus.’ (Archdiocese of Santiago 1984, 1) The deeds encompassed a full 
range of symbolic measures ranging from witnessing, and legal intervention for victims, to 
education for justice, and public denunciations of crimes against humanity. For instance, the 
Vicariate’s Legal Department takes up the legal cudgels against official brutality. The 
Department of Zones actively collaborates with local individuals and NGOs in all dimensions 
of relief and community self-help initiatives, while the Support Department meticulously 
documents individual violations of Chileans’ human rights. These are deliberately facilitative 
of domestic and external collaborations in presenting a discourse of victimhood to Chileans 
and the world (Archdiocese of Santiago 1984, 10-14, 15-18, 23).
The Vicariate’s aforementioned collaborator, the AFDD, stemming in part from its 
existence as an association of families of victims of the Pinochet regime, established an even 
stronger informational raison d’etre captured in its permanent slogan ‘donde estdn?’ (‘where 
are they?’). This question simultaneously extrapolates into one campaign to seek legal and 
symbolic redress for those still classified as detained and disappeared by the military regime, 
and another of philosophical warning against the persistence of the practice of genocide at 
the close of the twentieth century (Diaz-Caro 2001, interview, 24 May; AFDD 1997, 7). 
Chief among the AFDD’s activities since its formation as an NGO in 1977 has been annual 
participation in marches, demonstrations, folk culture events and solemn on-site
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commemorations of the deaths of Salvador Allende, and other outstanding individuals and 
groups around the country. From the 1980s onwards, it began associating with human rights 
groups of similar backgrounds in the rest of Latin America, forming a pan-regional NGO 
forum called the Latin American Federation of Associations of Relatives of the Detained and 
Disappeared (FEDEFAM)13 to mobilise against unresolved human rights issues in the region. 
Similar in motive, but equipped more for legal activism, is the Corporation for the Promotion 
and Defence of the Rights of the People (CODEPU)14 which stressed action to preserve 
future domestic, and indirectly, world peace by both educating awareness and adjudicating 
human rights violations in national, foreign national and international courts wherever 
possible, so as to create precedents against future violations. In the interview with the author, 
CODEPU’s executive secretary emphasised that if it proved necessary, advancing human 
rights causes must mean embracing the ‘imperialism of international law’ irrespective of 
geography, ‘whether it be Chile, Colombia or China.’ (Espinoza 2001, interview, 23 May)
Another party to the informational civil war is the former and existing political left 
associated with Salvador Allende’s then governing Popular Unity coalition. The Chilean 
Communist Party, with its long history of advocating anti-fascist fronts culminating in the 
armed overthrow of capitalist regimes, was an implacable foe of Pinochet. Although driven 
underground in 1973-90, it kept its structure intact and was re-legalised in time for the 
regime-organised 1989 presidential and legislative elections which facilitated Pinochet’s 
peaceful departure (Constable and Valenzuela 1993, 313-314). This party neither recaptured 
the level of electoral support, nor the position, to be kingmaker to the governing coalition,
13 Federation Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (AFDD 1997, 50- 
51).
14 Corporation de Promotion y  Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo. Refer also to their website 
<http://www.codepu.cl>.
310
but through its uncompromising opposition to Pinochet’s record, allied its political critique to 
the NGOs’ human rights cause. In January 1998, Communist Party president Gladys Marin 
signalled her party’s human rights solidarity by launching the first lawsuits against General 
Pinochet after he stepped down as army commander-in-chief. The Socialist Party (PS)15 of 
Salvador Allende was equally persecuted during the 17 years of dictatorship, but the 
experience divided the party into factions in dealing with the Pinochet era. As would be 
apparent in the 1998-2000 controversy, party members such as Isabel Allende and Juan Pablo 
Letelier, direct descendants of Pinochet’s more prominent victims, openly allied themselves 
to the intermestic campaign to extradite him against their governing Concertacion]6 
coalition’s official foreign policy stand. Jose Miguel Insulza, the first Chilean foreign 
minister in the 1998-2000 period and himself a PS member, had a difficult time defending 
the ‘sovereignty discourse’ amidst divergent sentiments in both the PS and his coalition. 
Similarly, the PS presidential candidate Ricardo Lagos, who was selected as the 
Concertacion’s joint candidate in 1999 was placed in a delicate position of supporting the 
return of Pinochet as a sovereign action abroad, while also upholding the principle of human 
rights accountability at home.
A third aspect of the informational civil war arising from the 1973-90 dictatorship is 
the institutional and political legacies of Pinochet’s departure as president (March 1990), up 
till and including the extradition controversy itself (1998-2000). Pinochet’s boast upon 
stepping down as President was his slogan ‘mission accomplished’. By this, he meant that the 
17 years of military rule had produced an improved national culture and concomitant 
institutions according to Pinochet’s vision of praetorian, anti-political, yet nationalistic
15 Partido Socialista.
16 See fh 21 for an explanation of this label.
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modernisation (Loveman 1991, 42-48). Firstly, the institutional legacy was centred upon the 
military-designed 1980 constitution. It created a permanent, and potentially infinite, slate of 
non-elected senators that automatically included all ex-presidents who served full terms. 
There was also a national security council in which the military members could convene at 
will and veto civilian decisions; a scheme of appointed mayors; and a gerrymandered 
electoral system. Annexed to these were the expanded interior security law of the state which 
granted the governing executive wide latitude for censoring the media and sanctioning 
journalists for reasons of national security. Furthermore, an Amnesty Law decreed in 1978, 
applied retroactively to murders and executions committed within the severest period of the 
dictatorship, 1973-78. There was also a submissive judiciary staffed with a large number of 
Pinochet-era appointees up till 1999, and which in practice was subordinate to military courts 
which could declare jurisdiction on matters regarded as military or national security in nature 
(Loveman 1991, 48-52; Human Rights Watch 1991; M.A. Garreton 1995; Oppenheim 1999, 
198-199). This last feature, together with the Amnesty Law, were to be politicised in the 
extradition controversy for between 1990 and 1998, multiple attempts to pursue human rights 
and political malfeasance claims through civilian courts were hampered by existing laws. 
One prominent case, involving the irregular sale to the army of a defence company by one of 
Pinochet’s sons, was eventually closed by its transfer to military courts. Even the few limited 
successes of human rights prosecutions, such as the imprisoning of Pinochet’s first 
intelligence chief, General Contreras, and his adjutant Brigadier-General Pedro Espinoza, 
over the 1976 assassination of ex-Allende minister Letelier, showed that the military could 
obstruct implementation of sentences. They initially shielded Contreras, temporising over his 
medical attention at a naval hospital, before allowing him to be imprisoned in a special 
complex built for ex-military and public officials. Contreras’ conviction came in 1993, but it
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was not until 1995 that he started his sentence (Correa 1997, 142-144). This partial success 
was a result of a game of political opportunism and daring played by the first two 
democratically-elected presidents after Pinochet’s departure against the military and political 
right.
All this time, Pinochet had continued as army commander-in-chief and issued his 
share of warning shots against overturning the permanent gains of the 1973 coup. This is the 
second Pinochet-era legacy: the consummate maintenance of political stalemate over the 
atrocities and impositions of the military government’s institutional preferences. This 
stalemate is derived from the general failures and limited successes of the first two 
democratically-elected civilian governments after 1990 in ameliorating authoritarian aspects 
of the 1980 constitution, curbing the autonomy of the military, and the unresolved human 
rights violations of 1973-90. It is also a stalemate because the social forces aligned to the 
erstwhile Pinochet regime continued to oppose any political initiative remotely intended to 
undo the military’s special guardianship of the polity. In any case, apart from the 1980 
constitution, interior security and Amnesty Laws, the political Right has staked out its 
electoral ground through the formation of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI)17 and 
National Renovation (RN)18 political parties which, between them, have since 1990 
maintained 30-40% of seats in the lower chamber (Chamber of Deputies) of the Chilean 
Congress. In the upper chamber (the Senate), the combination of UDI-RN elected senators in 
tandem with the small number of appointed senators with Pinochet-era connections, has
17 Union Democratico Independiente.
18 Renovacion Nacional.
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ensured a sizeable right-wing obstruction bloc.19 This power of the political Right in 
Congress is amplified by the constitutional provision that a two-thirds majority of both 
chambers is required for any constitutional amendment, or any changes to legislation 
concerning the Armed Forces (“CHILE” 2001, 214). Thrice in 1991, 1992 and 1995, the 
civilian administrations’ proposals to Congress to modify aspects related to asserting 
executive oversight on promotion and removal of officers were rejected (Loveman 2001, 
331-334, tab. 11-4). On the other hand, the first civilian administration of President Patricio 
Aylwin managed to veto several attempts by the Army to promote officers known to be 
involved in human rights abuses. Even during Pinochet’s detention in London in 1998, a 
Chilean military officer with such a reputation was recalled by President Eduardo Frei from 
his participation in a UN mission (BBC SWB 1998d; Atlanta Journal and Constitution 1998). 
These symbolic gestures of civilian supremacy, while annoying the military, did little to alter 
the status quo. The military budget was also a source of military autonomy, being legally 
guaranteed of a share of national budgets, and supplemented directly by 10% of the state 
copper company CODELCO’s revenues (Rojas 1994, 254-255).
Adjudicating human rights abuses constitutionally also proved impossible under 
political circumstances of stalemating strategies by the military and the political Right. 
Shortly after assuming office in March 1990, the Aylwin government created a National 
Commission of Tmth and Reconciliation chaired by a civilian judge, Raul Rettig, whose 
mandate was to investigate all human rights abuses which resulted in death from the day of 
the coup (11 September 1973) till President Pinochet’s last day in office (11 March 1990). 
Relying on testimonies from survivors of imprisonment, relatives of the disappeared, the
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Vicariate, AFDD, CODEPU and other NGOs, a list of victims’ names and the crimes 
suffered by them was collated (Rettig Commission 1991, 3). Even the military was asked to 
supply information. As the inquiry got underway, it became clear that information about 
torture would require a special section in the final report, plus there was the difficulty of 
accounting for those disappeared by the military government without confirmation of their 
fates. This outpouring of evidence, allegations and official recording of a list of crimes 
disturbed the military at the same time that a congressional commission had begun to 
investigate the earlier-mentioned corruption case involving Pinochet’s son. General 
Pinochet’s response in December 1990 was to order a sudden ‘exercise of security and 
coordination’ in which troops staged symbolic movements throughout the country. Although 
President Aylwin called in General Pinochet to explain the army action, the point had been 
made, and negotiations over the corruption case attempted to close the possibility of 
damaging Pinochet and the military (Loveman 1991, 41; Oppenheim 1999, 211). Meanwhile 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s findings proceeded apace and it released its 
report by March 1991, announcing 2,115 human rights victims (of maladministration of 
justice, torture, disappearances, and deaths through executions and excessive force in protest 
suppression), 164 victims of political violence, enclosing a sub-report on torture in 1973-90, 
and listing the fate of 641 persons unaccounted for in terms of offence (Rettig Commission 
1991, 196). In this way, an open-ended living discourse was created in simultaneously 
confirming and speculating the incidence and magnitude of human rights abuses under 
Pinochet’s rule. President Aylwin publicly condemned the practices of torture, executions 
and disappearances, asked for forgiveness from the families in the name of the Chilean 
nation, and asked the military to make gestures of reconciliation towards the victims (Aylwin
19 View the results of the last Congressional elections before Pinochet’s arrest in Britain in the report “CHILE” 
(2001, 215). For election results from 1989, see Oppenheim (1999, 225-226) and the Chilean Ministry of
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1991). In an information ploy to distance himself from the Report, now commonly known as 
the ‘Rettig Report’, Pinochet, together with the navy commander-in-chief, the head of the 
Carabineros (National Police) and some Right-wing support, called it a campaign to 
discredit the military. While the Air Force commander-in-chief accepted the Report, it was 
noted by observers that he and his service had not been implicated in the gravest violations 
(Human Rights Watch 1991, 32). Perhaps also in deference to Pinochet’s pressure, the Rettig 
Report had merely quasi-legal standing and did not name the perpetrators, although 
reparations were recommended and implemented by Aylwin’s government. Most of the 
deaths were also protected from litigation by the 1978 Amnesty Law. The ongoing suits 
launched by victims’ families were also either stalled by the civilian courts or languished in 
military ones (Human Rights Watch 1991, 39-63; Ensalaco 2000, 213-216).
In 1993, the military’s displeasure climaxed in another show of force when both the 
corruption case involving Pinochet’s son, and human rights prosecutions against military 
officers, continued with the prospect of damage to the military. This time, on 28 May 1993, a 
state of alert was declared lasting five days in which 42 army generals attended a ‘crisis’ 
meeting in combat uniform in the armed forces building across from the presidential palace. 
This incident was even more ominous in the absence of President Aylwin who was on an 
official visit to Scandinavian countries at the time. Immediate talks between Aylwin’s 
cabinet ministers, General Pinochet and his advisors resolved the tensions but led to 
concessions to some additional military demands over the signing of administrative decrees 
concerning the defence ministry, the diminution of the corruption investigation, and the 
defusing of other civilian-military conflicts over human rights. The exceptions to political 
stalemate were the earlier-mentioned prosecution of Generals Contreras and Espinoza over
Interior website <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.
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the assassination of Orlando Letelier in the US in 1976, the jailing of 15 former Carabineros 
in 1994 over the 1985 murders of three communists, and three other prosecutions of police
9 0captains and ex-army majors for tortures and deaths of students. As indicated, the military 
had procrastinated in surrendering Contreras and even then, the government had agreed that 
the guilty serve time in a special military prison. It was probably only the fact that the 
Letelier case was also the subject of widespread publicity and specific US pressure from 
1976 that it produced a prosecution, while the cases of the three murdered communists and 
students involved prosecuting only low-ranking officers. The atmosphere of obstruction 
continued during the extradition controversy in London, when a journalist published The 
Black Book o f Chilean Justice. This triggered not even an investigation of its allegations of 
corruption and cronyism in the judiciary dating back to the Pinochet government, but instead, 
a ban on its sale and distribution engineered by one of the ex-judges named in the book 
(LAWR 1999).
To some extent, the political stalemate manifested in the restricted independence of 
the Chilean government is attributable to the civilian coalition that has continuously 
controlled the government through three presidential elections since 1989. The Concertacion
91de los Partidos por la Democracia (CPD) was bom initially as a protest umbrella in 1983, 
grouping virtually all centrist and socialist parties united only in opposition to continued 
military government, while excluding the Chilean Communist Party (Constable and 
Valenzuela 1993, 285-286, 313-314). Between 1983, when the first wave of mass public 
protest occurred against Pinochet, and the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s continuation, the
20 Assessment by Correa (1997, 145-147).
21 ‘Concertation’ of Parties for Democracy, or simply the ‘Concertacion’. The latter has no direct English 
translation but it approximates ‘coalition’, which the CPD is electorally, and ‘coordination’ or ‘broad 
coordination’ (Boeninger 1997, ch. VII).
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embryonic opposition umbrella acted cautiously. It steered a middle course between 
campaigning for total removal of the institutional legacies of 1973-90, a reversion to 
Allende-style socio-economic programmes, and the taint of communist armed struggle which 
might have re-enacted Cuban and Nicaraguan-type political upheavals in Chile. In many 
ways, up till Pinochet’s detention in 1998, it was inevitably a transition agreed among elites. 
It bound historical rivals such as the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Social Democrats to 
a controlled level of political competition and collaborative agendas. More importantly, they 
avoided antagonising a substantively undefeated military and political Right who had 
voluntarily transferred power to a ‘protected democracy’ of the former’s own design and 
rules (Boeninger 1997, ch. VII-VIII; Oppenheim 1999, 230-233). Pinochet, who had stood in 
the 1988 plebiscite expecting to win, and lost, still claimed some 40% of the popular vote. 
This measure was retained for the political Right’s candidate in the 1989 elections. In the last 
presidential elections in January 2000, the vote difference between the Concertacion''s 
victorious Ricardo Lagos and the political Right’s Joaquin Lavin was 2.6% (Global News 
Wire: CHIPS 2000). In short, every Concertacion government has had to avoid rocking the 
boat by drastically amending or redressing the legacies of 1973-90, and this meant 
neutralising human rights adjudication if politically necessary. Pinochet’s pre-departure 
warning to the Concertacion in 1989 remained ominous: ‘The day they touch any of my men 
will be the end of the state of law.’ (Quoted in Spooner 1999, 255)
At this point, it becomes clear that given the legacies of the Pinochet regime and the 
political stalemate of the mainstream politics among political parties and the military, under a 
constitution and judiciary constrained by authoritarian pockets, the largest manoeuvrable 
space for redressing human rights issues belongs to non-state entities. The human rights
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NGOs such as the Vicariate, AFDD and CODEPU need to be located within a Chilean 
understanding of civif society. Civil society is not just a check and a rival, but on occasion a 
supplement, to the formal authority and welfare-delivery of the government. It is also a form 
of community grouping the unemployed, underemployed, manual and semi-skilled workers, 
self-help neighbourhood associations, communal kitchen operators, victims of human rights 
violations, informal vigilante groups protecting women and children of poor neighbourhoods 
against police brutality, and all other charitable NGOs. This amorphous category is called 7o 
popular’, or the popular culture (Aman 1991; Oxhom 1995, ch. 4). By its very nature, this 
non-state sector offered a social buffer against the public welfare cutbacks and physical 
repression of Pinochet’s neo-liberal authoritarian regime. This sector easily found roles for 
ex-socialist and pro-communist activists in broad alliance with all categories of the 
dispossessed, displaced and altruistic. It is easy to understand why human rights NGOs 
within Chile were able to articulate their discourse of justice against Pinochet as an 
affirmation of fundamental human self-respect and dignity of right to life, as a contrast to the 
mainstream political stalemate that tended to dominate Chilean foreign policy.
On the eve of Pinochet’s departure, the Concertacion had publicly conceded some
legitimacy to NGOs in an ironic parallel to their admission of authoritarian legacies within a
democratic transition:
In [the] past years, the majority of NGOs have been working on the improvement of 
conditions and quality of life of the poorer sectors, as well as being dynamizers 
(‘dinamizadores’) of the redemocratization of national life. In realisation of these 
actions, the NGOs have counted themselves [in] along with the generous 
collaboration of entities of international cooperation...
The grassroots-derived programmes of the Concertacion affirm that the new 
government will not aim to increase in disproportionate form the state apparatus, but 
on the contrary, will give incentive to socially organised participation in the search 
for solutions to diverse problems, as well as in the implementation of diverse socio­
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political [programmes]. In accordance with this, a vast field of cooperation between 
NGOs and the future government is open within the defined frame of the grassroots 
programmes.22
In this way, Chilean NGOs, whose numbers increased in 1985-86 at a rate equivalent to the 
whole period 1974-80 (Agurto 1990, 1), were ensured a special political standing in Chilean 
public life. This simultaneously constituted them as potential state-replacing interlocutors in 
welfare arenas, including human rights, with both internal and external NGOs. This 
effectively legitimised a creeping trend of intermestic linkages.
The virtue and political asset of the NGO lies in its non-governmental flexibility in 
combining means and ends with less-stringent accountability than that which governments 
are bound up with (Fisher 1997). Chilean human rights NGOs such as the Vicariate, AFDD 
and CODEPU established ‘just causes’ in common with entities which had claimed a nascent 
global mandate during the Cold War such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch’s 
precursor Americas Watch, the International Council of Jurists, the UN Commission for 
Human Rights and the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The last two 
are not NGOs but appendages of intergovernmental organisations that have been 
significantly influenced by NGOs. The shared just causes are broadly: the defence of the 
right to life, the prevention and the punishment of violations of the human rights listed 
primarily in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This intermestic correlation of aims 
of NGOs have two documented origins: the domestic interests o f Chilean NGOs aligned 
towards creating a voice for the oppressed under the Pinochet regime; and the international 
attempts by NGOs during the Cold War to amplify the results o f the postwar Nuremberg 
trials into a global standard o f conduct covering states and individuals (Keck and Sikkink 
1998, 85-88; Tolley Jr. 1987, 3-9). This remaining section will specifically explain how this
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intermestic correlation of non-state just causes over human rights emerged under the 
dictatorship and culminated in the events of 1998-2000.
Domestically, the NGO drive for external engagements began with the fact of 
repression. The Pinochet regime either destroyed or censored any independent media 
channels. Domestic audiences could only be reached through clandestine radios and 
unofficial journals put out by NGOs and daring individuals, or through news rebroadcast into 
the country by external radio and foreign newspapers. For the Vicariate, AFDD, CODEPU 
and Chilean exiles, it was considered a priority that internationally connected journalists, 
NGOs and foreign governments become aware of the unrelenting harshness of military rule 
and hence apply pressure for amelioration of human rights violations. All three Chilean 
NGOs clearly confirmed that they have been suppliers of human rights assessments and case 
histories to Amnesty International, Americas Watch, the UN, and the International 
Federation of Human Rights, just to name a few.23 Even during the Concertacion 
governments of 1990-98, Chilean human rights NGOs, while enjoying a large concessionary 
public space for remembrance and remonstration for justice, could not rely completely on 
domestic political and legal processes.24 Allying with Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, and the progress of international human rights law in the aftermath of the Cold War 
proved fruitful by 1998 in obtaining a measure of justice against Pinochet.
Global NGO efforts on behalf of human rights in Chile began within a purely 
international arena, that is, formal state-to-state arrangements with NGO persuasion involved
22 Concertacion Working Group on NGOs (1990, paras. 3-4). Author’s translation.
23 Diaz-Caro (2001, interview, 24 May) of AFDD, Espinoza (2001, interview, 23 May) of CODEPU, and 
Archdiocese of Santiago (1984).
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at the margins. The Nuremberg war crimes trials, the drawing up of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the creation of various conventions (regimes) prohibiting 
genocide, racial discrimination and torture trace their roots to individual, NGO and 
governmental revulsion towards the mass atrocities conducted in World War Two. Working 
through the American national polity, NGOs such as the Commission to Study the 
Organisation of the Peace, Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, and 
the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ, all lobbied in the final months of the war for 
making human rights promotion a main purpose of the UN, and specifically of its Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC). (Tolley Jr. 1987, 3-9) By 1947, a UN Commission on 
Human Rights had been established with rotating state memberships under the auspices of 
the ECOSOC along with a supporting secretariat. It had the ‘authority’ to ‘call in ad hoc 
working groups of non-governmental experts in specialised fields.’25 Significantly, NGOs, 
depending on size categorisation by the secretariat, could propose agenda items, make oral 
presentations, and submit short statements to the Commission through the secretariat. 
Through such preliminary lobbying and channels of international decision-making access, 
NGO capacity to use information power to denounce and shape human rights conduct 
across borders were extended under the shadow of the Cold War. Also, by influencing the 
genesis of ideas for international human rights law from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights onwards, to the Conventions against specific violations, through to the immanent 
International Criminal Court, NGOs can claim a pioneering specialisation in protecting 
individuals and sub-national groups against state abuses. Both Amnesty International 
(hereafter, AI) and Human Rights Watch, who came to play key roles in keeping Pinochet
24 Interviews ibid. Invariably, all the interviewees encountered by the author, including those exiles based in 
London, argued that because justice was frustrated by elite compromises made by the democratic transition at 
home, inviting external solutions was a necessity.
25 Tolley Jr. (1987, 16); echoed by Willetts (1996).
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under detention in Britain in 1998-2000, claim themselves to be voluntary monitors of the
application of international human rights law. Moreover, their mission statements against
torture, genocide and right to fair trials resonate with humanitarian standards of the spirit of
most national constitutions. The record of both organisations in frequently submitting
independent reports and briefings to the UN Commission on Human Rights on Chile suggest
an attempt to hold states accountable to embryonic global standards, as well as existing
international standards already ratified among states. This complex point about NGOs
policing what seems exclusively state-to-state agreements is all about shaping global
humanitarianism into a discourse transcending sovereignty, as it is attested to in AI’s
statement on its raison d’etre:
[M]ost of the member states of the United Nations -  countries that affirm the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights -  regularly violate some of those rights.
Furthermore, governments frequently make laws that themselves ignore human rights 
standards -  this is why AI sometimes works on behalf of people who have broken 
their country’s own laws.
If the protection of the forgotten victims was left entirely to the state, in many cases 
the victims would have no protection at all.
Organisations like AI are necessary because often there is no one else to speak up 
against human rights violations.
Often it is only mass international pressure -  the pressure of large numbers of 
ordinary people -  that can rescue those who suffer at the hands of state power. 
(Amnesty International 1991, 13)27
In short, human rights globalization is about the use of information on abuses in one 
or more countries to hold particular states to account to standards they have signed up to, and 
which technically privilege the individual’s rights and responsibilities as equal to the 
concerned states’. International agreements lend a ready value-mandate, though not
26 As elaborated in Chapter 4.
27 For Human Rights Watch, visit <http//www.hrw.org>.
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necessarily a legal one, for action that had been frequently obstructed by the capricious 
balance of power manoeuvres of Cold War politics at the UN. Nevertheless, it is crucial to 
note that the informational civil war between Chilean human rights NGOs and Pinochet had 
provoked a trail of intermestic interventions since 1973 that preceded and contributed to the 
events of 1998-2000:
October 1973
November 1973
April 1974
July-August 1974
December 1977 -  July 
1978
At the urgent prompting of AI and the International 
Commission of Jurists, the LACHR Secretary General Luis 
Reque negotiated a visit to determine respect for human 
rights in the wake of the coup.
An AI delegation visits Chile to report on conditions there, 
to stop killings and protect those in detention. The 
delegation meets with Chilean Ministers of Justice and 
Interior, judges and lawyers. Outcome is the first of 
Amnesty’s special reports on Chile. A delegation member 
also testifies to the US Congress.
International Commission of Jurists visits Chile at the 
suggestion of the World Council of Churches. A delegation 
member also testifies to the US Congress.
LACHR follows up on earlier visit, citing Chile’s 
membership obligations to it, and obtains visits to jails and 
torture sites, while also meeting up with NGOs.
Following NGO testimonies to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the convocation of an Ad-Hoc Working 
Group on Chile, and UN General Assembly resolutions 
condemning human rights violations in Chile, a prolonged 
propaganda exchange between Chile and the UN ensues, 
leading to a UN Ad-Hoc Working Group visit by July 
1978.
1981 - 1983 Americas Watch representatives visit Chile to document
human rights conditions ten years after the coup. The 
resulting report criticises the persistent partiality of the 
judicial system.
April-M ay 1982 AI conducts another mission focussing specifically on
torture, and includes doctors in the delegation to verify 
allegations and cases supplied by local NGOs and to
28 The following list was culled primarily from Ensalaco (2000, 98-119), Amnesty International (1974), 
Americas Watch (1983), Amnesty International (1983), and Americas Watch (1988).
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examine and interview victims directly. Special report on 
torture in Chile is published.
March 1987 -  Americas Watch conducts a series of fact-finding missions
June 1988 to Chile, interviewing victims and consulting local NGOs.
A comprehensive report is published on Chilean human 
rights up to almost the eve of Pinochet’s final plebiscite in 
1988.
This sample does not include numerous intermestic verifications, joint issues and transfers of 
reports through low-level fact-finding visits, local sections, regional action networks29 and 
volunteers of AI and Americas Watch/Human Rights Watch. Throughout the dictatorship, 
the Pinochet government either dismissed these criticisms as falsehoods, or downplayed their 
significance against the overriding needs of Cold War fighting. The latter justification 
worked to Pinochet’s advantage in stymieing serious sanctions from the US, Western Europe, 
or the UN. Also, the combative mood of the superpowers blocked any possibility of national 
or multilateral jurisdictions applying the still-embryonic international human rights law 
against Chilean violations (Tolley Jr. 1987, 199-202). Nevertheless these intermestic 
investigations succeeded in developing an information pool for future political reckoning 
and confirming Pinochet’s public odium.
Finally, before embarking on the chronology of the 1998-2000 events, one semi- 
distinct group needs to be treated under the category of ‘global NGO’: the one million 
Chileans exiled by the Pinochet regime primarily to Europe, the US and Australia. These 
people are quintessentially intermestic since they have either set up Chilean-only 
organisations for the recovery of democracy in Chile, or become members and intermediaries 
with AI and Human Rights Watch. Jose Zalaquett, a victim of the Pinochet regime, was one­
29 These are all part of the standard information collecting infrastructure of global human rights NGOs. See 
Amnesty International (1991).
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time executive director with AI, and a regular consultant for Human Rights Watch reports on 
Chile (Human Rights Watch 1998). Carlos Reyes of Chile Democratico, Silvia Velasquez (a 
Chilean working for the Colombian Refugee Association, CORAS), Sara De Witt, Jimmy 
Bell and Nicole Drouilly of the Chile Committee Against Impunity (subsequently, the 
Proyecto Internacional de Derechos Humanos, PIDH31), most of whom have been 
interviewed for this thesis, are examples of intermestic role merger in pursuit of human rights 
in Chile. Chile Democratico, formed in 1974, dedicates itself to publicising and informing 
the world about social and political conditions in Chile as part of an ongoing campaign to 
further democracy and human rights there. The global campaigning potential of ex-victims 
and exiles-tumed-activists is explained by Reyes who was president of Chile Democratico 
during 1998-2000:
Human rights abuses were verified through the families, eyewitnesses at the moment 
of detention, eyewitnesses at the detention centres, and international organisations 
wh[ich] had information about the whereabouts of those who were arrested. The 
secret police were using detainees as traps to arrest their friends and 
colleagues...Tens of thousands were detained at the time and those who were 
interrogated and released were able to inform the outside world. (Reyes-Manzo 2001, 
interview, 3 Jul.)
Silvia Velasquez of CORAS, who is also an ex-member of the Left-wing Movimiento Accion 
Popular Unitaria, suggested that their power lay in the multiplicity of individual narratives 
hounding Pinochet:
We had to constantly maintain a physical and symbolic presence inside and outside 
the court to remind Pinochet that his ‘nightmare’ of past abuses would not go away. It 
is not surprising that he had to be shielded everywhere he went, both at court 
appearances and on the Wentworth estate. We now keep the memories of the victims 
alive through the website memoriaviva.com. (Velasquez 2001, interview, 1 May)
30 A 1986 NGO-supported study named Chile as the third most frequently visited country for violations 
(Thoolen and Verstappen 1986, 122).
31 This NGO operated during the Controversy under the first name, as well as under an umbrella group called 
Piquete de Londres (London Picket). From April 2000, after Pinochet’s departure, it renamed itself as Proyecto 
Internacional de Derechos Humanos (International Human Rights Project) which formally appears on its 
website <http://www.memoriaviva.com>. Reference will hereafter be made only to PIDH as most of the 
material cited from it and its members, were procured under this name.
326
Sara De Witt, a former student activist and current member of the PIDH, also made the 
following comment to a British newspaper about a personal stake in persisting against 
Pinochet:
For over 20 years I had to try and suppress and forget the memories of my dreadful 
experiences (of rape). When he was arrested all the psychological wounds resurfaced. 
It was very tough. I have had to re-live all my pain, but [UK Home Secretary] Jack 
Straw refuses to reveal the medical evidence about Pinochet. (Quoted in Kelly 2000)
This informational device identified by all three as eyewitness accounts, reminders of
‘nightmares’, memories and psychological wounds are what human rights scholarship has
termed the personal narrative, which lends authenticity, emotion and counter-hegemonic aura
to any campaign for justice based on basic humanitarian solidarity (Slaughter 1997).
Reyes’ also elaborated on the intermestic necessity for justice saying that ‘any 
external judgement cannot be an imposition on Chile because we asked for it in pursuit of 
justice against a criminal regime at home.’ Chile Democratico had been supplying 
documentation on abuses in Chile to AI for 25 years prior to Pinochet’s British arrest. ‘Chile 
Democratico's role was more a matter of supporting the prosecution by sustaining the public 
opinion’s positive disposition towards extraditing and prosecuting Pinochet.’ (Reyes-Manzo 
2001, interview, 3 Jul.) One immediate boost to their strategy lay in aligning themselves to 
the discourse of international human rights law and humane conscience in the wake of 
genocidal events in Africa and former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Another was, of course, the 
availability of their personal narratives of past and present sufferings for media projection, 
and to support solidarity networks. All these would help create premeditated images of 
Pinochet’s culpability across global information space.
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In sum, the context of the Pinochet Extradition Controversy has been sketched: an 
informational civil war of human rights truths and falsehoods lined up non-state actors inside 
and outside Chile against a praetorian elite bent on preserving its version of the results of the 
1973 coup. Furthermore, due to the institutional and political stalemate caused by the mutual 
constraints imposed by incoming and outgoing elites under democratic transition, domestic 
political conflict was ready to become externalised for resolution within global information 
space.32 Chilean foreign policy, being historically elite-oriented and attuned to external 
support on an international basis, thus faced events where the ‘foreign’ could not be 
demarcated easily. ‘Pinochet’ represented a problematique of at once domestic and 
intermestic injustice/justice.
6.4 A Chronology of the Controversy: Chilean Foreign Policy’s Rivalry with Non-State 
Actors in Four Phases
This short chronology will demonstrate how the intermestic environment shaped the 
‘foreign’ in foreign policy terms. The four phases will be categorised according to the major 
legal judgements by the House of Lords’ Appellate Committees and British Home Secretary 
Jack Straw’s rulings since they serve as outcomes in the various stages of soft power trials of 
strength between foreign policy and non-state actors. Each set of legal outcomes triggers 
changes for and by the various actors. Also, this chronology will not provide a mere list of 
dates, but clusters events into three sectors of action -  the non-state sector, the Chilean 
foreign policy sector, and the international sector relating inter-foreign policy action -  and in 
four phases. These phases will be the reference points for illustrating the hypotheses of the 
Intermestic Correlation of Forces (ICF), Intermestic Socialisation (IS), and Multipolar Direct 
Emulation through Demonstration (MDED) in the last four sections of this Chapter. With the
32 Note this feature of externalised discourses in the discussion of global media space in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.
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exception of Chile, it will be evident from the chronology that the international sector was 
generally marginal to the controversy because of a lack of strong ideological polarisations 
compared to the Cold War, and the relative passivity with which states react when an issue 
appears quasi-legal and constitutionally consistent.
Phase I: 1996 -  16 October 1998 -  25 November 1998 -  From Pinochet’s Arrest to the 
First House o f  Lords’ Judgement
This phase technically began between 14 and 16 October 1998 when Spanish judge
Baltasar Garzon launched his interrogation and arrest warrants respectively through Interpol
and the London Metropolitan Police, but its legal origins predated these actions to 1996. It
started with the non-state initiative of a group of Spanish victims of both the Chilean and
Argentinian military regimes, who sought the legal advice of ex-President Allende’s advisor,
Juan Garces,33 who had been spending his exile in Spain. He took up their cases and filed for
investigation under Spanish civil law, setting in motion an inquiry to be handled ultimately
by Baltasar Garzon. This was an investigation into the complicity of high-ranking junta
leaders in Operation Condor, a multilateral plan to assassinate opponents of the respective
Latin American military regimes during the 1970s within and outside their sovereign
territories. The gathering of evidence naturally attracted human rights NGOs in Chile,
Argentina, as well as the support of AI and Human Rights Watch.34 When the by-now
Senator-for-Life Augusto Pinochet made a well-publicised visit to Britain, officially to
inspect possible arms acquisitions from Royal Ordnance, and privately for a back operation,
there were many non-state ‘whistle-blowers’ notifying Garzon to make an arrest.35 These
33 Also spelt ‘Joan Garces’ in some accounts.
34 The early trail of Pinochet’s prosecution is extensively detailed in R.J. Wilson (1999).
35 According to AI’s Richard Bunting, AI attempted to have British police arrest Pinochet on his previous visits 
in 1994 and 1995, which failed. On the first occasion, the UK Attorney General gave a ‘guarded’ response and 
disputed his prosecutorial powers. On the second, no action was taken by police either. (Bunting 2001b, email, 
23 Apr.) This may have been due to the fact that NGO efforts were not as transnationally coordinated as in
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NGOs and individuals mounted a public media campaign to indict him well before, and 
throughout the extradition appeal process. Parallel lawsuits filed by non-state actors in 
Belgian, French, Swiss and German courts followed.
Chilean foreign policy started making orthodox defences of state and diplomatic 
immunity to delegitimise both the arrest of Pinochet in Britain and the prospect of an 
extradition to Spain. These formal defences were undercut immediately by the disaggregation 
of the unified voice of the Chilean state, and the defections of sections of the Chilean ruling 
Concertacion to the anti-Pinochet camp of the non-state sector (BBC SWB 1998c). These 
defections weakened the discursive credibility of the government’s foreign policy in 
confining the issue to diplomatic channels.
The international sector was also deadlocked by the speed and scale of the non-state 
initiative. Intermestic alliances were working ostensibly through domestic law parameters, 
but expanding their implications globally through soft power devices in the media, and in 
citing state-ratified regimes on torture, genocide and terrorism. The British and Spanish 
governments wished to be seen to be adhering to the democratic rule of law, however much 
they disliked the political matter being adjudicated through it (Padgett et al. 1998). The US 
was diffident about putting pressure on freeing Pinochet, an ex-Cold War ally with a negative 
reputation for human rights, partly because of the post-Cold War sensitivity of unveiling the 
CIA’s past complicities in Latin America, and partly because the US wished to avoid 
jeopardising the Chilean democratic transition and the lucrative economic links with it (M. 
Matthews 1998). On the other hand, the Clinton Administration did not want to sully its
1998. The Spanish judiciary and Chilean NGOs were not directly involved then. Furthermore, a Conservative 
government was still in charge during the transition between Cold War to post-Cold War.
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human rights positions on atrocities in the 1990s in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The UN 
could not at this stage be counted on either to institute a trial or to free Pinochet given 
Russian and Chinese sensitivities towards the post-Cold War US hegemony and possible US- 
UK vetoes.
Phase II: 26 November 1998 - 1 7  December 1998  -  From the Effects o f  the First Lords ' 
Judgement to th e ‘Hoffmann Bias'Affair
For the non-state sector, the first House of Lords’ judgement of 25 November 1998 
affirming the validity of Pinochet’s extradition on charges of torture, hostage-taking and 
murder was hailed as a global victory of human rights, and a simultaneous signal that the 
cover of political office and status was no bar to criminal liability under international law. On 
9 December 1998, British Home Secretary Straw issued an ‘authority to proceed’ with 
extradition hearings. A MORI (Mass Opinion Research Institute) poll in Chile showed that 
Chileans were severely divided over whether Pinochet should be tried abroad or returned 
home.36 AI had boldly attempted before Straw’s ruling to file for a pre-emptive injunction 
against any possible decision by Straw to free Pinochet at his discretion. Even while the 
vindication of human rights NGOs was being celebrated, the expose by Pinochet’s lawyers 
following a pro-Pinochet individual’s tip-off, about a member (Lord Hoffmann) of the Lords’ 
Committee’s possible bias through his and his wife’s charity links with AI, had begun to 
build the case for a hearing on the overturning of the 25 November verdict.
Chilean foreign policy, alerted to the strength of non-state intermestic alliances 
against Pinochet, tried a plethora of strategies ranging from calling for compassionate release 
on health grounds to floating the possibility of a home trial for Pinochet, if he were to be
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released. Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Insulza openly admitted his diplomacy was frustrated 
by government members and groups in Chile arguing for ‘global human rights’ prosecutions 
abroad. Santiago garnered some international support for judicial sovereignty from 
MERCOSUR members, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, even Cuba. Special missions by Foreign 
Minister Insulza and Chilean Senate president Andres Zaldivar to London, Madrid and 
Brussels asserting the importance of sovereignty yielded no immediate results (Drago 1998). 
Straw’s ruling on 9 December is explained on the grounds that ‘justice’ outweighed Chilean 
arguments thus far, and that Britain’s obligations under the European Convention on 
Extradition were paramount.
The international sector generally proved indifferent to Chilean foreign policy actions 
apart from some Latin American states. Britain and Spain adhered to the position that it was 
an entirely juridical, and not a political matter. In another sign of post-Cold War fluidity, 
there was Anglo-American dissension over freeing Pinochet. Still, Washington backed off 
from pressuring London and said there was no right answer to balancing justice and peace in 
post-authoritarian transitions worldwide (AFP 1998c; M2 Presswire 1998). The Clinton 
Administration remained uneasy about revealing CIA complicity with Pinochet and feared 
that prosecuting Pinochet could set a precedent for prosecuting former US leaders abroad.
Phase III: 18 December 1998 -  14 April 1999 — From the Outcome o f  the (Hoffmann 
B iasy Verdict to the Third Lords* Judgement and Straw *s Second Authority to Proceed
The Law Lords’ ruling of 17 December 1998, overturning the judgement of 25 
November 1998, and the disqualification of Lord Hoffmann from subsequent hearings on 
Pinochet, was a partial setback for the non-state sector’s anti-Pinochet campaign. AI, Chile
36 A poll taken on 2 December 1998 showed 45% of Chileans opposed his arrest in Britain, while 44% favoured
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Democratico and members of the UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group expressed 
disappointment, but Judge Baltasar Garzon and Chilean human rights lawyers drew comfort 
from the British judicial system’s fair procedure. Indeed, the Lords’ second judgement 
acknowledged the scrutiny of three sections of world public opinion as a factor. A continuing 
press campaign by anti-Pinochet groups appealed to the conscience of world public opinion 
and political leaders using personal testimonies. There were spontaneous non-state efforts to 
undermine the Chilean government’s claim of competence to conduct a credible home trial of 
Pinochet: for example, Chilean judge Juan Guzman’s indirect admission of pessimism about 
a home trial, and the International Federation for Human Rights’ visit to Chile and its 
subsequent negative certification of the Chilean justice system (Egan 1999; BBC SWB 
1999g). The other key thrust of the anti-Pinochet groups lay in their consistent alignment 
with arguments advancing international human rights law in the January-February re-hearing 
of appeals through the House of Lords. The Lords’ 24 March 1999 ruling re-confirmed 
Pinochet’s non-immunity from prosecution even on time-limited charges, hence vindicating 
the anti-Pinochet intermestic campaign. The list of criminal charges against Pinochet was 
nevertheless expanded again by Judge Garzon through a generous supply of 85 cases sent by 
CODEPU to him on 25 March (C. Lamb 1999). At the same time, the non-state sector also 
became less predominantly anti-Pinochet as the Chile-based Pinochet Foundation, together 
with prominent Chilean right-wingers and British Conservatives, mounted a counter­
campaign ‘blackwashing’ Pinochet’s 1973 nemesis, Salvador Allende (Lamb, Bamber and 
Webster 1999). The military in Chile showed restiveness too through various gestures of 
independence from the Concertaciori* s foreign policy.
it (Chicago Tribune 1998).
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Chilean foreign policy was increasingly awake to the need to engage the discursive 
strategy of justice used by the NGOs. Foreign Minister Insulza and Senate president Zaldivar 
began to argue in statements to the UN, Organisation of American States, and the IACHR, 
that the real issue was finding the right court for a trial, while maintaining sovereign equality 
among states. Insulza also slammed the aforementioned International Federation of Human 
Rights certification as shallow and inappropriate. There was an open acknowledgement of a 
historically negative ‘Pinochet-Chile’ image association. Chile, for the first time, participated 
directly as an intervener in the appeal process, pleading for the protection of the principle of 
sovereignty and not the person of Pinochet. While Chilean foreign policy emphasised 
possibilities of a domestic trial of Pinochet, the vagaries of Chilean justice were highlighted 
by the contrasts between the successful prosecution of the case of an assassinated trade union 
leader by Pinochet’s secret police, and the invocation of state security legislation to prevent 
the circulation of a book alleging pro-military bias among judges. The latter forced the 
book’s Chilean author to seek asylum abroad.
Chilean actions had aimed to muster internationally a defence of Westphalian 
principles concurrent with manoeuvring upon the legal terrain so far dominated by NGOs 
using the humanitarian regimes of international law. Chile enjoyed some success in getting 
Vatican, Polish and Czech support. The US reaction to the 24 March ruling was ambivalent 
between supporting Chilean democracy and humanitarian accountability. The British and 
Spanish governments remained consistently silent, stressing that the juridical process must 
operate autonomously.
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Phase IV: 15 April 1999  -  2 March 2000 -  From the Effects o f  Straw’s Second Authority 
to Proceed to Pinochet’s Release on Medical Grounds
Having consistently allied themselves to themes of ‘justice through prosecution’ and 
observance of the international law of human rights, the non-state anti-Pinochet sectors found 
their satisfaction at the 25 November 1998 and 24 March 1999 rulings re-vindicated when 
Jack Straw’s statement of 14 April 1999 sided with their arguments. There was even more 
satisfaction in the fact that Straw marginalised warnings by the Chilean government and 
Pinochet supporters about democratic conditions within Chile being disturbed by approval of 
extradition. Straw’s observation that the Chilean state had not requested Pinochet’s 
extradition homewards enlarged the importance of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance’s 
arguments that Chile was not prepared to try Pinochet. This strategy of holding Chilean 
domestic governance and other legal processes up to scrutiny against largely Anglo- 
American democratic standards continued till the end, even to the point of compelling Jack 
Straw to release Pinochet’s confidential Home Office-authorised medical report on grounds 
of transparency. Sensing the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance having the upper hand, pro- 
Pinochet individuals, groups, the Chilean military, and even Pinochet himself, went so far as 
to give critical interviews upbraiding the Concertacion’s foreign policy bungling, and 
making strong gestures of irritation to prod more aggressive diplomatic efforts from 
Santiago.
Chilean foreign policy appeared even more sharply focussed on showing off the 
probity and efficacy of domestic accountability. The Concertacion government’s free rein to 
the judiciary to shift the boundary-markers against prosecuting the military accomplices of 
Pinochet’s regime -  a total of six high-ranking (Colonel and above) officers were prosecuted 
in 1999 alone in contrast to 2 the preceding 9 years -  emphasised how the intermesticity of
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the Pinochet affair had widened considerably the domain of ‘foreign policy.’ Foreign 
ministry officials repeatedly emphasised that Chile could convince world public opinion that 
trying human rights violations were possible in Chile. A human rights roundtable dialogue 
began with military collaboration for the first time in August 1999. Nevertheless, these 
measures contrasted with the government’s weak claim that its foreign policy had 
successfully ‘delayed’ Straw’s 14 April 1999 ruling for reasons relating to Chilean 
sovereignty (AFP 1999b). Both outgoing foreign minister Insulza, and his successor Juan 
Gabriel Valdes, claimed they would strive for ‘sovereignty and justice’ (UPI 1999; 
Echeverria 1999). This was translated into proving what the anti-Pinochet non-state sector 
desired -  a trial -  while at the same time, probably in response to the pro-Pinochet lobby’s 
pressure of gestures, making bilateral and trilateral approaches to the British and Spanish 
governments to release Pinochet.
The international sector saw the Spanish foreign ministry trying to be receptive to 
Chilean proposals for bilateral arbitration, first under the terms of the International 
Convention Against Torture, and secondly, through the International Court of Justice. 
However, Spanish foreign policy too was paralysed by domestic political opposition stirred 
up by Baltasar Garzon, NGOs and political parties sympathetic to victims’ groups in Chile, 
as well as by questions of constitutional legality (BBC SWB 19991). There was also limited 
success for Chile in sending diplomatic signals by boycotting the Ibero-American summit in 
Cuba. The most effective tactic was the resort to an appeal for Pinochet’s release on 
humanitarian grounds, addressed both to Prime Minister Blair and the British Home Office. 
Although this ultimately led to Pinochet’s release on 2 March 2000, it was not before the
37 Such as Army Commander-in-Chief Ricardo Izurieta’s personal visit to Pinochet two days after Straw’s 14 
April ruling.
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anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance and Belgian prosecutors had attempted to force disclosure 
and reinterpretation of Pinochet’s medical certification through the Home Office, and once 
again, the British courts.
6.5 The Intermestic Correlation of Forces (ICF): Chilean Foreign Policy Encounters 
Non-State Initiative -  Phases I Through IV
As was explained in Chapter 4, the intermestic correlation of forces (ICF) operates 
within a context of soft power targeted at achieving foreign policy change through forming 
interest alliances across national frontiers, grouping states, non-state actors and institutions of 
global and international governance in a common cause. The ICF affects foreign policy by 
making information for policy-making choices available or unavailable, or by simultaneously 
broadening and puncturing policy boundaries. Information creation and recreation through 
discourse construction and alteration is the primary instrument by which both states and non­
state actors form alliances of opinion. ICF has four parts that the preceding chronology 
supports: the direct mobilisation of ideas, the sanctioning of states through regimes, the non­
state self-constitution of expertise, and the manufacturing of public opinion.
6.5.1 Direct Mobilisation of Ideas
In Phase I, the initiation of Pinochet’s arrest by a motley cast of an independent
Spanish judge, AI, other Chilean exiles, and human rights NGOs fleshed out the charges of
‘crimes against humanity’ into reality. AI’s stance on enforcing the international human
rights law was clear from its mission statement, and with specific reference to Pinochet
Amnesty International wants Pinochet brought to justice by the international 
community -  for the sake of the thousands of victims in Chile and their loved ones 
and because it will send a clear message to other dictators that they cannot torture and 
kill with impunity. (Bunting 2001a, “AI: Internal Working Notes”, 19 Apr.)
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On 10 October 1998, six days before Garzon’s formal request for detention, AI had openly
called for Pinochet’s arrest on torture charges (Novedades 1998), reprising similar but
unsuccessful attempts in 1994 and 1995 during Pinochet’s earlier London visits (Bunting
2001b, email, 23 Apr.). On 16 October, following testimonies by AFDD and Spain’s
Izquierda Unida (a left-wing political party) before Judge Garzon’s inquiry into Pinochet’s
role in Operation Condor, a criminal suit before the Spanish National Court read
In this court formal charge has been presented against Augusto Pinochet Ugarte [and 
other named military officials of the Chilean junta...], and other persons to be 
identified for alleged crimes of genocide, terrorism and torture, lodged by the solicitor 
Sr. Sanchez Masa in representation of the Association of Relatives of the Detained 
and Disappeared of Chile ...; as well as the enlargement of the charge by the 
Izquierda Unida against Augusto Pinochet for the seizure and disappearance of 
multiple persons who are identified in the annexes which accompany the mentioned 
“Rettig Report”.38
These same themes were carried into Garzon’s request through Interpol to Britain on 14
October, which sought British police reports on whether Pinochet was available
.. .to provide a statement regarding his alleged involvement in the criminal activities 
under investigation in this Court, within the so-called Condor operation between the 
years 1975 and 1983 which are imputed to the authorities which governed at the time 
in Chile as well as in Argentina and which could constitute crimes of Genocide, 
Terrorism and Torture. (Spain 2000, 55)
Two days later, an order of arrest was faxed direct to London by Garzon for those crimes
substantiated by the jurisdiction of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch of Spain. This law
incorporated provisions of the respective International Conventions Against Genocide and of
Torture, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On that same night of 16
October 1998, a British magistrate signed the arrest warrant against Pinochet that was
immediately implemented as a procedure of national law. This chain of action in Phase I
from discourse to action operated when ‘crimes’ were categorised, ‘targets’ identified and
38 Sumario 19/97 (2001). Author’s translation.
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existing ‘law’ with cross-border implications invoked in a domestic and extra-territorial 
context.
6.5.2 The Sanctioning of Ideas through Regimes
The idea of ‘crimes against humanity’, defined broadly in international law as 
murder, extermination and torture against individuals or groups, harks back to the Nuremberg 
War Crimes Trials after World War Two, and its legal teeth had been sharpened in the 
largely customary basis of international law. However, its sanctioning power could only be 
applied in the post-Cold War context of global information space. Kenneth Roth, executive 
and advocacy director of Human Rights Watch, AI’s co-intervener in the legal hearings, 
explained in Phase I that the ‘temper’ of the world ‘public mood’ had created political will 
and legal momentum for implementing international law. In Britain, New Labour’s ethical 
foreign policy had made it difficult to object to Pinochet’s arrest. The ‘twin genocides’ of 
Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s ‘seem to have given the rest of the world a guilty 
conscience, and the United Nations Security Council has created war crimes tribunals for 
judging the perpetrators of these ghastly events’, while the indictments of these tribunals 
have politically marginalised troublemakers from the peace accords (Roth 1998; Human 
Rights Watch 1998, xv-xvi). These events also spurred the idea that an International Criminal 
Court (ICC) be established ‘to try the gravest crimes’, reaching a culmination in July 1998 
when the Rome Statute of the ICC was open to states for signature and ratification. In the 
written judgements for the 25 November 1998 ruling allowing extradition, and concurrently 
the irrelevance of immunity to charges of torture, murder and hostage-taking, this ‘public 
mood’ of punitive international law was taken into account by all five Lords as favouring 
prosecution in one way or another. But where they differed lay in whether Pinochet could
339
enjoy immunity as Head of State. The three-strong majority tended to side with Lord Steyn’s
view, and hence AI and Human Rights Watch as well, in that
.. .the development of international law since the Second World War justifies the 
conclusion that by the time of the 1973 coup d’etat, and certainly ever since, 
international law condemned genocide, torture, hostage-taking and crimes against 
humanity (during an armed conflict or in peace time) as international crimes 
deserving of punishment. Given this state of international law, it seems to me difficult 
to maintain that the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts performed in 
the exercise of the functions of a head of state.39
The extraterritoriality of international law as an ally of human rights NGOs is
exemplified in AI’s solicitor Patrick Duffy’s citation in the Lords’ hearings (House of Lords
Proceedings 25 February 1999, 19) in Phase III of Articles 4 and 5.2 of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)
which Spain, Britain and Chile had all ratified or incorporated into national law by 1998:
Article 4.1: Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its 
criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by 
any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
Article 5.2: Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is 
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him...
Concurring with this interpretation, Lord Hutton, in his written contribution supporting the
ruling of 24 March 1999 pronounced:
The alleged acts of torture by Senator Pinochet were carried out under the colour of 
his position as head of state, but they cannot be regarded as functions of a head of 
state under international law when international law expressly prohibits torture as a 
measure which a state can employ in any circumstances whatsoever and has made it 
an international crime. (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999b, 899)
*
39 Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet (1998,1506). Italics mine.
40 Reproduced from Evans (1999, 338). Italics mine. Note that this regime is also known as the International 
Convention Against Torture.
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In Phase IV, at the end of the extradition hearings of 27-30 September 1999 following
Straw’s second ‘authority-to-proceed’, AI issued a statement exhorting Britain to follow
through other international regime obligations:
Amnesty International, which recently called on New Scotland Yard to make public if 
it is investigating Augusto Pinochet over the torturing to death of people in Chile 
during his rule -  has repeatedly stressed that under the European Convention on 
Extradition, rejecting Spain’s extradition request and failing to prosecute in the UK is 
simply not an option. (Amnesty International 1999)
Acknowledging solidarity with this pro-regime trend, the Global South Coordinator for the
NGO Coalition for an ICC commented that while this campaign had no mandate to opine on
the Pinochet case, ‘our member organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch and others have actively participated in the case mentioned.’ (Gonzalez 2001, email,
19 Feb.)
6.5.3 The Self-Constitution of Expertise
The non-state actors’ claim to expertise through all four phases must be understood in 
terms of firstly, the evidence they possessed in regard to all crimes against humanity alleged 
against Pinochet’s government; secondly, the promotion of extraterritorial punishment of 
human rights violations via international law; and thirdly, their denigration of the 
possibilities of fair trials in Chile over human rights violations on the grounds that 
authoritarian domestic laws would obstruct them, or that they would trigger a recalcitrant 
response from the military and political Right.41 By contrast, the claim to expertise of official 
Chilean foreign policy would be derived from the Concertacion's political legitimacy arising 
from the circumstances of the Pinochet-era designed constitution, the elections won under it, 
and their accompanying constraints. The Concertacion's foreign policy could assert 
competence on behalf of the Chilean judiciary and democracy in so far as its external
341
sovereignty was not questioned through its incomplete internal sovereignty. The asymmetry 
in expertise was a direct manifestation of the informational civil war traced out in Section 
6.3.
The pattern of the democratic transition afforded a limited form of justice for human 
rights abuses in the Rettig Report, which categorised and documented violations without 
automatic legal effect upon the perpetrators. A salient contribution to its compilation by the 
Vicariate, the AFDD and CODEPU had, as mentioned earlier, been officially acknowledged 
(Rettig Commission 1991, 3). In this way, the Rettig Report was one manifestation of 
Chilean NGOs’ evidentiary expertise that was wielded to legal effect in Garzon’s initial and 
subsequent charge sheets against Pinochet, some of which have been quoted earlier. The fact 
that both the AFDD and CODEPU chose actively to participate in Garzon’s inquiries 
signalled that up till 1998, legal justice could not be obtained within Chile against Pinochet 
and his close aides. This was to be the line of interpretation put out in the world media 
beginning in Phase I, and which would be carried through to the end as a combined Chilean 
and nascent global civil society reading of Chile’s domestic governing incapability. In Phase 
I, this occurred not only through web-based calls to human rights action networks to ‘Help 
Extradite Pinochet’ (Equipo Nizkor 1998) by writing letters to persuade prominent decision­
makers in Britain and Spain, but also through interviews with AI, Chile Democratico's 
Carlos Reyes, and with assorted Chilean exiles who publicly volunteered additional personal 
testimonies to violations.42 This non-state cause was swelled by individual and group 
dissenting opinions voiced from within the Concertacion government, notably socialist MP 
Isabel Allende’s approval of British and Spanish actions, and her comparing of Pinochet’s
41 These were recurrent themes in interviews with the AFDD, CODEPU, Chile Democratico, AI and the PIDH.
42 Details in Section 6.5.4.
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guilt to Hitler’s (Delano 1998). Another socialist MP, Juan Pablo Letelier, also a descendant 
of one of Pinochet’s more famous victims, called for a foreign ‘detergent’:
We would love to be able to wash our dirty clothes at home. But we need detergent.
The opposition parties, given our particular transition, are blocking that possibility.
The possibility of the administration of justice of human rights violation cases in
Chile until now has been basically closed - negated. (The Times 1998)
Throughout Phase I, Chilean foreign policy adhered to a standard Westphalian 
defence of juridical and political sovereignty among states, and from there extrapolated the 
principle of Pinochet’s immunity from all foreign legal proceedings. This statist argument 
was intensely supported by the formal members of President Frei’s government, the right- 
wing political parties, and the military. However, the trading of charges of sedition and 
treason between parties of the Left, Right and Centre hampered the unitary image of 
sovereignty which arguments in foreign policy required.43 This factionalism was aggravated 
by street protests for and against Pinochet’s return, and the thematic conflation of Pinochet’s 
return and his immunity. Incidentally, Chilean foreign minister Insulza admitted twice on 29 
October and 18 November 1998 that global antipathy towards Pinochet was a given and that, 
despite Chilean democratic transition and prosperity, ‘legitimizing a military dictatorship that 
never had international legitimacy cannot be measured as an effect of reintegration [of Chile 
into global community.]’ (BBC SWB 1998c)44 Noticeably, Pinochet’s legal defence was left 
to private lawyers, none of whom had been sanctioned by the Chilean state. However, in 
court, they did not hesitate to invoke Chilean foreign ministry arguments, and cited the 
danger of democratic regression in Chile should Pinochet be extradited, thereby triggering 
further political upheaval45
43 An assessment admitted by Chilean foreign minister Insulza (BBC SWB 1998a).
44 See also ibid.
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In their written judgements on 25 November 1998, the majority of the three Lords 
tended to favour the ‘expertise’ claimed by the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance. Lord 
Nicholls wrote
It cannot be stated too plainly that the acts of torture and hostage-taking with which 
Senator Pinochet is charged are offences under United Kingdom statute law. This 
country has taken extraterritorial jurisdiction for these crimes...Arguments about the 
effect on this country’s diplomatic relations with Chile if extradition were allowed to 
proceed, or with Spain if refused, are not matters for the court. These are, par 
excellence, political matters for the Secretary of State... (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte 
Pinochet 1998, 1502)
Lord Steyn also wrote
Relying on the information contained in the request for extradition, it is necessary to 
expand the cryptic account of the facts in the warrant. The request alleges a 
systematic campaign of repression against various groups in Chile after the military 
coup on 11 September 1973...[Details supplied]...The case is that he [Pinochet] 
ordered and procured the criminal acts which the warrant and request for extradition 
specify.. .The House is not required to examine the correctness of the allegations. The 
House must assume the correctness o f the allegations as the backcloth o f the 
questions o f law arising on this appeal.4
Lord Hoffmann concurred completely with Lords Nicholls and Steyn without elaboration,
thus putting a seal on non-state expertise as the more persuasive. Jack Straw’s authority to
proceed issuing from this ruling similarly downplayed its impact on Britain’s bilateral
relations with Chile and on Chilean democracy, concluding that the extradition request was
made ‘in good faith in the interests of justice.’ (Straw 2000, 186, para.23)
From this triumphal point, non-state expertise endured a trial of impartiality itself in 
Phase II when a tip-off alerted the Pinochet defence team to Lord Hoffmann’s links with AI. 
While the financial, charitable and administrative proximity of Hoffmann to the human rights 
NGO need not be examined in detail here, it was sufficient in the perception of both the 
Pinochet team and his fellow jurists to reach the unanimous conclusion ‘that public
45 Case for the Respondent (Pinochet), para.70 (House of Lords 2000, 123).
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confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice would be shaken if his decision 
were allowed to stand.’ (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999a, 294) Lord Hope 
commented that it
.. .is inescapable that Amnesty International has associated itself in these proceedings 
with the position of the prosecutor. The prosecution is not being brought in its name, 
but its interest in the case is to achieve die same result because it also seeks to bring 
Senator Pinochet to justice...It has for many years conducted an international 
campaign against those individuals whom it has identified as having been responsible 
for torture, extra-judicial executions and disappearances...[Hoffmann’s] relationship 
with Amnesty International was such that he was, in effect, acting as a judge in his 
own cause. (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999a, 290-291)
Two points arising from the ‘Hoffmann affair’ can be analysed. Firstly, it showed that ICF
politics do considerably transcend borders and pervade structures purporting to handle
intemational-to-global justice. Secondly, the heed paid to ‘public confidence’ openly
acknowledged the existence of global information space. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s
prefacing comments on world public opinion in reference to Hoffmann’s bias heightened
scrutiny of both non-state and state expertise in the next phases:
The hearing of this case, both before the Divisional Court and in your Lordships’ 
House, produced an unprecedented degree of public interest not only in this country 
but worldwide. The case raises fundamental issues of public international law and 
their interaction with the domestic law of this country... There are many Chileans and 
supporters of human rights who have no doubt as to his guilt and are anxious to bring 
him to trial somewhere in the world. There are many others who are his supporters 
and believe that he was the saviour of Chile. Yet a third believe that, whatever the 
truth of the matter, it is a matter for Chile to sort out internally and not for third 
parties to interfere in the delicate balance of contemporary Chilean politics by seeking 
to try him outside Chile. (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999a, 276)
Although the Hoffmann affair did not assist Chilean foreign policy goals 
significantly, it reinforced its awareness of the ideological mass of the intermestic correlation 
of forces ranged against a raison d’etat-style defence of Pinochet. The Hoffmann affair also 
catalysed a consensus within the Chilean foreign policy system (by which is meant the
46 Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet (1998, 1503-1504). Italics mine.
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members of the cabinet, president and the foreign minister) that a foreign policy of delivering 
Pinochet home had to be mounted through articulating a community of principles among 
states and non-state actors, or in short, a semblance of both inside-out and outside-in 
leadership. This came into play in Phase III, when Santiago defended principles of 
‘international community, national justice’ on both diplomatic and legal fronts, with the latter 
translating into direct participation in the House of Lords appeals. On 24 December 1998, 
only seven days following the Hoffmann verdict, foreign minister Insulza linked the assertion 
of Chilean sovereignty to an exercise of national responsibility, a critique of Spanish 
colonialism, and in an inclusive reference to non-state agendas said ‘I want justice to be done 
in Chile, but I do not feel obliged to go and prove it to anyone.’ (BBC SWB 1998g)
The new discursive diplomatic strategy for Phase III began quickly with President
Frei addressing foreign ambassadors in Chile on the need to respect diplomatic immunity and
territoriality of justice in support of the ‘international community’. Foreign minister Insulza
wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for help, citing the impropriety of judges without
international mandate trying a state’s domestic affairs. He also emphasised the
consequentialist argument about trying Pinochet abroad, saying it could shatter domestic
democratic tranquillity (BBC SWB 1999a; Insulza 2001). Insulza adopted the same argument
in a separate letter to the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States, but
warned that the Chilean courts could sue British authorities for ‘obstructing justice’ by
holding Pinochet (Xinhua 1999). The Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister Mariano Fernandez
backed up his superior by starkly outlining the legal choice facing Britain:
[The] English will have to decide what is more important: to extradite Pinochet 
because a foreign judge has requested that with arguments that are politically 
important but legally weak or to respect principles of international law [among 
states.] (Quoted in Gallardo 1999)
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Ostensibly to support the ‘national justice’ argument, reinforcing statements about a home 
trial for Pinochet had increasingly been made by various Chilean ministers, even from the 
Pinochet-era appointed Supreme Court President Roberto Davila. To buttress the overall 
defence of ‘international community, national justice’, Chile solicited the intervention of the 
Vatican whose subsequent letter to Britain requested respect for Chile’s sovereign equality 
among states and its national reconciliation process. When the Vatican letter was revealed in 
late February after the third House of Lords hearings had concluded, it drew intense criticism 
from the AFDD, Chile Democratico and other anti-Pinochet intermestic allies (Deane and 
Hamilton 1999).
Both inside and outside the Court, the anti-Pinochet non-state groups were already 
reasserting their expertise in disabusing world public opinion47 by undercutting Santiago’s 
claims of a possible home trial for Pinochet through public counter-statements by Chilean 
human rights lawyers Roberto Garreton, Nelson Caucoto, Hector Salazar, Carmen Hertz and 
Juan Bustos (Global News Wire: CHIPS 1999b; BBC SWB 1999c). All of them had been 
prominently involved in attempting prosecutions against Pinochet’s aides before 1998. On 17 
January 1999, amidst the Lords’ hearings, Isabel Allende published an open letter -  
‘Pinochet without Hatred’ -  in the New York Times deriding Pinochet’s democratic legacy 
as having been built on ironies, described Chile as ‘traumatized, like an abused child’, and 
approved foreign intervention in getting public ‘moral censure’ of Pinochet, thereby helping 
to shatter fear within Chile (I. Allende 1999). The credibility of these claims were 
dramatically justified the next day when a former intelligence chief under Pinochet, General
47 This is explained in Chapter 3 as a tendentious expression of a dominant collective conviction by various 
actors backed by a desire to give effect to it within global information space. World public opinion need not be
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Mena, threatened to charge Allende, other socialist party members and human rights activists
with assorted crimes such as ‘illegal association’ and sedition under state security laws
(London Observer Service 1999). In another direct challenge, Human Rights Watch
submitted a statement to the Lords’ hearings on the inefficacy of Chilean justice authored by
the earlier-mentioned Roberto Garreton, a former judicial director of the Vicariate, a Chilean
ambassador to the UN Commission on Human Rights 1990-94, and a practising lawyer in
Chile. Part of his submission read:
The foremost obstacle to Chile’s prosecution of Pinochet is the April 1978 amnesty 
from prosecution that the Chilean military granted itself for the crimes committed 
from the September 1973 coup through March 1978 -  the period in which the bulk of 
[the] Pinochet regime’s crimes were committed. The Chilean Supreme Court has 
repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of this self-amnesty. Any theoretical 
possibility of declaring the amnesty ‘null and void’ would be blocked by Pinochet’s 
supporters in the Senate, including some Senators not democratically elected. (R. 
Garreton 2000, 211)
In court, the discursive alliance between the Crown Prosecution Service, AI and
Human Rights Watch produced a steady reinforcement of a genealogical reading of post-
1945 international law as culminating in the elimination of automatic immunity for both
present and former Heads of State. Professor Christopher Greenwood, an international law
scholar arguing for the prosecution, said
the state itself cannot authorise or order except through the medium of an individual 
and eventually one comes up against the proposition which is at the heart of the 
Respondent’s [Pinochet’s] case, which is that these were official acts because the 
Respondent said so, because the Respondent decided that this was what he was going 
to do, and that becomes a self-justifying principle in relation to immunity which, in 
our submission, cannot be part of the modem international law. It goes wholly against 
the trend of the way in which international law has developed. (House of Lords 
Proceedings 19 January 1999, 62)
representative. It is political when it gives sufficient impression that it is the moral interest of a majority of 
global actors, both state and non-state.
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Speaking more directly for AI, AFDD and the Medical Foundation for Care of the Victims of
Torture, Peter Duffy QC interpreted the extraterritoriality of Section 134 (covering torture) in
Britain’s Criminal Justice Act 1988 as implying
[F]irstly in it [Britain’s] Parliament has decided that a criminal wrong answerable 
before our courts occurs regardless of the nationality of the alleged torturer or where 
the alleged act of torture has occurred; secondly, that public officials or persons 
acting in an official capacity are responsible for the crime; and thirdly, that the crime 
occurs...in the performance or purported performance of official duties. (House of 
Lords Proceedings 25 January 1999,13)
That the Lords in their third hearing were partial to this line of expert reasoning was evident
in their disapproval of immunity in extradition proceedings and in expunging Garzon’s list of
charges only according to the date of implementation of the international torture convention
in Britain. That left two charges -  of torture and conspiracy to torture -  available for the use
of the anti-Pinochet alliance. Chilean foreign policy expertise had no substantive counter to
non-state claims of self-constituted expertise allied to international law in Phase IV, except to
shift the Westphalian community argument towards the invocation of ‘humanitarian justice’,
connected to Pinochet’s physical health. Even then, the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance
held up Pinochet’s release by questioning the credibility of Pinochet’s secret medical
assessments, citing rival medical expertise.
6.5.4 Manufacturing Subjective Public Opinion
Due to the intermestic nature of the extradition controversy, references here to public 
opinion should be understood interchangeably as ‘world public opinion’. Moreover, the 
notion of publicness discussed in Chapter 3 is spatially infinite in global information space. 
The author’s interviews with the CODEPU, AFDD, AI and the exile groups Chile 
Democratico and PIDH confirmed that publicness was constituted in overlaps of the ‘legal’ 
and the ‘political’ spheres, the British and Chilean conservative-right-wing campaign for
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Pinochet, in the fight for substantive globalization of international human rights law against 
its realist opponents, as well as within the three House of Lords’ Hearings. In short, the 
causes tend to construct intermestic correlations of partisan forces because of their open- 
ended nature and their inherent demonstration effects across time and space. Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson had confirmed this in his assessment of three world public opinion constituencies 
in the judgement of 17 December 1998 over the Hoffman affair (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte 
Pinochet 1999a, 276). The global demonstration effects have also been strongly alluded to in 
the way the intermestic correlations mobilised ideas, sanctioned states through regimes, and 
self-constituted expertise on the normative options surrounding the symbolism of Pinochet.
In the words of one activist, ‘campaigning cannot be restricted to one medium.... 
[And ajlthough we cannot control the media, we can control the information we put out to 
them i.e. control over sources of Internet, TV, newspapers et cetera.’ (Drouilly 2001, 
interview, 13 Aug.) Another activist from the PIDH, which contributed significantly to the 
NGO media campaign against Pinochet, stressed the advantages of being an NGO-cum- 
network with little or no fixed infrastructure, hierarchy and assets. Firstly, there was freedom 
of action within broad guidelines, and secondly, it had the ability to avoid state and pro- 
Pinochet corporate retaliation against immobile assets (Bell 2001, interview, 16 Jul.). This
48 These understandings of world publicness in campaigning can be seen in AI (Southern Andean Regional 
Action Network) coordinator David Pearson’s statement on the difficulty in separating legal and political 
processes: ‘[T]here were two agendas, one legal the other political and it was important that Amnesty was seen 
to be following and influencing the first and not being embroiled in the second. In court the distinction was 
readily made but on the streets and in the media it was difficult to avoid at least a perception that there was an 
overlap. Amnesty was always at pains to emphasise its pursuit of justice and to refute any suggestion that it had 
a political agenda... Fortunately, the Home Secretary responded positively to Amnesty’s plea that Pinochet’s 
crimes were no more Chile’s business than they were the business of Britain or Spain. The principle that certain 
crimes are so heinous that they override sovereignty, first propounded by Robert Jackson at Nuremberg, was 
urged and received.’ (Pearson 2001, email, 31 Mar.) Carlos Reyes of Chile Democratico also took the view that 
battles of opinion cut across legal and political boundaries and ‘when Pinochet was stripped of his immunity as 
head of state[,] a historical precedent was set.’ (Reyes-Manzo 2001, interview, 3 Jul.) Nicole Drouilly of PIDH 
was also of the view that the Pinochet prosecution occurred in a context where ‘[hjumane standards have been
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fluid ensemble run by the overwhelmingly anti-Pinochet Chilean exiles49 enabled Chile- 
based human rights NGOs to wage the informational civil war against Pinochet with diligent 
partners, and with a certain impunity from the authoritarian strictures within Chile. To him, 
the end of the Cold War helped enormously due to the change in perception it brought among 
right-wing politicians throughout Latin America, North America and Europe: the latter could 
no longer plausibly justify human rights abuses when trends were favouring openness and 
democracy worldwide. Soviet glasnost was cited as an example (Bell 2001, interview, 16 
Jul.). This activist acknowledged there were tensions between ‘hardliner’ and ‘idealistic’ 
factions in deciding how to manage a common theme into the media strategy. The former 
wanted to emphasise the victimisation of socialists, the ‘fascist dictatorship’ and ‘the 
structuring of oppression’ while the ‘idealists’ stressed ‘truth and justice’ versus ‘silence and 
impunity.’ This ideological division was resolved, network-style, by creating lateral working 
groups which carried out a division of labour on organising public demonstrations, ‘thinking 
strategy’, ‘thinking out all possible themes for articulation’ and so on. However, a consensus 
was maintained on a covering media theme of ‘truth and justice’, a kind of lowest common 
denominator to be woven into all interviews by victims of the dictatorship, a category which 
covered ‘just about everybody in the exile community.’ There was also to be ‘no labelling of 
Salvador Allende as a “socialist victim”; he was, like many other Chileans, a “victim of 
injustice”.’ Operationally,
There was to be flexibility through the self-exercised autonomy in giving interviews,
and releasing images and other sound-bites to capture the public imagination, with the
set since the Nuremberg trials, and this makes for a global society with a single set of moral standards.’ 
(Drouilly 2001, interview, 13 Aug.) Publicness was thus construed in multiple global dimensions.
49 Reflecting a Chilean cultural obsession with creating organisations to handle all socio-political activities, 
most exiles, according to Dr Bell (2001, interview, 16 Jul.), operated initially under the umbrella of Chile 
Democratico. However, due to schisms in political perspective between management and membership arising 
from the 1990 transition to the Concertacion government in Chile, the decision was taken to create independent 
groups to campaign for human rights, separate from those catering to non-political activities such as sports and 
education. Hence the plethora of Chilean exile organisations (e.g. the PIDH, the Chile Committee for Justice 
and Chile Democratico) working in loose formation towards extraditing Pinochet in 1998-2000.
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condition that all abided by the common theme. We learned this from observing the 
media and what they reported in the TV and the press. The concept of ‘one voice 
through many voices’ was our operational guide -  this meant saying the same thing in 
many different forms and using different mediums. For example, the idea of white 
balloons, the multiple crosses on Parliament Square, the red-painted hands and so on 
-  all were intended to associate in the public mind the issue of extradition with truth 
and justice. To ensure coherence, we kept discussion of our cause to a narrow cluster 
of themes. (Bell 2001, interview, 16 Jul.)
Although most activists did not single out the Internet as the primary medium for 
speed and connectivity, emphasis was commonly put on solidarity among human rights 
groups as the enabler of joint campaigning through ‘Action Alerts’ and information 
coordination by fax, telephones and email. Both Bell and Drouilly of the PIDH recalled for 
instance that when Home Secretary Straw refused to reveal Pinochet’s medical records in 
early January 2000,
a bombardment of his office by 70,000 emails and faxes from various human rights 
and Chilean exile groups in the Europe, the Americas, Canada and Australia produced 
a clear response. It should also be pointed out that the sustained protests between 
1998-2000 for the extradition of Pinochet to Spain[,l in the UK and the world[, were] 
coordinated almost completely through the Internet. 0
‘Action Alerts’, which were utilised at critical junctures by AI and the lefrwing Spanish NGO
Equipo Nizkor, which associated with the Garzon prosecution, consisted of letters with a
standardised content (listing Pinochet’s crimes and exhortations for due legal process) to be
sent out by networks in tandem,51 or in parallel with the PIDH. In sum, the anti-Pinochet
intermestic alliance’s world public opinion strategy comprised the use of fluid horizontal
networks to publicise common themes based on solidarity of human rights principles.
Ostensibly, this contrasted with the pro-Pinochet lobby in the UK attempting to ‘blackwash’
50 Bell (2001, interview, 16 Jul.). This account is echoed by the interview with Drouilly (2001, interview, 13 
Aug.).
51 A sample of this is the “Help Extradite Pinochet” document (Equipo Nizkor 1998).
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Salvador Allende and downplaying atrocities under Pinochet, or the Chilean military’s public 
hints of disaffection with Chilean foreign policy in Phases III and IV.
As an interim summary, we can say that the idea of ICF elucidates four points. 
Firstly, intermestic correlations of agendas and sympathies can distort foreign policy by 
initiating actions that combine domestic grievances with external humanitarian ideals. The 
informational civil war engaged global non-state support against Pinochet as a symbol of 
humanitarian injustice since 1973. This mixture only acted to sanction Pinochet in a proto- 
global court in the post-Cold War era due to the ‘decompression’ of the effectiveness of 
international law coinciding with the passing of bipolar geopolitical competition. Secondly, 
the intermestic correlations of human rights advocates seriously confronted statist realpolitik 
with the soft power of global humane standards, because intermesticity undermined the 
unitary actor basis of foreign policy. Chilean foreign policy and its theoretical commonalities 
with Pinochet’s legal defence could not consistently claim to speak for a united Chile, given 
the publicity of pro-global dissenting discourses of Chilean NGOs and party members of the 
mling Concertacion government. Thirdly, the ICF threatens to amplify and invert notions of 
community. Pinochet’s legal defence had hung on customary legal ideas of nationally- 
derived ‘Head of State immunity’ from prosecution abroad, and Chilean foreign policy 
likewise asserted sovereign equality of national communities as a recognised pillar of a 
Westphalian international community. The intermestic correlations created a community of 
interests which denied both of the former claims, creating a crisis of rival discursive 
communities in global information space.
353
6.6 The Competition of Ideas and their Resolution (I): Attempted Intermestic 
Socialisation (IS) by Non-State Actors
This section and the next further explains how the intermestic correlation of forces 
are considered to have enjoyed qualified success in inducing reactions in Chilean foreign 
policy instead of the latter acting as the initiator of events. Intermestic socialisation (IS) 
occurs where non-state actors hold states to account through regimes they sign or ratify. It is 
one way in which ideas in international relations, when administered, operate to change the 
actions of states and the lives of citizens. It is socialisation in the sense that ideas are 
institutionally and geographically agreed and sustained upon the principle of state signatories 
promising to effect legal adherence to regime norms and rules in relevant domestic and 
external matters. Although implementation as either domestic or international law depends 
on a state’s domestic political will, once a sizeable majority of states ratify the regime, it can 
be invoked over time by non-state actors and signatory states alike to psychologically compel 
compliance through generating critical reports and creating a discourse for change involving 
domestic lobbies, transnational groups, other states and international organisations. While 
ICF mobilises information for sanctioning and confrontation, IS specifically coaxes 
adherence to existing norms. Thus elaborating IS does not cover fresh ground, instead it is 
one complementary effect of intermestic action by non-state-state coalitions against Chilean 
foreign policy objectives.
Two main intermestic actions during the extradition controversy qualify as IS: the 
non-state intermestic alliance with the principles and implementation of international law, 
especially on human rights; and the alliance between Chilean NGOs and their global 
partners. The alliance with international law manifested itself firstly in the direct legal
52 See the respective chronological phases in Section 6.4.
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intervention by AFDD, AI, Human Rights Watch and the Medical Foundation for Care of the 
Victims of Torture.53 This was meant, firstly, to associate with Garzon’s initiative in 
launching the extradition bid. It was also to reinforce the Crown Prosecution Service’s efforts 
in arguing that international law obligations denied both Pinochet’s main legal defence, that 
of Head of State immunity or such-like from 1973-90, and diplomatic immunity for his 
September 1998 visit to Britain. Discourse is integral to the widely acknowledged reliance of 
international legal interpretation on customary law: that is, the recognition of ‘good 
precedents’ in bilateral and multilateral treaties, national legislation on diplomatic privileges, 
as well as national court judgements on third party disputes between various combinations of 
foreign policies and between foreign and national parties (Henkin 1979, 23; Harris 1998, 23- 
45). Professor Greenwood argued for the prosecution in the third Lords’ hearings in Phase III 
that:
[SJpeaking generally, in embarking on international law, their Lordships are to a great 
extent in the realm of opinion, and in estimating the value of opinion it is permissible 
not only to seek a consensus of views, but to select what appear to be the better views 
upon the question. (House of Lords Proceedings 20 January 1999, 13)
In another instance, Professor Ian Brownlie, another international law scholar speaking
directly on AI’s behalf argued that
we are here concerned with important areas of international law which have been 
domesticated; they are not, so to speak, out there somewhere, but they are 
incorporated in English statutes.. .[A]t the end of the day, the court has to consider the 
proper relationship of a set of English statutes dealing with torture and other 
international crimes together with the Act covering state immunity. (House of Lords 
Proceedings 25 January 1999, 12)
This is clearly discourse that simplifies and constructs Pinochet’s culpability in the
considerations of the judges. The entire section treating non-state self-constitution of
53 This is the cumulative list of NGO interveners in the First and Third Lords hearings. The second involved 
largely AI over the Hoffmann bias allegation.
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expertise in human rights, Chilean political conditions and international law buttresses non­
state actors’ socialisation capabilities in this regard.
Just as importantly, their alliance with international legal principles and 
implementation enables non-state actors to expose previously hidden or distorted historical 
truths about past and present human rights violations in legal and open media forums. Such 
exposure also engenders awareness of individuals’ rights and legal protections. The NGO 
CODEPU for example, stressed that trying Pinochet was a symbolic attempt to outflank the 
Chilean political Right’s whitewashing of their degree of historical responsibility for 
rupturing democracy and supporting military violence (Espinoza 2001, interview, 23 May). 
The AFDD was pledged to be an eternal witness for victims who are ‘detained and 
disappeared’ under Pinochet, and their legal actions reflect their motto: ‘If I am in your 
memory, I am part of history.’ (AFDD 2000)54 AI and Human Rights Watch wished an 
international law prosecution of Pinochet to send a signal to torturers and dictators 
worldwide that they are not immune from punishment for crimes against humanity. So for all 
these non-state objectives, agglomerated under the umbrella of victims’ justice, international 
law, once implemented even in small degrees, such as the listing of victims’ names on charge 
sheets, enables the arraignment of unjust states or portions of their political institutions.
The second main intermestic action classifiable as IS is the alliance between Chilean 
NGOs and global partners for a dual purpose of continuing an informational civil war arising 
out of Pinochet’s 1973 coup, and in globalizing the struggle for a humane world order. As 
has been elaborated in Sections 6.3 and 6.5, having allies and proxies among ex-Salvador 
Allende advisor and lawyer Juan Garces, Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon, AI, Human Rights
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Watch, Medical Foundation for Care of the Victims of Torture, and the services of 
international law scholars such as Christopher Greenwood and Ian Brownlie, facilitated the 
application against Pinochet of international conventions against torture, genocide and 
hostage-taking in Phases I and III. The judgements in these phases in turn compelled British 
Home Secretary Straw twice to authorise extradition proceedings over Chilean foreign policy 
objections. Extraterritoriality of law was driven through the national jurisdictions of Britain 
and Spain against Chile, and this was achieved through a discursive non-state strategy that 
fettered British and Spanish foreign policies in the sense that the international laws invoked 
were operating along established lines of domestic legal processes.
In ensuring that both British and Spanish states did not brake the operation of normal 
legal processes in extraditing Pinochet, the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance campaigned for 
probity in all judicial investigations and procedures. This soft power operation could be seen 
in Phase II when AI and the Chilean NGOs peacefully respected the ruling over the 
Hoffmann bias and the overturning of the first Lords’ ruling approving extradition 
proceedings. From this high ground, many intermestic parties castigated the partial nature of 
the Chilean judiciary (Press Association Newsfile 1998; Global News Wire: CHIPS 1998). In 
Phase IV, when Secretary Straw was ‘minded’ to release Pinochet on confidentially 
examined health grounds, the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance was able to convince a 
British court to force Straw to disclose Pinochet’s medical examination using the same 
transparency of law argument (Sengupta 2000). Also, the nature of intermestic alliances 
ensured that the British, Spanish, even Chilean and American foreign policies, could not 
aggressively end the Pinochet affair through pure raison d’etat. This was because sizeable 
domestic constituencies dissented: the radical Left within Britain’s ‘New Labour’ Party, the
54 Author’s translation.
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socialist opposition parties and sections of the judiciary in Spain, the high profile of the NGO 
protests and intra-Concertacion fissures in Chile, as well as the ambivalence between the 
Clinton Administration and Attorney General Janet Reno in the US. These fractured official 
positions on their sympathies for and against the anti-Pinochet human rights campaign 
(Weiner 1998; Parker 1998; Gooch and Hopkins 1999). Moreover, they forestalled a unitary 
front for foreign policy coordination among Washington, London, Madrid and Santiago. IS 
by the anti-Pinochet alliance was further assisted by its alignment with the global intermestic 
campaign for the implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC signed by 120 states 
(Britain, Spain and Chile included) three months before Pinochet’s arrest.
IS displaced Chilean foreign policy in two key directions away from its initial 
defence of state immunity for Pinochet. Firstly, it shifted its case for returning Pinochet from 
one pitched at diplomatic immunity to one defending principles of justice at different levels. 
Secondly, it was merged increasingly into pronouncements on micro-processes of domestic 
politics such as whether the Chilean judiciary met Anglo-American standards of 
independence, whether the nascent democracy would unravel if the transition ‘deal’ of 1988- 
90 was disturbed, or if human rights were being protected constitutionally. During Phases II 
to III, after the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance successfully provoked the first Lords’ 
ruling invalidating Pinochet’s immunity from international human rights conventions, 
Chilean foreign affairs spokespersons began articulating a defence of Pinochet on grounds of 
‘principles and not the person’. They claimed that achieving both sovereign and personal 
justice required a legitimate venue of either Chile or a properly functioning international 
court such as the ICJ, or the impending ICC (BBC SWB 1999b; Bellaby 1999; BBC SWB 
1999f). Additionally, the Concertacion government seemed willing to guarantee a trial of
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Pinochet in Chile in spite of the risk of manipulation by authoritarian enclaves in its political 
institutions. When on human rights grounds, in Phases III and IV, President Frei conducted 
his first meeting with the AFDD since entering office in 1994, he called on the military to be 
forthcoming on information on the disappeared. He then initiated a pioneering roundtable 
dialogue between the military, the Catholic Church and human rights lawyers on accounting 
for violations during 1973-90 (Global News Wire: CHIPS 1999a; BBC SWB 1999k; Bellos 
1999).
By Phase IV, Chilean foreign policy had also begun floating proposals to Spain and 
Britain, albeit unsuccessfully, for releasing Pinochet through bilateral arbitration under 
Article 30 of the much-cited International Convention Against Torture. This article allowed 
arbitration in the event that disputes between two or more states over interpretation of the 
convention could not be settled through negotiation. If the organisation of arbitration among 
states fails, then the ICJ may be resorted to.55 This was part two of Chile’s Phase IV 
strategies, which Spain also rejected. The main stumbling blocks for Madrid were the anti- 
Pinochet intermestic linkages within the Spanish political opposition and sections of the 
judiciary, which inhibited a raison d’etat solution, heightened by a looming election in 2000 
(Gooch and Hopkins 1999). In these ways, IS employed by non-state intermestic alliances 
overrode Chilean foreign policy initiatives. It was finally by appealing to the public 
acceptability, however contested, on the humanitarian grounds of Pinochet’s failing health 
that enabled Britain and Spain to reassert the prerogatives of foreign policy in acquiescing to 
Pinochet’s release. The soft power circle of a human rights discourse contra-Pinochet was 
closed when the discourse of human rights pro-Pinochet was ultimately activated by Chilean 
foreign policy.
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6.7 The Competition of Ideas and their Resolution (II): Multipolar Direct Emulation 
through Demonstration (MDED) by Non-State Actors
IS has been shown to be a result of intermestic forces producing some ideas which 
almost completely marginalise or complicate others through the former’s overwhelming 
moral, structural and temporal domination. This was seen in courtroom arguments, 
judgements and discursive alliances of political constituencies. Multipolar Direct Emulation 
through Demonstration is a more passive relation: some ideas ‘win’ over others because they 
demonstrate superior performance in normal existing operation. The prefix ‘multipolar’ is 
added to acknowledge the omnidirectional attraction of soft power in a fluid post-Cold War 
context.56 A general comparison can be made with the demonstration of two or more new 
models of television sets in an electrical store before incidental and prospective customers 
who already own television sets at home. The customer may buy on the impression that the 
new set is better than his existing one on either subjective or objective criteria. For foreign 
policy in global information space, MDED results from a state, or a non-state actor, 
emulating ideas that have been proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining particular 
objectives.
The Chilean transition from military dictatorship to protected democracy, as 
elaborated in Section 6.3, was a uniquely brokered phenomenon which could not satisfy the 
individuals and NGOs unwilling to surrender in the informational civil war over the truth 
about human rights violations in 1973-90. This formed one source of the popular Chilean 
yearning for a better model of a democratic polity. Another motivation for emulation 
developed indirectly from the effects of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance pronouncing
55 ‘Convention Against Torture’ in Evans (1999, 346).
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upon the unsatisfactory conditions for legal justice within Chile before the first and third
Lords’ hearings in Phases I and III respectively. In the judgement from the first hearings on
25 November 1998, of the three-strong majority who voted for Pinochet’s extradition, only
one Lord referred to the need to take into account the Chilean judiciary and politics by way
of declaring them within the competence of the Home Secretary, while all three Lords argued
Pinochet’s culpability on overwhelming grounds of international legal jurisdiction. Notably,
the two dissenting Lords also explained their decisions on points of international law, but
both voted for Pinochet’s release by sidestepping issues of integrity concerning Chilean
politics and law (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1998, 1460-1508). It was Secretary
Straw’s subsequent explanation following his authorisation of extradition proceedings on 9
December 1998 that cast aspersions on Chile’s domestic institutions
The Chilean Government argued that Senator Pinochet should be returned to Chile 
where he could stand trial. However there is no extradition request from the Chilean 
Government, which the Secretary of State could consider.. .Moreover, there is no 
provision of international law which excludes Spain’s jurisdiction in this matter. The 
Secretary of State does not consider the possibility of a trial in Chile to be a factor 
which outweighs the UK’s obligations under the ECE (European Convention on 
Extradition) to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain. (Straw 2000, 186-187)
Based on the context sketched out in Section 6.3, and from Phases I through II of the
controversy, there was thus a palpable demonstration by external events to the Chilean state
that its foreign policy had to deal with the discourse of aspersions cast upon the integrity and
efficacy of its national political and judicial institutions: first, could Chile prove itself capable
of rendering due legal process for the ‘combatants’ in the informational civil war over human
rights violations? And second, could its post-dictatorship foreign policy of pro-democratic
and pro-multilateral reinsertion into the international community live up to the expectations
of the international community and interested parties? These questions were themselves
56 See Chapter 3’s discussion on post-Cold War ideological multiplicity.
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confirmed by Foreign Minister Insulza on Chilean television two weeks after Pinochet’s 
arrest:
I believe it is too evident that we have had an unfinished transition. I am not happy or 
content and we have done what we had to do. But I save my happiness for the day 
when Chile has more justice in human rights matters. (BBC SWB 1998b)
Substantive signs of the echo of Anglo-American standards of legal and political
justice in Chilean foreign policy positions came upon the heels of reactions to the 25
November 1998 Lords’ ruling. Viviana Diaz, then vice-president of the AFDD commented:
At last Pinochet will face the trial he deserves. It is nothing but right that he should be 
submitted to a due judicial process where a judge and jury can decide whether he is 
guilty of the crimes that he is accused of committing.
We have for so many years been scared to speak up about our dark past for fear of 
reprisals from the right-wing military in Chile. The ruling by the Lords has given the 
human rights campaign international approval. (Quoted in Gamini 1998)
Isabel Allende of the Socialist Party, part of the ruling Concertacion, echoed this sentiment
on behalf of all of Pinochet’s victims saying that a foreign judiciary ‘demonstrate[d] that
there are principles in the world and that dictators cannot travel around the world with
immunity, believing they are above the law.’ (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 1998) Chilean
foreign policy, reacting ostensibly to the import of the Lords’ decision and the ascendance of
intermestic arguments about the lack of proper justice in Chile, adjusted its original
sovereignty and diplomatic immunity arguments during Foreign Minister Insulza’s 29
November -1 December 1998 mission to London and Madrid. Insulza now supported trying
Pinochet at home, denying that his former Head of State status barred prosecution. At the
same time, he claimed the ‘political atmosphere in Spain is not favourable to General
Pinochet’ regardless of the Spanish judiciary’s wish to be impartial. Insulza also said respect
for sovereign justice between Spain and Chile ought to be mutual (BBC Monitoring Europe
1998). These positions were diluted within Chile by calls by the Christian Democrat and
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Socialist Party presidential candidates for learning lessons from abroad on reforming Chilean 
justice. Members of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance were quick to hold Insulza to 
account. The Chilean Socialist Party president countered that conditions for ‘a just and 
rigorous trial* of Pinochet were not in place (AFP 1998a). Chilean lawyer Eduardo 
Contreras, involved in several lawsuits against Pinochet and his aides, retorted that if the 
Concertacion wanted to try Pinochet, ‘we ask the minister why the Chilean government has 
not filed [a] suit against him.’ (AFP 1998b) On 3 December 1998, as though synchronised as 
a reply, the Chilean Supreme Court President Roberto Davila told the press that Pinochet 
could be guaranteed a trial in Chile if he were freed from Britain. Subsequently, Chilean 
exiles in London and other members of the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance, including 
politicians from the Chilean Socialist Party, Christian Democratic Party, and even Supreme 
Court President Davila, cited the Lords’ Ruling on Hoffmann’s bias as a lesson for Chilean 
justice in fairness (Global News Wire: CHIPS 1998; BBC SWB 1998f).
By Phase III, Santiago’s first substantial emulation initiative was to float the idea of 
requesting the CDE (Council of State Defence)57 to participate in domestic cases against 
Pinochet. The opposition right wing parties said the government was catering to the claims of 
overseas doubters against Chile while the military questioned the Concertacion*s partiality 
towards Pinochet in doing so (BBC SWB 1999d, 1999e). For the Concertacion, invoking the 
CDE as a plaintiff or intervener against Pinochet thus meant soft pedalling the option until 
military and right wing opposition relented. By the time of the third Lords’ ruling which 
reiterated the stripping of Pinochet’s immunity to extradition, albeit on time-limited charges, 
it was apparent that the Chilean foreign policy position had again failed to convince the 
Lords either through its British solicitor’s first-ever direct intervention in the appellate
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hearings, or through its public statements insisting on sovereign justice. Secretary Straw’s
second ‘authority to proceed’ for extradition hearings reaffirmed the weakness of Chilean
judicial efficacy previously declared on 9 December 1998 using the same wording:
The Secretary of State does not consider the possibility of a trial in Chile to be a 
factor that outweighs the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECE (European 
Convention on Extradition) to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain.58
A significant emulation of British and Spanish judicial patterns in regard to 
Pinochet’s alleged ‘crimes against humanity’ began about this time with Foreign Minister 
Insulza’s letter to Jack Straw in late March 1999 arguing that Chilean democracy could be 
‘greatly strengthened’ if the trial of Pinochet and his aides could be carried out at home (BBC 
SWB 1999h). On the day of this announcement, a Chilean appeals court reopened an 
unfinished case concerning the Pinochet-era assassination of a trade union leader and 
detained 12 ex-intelligence agents pending trial (AFP 1999a). Carlos Montes, speaker of the 
lower house of the Chilean Congress, the Chamber of Deputies, called on all Chileans and 
their institutions to solve the human rights conundrum ‘because to the extent that we fail to 
do so, there will continue to be an ethical demand worldwide [for justice]... ’ (BBC SWB 
1999i) In late May 1999, human rights prosecutions in Chile saw Judge Juan Guzman’s 
ongoing investigations making significant headway by indicting five Pinochet adjutants 
involved in the ‘Caravan of Death’ massacres of September 1973, some of whom ranked 
Colonel and General. These officers appealed against their arrest for trial but in July the 
Chilean Supreme Court turned down their appeals. This was serious enough for the Army 
Commander-in-Chief to issue a statement calling for human rights dialogue with Chilean 
NGOs, and the convening of emergency meetings with top serving and retired officers to plot 
countermeasures (BBC SWB 1999j). On 21 August, not long after Chilean foreign policy
57 Chile’s equivalent of Attorney-General, or Crown Prosecution Service.
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floated bilateral arbitration proposals to Spain, a roundtable on human rights began between 
the military and human rights lawyers. However, the AFDD was significantly absent, 
preferring open trials instead of exchanges of information for impunity (Bellos 1999). By the 
last quarter of 1999, the Chilean judiciary had allowed Judge Guzman’s excavations of 
alleged mass graves in Chile’s Atacama Desert to proceed, and charged two more Generals 
linked to Pinochet’s intelligence services for political murders (AFP 1999c). By late 
February 2000, some 59 lawsuits had been filed against Pinochet directly in Chilean courts.
In a final consummation of the MDED effect upon Chilean foreign policy aimed at 
deflecting further foreign prosecution, particularly from a joint Belgium-NGO eleventh hour 
appeal for stay of Pinochet’s release on 25 January 2000, foreign ministry spokesman Carlos 
Mladinic said he hoped ‘people will realize the best solution is to try him in Chile.’ He added 
that in recent months, a large number of cases, some pre-dating 1988,59 have flourished in 
Chilean courts. He also said that due to a ‘changing attitude’ within the courts, along with a 
complete renovation of the Supreme Court, ‘there is a judicial basis’ for the Supreme Court 
to strip Pinochet of his immunity as a Senator-for-Life (Global News Wire: EFE News 
Service 2000). All this came to pass over the next 16 months following Pinochet’s release on 
humanitarian grounds on 2 March 2000. But on 9 July 2001, in a mirror of Straw’s March 
2000 decision, Pinochet was ruled unfit for trial on the same humanitarian grounds by the 
Chilean Supreme Court.60 Although this form of MDED rebounded in Pinochet’s favour, 
litigation against his accomplices has continued, indicating that the legacies of 1973-90 were 
now less untouchable.
58 From the full text of Straw’s statement reproduced in Graves (1999).
59 The third Lords’judgement on Pinochet’s vulnerability for prosecution limited it to cases after 8 December 
1988 (Reg. v. Bow Street Ex Parte Pinochet 1999b, 927).
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In summary, IS and MDED are complementary forms of soft power. Both envision 
the adoption of visible standards of normative behaviour. Both also enable non-state actors to 
assert a disproportionate form of rival foreign policy power in the form of publicity and ideas 
that can alter a state’s foreign policy. A third observation would be that intermestic alliances 
are discursive communities acting as both cause and effect of foreign policy change by 
splitting the unitary basis of foreign policy projection. Where IS and MDED differ is in their 
reference standard: the former invokes regimes signed by states, the latter relies on 
circumstantial, or free-ranging standards. This case study has perhaps been exceptional 
because of the stark cases of human rights and wrongs stemming from the Pinochet military 
dictatorship 1973-90. If issues had more complex causes and effects, such as nuclear 
pollution in a border zone, or financial ruin wrought by financial speculation, the intermestic 
lines of discursive community might be more difficult to draw for political socialisation or 
demonstration.
6.8 Conclusion
As a case study of foreign policy in global information space, Chile exhibited long­
term patterns of engagement with external media flows, economic flows, and ideological 
trends, and has served as a test-bed for competing social ideas from abroad. The military 
dictatorship of General Pinochet and its foreign policy of defensive isolation, while 
harmonising the domestic economy with world capitalism, was as much a product of the 
Cold War as it was of elite initiative from within its borders. This was the backdrop and 
foundation for the Pinochet Extradition Controversy and its testing of Chilean foreign policy.
60 Pinochet’s medical report in Chile listed grounds of ‘mild to moderate dementia,’ paralleling the British 
medical report of January 2000 (Faiola 2001; Simons 2000).
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The Pinochet regime’s human rights violations throughout its 17-year existence had triggered 
an embryonic intermestic alliance of largely non-state opponents, which not only survived 
the end of the military regime, but gained added momentum with the emergence of global 
information space in the 1990s. The prosecution of Pinochet over human rights atrocities was 
an example of the employment of information to enlist allies and divide opposition. This was 
soft power. Chilean foreign policy faced a prospect of entangling itself in discursive 
communities of opinion, when trying to defend principles of sovereignty without also trying 
to defend the Pinochet regime’s excesses.
The intermestic correlation of forces (ICF) was clearly illustrated by the solidarity of 
non-state actors in pursuit of trying Pinochet wherever possible, in this case, via extradition 
to Spain, or trial in Britain. This solidarity operated in network formations. It mobilised 
information, utilised national legal avenues, amassed evidence for prosecution, constituted its 
own expertise, and manufactured a favourable world public opinion. Such a network meant 
that when and where one set of non-state actions proved unable for political, legal or 
geographical reasons to deliver action upon a common cause of prosecuting a violator, their 
comrades could be entrusted and coordinated to do so on their behalf.61 The elaboration of 
the non-state anti-Pinochet networked media strategies under ICF revealed in great detail the 
flexibility and competence with which a human rights campaign marshalled a moral and 
expert community of opinion against not only Pinochet’s personal legal defence, but also in 
forcing significant changes to Chilean foreign policy.
Intermestic Socialisation (IS) and Multipolar Direct Emulation through 
Demonstration (MDED) have shown themselves as complementary explanations of the
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results of the employment of soft power by the intermestic correlation of forces. IS as a 
producer of change in Chilean foreign policy was made possible by non-state reference to 
available international standards, and extrapolating from them national legal avenues to 
socialise others towards their human rights objectives. By articulating ideas with an 
extraterritorial legal status, a dominant discourse is achieved. Foreign policy will 
accommodate to IS especially if the intermestic alliance includes domestic political 
constituencies in the target state which are opposed to its foreign policy. Similarly MDED 
accounts for a demonstration effect upon foreign policy through non-state reference and 
recommendation of free-ranging and proven ideas -  a greater flexibility than IS’ reference to 
international regimes. MDED works where the non-state intermestic alliance can articulate 
normative comparison with a working model elsewhere in the world. The foreign policy of 
the target state will accommodate to the demonstration effect, again if the intermestic alliance 
campaigning for it includes sizeable political constituencies within the target state that are 
opposed to its foreign policy.
Scrutinising Chilean foreign policy throughout this episode might lead to the 
conclusion that it was reacting all along to the political initiatives of the anti-Pinochet ICF. 
Yet in their patterns of reaction, Chilean foreign policy officials have also revealed a capacity 
to learn and adapt to the informational milieu of the issues surrounding Pinochet. The 
willingness to resort to invoking humanitarian reasons for getting Pinochet released showed 
an awareness of catering to the sensitivities of world public opinion aroused by the ICF. The 
willingness of other parts of the Chilean polity to make gestures in consonance with foreign 
policy change had also given substance to the Chilean credentials, in terms of a new foreign 
policy of post-dictatorship reinsertion into responsible global community.
61 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 on ‘network’.
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CONCLUSION:
SOFT POWER AS INSTRUMENTAL 
IN GLOBAL INFORMATION SPACE
The thesis of soft power has been argued through all the preceding chapters as an 
instrument borne of the necessities of maintaining foreign policy in an unfamiliar 
environment characterised by globalization, intensified information flow and the existence of 
the nation-state. These three notions have been explained as part of a three-sided process 
called information globalization, comprising the implications of advances in ICTs, global 
capitalist dynamics and post-Cold War geopolitical fluidity. Using information globalization 
as a vehicle for explaining the new environment in policy terms, it has been argued that a 
globally enlarged space of accountability irrespective of political and geographical 
boundaries has come about. This is global information space. This space is both polycentric 
and public in character, and a common site for struggles of definitions of order, community 
and identity. However, unlike a national public sphere, there is no central reference point for 
governance. Global information space, as a public space, is connected with the operation of 
world public opinion which, like its national counterpart, is partly a product of unpredictable 
power politics. World public opinion is defined, like its national counterpart, as an expression 
of dominant conviction backed by the intention of its originating sectors to give effect to it. 
Notably, the operative word is dominant conviction, not democratic justice. In a world 
context, opinion emanates from nation-states and non-state actors alike, focussed upon 
selectively defined common consequences. The evolving of commonality of order, 
community and identity is analysable in terms of the power of information, which in a strict 
sense is the creation of meaning in symbols. This power is also a Foucaultian formation of a 
‘regime of truth’ whereby power is synonymous with the subjective geneses of ideas and 
with the linkages between them.
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Interestingly, this information power does not kill, maim or disenfranchise directly. It 
effects ‘hard’ consequences indirectly, by acting ‘softly’ to convert or subvert opinions and 
designs for the initiatives and responses of nation-states and non-state actors. Within global 
information space, following Nye’s formulation, it creates a soft power of attraction that 
makes others want what the exerciser wants. Soft power makes sense when one understands 
globalization through structuration theory as set out in Chapter 1. That agents and structures 
can constitute one another, or co-constitute one another simultaneously, implies that power is 
highly transferable in form. This is where hard power retains its traditional utility to coerce 
and punish up to a point, beyond which its gains run into diminishing returns. Witness for 
instance the consequential ambiguities of post-Cold War humanitarian interventions after the 
deployment phases. Soft power, in contrast, takes the explanation and projection of power 
into the analytically subtle terrain of structures, be they forums, regimes, mediatised agoras, 
or national courtrooms. This power residing in structures acts on the assumption, fleshed out 
in Chapter 2, that politics operates as mental symbols in the minds of friends, foes and 
neutrals to solidify acceptance, rejection, or at least benign indifference towards others’ 
gains. In short, where hard power cannot consolidate a gain through time and space by fear of 
punishment, soft power does it through the conversion of minds and persuading them into a 
principled adherence to ‘rules of the game’. Soft power does what most realists have yet to 
do, extend two-and-three dimensional power into a Foucaultian discursive mode within 
International Relations. More of this will be considered in the next few sections in terms of 
the relevance of soft power in foreign policy vis-a-vis realism and its neo-liberal and neo­
realist critics.
370
Translating soft power directly into foreign policy analysis, as was shown in Chapter 
4, is to map out the theoretical possibilities of a soft power foreign policy in contrast to the 
hard power of economic sanctions and military coercion. In fact, in an era of globalization 
wrought by technology, mass destruction potential and neo-liberal economics, the 
complementing and prefacing of hard policy instruments with soft power is essential in 
navigating the interests of nation-states. With this in mind, it was the deliberate choice of this 
author to select two non-westem weak-state-derived case studies to illustrate the possibilities 
of soft power beyond its largely North Atlantic milieu as theorised by Nye.1 A soft power 
foreign policy was deducible from the Hobbesian nature of global information space, within 
which the nation and its co-referent, the state, necessarily assume roles as containers and 
guardians of the basic order, community and identity goals of mankind. This pure form of 
soft power foreign policy is manifested in the propositions illustrated by the case study of 
Singapore and the Asian Values Debate:
On the other hand, nation-states are not the only ones with the ability to utilise soft 
power to constitute communities of allegiance for policy effect. Non-state actors are equally 
adept at manoeuvring domestic and world public opinion in intermestic combinations to rival
Soft Power Foreign 
Policy I  (LIO)
A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy 
objectives through Leadership Inside-Out by 
projecting a communitarian base, by its credibility 
as a source o f information, and by targeting an 
omnidirectional audience.
Soft Power Foreign 
Policy II (LOI)
A nation-state can achieve its foreign policy 
objectives through Leadership Outside-In by 
exercising political entrepreneurship through 
international regimes, and by forming epistemic 
communities.
1 See fii 3 of the thesis’ Introduction. Nye ‘qualified’ Japan and Singapore for soft power in passing mention, 
while criticising China’s unsuitability.
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and induce shifts in foreign policy positions of states through monitoring, exposure and
demonstration. The case study of Chilean foreign policy and the Pinochet Extradition
Controversy demonstrates that the intermestic politics of foreign policy is a real prospect
where non-state actors are determined to employ soft power. Hence, three other possibilities
of using soft power to challenge foreign policy exist:
Non-state Soft The intermestic correlation o f forces joining
Power I  (ICF) state and non-state parties can shape foreign
policy change through direct mobilisation of 
ideas, sanctioning standards through global 
regimes, non-state self-constitution of 
expertise, and manufacturing subjective world 
public opinion.
Non-state Soft Intermestic socialisation occurs when non-
Power II (IS) state actors hold states to account through
regimes they sign on to.
Non-state Soft Multipolar Direct Emulation through
Power III (MDED) Demonstration occurs when states and non­
state actors emulate ideas that have been 
proven elsewhere to be efficacious in attaining 
particular objectives.
The rest of this conclusion will proceed to assess the implications of these soft power 
applications by first comparing the respective sets of Soft Power Foreign Policy and Non­
state Soft Power to explain on the one hand, how far foreign policy reveals the nation-state as 
being reliant on structural power, and on the other, how far soft power may operate through 
non-state actors without the international legal status of states. Additionally, the comparison 
shows that soft power can act passively. Secondly, some lessons will be drawn from the 
experiences of soft power as seen in the two case studies, for their implications for these 
countries’ future foreign policies, as well as for the autonomy of non-state policies. Finally, 
the pertinence of the exercise of soft power for the roles of policy-makers and academics will 
be considered.
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Soft Power and the Permeability of Foreign Policy: Comparing the Two Sets of Soft 
Power Models
The concept of permeability best describes the transformations foreign policy has 
undergone in global information space. Decisions are still made by formal organs of states 
but they are no longer primus inter pares on every issue. The wideness of space for initiation 
and reaction extends as far and as persistently as the components of information flow, 
accessed and utilised by other states and non-state actors, will make of it. The Foucaultian 
possibilities of creating discourse are enormously democratised by the nature of global 
information space, and because the media, economic and political stakes are intertwined, as 
elaborated in Chapter 3, actomess itself becomes an issue for foreign policy.
However, looking at the nature of the two sets of soft power usage deduced and 
illustrated in this thesis, the nation-state still remains central in global issue framing and 
resolution. The first set of Soft Power Foreign Policy establishes ‘leadership’ through 
bounded examples of material, political and even cultural success. For leadership to operate 
inside-out or outside-in, a communitarian base must be a prerequisite, and the indices of 
success must stand up to scrutiny. The best assurance of credibility as seen in the Asian 
Values Debate is to have an empirical model to point to. Yet for leadership to appeal across 
boundaries, it must operate on the assumption that a global audience is a given. This means a 
promotional relationship between ‘seller’ and ‘client’ must be believed in by those who run a 
soft power foreign policy. It is in the nature of soft power that attraction must be voluntary 
and as widely exercised as possible among states and non-state actors.
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These same soft power considerations for pure foreign policy apply equally, but with 
reverse motivations, to non-state actors that intend to effect what they perceive as desirable 
change in foreign policy. Following the three versions of Non-state Soft Power, the non-state 
actors evidently need to target the state with discourse with the intent of uncoupling or 
realigning the sense of community embodied by the double boundary of nation and state. 
Hence non-state actors project information in such a way that forces favourable to their 
causes are aligned against the straightjacket of foreign policy in the way that ICF operates. 
Alternatively, non-state actors can act as witnesses and policemen of the conscience of 
nation-state obligations (IS) to either the international community of states, or the global 
community of humankind, as it has been shown in the Chilean case. A third possibility of 
non-state soft power operating through or against the nation-state is discursively to point to 
examples of betterment through the demonstration effects of MDED. MDED works where 
good communitarian examples can offer their inspiration for improvement elsewhere. 
Ultimately, whether it is Soft Power Foreign Policy or Non-state Soft Power, the nation-state 
is the status quo claimant on communitarian allegiance, and it is only by deconstructing this 
prior claim on loyalty that information can demonstrate its power.
Secondly, both models o f soft power are premised to varying degrees on the reliance 
upon structures to carry information to audiences worldwide. This observation approximates 
to what Robert Cox has termed ‘new realism’, whereby power resides more in structures 
such as market, corporate, cultural and media networks of countries, groups, and individuals, 
rather than in states per se (Cox 1997, xv-xxx). Soft power foreign policy, as elaborated in 
the Singapore study, clearly depends upon linking Asian cultural and political networks on 
both state and non-state discursive levels to generate an effect. It is no surprise that debates
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and engagements with advocates of a ‘western way’ occurred at a World Conference on 
Human Rights, through media representations of a ‘Singapore Model of Development’ in the 
case of the ethics of caning as a law and order formula, and through organisations such as 
ASEAN, the World Bank, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. In keeping with the possibility 
of weaker forms of soft power, some of these conflicts on Asian Values were also played out 
in academic debates on paths for Third World development. Non-state Soft Power relied 
even more on information flow conducted through structures of open access to carry 
messages. As is also evident from the Chilean case, foreign policy has to reckon with such 
unlikely rivals as a human rights action network coordinated via email and intermestic 
personnel appointments, personal exchanges of solidarity and information of abuses, and the 
imaginative employment of international legal discourse in tandem with national legislation 
on protections of human life. In short, if global information space did not exist, soft power 
cannot be an instrument. This is especially so for the non-state actor since unlike the state, 
the former cannot level the playing field of power on its own.
A third comparative observation can be made as to the possibility o f exercising soft 
power in passive modes. Soft Power Foreign Policy has shown itself to be passive in the 
Singaporean case in so far as the latter provided aid in the form of sharing, coaching and 
partnering expertise through an epistemic community. The Singapore Model of Development 
is a passive tool in part because of Singapore’s size, and in part because it is more likely to be 
effective as a gainer of friendships in contrast to the ‘strong arm’ precedents of Cold War aid 
patterns. Non-state Soft Power however is only reliant on passive soft power in so far as 
academic and public opinion points can affect official mindsets through reference to 
demonstration effects (MDED). Non-state actors are nevertheless predisposed to act on the
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stronger end of the spectrum of soft power possibilities where they can (Figure 2, Chapter 
3). The anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance’s employment of ICF and IS in 1998-2000 to alter 
the course of Chilean foreign policy catalysed more tangible results than years of patient 
protest through mere publicity.
Ultimately this comparison has shown that the use of soft power by both states and 
non-state actors for goal attainment is the result of foreign policy being made permeable by 
the structures of global information space. The degree of state vulnerability to discursive 
power of the Foucaultian form corresponds directly to the degree to which it is linked in 
multiple networks, both formal and informal. At this juncture, it is clear that this entire study 
has attempted to adapt realism constructively to the permanence of structures penetrating and 
linking the unitary actor to schemes of cross-border cooperation in economics, politics and 
information. Realism holds that states are primary actors in international relations and that 
they seek to maximise their relative power to achieve goals vis-a-vis others. This self-seeking 
behaviour is duplicated by all states, culminating in an anarchical pattern of competitive 
relations. The conception of a Hobbesian global information space owes much to this 
tradition, along with the explanation of the communitarian bases of soft power. Yet 
traditional realism stops short of developing an account of state agency for and against the 
discursive power inherent in information flows carried over economic knowledge structures 
and political regimes such as the UN World Human Rights Conference or the International 
Convention Against Torture. Martin Wight wrote that ‘a power is a modem sovereign state in 
its external aspect, and it might almost be defined as the ultimate loyalty for which men 
today will fight.’ (1979, 25) The global information space problematique will query: how 
does realism describe state responses to the power of censure by portrayal through global
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media? Furthermore, how do states respond to non-state actors who use such ‘censure by 
portrayal’ to generate coalitions for immobilising hard power? This thesis advocates the 
instrumentality of a Foucaultian discourse reifying one’s national community as a defensible 
moral entity to connected audiences both within and without the state concerned, hence its 
identification with Coxian new realism. Communitarian defence and goal maximisation must 
occur through creating acquiescence among other actors, so as to solidify gains made. And if 
creating acquiescence among others necessitates amending existing structures of 
interdependence, or creating new ones, foreign policy as a discourse of attraction is the way 
to go about it.
In Chapter 1, it has also been suggested that given globalization’s structurational 
possibilities, a la Giddens, the neo-realist and neo-liberal theorists initially have a case in 
arguing that studying state agency, and hence foreign policy, may be superseded. The ‘neo- 
neo debate’ would focus explanations on managing the international system through balances 
of power or looking at long-term pay-off structures in international cooperation as a 
resolution of purported anarchy in information flows. However, they ignore the fungibility of 
power where nation-states need to respond to globalization by justifying their very existence 
against the challenges posed by the informational practices of capitalism, the extensions of 
ICTs in creating multiple networks of transmission and reception, and the end of bipolar 
strategic verities. The strategic question for nation-states in global information space 
remains: how can foreign policy secure identity when information flows originated by others 
can construct and deconstruct community? Alternatively how does the ‘neo-neo debate’ reply 
to the power possibilities behind expressions of world public opinion? The latter may be a
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soft issue playing in the abstract arena of meaning creation. But within global information 
space, opinion will also precede any decision to apply economic and military power.
In the final analysis, soft power foreign policy is a partner in the new skein of FPA
commonly known as ‘foreign policy as discourse’ (Larsen 1997; Campbell 1998) since it is
analyses how foreign policy defends identity in words and meanings when globalization
threatens the ideological space the state inscribes itself upon. Following Campbell, it is not
unreasonable to argue that within global information space,
Foreign policy shifts from a concern of relations between states that take place across 
ahistorical, frozen, and pregiven boundaries, to a concern with the establishment of 
the boundaries that constitute, at one and the same time, the ‘state’ and ‘the 
international system.’ (Campbell 1998, 61)
Singapore, Chile and Non-State Actors: Scrutiny, Inequalities and Learning as 
Challenges for Foreign Policy
Having made theoretical observations about the actualisation of soft power in the
preceding section, it is also useful to briefly revisit the foreign policy experiences of the three
actors examined for the case studies, so as to indicate how the ‘theory’ set forth may find
further practical application. Rather than present a full epilogue on Asian Values or the fate
of Pinochet, this section will be arranged in three themes: the inevitability of cross-border
scrutiny; creative manoeuvres around power resource inequalities; and learning. A central
characteristic of these themes is their interrogation of the coherence of foreign policy: who
forms the community that defines ‘foreign’ through exclusion? And if foreign policy is to
retain utility and legitimacy, must the boundaries of community widen or constrict?
The nature of global information space has made political scrutiny inevitable across 
all sorts of borders. The global reach of ICTs ensures that no terrestrial space is remote from
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politicisation, even though the degrees of doing so will remain uneven, being tied to the 
‘empire of circumstance’ as one writer put it (C. Hill 1996,112). The relentless expansion of 
neo-liberal capitalism has joined every national economy into a global one interlinked by a 
knowledge structure which relies upon ICTs to create price comparisons, facilitate interaction 
between demand and supply, and labels territories according to investment stability criteria. 
This links into the global political component which, as a result of the end of the Cold War, 
amplifies possibilities for fluid ideological contestations and the widening of local 
antagonisms into matters for multiple protagonists. Above all, global information space is 
political in the sense that it involves a distribution of values, priorities and material goods 
according to the dominant voices that construct the design for distribution at any moment.
The Singapore case exhibits all of these challenges. Despite having opted to prosper 
by fitting into a neo-liberal global capitalism, its foreign policy has had to defend community 
on a national, regional, and global level in the immediate post-Cold War context through the 
Asian Values Debate. The target of Singaporean discourse was the prescription of western 
liberal democracy as the ideal imprint of a new world order. This defence of Asian Values, as 
pointed out in Chapter 5, stands as long as there is a Singapore Model of Development to act 
as the foundations on which cultural exceptionalism may be built. Increasingly, as the 
country continues to weather recessions and progresses towards First World income 
standards on the basis of being the ‘most globalized’ nation-state (“Measuring Globalization” 
2001, 59), scrutiny of its formula for governance will increase regardless of whether 
leadership inside-out, and outside-in, remains conscious policy or not. The response by two 
senior civil servants to a query posed by the author on whether Singapore’s policy on Internet 
governance amounts to a surrender to external standards is revealing:
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A global consensus on many critical issues, such as security, privacy, consumer 
welfare and protection, taxation, cybercrime etc, has yet to be forged. Furthermore, 
there exists social stratification issues among the Intemet-sawy and the not-so-sawy 
all around the world. We have to evolve a ‘Singapore Way’ built up over the past few 
years through our very own national attitudes on Internet management, legal 
precedents and legislation. This could serve as a reference to other countries 
considering ways of safeguarding their citizens and global economic interests amidst 
an unfettered information superhighway....For external audiences to fully understand 
such seemingly strict measures, they must be willing to appreciate the country’s 
governing philosophy and very real social constraints, such as our geopolitical 
environment and multiracial population. (Chan and Choong 2000, interview, 12 May)
The thrust of Singaporean information policy, operating as foreign policy, will be to
convince external audiences to live with, and maybe adapt, a Singapore Way if it appears
practical for them.
For Chile, external audiences also matter greatly. The whole spirit of a foreign policy 
of reinsertion into the global community is hinged on regaining the reputation for stable 
democracy and respect for human rights squandered during the Pinochet years. Reinsertion 
into a, largely western, international community of democracies is desirable because it 
enhances a weak state’s international power, both hard and soft, in an era of globalization. 
Moreover, it alleviates the pre-existing regional isolation the post-authoritarian civilian 
governments inherited. The trend of Chilean foreign policy initiatives in the 1990s spell this 
out. Firstly, there was rapprochement with neighbouring Argentina and Peru, with whom 
Chile has had political and armed conflicts over the past century, and which were 
exacerbated under Pinochet. And secondly, Chile showed enthusiasm for associating with the 
MERCOSUR common market and NAFTA, as well as signing free trade agreements with 
Central American states (Veronica 2000, 325-330). This is, ironically, an advantageous 
undergirding of the continuing success of the neo-liberal economy of Pinochet-era design. 
Although national income standards are nowhere comparable to Singapore’s, Chile’s is still
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outstanding in Latin America, and the Chilean ‘jaguar’ economic model has been held up by
individual economists and the International Institute of Economics as an example for its
neighbours, and even Russia (Pinera 1994; 2000). The Pinochet Extradition Controversy
however undermined this neo-liberal soft power by externalising the unfinished business of
democratic transition, and allowing an intermestic human rights alliance to define the terms
of reinsertion. Reflecting on the shock of the ‘globalization of new actors’ such as Amnesty
International and the application of ‘universal jurisdiction’ on human rights against Chile, the
Chilean foreign ministry’s director of planning during the controversy commented:
[T]he Pinochet case demonstrates the necessity of solid regimes of regional and 
global human rights, designed carefully and without discrimination, which establish 
clear jurisdictional priorities, and which do not allow space for discretionary and 
arbitrary interpretations. (Van Klaveren 2001, 48)2
In other words, global scrutiny is a given for Chilean foreign policy, even if corrections for
impartiality are needed from a Chilean perspective.
Non-state actors, characterised by their profile as information creators, monitors and 
disseminators for idealistic purposes, benefit naturally from the linkages between the media, 
and the economic and political components of global information space. The non-state actors 
are able to use scrutiny against foreign policies because of two things. Capitalist economic 
prosperity depends on a wide degree of ICT penetration and information circulation across 
borders; and politically, nation-states have grown increasingly reliant on media to inform, 
argue and promote geographical community through newspaper, telegraph, radio, television 
and even Internet sites. Whether singly, as individuals, or in groups, as NGOs pooling greater 
resources, non-state narratives threaten the positive communitarian identity foreign policies 
seek to promote. In this sense, non-state actors do not pursue ‘foreign policies’ but ‘non-state
2 Author’s translation.
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policies’ that are partially territorially based, and often not democratically-legitimised in an 
electoral sense. Therein lies their flexibility in championing causes that advance through the 
shame of exposure and criticism, or an offering of counter-reality. This is the demonstration 
of the Foucaultian logic of discursive power generating its own counter-construction 
(Foucault 1980, 141-143). The PEDH in the Pinochet Controversy, for example, transformed 
itself from being the 503-day London Picket against one ex-dictator into a permanent 
collective organisation based in London to ‘fight against impunity and defend human rights 
in Chile, the rest of Latin America and worldwide.’ One of its initiatives is the website 
www.memoriaviva.com (‘living memory.com’) which is a site of remembrance for the 
victims of the 1973-90 period. Additionally, it publicises documentation on Pinochet’s 
detention centres, the perpetrators of violations, as well as eyewitness accounts of those 
violations. The site also offers a free email bulletin on human rights issues in Chile and Latin 
America drawn from Chilean, American and European news sites (Human Rights 
International Project, London 2001; http://www.memoriaviva.comL
A second foreign policy experience common to all three actors, but to varying 
degrees, is their use and leverage of relative inequalities in power and status. On measures of 
hard power in economic,3 military and political4 areas, Singapore, Chile and the non-state 
actors are barely within the shadow of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, 
or the G-8 industrial states. It is global information space that mitigates their relative 
inequalities by empowering their actomess in the realm of ‘soft resources’ such as economic 
arbitraging within networks of IT and commerce, intellectual traffic between core, semi­
periphery and periphery, and possibilities of developing niche specialisations in shaping the
3 For example, market size, foreign reserves, and numbers of home-grown entrepreneurs.
382
any future transitions towards global governance. Singaporean foreign policy derives its post- 
Cold War resources largely from its cumulative and acknowledged proficiency in financial 
and communications hubbing, as well as in high technology manufacturing, research and 
development. The geocultural and geopolitical position of Singapore, while not being 
comprehensive assets, have contributed to its developing a model of governance that blends 
imported technological modernity with imputed cultural proclivities towards 
authoritarianism. These strands have been drawn upon in the articulation of the Singapore 
School in the Asian Values Debate with the main intention of adding variety to western-led 
designs for a new world order. As analysed in Chapter 5, the Singapore School gained 
positive resonance among East Asian foreign policies largely because its exponents spoke 
from a reasonably cognate cultural repository, and linked it to the performative success of the 
Singapore Model of Development. The Singapore School also gained some mileage as a 
holistic aid programme because it offered an alternative to a western package of neo-liberal 
capitalism and liberal democracy. ‘Singapore’ represented a fusion between techno-capitalist 
modernity and an Asian way, that does not exclude authoritarianism. This was a niche 
creation amidst post-Cold War ideological fluidity.
Chile also imbibed neo-liberal capitalism comprehensively under the Pinochet 
regime, which enhanced the country’s already highly integrated economic links with the rest 
of the world, as well as its economic growth. But this did not correspondingly augment its 
foreign policy resources. The military authoritarian form of political governance vitiated the 
soft power comprehensiveness of Chile’s economic model because of its systematic and 
widespread human rights violations. While Pinochet-era foreign policy justified
4 For example, positions in elite decision-making councils of international organisations and numbers of 
diplomatic missions etc.
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authoritarianism in terms of Cold War fighting at home and abroad, it could no longer 
maintain its plausibility over time, especially since the ideological threat of communism was 
waning in its international centres in Beijing and Moscow in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the 
nature of the informational civil war between human rights advocates and the military 
government led the former actively to support external attempts to monitor and pressure 
Chile, creating a conflict pattern enduring past 1990.
The non-state actors were well placed to exploit post-Cold War ideological fluidity in 
part because they could prosecute the informational civil war more fully without entangling 
Cold War discourses. They were also nimble in part because global information space 
facilitated information penetration across borders and raised issues of normative governance 
in a boundary-eroded world. The prime asset of the non-state actors was their ability to 
deploy information at important junctures in time and space using ICTs such as the Internet, 
fax, newspaper and television. Due to their innate characteristics, these media facilitated a de 
facto global public sphere susceptible to those with loud voices, real and simulated majority 
opinions, evocative narratives, and pictures. In this realm, Singapore, Chile, non-state actors 
and the G-8 might enjoy equality of access to soft power. The equalisers, inherent in soft 
power, being the availability of holistic visions and the credibility to advocate them 
(Keohane and Nye Jr. 1998, 89-92). The non-state actors pitched their campaign to try 
Pinochet on the ground of democratising and humanising the new world order in tandem with 
huge polarised debates on redressing genocides in ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the ICC’s 
role. And to enlarge worldwide constituencies of agreement on principles, the intermestic 
alliance based in London co-ordinated a basic media theme of ‘truth and justice’ to their 
narratives and pictures. This global scope of discourse contrasted starkly with Chilean
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foreign policy attempts to reduce discourse to that of ‘international community, but national 
justice’ through diplomatic channels.
The third common foreign policy experience is the learning aspect. Using soft power 
necessitates ensuring that the information transmitted is timely, focussed and adaptable to 
targeted levels of decision-making. Both the Singaporean and Chilean foreign policies in the 
cases surveyed have encountered this. The first, in trying to avoid total diplomatic 
breakdown despite bilateral and multilateral discursive competition, and the second, in trying 
to stay relevant in arguing Pinochet’s release over time. The Singapore School had its 
‘strategic fuzzy logic’ in diagnosing the American predicament over the Fay Incident by 
reducing the caning sentence in deference to President Clinton’s intercession without 
eliminating the principle of punishment to deter crime. It was also strategic fuzzy logic 
operating in advising Thailand and South Korea to restore discipline and communitarian 
purpose without jettisoning IMF-World Bank conditions following the Asian financial crisis. 
The ‘fuzziness’ comes in the chameleon logic of asserting consistent values that can entertain 
supple positions for fencing purposes.5 Interestingly too, the Singapore School had the 
humility to admit that in applying Asian Values through aid regimes, strategic fuzzy logic 
meant in effect not highlighting them as necessary features of method transfer, in order to 
broaden the Singapore Model’s appeal across cultures. In diplomatic regimes, such as 
ASEAN, APEC and the ARF, the Singapore School also had to ‘retreat’ where diverse 
national interests operated against strict consensus.
In the Chilean case, foreign policy response clearly evolved over time by learning to 
play in the field of discourse dictated by the anti-Pinochet intermestic alliance. In every
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phase of the Pinochet Controversy, the intermestic seemed to have largely determined the 
initiation of events from legal courtroom to courtroom of opinion. This pattern clearly 
showed to Chilean foreign policy-makers that the discourse of globalization of human rights 
was in the ascendant, and that it had to outflank the prosecution camp by ironically 
demonstrating that there was a visible domestic capability in administering impartial justice. 
The fact that humanitarian reasons and Pinochet’s medical report had to be invoked and 
revealed symbolised how far the non-state soft power had gone in affecting Chilean foreign 
policy through invoking international regimes, mobilising humanitarian ideals and 
manufacturing world public opinion. The Pinochet case also demonstrates the agility of non­
state-driven intermestic alliances as an organisational form adept at soft power. Horizontal 
networks based on solidarity for a generic common cause enabled co-ordinated legal 
submissions, publicity and developing precedents in spite of foreign policies’ ambivalence or 
outright obstruction. Although Pinochet escaped extradition, the symbolic and legal 
demonstration effect of putting a major human rights violator, who was also an ex-Head of 
State, in the dock, through a predominantly non-state and intermestic initiative, had 
significantly eroded Pinochet’s invulnerability in Chile. It also set a precedent for global 
governance via international human rights law, and undercutting sovereignty.
What all these foreign policy experiences suggest is that in global information space, 
foreign policy will have to be permanently vigilant in articulating community. It is also less 
inhibited by power and status inequalities in asserting actomess. These experiences also 
challenge the foreign policy-maker to learn adaptability from permeable frontiers and the 
increasing ability of non-state actors in declaiming their voice through global networks of 
connectedness. In the light of the 2001-2002 global ‘war on terrorism’, non-state and state
5 See Chapter 5.
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uses of soft power are more relevant than ever if vicious cycles of violence are to be avoided. 
The fundamental causes of terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere need to be confronted: 
the lack of tangible material and political development in many developing states that exhibit 
the uneven wealth of a rentier elite. At the same time, the generic targets of terrorism must 
also be recognised for what they need to promote more: western modernity’s hospitality to 
non-western variations of modernity. Terrorism is potentially rooted in domestic frustrations, 
expressed in intermestic strategies of violence. The multinational composition of the Al- 
Qaeda network is suggestive of this. Developing states need to demonstrate their ability to 
match their peoples’ material and political expectations, and hence inspire others through 
leadership examples from ‘inside-out’ and ‘outside-in’. The western states need to employ 
soft power to diminish misperceptions of their socio-economic insensitivities towards a 
globalizing world which is constantly uncovering diversities of mindsets. This goes back to 
the problematique of pursuing foreign policy amidst globalization: how can the diversities of 
statist political communities be projected without suffocation by blanket ideologies? A 
modest start would be to socialise ‘others’ into pacific coexistence through narratives of 
accommodative diversity. This is a task for both states and non-state actors.
Actualising Soft Power, Joining Practitioners and Academics
A final reflection on soft power revolves around the communitarian justifications of 
foreign policy in global information space. All national communities, as interpreted by 
scholars as diverse as Renan, Weber, Smith and Anderson, invariably contain strong 
linguistic-cultural components that compose a discourse of togetherness and simultaneously 
inscribe an otherness. Judging from the deductive account of global information space as 
Hobbesian in Chapter 3, it would follow that nation-state articulators are as relevant in the
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era of globalization as they have been historically. If foreign policy practitioners are to justify 
their portfolios in governments and their budgets, intellectual competencies in explaining 
community in its media, economic and political dimensions are a necessity not a luxury.
The question can now be posed: can a bureaucrat be an intellectual leader as well? 
Existing literature on the practitioner versus academic role debate in international relations 
suggests that a practical gulf between the two remains to be decisively and organisationally 
bridged -  over pragmatic issue management in matters of government, the role of the 
normative visionary in organisational hierarchies, and the relative utilities of emergency fixes 
versus long term strategizing (Hill and Beshoff 1994; Webb 1994; Eberwein and Horsch 
1994). Actualising soft power may be a significant bridger of the two in the way that it draws 
upon skills of congenial persuasion, salesmanship, oral and visual presentation for the mass 
media, charismatic leadership, ideology-making, creative legal interpretations, conversing 
constructively with non-state constituencies, and working in a logic of learning and 
adaptation. All this is useful in addition to the standard diplomatic skills of arbitration, 
mediation, bargaining and summitry. This broadening of skills takes foreign policy into the 
realm of the man-in-the-street, the arts of commerce, the intangibles of leadership mystique, 
and the inchoate world of academic reflection. Emulating the intellect of a Huntington, a Lee 
Kuan Yew, a Mahbubani, a Clinton-Blair-Giddens ideological nexus, an Allende, a Garzon, 
or a human rights activist may be a requirement for launching soft power. Leadership inside- 
out and outside-in rely as much on personification, vision, model presentation and inclusive 
partisanship as intermestic political correlations for socialisation and demonstration do. 
These are the hybrid skills expected of a globalization-competent policy-maker. In this
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mixture the academic, writ large to include thinkers among the non-governmental, has much 
to offer the organisational operator.
Although Foucaultian thinking about power is unlikely to make policy-friendly
reading to the conventional foreign policy bureaucrat, the following rhetorical point is worth
reflecting on in the light of soft power:
What political status can you give to discourse if you see in it merely a thin 
transparency that shines for an instant at the limit of things and thoughts? Has not the 
practice of revolutionary discourse and scientific discourse in Europe over the past 
two hundred years freed you from this idea that words are wind, an external whisper, 
a beating of wings that one has difficulty in hearing in the serious matter of history? 
(Foucault 1997,209)
Global information space rapidly mediates policy into particular political history if the
discourse initiator values the subjective role of world public opinion and tries manufacturing
it. The second last word may then go to Morgenthau whose realist meditation on the relative
positions of hard and soft power is often underestimated:
What we suggest calling cultural imperialism is the most subtle and, if it were ever to 
succeed by itself alone, the most successful of imperialistic policies. It aims not at the 
conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control 
of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the power relations between two 
nations. (Morgenthau 1950, 40)
To Foucault and Morgenthau, this thesis adds that in global information space foreign policy,
as well as non-state policy, actualises soft power by both creating it, and having its creation
re-create others.
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